ABSTRACT This paper develops a relational perspective in the philosophy of chemistry. It argues that chemical entities should not be understood as self-subsistent substances endowed with fixed intrinsic properties, but as historically situated and processual realities whose identities emerge through networks of relations. These relations are not limited to intramolecular interactions, but also involve experimental practices, representational tools, technological infrastructures, environmental conditions, social uses, and temporal trajectories. Grounded in Whitehead's process philosophy and in contributions from Schummer, Bensaude-Vincent and Harré, the paper proposes a threefold framework of relationality: ontological, epistemological, and socio-environ mental. At the ontological level, chemical substances are conceived as nodes in dynamic networks of reactivity and transformation; at the epistemological level, chemical knowledge is shown to depend on situated practices of modeling, experimentation, and representation; at the socio-environmental level, chemical entities acquire multiple modes of existence beyond the laboratory. The case of amphetamines illustrates how chemical substances are created, stabilized, circulated, and transformed within scientific, industrial, cultural, and ecological contexts. The paper concludes that a relational philosophy of chemistry offers a more adequate framework for understanding the contingency, plurality, and ethical implications of chemical entities in the world.

ABSTRACT The living organism raises a distinctive epistemological problem: biology presupposes wholeness, purposiveness, and self-generation, yet these cannot be derived from interactions among independently identifiable parts. I argue that the classic opposition between mechanism, vitalism, and organicism reflects different responses to this difficulty—how organisms become intelligible objects of knowledge. Building on Kant’s analysis of teleological judgment, I offer a systematic epistemological reading of Goethe’s morphology and Steiner’s interpretation of it. Goethe’s conception of plant metamorphosis is presented as a morphological construction: not the subsumption of data under fixed concepts, but the use of transformable ‘living concepts’ that reconstruct a formative process, analogous to (yet distinct from) mathematical construction in physics. Steiner further developed this idea by claiming that productive reconstruction can disclose not only lawful organisation but the organism’s self-generating activity, that is its formative force. In dialogue with Fichte’s notion of intellectual intuition, I propose that reenacting organic formation in thought establishes a structural correspondence (not identity) between productive cognitive activity and organic self-formation. The result is neither ontological nor methodological vitalism, but an epistemology of organicism which complements, rather than replaces, causal-mechanistic analysis.

ABSTRACT Network theory is a novel approach to mental disorders, conceptualising them as causal relationships between symptoms. Despite its extensive prevalence and the significant research that has been inspired by its core ideas, limited critical inquiry has been conducted to assess its explanatory power and theoretical coherence. This paper aims to address this gap by critically examining three theoretical assumptions endorsed by proponents of network theory: (1) mental disorders can be seen as mereological sums; (2) intentionality unlocks the causal role of symptoms; and (3) symptoms are linked in the same way causally. Our examination indicates that all three assumptions should be reframed or adjusted. Firstly, although the part-whole relationship can be construed as constitutive of mental disorders, it is not fully able to capture the nature of symptom relationships. Secondly, although the intentional contents of psychiatric symptoms provide explanatory value, theory advocates cannot affirm the unique causal role of intentional contents. Finally, the practice of a uniform causal relationship conceals an important distinction between how one symptom causally impacts another symptom. Symptoms can directly activate another symptom or indirectly lower its threshold value. We recommend that the network theory differentiates between structural causation and triggering causation in its network model.

ABSTRACT This paper aims to shed light on an aspect of Kuhn’s philosophy of science which has not received much attention, namely, the role of interpretation in science. We argue that in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Kuhn employs the notion of interpretation in the theoretical sense and claims that scientists routinely interpret observations and data during normal science, but emphatically denies that revolutionary science is interpretive in any way. In his later writings, he starts using it in the hermeneutical sense and holds that it is revolutionary rather than normal science that is hermeneutically interpretive. After we explain the differences and similarities between the two senses, we discuss the sources of this shift and its consequences for his mature philosophy. Understanding the role of interpretation in Kuhn’s overall philosophy suggests a new line of research that can shed new light on his influence on the social sciences.

ABSTRACT There is an ongoing debate about how to understand the nature of natural selection, and one view holds that it can be characterised as a mechanism. Wei (2024) argues that this characterization is problematic, since it is difficult to attribute an appropriate phenomenon to natural selection. Pérez-González and Luque object to Wei’s arguments and contend that they fail to challenge their proposal that natural selection is responsible for increasing reproductive success. In this paper, I reply to their critique and show that many of their objections rest on misinterpretations of Wei’s original paper and are ultimately unconvincing.

ABSTRACT In contemporary biology and philosophy of biology, there remains a lack of consensus regarding the nature of natural selection. Over recent decades, a wide variety of interpretations and approaches to natural selection have been proposed. In a recent paper, Wei (2024, “Natural Selection, Mechanism and Phenomenon.” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 37:37–50.) critically examines current mechanistic accounts of natural selection. For this purpose, he focuses on a particular aspect of the mechanistic approach: a mechanism is always a mechanism for a phenomenon. Wei introduces two criteria that the phenomenon assigned to natural selection should fulfil and, on this basis, evaluates phenomena previously considered. Contrary to Pérez-González and Luque (2019, “Evolutionary Causes as Mechanisms: A Critical Analysis.” History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 41:13.), Wei argues that the increase in the frequency of fitter traits cannot be considered the phenomenon for which natural selection is responsible. The aim of this paper is to analyse and engage with Wei’s critique. We contend that his arguments face significant challenges and do not substantially weaken the assignment of increasing the frequency of fitter traits.

ABSTRACT This article compares the transformation of two distinct strands of twentieth century philosophy under two politically repressive regimes. It begins by presenting the suppression of the Lvov-Warsaw School by the Soviet regime. Then, it turns to the persecution of logical empiricists in the US during the McCarthy era. While Stalinist repression forced the philosophers into ideological conformity, McCarthyite pressures contributed to the depoliticisation of philosophy of science. In both cases, political repression distorted scientific priorities. It is argued that cases like these represent extreme forms of the central case of ‘epistemic intimidation’.

ABSTRACT The ‘Sixth Report—Reproducibility and Research Integrity’ (UK House of Commons Science, Innovation and Technology Committee 2023. ‘Sixth Report—Reproducibility and Research Integrity’) (‘The Report’) recommends measures designed to tackle an alleged ‘reproducibility crisis’ in scientific research. Our systematic analysis of the content of this report revealed that its findings and recommendations are consistent with the scientific literature, including the acknowledgement that conclusive evidence demonstrating the existence of a ‘reproducibility crisis’ is lacking. Though conceding that there is currently no way to determine the size of the crisis or whether it even exists, The Report nevertheless proposes actions to tackle the alleged crisis. However, without a quantitative understanding, the efficacy of the proposed measures cannot be verified. Hence, the current approach towards the alleged reproducibility crisis, here exemplified by The Report, does not adhere to the standards that would normally applied to the scientific method. An evidence-based approach requires the establishment of a quantitative understanding of whether data variability in the research literature exceeds technically achievable levels of reproducibility. If it does, the resulting understanding will enable the design of actions, whose success can be monitored. Our findings emphasise that the research environment requires the same level of rigour and scrutiny as the scientific experiments themselves.