This paper defends four main theses. First, at least some conscious experiences are aesthetically valuable. Second, phenomenal consciousness as a whole – as a general phenomenon – is plausibly an aesthetically valuable addition to the universe. Third, the fact that something like phenomenal consciousness exists in a world otherwise consisting in particles mindlessly buzzing in mostly empty space merits the kind of awe characteristic of the aesthetic category of the sublime. Fourth, given all of the above, consciousness aesthetics is a viable branch of aesthetics. A fifth and more daring thesis is also explored: that all aesthetic value is originally in consciousness.

To engage with something aesthetically you must be conscious of it. But can consciousness itself be an object of aesthetic appreciation? Is consciousness aesthetically interesting? If it is, there may be room for a theory of how this can be: of what is interesting about consciousness (or some particular form of it), from an aesthetic point of view, and what our relations to it must be for us to engage with it. Such would be an ‘aesthetics of consciousness’. I argue that such a theory is already available, in the work of Susanne Langer. Langer’s account is primarily a theory of art. She tells us both what makes something art, and what differentiates its various forms: what each art form has to offer that is distinctively its own. Langer takes the defining feature of art to be that it articulates for us the nature of various conscious states, and perhaps that of consciousness itself. This is art???s mission, and to appreciate art, as art, is to appreciate it as articulating forms of consciousness. But, more than this, it will emerge that on Langer’s view, to appreciate a work of art is to appreciate the conscious states it expresses. Her view thus tells us both that it is indeed possible for those states to be objects of aesthetic engagement, and how this can be. It thereby offers us at least a good part of an aesthetics of consciousness.

Quantum consciousness concerns both the possible role that quantum mechanics has for understanding consciousness as well as the role that consciousness has for interpreting quantum physics. Quantum brain theories hypothesize that quantum physical processes occur within and between the neurons of the brain and have important effects on cognition as well as consciousness. Quantum cognition is a growing new field in cognitive science concerned with the application of the mathematical principles of quantum theory to human judgment and decision-making behaviour. What do all these theories have to do with each other? Quantum theories of consciousness have more to say about quantum physics than cognitive psychology and conscious experiences. Quantum brain theories have not been sufficiently ‘scaled up’ to provide clear implications for how quantum physical processes generate more complex cognition. Quantum cognition theories have avoided addressing fundamental issues about consciousness and have remained agnostic with respect to the quantum brain hypothesis. This article will address the problem of connecting these ideas together by connecting quantum cognition to the other two topics.

In a series of papers, Miri Albahari (2019; 2020; 2022; 2024) has articulated and defended perennial idealism (PI), a view she associates with Śakara’s Advaita Vedānta. She argues that PI offers a solution to the hard problem of consciousness (HPC). In this work, I distinguish the HPC, which occupies contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, from the hard problem of the self (HPS), which occupied classical Indian philosophy. I then critically evaluate Albahari’s use of non-dual universal consciousness to solve the HPC. I focus on her response to a set of objections to the view that non-dual universal consciousness is fit for grounding subject‐level phenomenal‐intentional consciousness – the target of the HPC. I argue that because Śakara’s metaphysics of non-dual universal consciousness as the ground of all being is not fit to ground, it cannot solve the HPC.

Many modern theories of consciousness seek to be consistent with prevailing scientific theories of the physical. While ontological flexibilities and current uncertainties in physical laws permit many options, it remains valuable to monitor evolving scientific thinking, generating new constraints and ideas for consciousness research. A structured literature review identifies 24 distinct ontological positions regarding theoretical physics. Significant variety exists across them, partially captured along eight axes: Substrate perspective; Property ontology; Property plurality; Dimensional ontology; Dimensional plurality; Allowed interactions; World plurality; and Intuition rejection, e.g. which intuitions of classical mechanics they are willing to drop. We identify three main implications for consciousness theorists: (i) three strategies for maintaining an ‘enlightened agnosticism’ about physical ontologies; (ii) a default weakening of ontologically-grounded arguments, alongside a strategy for bolstering them; (iii) an exploitable parallel between physical ontologies and philosophy of mind concerning intuition prioritization, leading to potential cross-disciplinary collaboration. We close by suggesting ways this work could be extended and made more useful to consciousness researchers.

One can either take consciousness as the absolute focus of appreciation or rather focus on the contribution of consciousness to the aesthetic appreciation of another item. This paper focuses on a specific item to which consciousness might give a significant aesthetic contribution, namely, the universe. First, I will explain in which sense the universe can be an object of aesthetic appreciation. Then, I will consider how such appreciation is affected when consciousness enters the picture. Finally, I will wonder whether consciousness enriches the aesthetic value of the universe, weighing reasons for both the positive and the negative answer to this question.

This paper explicates the idea of ‘consciousness aesthetics’, which explores the aesthetic properties of conscious experiences themselves, rather than the aesthetic properties of the external objects they represent. In particular, I address the following questions: what aesthetic properties can conscious experiences instantiate? How can we appreciate the aesthetic properties of conscious experiences? Can conscious experiences be artworks? By engaging with these questions, I introduce consciousness aesthetics as a promising area for further research.

In recent years, interest in the value of consciousness has gained momentum. Much of the debate has focused on the epistemic and ethical value of consciousness. At least in principle, there is a third kind of value that may be attributed to consciousness: aesthetic value. The question of the aesthetic value of consciousness concerns not (or not just) whether consciousness is a necessary condition for the existence or instantiation of aesthetic value, but whether consciousness itself instantiates some aesthetic value. Research on the aesthetic value of consciousness in this sense has been virtually inexistent until very recently. Due to its embryonic state, almost everything about this potential new research area is yet undefined. In this paper, I attempt a preliminary articulation of some of the questions an aesthetics of consciousness may investigate, suggest a tentative evaluation of possible answers and lines of investigation, and offer some reflections on whether an aesthetics of consciousness is a philosophical enterprise worth pursuing.

Anomalous experiences are of particular interest to phenomenology. Such experiences include both psychopathological and mystical phenomena. Phenomenological concepts serve as valuable interpretative tools in analysing these cases. In particular, intentionality proves to be a powerful analytic framework, providing promising insights into mystical unions with the divine. In this article, I present the key characteristics of mystical union experiences within the temporal context of intentionality. I provide a definition of mystical unions and an analysis of these phenomena, which allows a detailed examination of the structure of intentional temporality in mystical experiences. I identify four disturbances of temporal intentionality that may be present in mystical unions and compare them to similar experiences found in psychopathology. I argue that synthesis plays a crucial role in shaping the temporal dimension of both mystical unions and psychotic experiences, as well as anomalous experiences more broadly.