As India positions itself as a rising regional decolonial power by promoting its socio-cultural norms and carving out a new place for itself in the changing landscape of global politics, its internal landscape and security policy continue to exhibit processes and practices that hark back to colonial times. This article highlights these internal contradictions by examining India’s approach to addressing armed violence in the context of the Maoist conflict, as well as the racialising logic applied to its Adivasi population. It also links this approach to the homogenising and Hindu civilisation approach that has gained primacy in India’s foreign policy since the BJP came into power fifteen years ago. It concludes with the suggestion that, if India is to establish itself as a leading voice in the shift towards decoloniality in international politics, it must address its internal contradictions in matters of internal security. The securitisation of these issues has severely undermined the political agency of India’s marginalised population, thus undermining India’s claim to decoloniality.

The Global Threat Assessment 2026 examines the evolving global security environment shaped by superpower rivalry, geopolitical fragmentation, and the persistence of terrorism and extremism. While attacks in Western states will remain limited, the vast majority of terrorist violence will occur in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, driven primarily by Islamic State and Al Qaeda affiliates and state-sponsored militant proxies. The assessment highlights the growing convergence of state and non-state actors, the rise of hybrid and irregular warfare, and the expanding role of digital platforms in radicalisation, recruitment, and operations. It concludes that terrorism will remain the preeminent national security threat in 2026, requiring preventive counterterrorism strategies, stronger regulation of physical and digital spaces, and sustained international cooperation across ideological divides.

The discourse on India–Israel relations has remained constrained by a security centred paradigm in which defence cooperation and diplomatic pragmatism are treated as the partnership’s principal markers. Recent scholarship, however, indicates that this framing no longer captures the wider ideational, technological and geoeconomic forces shaping the relationship in the twenty first century. A more textured account emerges when cultural nationalism, technology as statecraft and geoeconomic convergence are approached as interconnected domains that recast how each state understands and pursues strategic alignment. These domains reveal a form of strategic behaviour shaped by the demands of technological competition, economic fragmentation and shifting regional orders. By tracing how ideas, infrastructures and economic strategies intersect within this bilateral relationship, the analysis contributes to wider debates on strategic culture and the transformation of statecraft in the contemporary global landscape.

With the dismantling of the Berlin Wall there was a subsequent vocalisation of the end of history thesis, which marked a turning-point in the study of world politics. However, with a gradual transition from a unipolar to an increasingly oligo-polar order, such transformation reconfigured the conventional west-centric conceptions of diplomacy and power balancing within politics amongst nations. Eventually, this generated an alternative discourse in world politics that not only challenges the Eurocentric epistemic within IR, but profoundly foregrounds ways for a normatively oriented, non-western frameworks. In South Asia, India, by virtue of its geostrategic location and enduring civilizational heritage, emerges as a vibrant actor that well aligns within this evolving framework. To substantiate this claim, the paper uses a case-study approach across three distinct non-western spaces, and make an attempt to evaluate three non-security lexicons (cultural & civilizational capital, postcolonial sub-regional engagements, and value-based humanitarian diplomacy) to demonstrate how India is positioned to substantiate its claim for the broader non-Western space.

This article analyses India’s soft power strategy in Afghanistan across three phases: its consolidation (2001–2021), abrupt disruption following the Taliban’s return, and cautious recalibration thereafter. It contends that, despite the inherent limits of soft power in coercive environments, humanitarian and development assistance has functioned as the primary vehicle for New Delhi’s pragmatic re-engagement with the Taliban regime after 2021. Drawing on two decades of Indian aid diplomacy and post-2021 policy shifts, the study examines how India has balanced principled commitment to inclusive governance with strategic imperatives of maintaining relevance and countering rival influence. The analysis illuminates the tension between values and realpolitik in India’s evolving Afghanistan policy and evaluates the opportunities and constraints of its current “humanitarian-plus” approach within a broader quest for regional stability and strategic autonomy.

This article describes the transition from India’s idealist foreign policy under Nehru (the Nehruvian era) to its present-day pragmatism. We contend that this shift stems from India’s global leadership claim, caught between lofty normative goals and material constraints. India’s foreign policy reflects an interplay between global systemic pressures and domestic preferences, shaped by postcolonial anxieties and a distinct civilizational identity. New Delhi’s diplomacy has moved from moral non-alignment to post–Cold War strategic multi-alignment, economic liberalization, and nuclear assertion. The article examines India’s participation in multilateral forums of global governance (UN, WTO, BRICS, G20), where it promotes a fair and egalitarian global order through developmental diplomacy. It also highlights the distinctiveness of the Modi government’s strategy, which deploys civilizational soft power and symbolism to integrate cultural heritage with strategic considerations. Several Structural constraints continue to limit India’s influence. India’s rise reflects a complex interaction of power, principles, history, and modernity.

The strategic notion of the Indo-Pacific revolves primarily around the perception of China’s assertive rise and the potential decline of the US-led liberal international order, triggering strategic competition and rivalry between rising and dominant powers. Unlike the term 'Asia-Pacific', which emerged in the 1960s and emphasised the partnership between the economic giants of the time, the term 'Indo-Pacific' has more strategic and political connotations. India is considered an important component of this strategy. The USA wishes to involve India in its grand ‘Indo-Pacific’ strategic design, especially to counter the Chinese challenge in the East Asia/Pacific region. To this end, it has promoted India’s growing association with its East Asian and Pacific allies. However, the nature of the strategy suggests that it is more Pacific than 'Indo', and India has limited scope to contribute significantly, given its preoccupation with handling the geostrategic challenges emanating from its belligerent neighbours in South Asia.

India has only recently begun to be regarded as an EU strategic partner in the Indo-Pacific region with regard to maritime security. This article examines the challenges of EU–India security interactions, referring to three interconnected dimensions that collectively explain their drivers and limitations. Strategically, India offers the EU extra-regional reach and support in managing China-related risks, as well as growing defence cooperation. However, structural constraints remain. Brussels and New Delhi have different security priorities, disagree on Russia, and lack a coherent treaty framework. Although their relationship is presented as that of 'like-minded democracies', it actually serves as an instrument of mutual leverage rather than providing coordinated support for democratic values and human rights. Nevertheless, recent developments reveal more substantive outcomes in terms of maritime cooperation and security dialogue.

The post-pandemic multipolar world order has led to a 'decoupling' of supply chains, prioritising reliable collaboration and attempting to delimit and isolate China geopolitically. However, Sino-American rivalry has been particularly pronounced in the strategic semiconductor industry, where rising regional powers such as India assume tremendous importance given the recent Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) roadmap. This article examines the intersection of geoeconomics and security in the semiconductor industry, drawing on Buzan's concept of 'multi-dimensional security' and Keohane and Nye's idea of 'complex interdependence'. Finally, it considers how India might influence the emerging network of supply chains and the consequent implications for technological security.

The relationship between India and the US is a unique case in the study of international relations, as the two nation-states share many similarities, yet there are also differences that have shaped the formative years of their relationship. Over the years, relations have evolved from 'estrangement' to multifaceted strategic engagement. This article examines the evolving nature of India–US relations, with a particular focus on the Indo-Pacific region. While the United States considers itself an Indo-Pacific power, India favours positive engagement with regional stakeholders. This article investigates the significance of the Indo-Pacific region for the security calculations of India and the US, considering the implications in light of China's rise and assertiveness in the region. It elaborates on their policies and assesses the ramifications of their partnerships on the region's security dynamics.