The purpose of this article is to analyze the meaning and function of the concept "Gesinnung" in Immanuel Kant's philosophy and to compare it with one of Karl Jaspers' key philosophical terms, "Existenz." In the first part, the author clarifies the meaning of "Gesinnung" alongside concepts such as "Augenblick" and "Entscheidung." This is followed by a critical analysis of the formative nineteenth-century concept of "Character," before exploring Jaspers' interpretation of "Existenz." Through numerous examples, the author highlights important similarities between "Gesinnung" and "Existenz," demonstrating that both philosophers, despite using different terms, seek to articulate similar fundamental human experiences.

The University of Jena was the place where Kant’s philosophy began as a new intellectual movement, and from there spread throughout Germany. Goethe was in charge of state supervision of the university on behalf of his Weimar Duke Carl August and was one of the first to recognize the importance of Kant and to try to assimilate the results of his thinking. This applied above all to Goethe’s Natural Sciences and his teachings on the Metamorphosis of Plants. In his natural philosophy, the concept of primal polarity (Urpolarität) plays a key role, which Goethe finds again as the force of attraction and repulsion as conditions of material existence in Kant’s work Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. It is interesting that Goethe’s first reading of the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Judgment took place without the influence of Schiller, who was an expert of Kant’s philosophy. In conclusion, it should be emphasized that Goethe did not feel influenced by his studies of Kant, which at times outweighed his poetic work; he rather wanted it to confirm his scientific way of thinking.

The article presents two possible interpretations of Kant‘s treatise Towards Perpetual Peace. The first interpretation treats the treatise as a purely political text, whereas the second links the idea of the treatise to Kant‘s other latter works, arguing that the idea of eternal peace is related to the conviction that human nature can progress and that moral evil can be overcome. The text will discuss both of these interpretative traditions, referring to the authors who represent each of them and examining the extent to which these two ways of interpretation can be reconciled.

The article demonstrates that the perception of paradoxical problems does not signify the "end of reason." On the contrary, paradoxes reveal new perspectives for independent thinking. In a sense, paradoxes expand thinking into a "stereoscopic" diversity. For Critical Philosophy, paradoxes also open up new spaces for communication dominated by irony. As a polemical tool, the paradox can expose cognitive inability within discourse (e.g., the Jacobi paradox) and thus entirely new paths of thought to "free us from an old delusion" (25:880).

Although Kant abandoned his early interest in the sciences in favour of a new set of problems during his so-called critical period, cosmological motifs, in particular from Newtonian theory, did not disappear from his writings. On the contrary, one can speak of a consistent presence of these motifs in his work. The problems that Kant reflected on the basis of these motifs must therefore have occupied him particularly intensively. After the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason, however, Kant used the cosmological motifs differently: as metaphors (or, to use his formulation: as symbols). He uses them to shape the specificity of the mutual relationship between theoretical and practical reason. By analysing the way in which Kant uses the key motifs of Newtonian theory as symbols, it is possible to argue that he was guided by the intention of radically distinguishing the moral world from the order of nature, as it was produced by the modern mathematical natural science of his time.

Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason cannot be understood as following from the pure scientific interest of its autor to state the reasons for pure philosophical morality. It does not belong to the System of Philosophy, but to the problem of the demarcation of philosophie from theologie and, thus, it forms the argumentative background of the defense against the censorship of the Prussian state. In the preface to the first edition of the writing on religion it is clear that respect (Achtung) becomes free, if it happens through censorship. It means that Kant's control by censorship includes voluntarily his own control. He favours self-censorship of his own writing. But against this right the supreme censor right of the theological faculty is used, that has exclusively the right of the first censorship. Ecclesiastical and religious beliefs are well distinguished, but his book on Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason can be used by students of Theology as well to complete their studies. It is a fact, that people do not posess all the means by the moral law to act obligatory, but that they still need a final end. It is unavoidable because of their limitation as finite beings. For that reason, morality must evidently refer to the concept of final ends. In the end it is experience, in which the effects of morality demonstrate their ends, that brings the real ground of the expansion of men beyond of all morals. It must be an almighty moral being as a world creatur, that must be thought to take precautions of it. In this sense, morals lead inevitably to religion; that is, it can never be considered a being derived from mere reason.

Praxeological economics has proven itself to be a potent source of universally valid insights capable of circumscribing and deepening our normative intuitions. In view of this, in the present paper, I argue that invoking economic concepts such as the general conditions of action, complementary capital goods, and long-term transactional relationships allows for articulating a critique of evictionism that is grounded in more than deductions derived from essentially contestable normative intuitions. By doing so, I intend to approach the subject of evictionism from the perspective of positive science, thus hopefully demonstrating that there is still an untapped interdisciplinary potential to be unleashed in discussions on fundamental ethical issues.

Walter Block argues that the correct libertarian approach to abortion is evictionism. In his view, it follows from the fact that a woman has the right to self-ownership that she has the right to evict an unwanted child from the domain of her body. But according to libertarian theory, one can acquire a positive duty if, among other things, one's actions endanger another person. Therefore, it can be argued that the woman does not have the right to evict the foetus because by conceiving the child she has endangered it and therefore has a positive duty to carry the pregnancy to term (until the child is able to survive outside the womb). Łukasz Dominiak has presented a critique of this argument, pointing out that conceiving a child cannot generate positive obligations on the part of the parents because it is not a trespass and because one cannot endanger someone who does not exist. In this paper I argue that his criticism is unconvincing: to generate a positive duty, an act does not have to be a trespass. Nor is it true that one cannot endanger someone who does not exist. Consequently, if we accept Block's assumption that the child is a human being with a right to self-ownership from the moment of conception, then, according to libertarian ethics, eviction should be prohibited and the mother should carry the pregnancy to term.