Academic discourse on ubuntu, both in South Africa and Zimbabwe, coincided with the arrival of freedom in these countries. Ubuntu’s revival sought to show that there was an African alternative to the oppressive regimes that had cruelly governed both countries. This alternative was pronounced as offering a grounded beginning of the postcolonial society that would be able to humanize the African through resuscitating traditional values. These values would speak to how the African was supposed to be; ontologically, ethically, and politically. The hope was that the social conditions would, in line with these values, also transform to enable Ubuntu to thrive. However, I will contend that the social conditions developed in both countries not only fail to animate ubuntu but have begun to directly undermine its basics.

Since apartheid was formally abolished in 1994, South Africa has had a complicated social environment. Even though the end of apartheid was a great achievement, this country is now facing a number of societal issues that affect social cohesiveness. These issues include high unemployment rates, racial conflicts, economic inequality, and land reform-related problems. In addition, South Africa has problems with crime, corruption, and service delivery, all of which erode public confidence in institutions and exacerbate social unrest. Rainbowism is one tactic employed to promote social cohesion; however, much debate exists about its capacity to deliver. Therefore, this study proposes Kwame Nkrumah’s philosophical consciencism as a means of promoting social cohesion in South Africa.

African environmental ethics (AEE) encompasses specific features that make it well-equipped to tackle many of the ethical issues posed by climate change. In particular, the African prescription to foster harmonious relations between oneself and other humans, non-human animals and nature as a whole, and the African notion of land ownership enable AEE to offer the moral and theoretical resources needed to deal with the climate change problem. I use Stephen Gardiner’s analysis - which likens climate change to a perfect moral storm - to show that traditional AEE can handle climate change’s most challenging aspects. Since, as Gardiner proposes, we lack an ethical theory capable of responding to the challenges posed by this perfect moral storm, it is significant to show the benefits that the African ethical approach offers in this regard. Such a systematic analysis, that uses Gardiner’s storm as a basis, has not been undertaken before.

Philosophical counselling, a contemporary movement in practical philosophy, continually expands its discourse by introducing novel philosophical ideas and different traditions. Nevertheless, a conspicuous silence persists regarding the introduction of African philosophies in its discourse. This issue becomes apparent when the question “How might one live?”—a fundamental question that the philosophical counsellor deals with—is adequately investigated. However, its current formulation suffers greatly from a much-needed nuance concerning temporal and contextual awareness. To address and transcend this shortcoming, I turn to two distinct African philosophies, namely, the hermeneutic philosophy of Tsenay Serequeberhan and the conversational method of philosophising advocated by Jonathan O. Chimakonam. By incorporating these philosophies, my aim is twofold: first, to promote an interpretative actualisation situated within a conversational framework that might lead to the creation of new concepts and/or the disclosing of different ways of being/becoming, and second, to draw attention to an underlying assumption that might maintain the neglect of philosophical traditions beyond Western philosophy.

My aim in this paper is to tease out the sceptical dimension of Ezumezu logic, which is the logic that grounds the method of conversational thinking. I engage with the question of the place of scepticism in African philosophy and show that Ezumezu logic is a sceptical trend in contemporary African philosophy. I argue that the nature of the basic principles and concepts, such as arumaristics, thesis of regimented ontology, benoke point, tension of incommensurables, disjunctive-conjuctive motion, and methodological anarchy, that constitute a major part of Ezumezu logical system point to the need for continuous inquiry while suspending judgement, thereby encouraging the production of new thoughts. I demonstrate that this suspension of judgment is a basic tenet of scepticism.

This paper evaluates Caesar Alimsinya Atuire’s essay “African Perspectives of Moral Status: A Framework for Evaluating Global Bioethical Issues”. Atuire’s essay aims to contribute to global ethical discourse by articulating a systematic account of an African ethical perspective, specifically focusing on the themes of personhood, moral status and the legal question of abortion. We make three objections against Atuire’s essay. Firstly, we argue that a plausible approach to African personhood must consider both its individualistic and relational features, rather than merely emphasize the relational component. The second objection focuses on the theory of moral status, and it has two parts: (a) we insist that a correct understanding of the concept of moral status must construe it as a moral patiency rather than a moral agency term. We believe that Atuire’s view errs in regarding it as the latter. (b) we argue that contrary to Atuire’s assertions, Thaddeus Metz’s friendliness theory of moral status does a better job than Atuire’s object moral status (OMS) and subject moral status (SMS) views of moral status. The final objection is that maybe before we reflect on the legal status of abortion, as ethicists, we should begin by considering the ethical status of abortion in light of African axiological resources. In the final analysis, the paper appreciates Atuire’s contribution to African ethical theory, but it argues that much work still needs to be done before it can be suitable to provide a global framework for evaluating global bioethical issues.

In response to the question about what the most attractive method for African philosophy is, we consider conversational thinking as an alternative to pre-existing methods in African philosophy, especially in contemporary times. We shall show in this essay that the heavy critique of the ethnophilosophical method–concerning its inadequacy–left a gap that both philosophic sagacity and hermeneutics have failed to fill. In the contemporary period, Innocent Asouzu developed what he calls complementary reflection, which is a framework for bridge-building between old and new, weak and strong, local and alien and in all aspects of reality, which he claims constitute missing links of reality. Unfortunately, Asouzu’s method of complementary reflection appears to say little about resolving conflicts among dissenting variables, and in this regard, his method, though promising, also remains inadequate. Our goal here is to demonstrate that conversational thinking is a viable attempt at a systematised and well-developed methodology for doing African Philosophy – one which proceeds from an African place and discovers its relevance in the global space. To properly articulate the relevance and viability of conversational thinking, we begin by examining, in some detail, the various flaws of the pre-existing methodologies of African philosophy. We go a step further to explicate the tenets of conversational thinking and present it as a viable method(ology) borne out of the African experience for African philosophy. Furthermore, we introduce the up-down movement of thought as a novel description of conversational thinking at the level of what we refer to as the sub-micro level of conversational thinking. We conclude by identifying the ways in which conversational thinking situates African philosophy and can drive its discourses in contemporary time.

This paper aims to ground an argument for a widened scope in regard to the motivations or reasons accounting for moral considerability. Such a scope, it is here argued, would account not only for human persons but animals, ecosystems, hypothetical artificial moral agents and so-called Martians as well. And it does so by first distinguishing between two categories of entities: members of group X, and entities not of group X. This basic distinction is then employed to articulate the groundwork for a two-level, multimodal account of moral considerability and gives signification to the idea of de facto moral friends. To achieve this, it appropriates much of its central tenets from the affluence of African philosophical, and intellectual heritage, on this occasion, the notion of Ubuntu. Lastly, this paper assumes the viewpoint of metaethical X-centrism, alternatively, metaethical anthropocentrism in constructing moral claims

Sex robots, in a broad ethical sense, challenge our traditional social norms, sexual interactions, and how we visualise the human body. As a distinct sex stimulation technology, sex robots are ethically problematic because of the humanlike characteristics that these technologies embody. In this paper, I argue, on the one hand, that the design of sex robots objectifies the human body, from an African perspective, because of their humanoid appearance. This objectification of the human body contradicts the African conception of the human body as possessing inalienable dignity, vitality, and sacredness. On the other hand, I show how the designs of sex robots reinforce adverse stereotypical gender norms and standards of beauty. This paper is significant because it deploys sub-Saharan African values of sex and the human body to make a novel contribution to the ethical discourse of sex robots.

The question of the nature of “it” and the progression1 from “it” to an “it” in Ifeanyi Menkiti’s normative conception of a person has created divisions amongst philosophers in African philosophy. In this article, I attempt to offer a charitable interpretation of Menkiti’s use of an “it” to denote an individual’s life through the usage of epistemological and ontological tools to assess the individual’s performance. In doing so, I argue that a better account of the progression is from an “it” to an “it+” rather than from an “it” to an “it-it” as formulated by Edwin Etieyibo. This formulation of the nameless dead acknowledges that the latter “it” is significantly distinct from the first “it” as it possesses a number of properties that are distinct from its former “it”, with the moral force as the significant factor in its constitution. In this article, I seek to argue that accepting Etieyibo’s formulations of the latter “it” as an “it-it” risks complicating the normative account of a person conceptually.