ABSTRACT This article assesses the likelihood that the objectives for replacement of the population established by the President of the Russian Federation in the May 2018 Decree [1] (hereinafter the “Decree”) can be achieved. For each of the objectives, the author outlines the current situation, current trends, and the most likely outcomes. He surfaces the factors that either contribute to a solution to the indicated problems or aggravate them. In particular, any growth in or even simple maintenance of the current number of births will be hindered by the constantly decreasing number of women of active reproductive age (25–39 years of age) that has been observed since 2015. Women in this age range account for four-fifths of all births. 1 1. The study was performed with the financial support of RFBR, project no. 19-011-00626.All of the indicators that have not been footnoted in the article were calculated based on the Rosstat database: http//cbsd.gks.ru [2]. The number of women in this group will decline from 17.9 million in 2015 to 15.0 million in 2024 and then to 12.0 million in 2030. The task of reducing mortality from diseases of the circulatory system and from cancer will be hampered by the aging of the population; the inability of many members of the population to quickly break bad habits, such as smoking and regularly consuming alcohol to excess; the poor quality of consumed food and alcohol; and so on. In addition, in the future, as life expectancy (LE) increases in Russia, those who have been cured of diseases associated with other major causes of death will eventually begin to die from diseases of the circulatory system or from cancer. These diseases are the leading causes of death in countries with high LE. The author draws the following basic conclusions: It will be practically impossible to achieve the goal of “increasing the population of the country” (in accordance with the Decree) by reproduction alone in the near future. It will be necessary to achieve a balance by both increasing the birth rate and encouraging migration in order to solve the general demographic problems facing Russia (ensuring the growth of the country’s population; optimizing the distribution of the population across its territory in order to serve not only the economic but also the geopolitical interests of the state; compensating for volatile shifts in the country’s demographic structure; and so on).

ABSTRACT The current changes in ratio of Russia’s main socioeconomic groups (working-age, youth, and elderly) are adversely impacting the country’s economic development. The purpose of this article is to reflect these changes during a demographic wave. To that end, we use official statistics and predicted population changes up to the year 2050. Our analysis shows that the number and share of the working-age population will decline, the elderly population will grow, and the youth population can either decrease or increase. This will lead to a decline in the number of people employed and to a significant increase in employment of the elderly, to a substantial demographic burden, and to a decrease both in standard of living and in volume of the domestic market.

ABSTRACT The author offers several solutions (such as moving the capital of the Russian Federation eastward) to overcome regional imbalances and achieve equilibrium in order to modernize the domestic economy.

ABSTRACT This article considers the institutional trust of Russia’s humanitarian intelligentsia, describes its underlying qualities, characterizes the structure of institutional trust, reveals the essence and prerequisites of its occurrence, and analyzes the elements of institutional structure. The intelligentsia demonstrates a very high level of trust in the Russian president, but the attitudes and motives of this trust differ significantly (the difference between true supporters and passive observers). Trust in the military reflects the intelligentsia’s recognition of its merits and role in ensuring the security of the state. Complete trust in the church indicates the intelligentsia’s identification with its values and goals. The intelligentsia’s low level of trust in political institutions is part of a contemporary international trend—a sense of injustice, the belief that things will not improve, and incredulity about the future undermine trust in the state. Trust of the police and the courts is low, largely due to widespread prejudice, low awareness of their activities, and rare interactions with them. The intelligentsia’s trust in television and the press is very limited; however, television remains the main source of news, while an important alternative is the Internet. The low level of institutional trust among members of the humanitarian intelligentsia is combined with conservatism, paternalism, and civic and political passivity, and is more likely an indication of disappointment and alienation than an active criticism of Russian institutions.

ABSTRACT The authors describe the factors that are destroying the Russian education system, a strategy and tactics for overcoming the crisis, as well as model ideas about the future of education in Russia.

This article is the republished version of:The Generational Problem in Russia: Historical-Symbolic and Political Attitudes

ABSTRACT The article describes vigilantism among young people in contemporary Russia, characterizes the individuals predisposed to this behavior, and presents the objective and subjective factors of vigilantism. Higher rates of violence in a society are an objective condition of vigilantism. Having considered the factors of vigilantism, the article offers several measures for lowering its prevalence among Russian young people.