More than two decades on, the shadow of 9/11 and the Bali bombings continues to linger over Australia and its small Muslim population. We posit this is due to an existential fear of both Islam and Muslims in the Australian imaginary, an imaginary that continues to be cast as Judeo-Christian. This has led to the hyper-securitisation of an entire religious community which has had several effects on the ways Muslims navigate a sense of belonging in and to contemporary Australia. This article analyses interviews with members of two specific and different ethnic groups in different locations in Australia, to explore similarities and differences in their lived experience resulting from this securitised environment. The comparative analysis between Indonesians in Perth and Lebanese in Sydney demonstrates strong mixed cultural identities are common, but finds tensions expressed about how the high levels of securitisation manifest in starkly different and novel ways. While the Lebanese participants are critical of the securitised and challenging socio-political context, the Indonesian participants interpret experiences of hostility and micro-aggressions as not necessarily directed towards all Muslims, but as focused on particular ethnic communities. Our data suggest that one outcome of the securitised environment is that the ‘good Muslim’ and the ‘bad Muslim’ distinction has become internalised.

This article explores how Hui Muslims in urban Kunming, China, have navigated religious suppression and increasing secularization by transforming matchmaking activities into a resilient social and religious practice. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork, it reveals how marriage events, initially secular, gradually came to integrate Islamic teachings and missionary elements, especially through the influence of movements like the Tablighi Jama’at. While the revival of Islam since the 1980s fostered stricter religious practices, state-led urban redevelopment simultaneously eroded traditional Hui communities. Under Xi Jinping’s administration, with intensified religious control, overt Islamic activities have diminished. However, matchmaking activities continue, subtly maintaining Hui ethno-religious identity through improvised adaptations – such as de-Islamized language and unofficial organization. The study argues that the entanglement of religiosity and ethnicity allows the Hui to sustain Islamic values and community ties, not in defiance of the state, but through ambiguous, socially embedded practices that evade direct political confrontation.

This article examines the negotiation of sexual and religious identities of four celibate LGBTQ+ women who, as adults, convert to Catholicism. Through semi-structured interviews, a model of conversion was developed by integrating previous theoretical work on religion and identity. Important moments in the conversion process led to identity integration in these individuals: (1) Experiencing ‘The Call’ (the initial interest in Catholicism), (2) Encountering the Religious ‘Other’ (association with a welcoming and enduring Catholic LGBTQ+ Community), (3) Immersion in Church Teaching (relationship with Church Teaching and social movements in the Church), (4) Reframing Identity in the Context of the Church (internal restructuring of identity importance). Interviews with the four respondents indicate that some celibate LBGTQ women who choose to convert to Catholicism may experience minimal levels of cognitive dissonance.

This article explores the hip-hop response to the hypersecuritization faced by Muslim minorities in the aftermath of September 11. Often, this confrontational style includes subverting the hegemonic narrative of Muslims as terrorists and turning the gaze to state operators and the structural and everyday discrimination faced by Muslims. Another exciting aspect of the Muslim hip-hop movement is how many hip-hoppers see their work as continuing the work of the Prophet. These hip-hoppers of the September 11 generation shirk their label as ‘enemy of the state’, instead embracing the role of flag bearers of an entire generation that has been deviantized by their ascribed status. The potency of hip-hop culture has also seen Western powers engage in hip-hop diplomacy as a form of soft power in Muslim countries. This alternative foreign policy tool is a form of soft power that acts as a more subtle C.V.E. (Countering Violent Extremism) policy that has been institutionalized.

This qualitative study, employing the Grounded Theory Method, poses a crucial question: Do Iranian women, particularly those of the revolution’s first generation, still adhere to the official religion and its sanctioned religiosity style? The triple coding process of data from 16 semi-structured interviews with women aged 35–45 living in Kerman revealed a significant metamorphosis in their religious meaning system, leading to the construction of ‘reflexive religiosity’ as an alternative to official religiosity. Reflective religiosity, in this context, has been gradually constructed due to Iran’s patriarchal religious and political system and an overarching socio-religious disappointment. This core category represented the construction of a disenchanted worldview, secularized salvation, depoliticalized religion, individualized, self-referential, rationalized, and secular religiosity, emphasizing humanity as the religion. The formation of reflexive religiosity indicates the Islamic Republic’s failure to continue the socialization and meaning-construction process for controlling and keeping women’s bodies and minds docile and obedient.

This article examines how practices of policing and surveillance reshape the religious lives of Muslims in Belgium. While scholarship on Islam in the West has increasingly focused on the securitization of the Islamic field – particularly how Muslim practices and institutions are targeted through surveillance and counter-radicalization policies – less attention has been paid to how these measures affect Muslims’ everyday religious practices and experiences of community. Drawing on qualitative interviews with 24 Belgian Muslims who believe they have been targeted by state surveillance due to specific events (such as job loss, deportation, or bank account closures), we explore how such incidents have reshaped their religious experiences on two levels. First, we describe an affective re-habituation and attunement to the perceived risks of religious expression, often leading to the concealment of beliefs and practices. Second, we identify a shift in relationships with the Muslim community, marked by a growing disenchantment with communal religious life. We theorize these findings through the concept of securitized privatization , arguing that state surveillance contributes to the individualisation and privatization of religious life, while revealing the convergence of security logics with liberal and secular sensibilities.

This research examines the securitisation of Muslims within the context of Indonesia’s democratic system, focusing on the perceptions and experiences of Salafi groups. Applying a critical ethnographic methodology, the study amplifies the voices of a particular group of Muslim in Indonesia, particularly those who have distanced themselves from extremist actions, to understand how anti-terror policies impact their lives and principles. The research emphasises the complex interaction between state security measures and the lived realities of Muslim communities, revealing how securitisation narratives often marginalise these groups. By incorporating perspectives from government officials, civil society activists, and Salafi representatives, the study illustrates the challenges and opportunities for dialogue in addressing the concerns of Muslim communities in a securitised environment. Ultimately, this work calls for a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between Islam, security, and democracy, advocating for inclusive policies that recognise the diverse voices within the Muslim population.

Religious beliefs and practices can and do shift depending on the context of the religious believer, and how they talk about those beliefs and practices may change depending on that context. This article focuses on how religious people position their religious beliefs and practices, and how the use and understanding of those religious positions can shift depending on contextual factors. It aims to present a method for analysing these shifts, using positioning theory and close discourse analysis. The conclusion argues that analysis of the dynamics of religious positioning has consequences for how religious belief is talked about and understood in contemporary society, how power is exercised in interaction about religion, and how people of different religious faiths and backgrounds come to understand one another and people of no faith in superdiverse settings.

In this article, we explore the narratives of young Quebec adults who currently claim no religious affiliation. We have identified four distinct types of narrative registers used to explain and legitimize their current nonreligious stance: the rational-humanistic, rational-scientific, individualistic, and relational registers. This analysis must be understood in light of the growing nonreligious population, as well as the rapid and recent changes in Quebec’s socioreligious and cultural landscape. The data presented in this article come from a qualitative study conducted among 38 nonreligious young adults aged from 20 to 32 years. Our typological analysis explores the narratives that support this claimed nonreligion. The arguments presented provide valuable insights into why religion is suffering from a ‘crisis of credibility’ among younger generations, and what nonreligious forms and identities might look like in contemporary Quebec.