OVER THE YEARS since its independence in 1948 Burma has been one of world's most consistent practitioners of non-alignment. It has also been strongly non-interventionist. It had never approved of U.S. intervention in Indochina, nor of American bases in Thailand. Thus Communist triumph in Indochina and U.S. military withdrawal from mainland Southeast Asia has not been set-back for Burma that it has been for other non-Communist Southeast Asian countries. However, environment within which Burma practices its delicate diplomatic balancing act has changed. Sino-Soviet rivalry now over-shadows Sino-American rivalry in Southeast Asia. During summer and fall of 1975 Chinese media harped on alleged Soviet ambitions in Southeast Asia, and Chinese leaders drummed this theme into ears of visiting statesmen from region. In his speech at welcoming banquet for Thai Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj on June 30, for example, Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping accused Soviet Union, which he referred to as the other superpower, of posing a menacing threat to peace and security of Southeast Asian countries.' Burmese President Ne Win also heard Teng castigate Soviet policy during course of his friendly official visit to China in November. In fact, Ne Win's cordial reception by Chinese may well have been due in part to Peking's anxiety over Soviet ambitions and its desire to counter Soviet influence. In spectrum of world's political systems, Burma's, though unique, is as close to Soviet's as to any other and very far from that of United States. Moreover, Burma's official relations with Soviet Union, in recent years at least, have been closer and more extensive than with United States. In current atmosphere of intense Sino-Soviet rivalry, Peking may thus feel