World Supremacy Research Articles

Book reviews

Book reviewed in this articles. Human rights and ethics Terrorism, human rights and the case for world government. By Louis P. Pojman. International law and organization After anarchy: legitimacy and power in the United Nations Security Council. By Ian Hurd. Foreign policy US policy toward Israel: the role of political culture in defining the ‘special relationship’. By Elizabeth Stephens. China in Africa. By Chris Alden. Conflict, security and armed forces Getting in: mediators’ entry into the settlement of African conflicts. By Mohammed O. Maundi, I. William Zartman, Gilbert M. Khadiagala and Kwaku Nuamah. Arguing the just war in Islam. By John Kelsay. The nuclear taboo: the United States and the non-use of nuclear weapons since 1945. By Nina Tannenwald. Koran, Kalashnikov and laptop: the neo-Taleban insurgency in Afghanistan. By Antonio Giustozzi. Political economy, economics and development The WTO after Hong Kong: progress in, and prospects for, the Doha Development Agenda. Edited by Donna Lee and Rorden Wilkinson. Global outlaws: crime, money and power in the contemporary world. By Carolyn Nordstrom. Capitalism without democracy: the private sector in contemporary China. By Kellee S. Tsai. Ethnicity and cultural politics The politics of the veil. By Joan Wallach Scott. History Summits: six meetings that shaped the twentieth century. By David Reynolds. Fateful choices: ten decisions that changed the world, 1940–1941. By Ian Kershaw. The great partition: the making of India and Pakistan. By Yasmin Khan. Napoleon in Egypt: the greatest glory. By Paul Strathern. Napoleon's Egypt: invading the Middle East. By Juan Cole. Triumph forsaken: the Vietnam War, 1954–1965. By Mark Moyar. Before the killing fields: witness to Cambodia and the Vietnam War. By Leslie Fielding. The history of the PRC, 1949–76. Edited by Julia Strauss. Europe Fianna Fáil, Irish republicanism and the Northern Ireland troubles, 1968–2005. By Catherine O'Donnell. Middle East and North Africa Les Palestiniens: peuple de réfugiés? By Aude Signoles. Algeria: anger of the dispossessed. By Martin Evans and John Phillips. Sub-Saharan Africa Liberals, Marxists and Nationalists: competing interpretations of South African history. By Merle Lipton. Asia and Pacific Ethnic warfare in Sri Lanka and the UN crisis. By William Clarance. Japan rising: the resurgence of Japanese power and purpose. By Kenneth B. Pyle. China: fragile superpower. By Susan L. Shirk. East Asian visions: perspectives on economic development. Edited by Indermit Gill, Yukon Huang and Homi Kharas. India after Gandhi: the history of the world's largest democracy. By Ramachandra Guha. North America Freedom's power: the true force of liberalism. By Paul Starr. Winning the right war: the path to security for America and the world. By Philip H. Gordon. A pact with the devil: Washington's bid for world supremacy and the betrayal of the American promise. By Tony Smith. Latin America and Caribbean Puerto Rico in the American century: a history since 1898. By César J. Ayala and Rafael Bernabe.

Black Internationalism and the Decline of White World Supremacy

Black Internationalism and the Decline of White World Supremacy

Historical Trauma: <em>Anti-Manchuism and Memories of Atrocity in Late Qing China</em>

In April 1644 the reigning emperor of Ming-dynasty China committed suicide as massive rebel armies invaded Beijing. By the end of that year the Qing dynasty (1644-1912), led by Manchus, had defeated the rebel armies and remnant Ming forces in and near the capital and had seated a new emperor on the throne in the Forbidden City. They had taken control of northern China and were well on their way to imposing their authority in the south as well. The Qing, like the earlier Yuan (Mongol) dynasty of the thirteenth century, was a conquest dynasty, achieving power through invasion from the north. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Manchu tribal leaders had put together, through conquest and alliance, an ever larger and more efficient military machine that also included Mongols, Koreans and Han Chinese (in what we now call southern Manchuria). The collapse of the Ming, the spread of violence across much of China in the early seventeenth century and the final attacks of the Qing forces caused great suffering. Whole cities were razed when their residents did not submit; men were killed, women raped and children enslaved. Men were ordered to shave their pates and grow queues in the Manchu style, and some committed suicide rather than do so. This historical trauma was recorded extensively by literate Chinese.1 [End Page 67] However, the Qing conquest overall was accepted by the Chinese landholding gentry. Historians generally agree that in spite of widespread Ming loyalism and resentment against the new "barbarian" overlords, the Qing ability and willingness to maintain the basic socioeconomic order led the "gentry" class to cooperate. Tellingly, family heads who refused to accept service under the Qing encouraged or acquiesced as their sons and nephews participated in the revised examination system and pursued careers in Qing officialdom. Rulers like the great Kangxi emperor (r. 1661-1722) understood the need to appeal to this critical social elite. In the Confucian tradition, populations could be categorized according to standards similar in some ways to modern racial thinking. Certainly, the distinction between the "civilized" (Chinese) and the "barbarous" (foreigners) was central. At one extreme, it was held that barbarians were innately animal-like and could never become civilized. However, the mainstream view essentially held that this distinction was not immutable: barbarians could become civilized ("transformed"—jiaohua, xianghua) and indeed were even expected to do so. Also, rulership was legitimized by the "Mandate of Heaven," which was bestowed on the basis of virtue, not racial purity. Anyone, theoretically, could claim the Mandate and an orthodox place in the succession of emperors. The Qing dynasty's claims to legitimacy were virtually unquestioned through the eighteenth century, but that authority began to fray in the nineteenth. As the Qing government suffered a series of defeats and humiliations at the hands of the British, French, Americans, Germans and other Western powers, and in 1895 at the hands of the long-despised Japanese, and as domestic reforms were stymied by conservatives, calls for radical change increasingly were heard. The scions of the old gentry elite were then being educated in modern schools located in east-coast cities and abroad, where they learned modern racial thinking, that is, the mainstream Western view that humanity was divided among several major, essentially immutable breeding populations. Generally these were referred to in five, color-coded categories: Whites, Yellows, Browns, Blacks and Reds. This order also represented a hierarchy of intelligence and morality that justified rule by Whites—temporary and tutorial rule in some views, permanent rule over uneducable peoples in other views. The present essay cannot pursue this subject. Suffice it to say [End Page 68] that Chinese thinkers at the turn of the twentieth century accepted some of the basic premises of racial thinking, tending to equate the intelligence of Whites and Yellows and sometimes predicting a racial war between them for world supremacy.2 Chinese thinkers also understood...

Historical Trauma: Anti-Manchuism and Memories of Atrocity in Late Qing China

In April 1644 the reigning emperor of Ming-dynasty China committed suicide as massive rebel armies invaded Beijing. By the end of that year the Qing dynasty (1644-1912), led by Manchus, had defeated the rebel armies and remnant Ming forces in and near the capital and had seated a new emperor on the throne in the Forbidden City. They had taken control of northern China and were well on their way to imposing their authority in the south as well. The Qing, like the earlier Yuan (Mongol) dynasty of the thirteenth century, was a conquest dynasty, achieving power through invasion from the north. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Manchu tribal leaders had put together, through conquest and alliance, an ever larger and more efficient military machine that also included Mongols, Koreans and Han Chinese (in what we now call southern Manchuria). The collapse of the Ming, the spread of violence across much of China in the early seventeenth century and the final attacks of the Qing forces caused great suffering. Whole cities were razed when their residents did not submit; men were killed, women raped and children enslaved. Men were ordered to shave their pates and grow queues in the Manchu style, and some committed suicide rather than do so. This historical trauma was recorded extensively by literate Chinese.1 [End Page 67] However, the Qing conquest overall was accepted by the Chinese landholding gentry. Historians generally agree that in spite of widespread Ming loyalism and resentment against the new "barbarian" overlords, the Qing ability and willingness to maintain the basic socioeconomic order led the "gentry" class to cooperate. Tellingly, family heads who refused to accept service under the Qing encouraged or acquiesced as their sons and nephews participated in the revised examination system and pursued careers in Qing officialdom. Rulers like the great Kangxi emperor (r. 1661-1722) understood the need to appeal to this critical social elite. In the Confucian tradition, populations could be categorized according to standards similar in some ways to modern racial thinking. Certainly, the distinction between the "civilized" (Chinese) and the "barbarous" (foreigners) was central. At one extreme, it was held that barbarians were innately animal-like and could never become civilized. However, the mainstream view essentially held that this distinction was not immutable: barbarians could become civilized ("transformed"—jiaohua, xianghua) and indeed were even expected to do so. Also, rulership was legitimized by the "Mandate of Heaven," which was bestowed on the basis of virtue, not racial purity. Anyone, theoretically, could claim the Mandate and an orthodox place in the succession of emperors. The Qing dynasty's claims to legitimacy were virtually unquestioned through the eighteenth century, but that authority began to fray in the nineteenth. As the Qing government suffered a series of defeats and humiliations at the hands of the British, French, Americans, Germans and other Western powers, and in 1895 at the hands of the long-despised Japanese, and as domestic reforms were stymied by conservatives, calls for radical change increasingly were heard. The scions of the old gentry elite were then being educated in modern schools located in east-coast cities and abroad, where they learned modern racial thinking, that is, the mainstream Western view that humanity was divided among several major, essentially immutable breeding populations. Generally these were referred to in five, color-coded categories: Whites, Yellows, Browns, Blacks and Reds. This order also represented a hierarchy of intelligence and morality that justified rule by Whites—temporary and tutorial rule in some views, permanent rule over uneducable peoples in other views. The present essay cannot pursue this subject. Suffice it to say [End Page 68] that Chinese thinkers at the turn of the twentieth century accepted some of the basic premises of racial thinking, tending to equate the intelligence of Whites and Yellows and sometimes predicting a racial war between them for world supremacy.2 Chinese thinkers also understood...

Thinking Locally, Acting Globally

intimately connected with the fates of Africans and other has a long history. From Martin Delany's hopes for a return to Africa to the links between Americans and South Africans in the African Methodist Episcopal Church, Americans of African descent drew inspiration from real and imagined connections to the continent of their origin, however distant in generations or miles.2 And white Americans, including those in the ranks of government, spouted a seemingly endless stream of racist analogies that placed non-whites low on a racial hierarchy that was as breathtaking in its purported precision as in its global reach.3 Du Bois and Harding both believed that America's racial concerns must be understood in international context. Yet they drew very different lessons from their global visions. The president credited arch-racist Lothrop Stoddard with broadening his perspective. Stoddard had recently authored the screed whose title reveals the book's alarmist tone as well as its racist argument: The Rising Tide of Color against White World Supremacy (1920). Du Bois, on the other hand, excoriated the ways in which the color line, whether in form of Jim Crow segregation or colonial oppression, made racial discrimination into an international problem.4 Fewer than four decades after Harding's speech, however, these global visions had converged significantly, if not completely. Changing domestic political and social circumstances, combined with transformations in international relations, challenged the State Department and White House to reconsider the racial norms espoused by their predecessors. African-Americans' determined struggle for justice provoked violent resistance from white

J.I. Israel, Conflicts of empires. Spain, the Low Countries and the struggle for world supremacy, 1585-1713

J.I. Israel, Conflicts of empires. Spain, the Low Countries and the struggle for world supremacy, 1585-1713

Conflicts of Empires: Spain, the Low Countries, and the Struggle for World Supremacy, 1585-1713

Conflicts of Empires: Spain, the Low Countries, and the Struggle for World Supremacy, 1585-1713

Book Review: Conflicts of Empires: Spain, the Low Countries and the Struggle for World Supremacy 1585-1713

Book Review: Conflicts of Empires: Spain, the Low Countries and the Struggle for World Supremacy 1585-1713

Shorter notice. Conflicts of Empires. Spain, the Low Countries and the struggle for World Supremacy, 1585-1713. J Israel

Journal Article Shorter notice. Conflicts of Empires. Spain, the Low Countries and the struggle for World Supremacy, 1585-1713. J Israel Get access H Kamen H Kamen Higher Council for Scientific Research, Barcelona, Spain Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The English Historical Review, Volume 114, Issue 456, April 1999, Pages 439–440, https://doi.org/10.1093/ehr/114.456.439 Published: 01 April 1999

Shorter notice. Conflicts of Empires. Spain, the Low Countries and the struggle for World Supremacy, 1585-1713. J Israel

Shorter notice. Conflicts of Empires. Spain, the Low Countries and the struggle for World Supremacy, 1585-1713. J Israel

Conflicts of empires: Spain, the low countries and the struggle for world supremacy, 1585-1713

The court of Albert and Isabella, 1598-1621 garrisons and empire Spain's strongholds in north-west Germany, 1589-1659 a Spanish project to defeat the Dutch without fighting the Rhine-Maas Canal, 1624-9 Olivares, the cardinal-infante and Spain's strategy in the Low Countries the road to Rocroi, 1635-43 art and diplomacy - Gerard Ter Borch and the Munster Peace negotiations, 1646-8 Spain and Europe from the Peace of Munster, (1648) to the Peace of the Pyrenees, 1648-54 Dutch Sephardi jewry, millenarian politics, and the struggle for Brazil, 1640-54 the diplomatic career of Jeronimo Nunes da Costa - an episode in Dutch-Portuguese relations of the seventeenth century Lopo Ramirez (David Curiel) and the attempt to establish a Sephardi community in Antwerp, 1653-54 the Jews of Spanish Oran and their expulsion in 1669 toleration in seventeenth-century Dutch and English thought William III and toleration England's mercantilist response to Dutch world trade primacy, 1647-74 the Amsterdam Stock Exchange and the English revolution of 1688 England, the Dutch and the struggle for mastery of world trade in the age of the glorious revolution Gregorio Leti, 1631-1701 and the Dutch Sephardi elite at the close of the seventeenth century the Dutch republic and the jews during the conflict over the Spanish succession, 1699-1715.

The industrialization of invention: a case study from the german chemical industry.

IN THE LAST DECADES of the nineteenth century the relationship between science and industry changed in a decisive way. Invention was industrialized. Large company laboratories were set up. The consulting scientist and the scientific entrepreneur were replaced by the salaried industrial research worker. Applied science became a driving force for technical development and economic growth.' The German chemical industry has often served as the outstanding example of an early science-based enterprise. In particular, it has become commonplace to stress the importance of research for the rise to world supremacy of German dye manufacturers. But while this truism has been readily accepted, the manner in which science was turned into a productive force has not been subject to detailed investigation. Because it turns out, ex post, Paul M. Hohenberg wrote in 1967, the gamble was a good one for the chemical industry in 19th-century Europe, identifying the sources of the industry's growth reduces largely to finding the factors affecting the decisions to take the gamble. The prevalence of this attitude has meant that apart from the work of John J. Beer, little is known about industrial research in the German chemical industry up to 1914.2 The first small dyestuffs firms were founded in several western European countries in the late 1850s and early 1860s. Although the number of workers employed and the amount of capital invested always remained small as compared with older ventures such as textiles, coal, or iron, the rise of the dye industry was remarkable in at least two ways. First, dye manufacturing was the prototype of a new type of industry based on science. Second, Germany dominated the manufacture of dye-

U.S. Foreign Policy in the 1980s

The trouble with most discussions of U.S. foreign policy, on the left as well as on the right, is that they are placed in a totally inappropriate framework of assumptions and preconceptions. The most important of these is that the United States and the Soviet Union are locked in a gigantic superpower struggle for world supremacy. This is seen as the number one contradiction in the world today to which all other contradictions and conflicts are subordinate. From this premise it is assumed to follow that a gain by either side is, directly or indirectly, a loss for the other. In other words, the superpowers are playing what is called a zero-sum game: a plus for one is cancelled out by a minus for the other; it is impossible for both to gain or lose at the same time.This article can also be found at the Monthly Review website, where most recent articles are published in full.Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the Monthly Review website.

The Myth of the Decline of U.S. Capitalism

Abstract During the early part of this decade a number of writers asserted that we were entering a new historical period marking the end of U.S. world supremacy. Mustering an impressive set of dramatic events, the argument against the American century was quite convincing. In the Third World, U.S. military-technological and economic power was decisively defeated in Indo-China, resulting in the establishment of non-capitalist regimes. In addition, primary producing countries were organizing and demanding better prices and more equitable terms of exchange from the industrialized countries. The successful effort by OPEC was interpreted as a major breakthrough, signalling a drastic shift in financial and political power toward the Third World, or at least its oil beneficiaries.

Sasanian Pahlavi inscriptions: A concordance

THE TERM Pahlavi, originally meaning "Parthian," was applied to the Middle Persian language of the Sasanian era (A.D. 226-651) after the language had gone through a considerable evolution on its way to the so-called New Persian. By this time the term Pahlavi had attained the significance of "heroic" and was applied to anything reminiscent of the Persian past glory, including the official language of the Sasanian empire. The origins of Middle Persian, however, go back to about 300 B.c., or about five and a quarter centuries before Ardashir founded the dynasty. Like Old Persian of the Achaemenian period (546-330 B.C.), Middle Persian is a Western Iranian language, as opposed to the ancient Avestan of the Zoroastrian scripture and a host of other languages which form the Eastern division of the Iranian languages. All the extant textual literatures in Pahlavi are, however, from the post-Sasanian period, committed to writing from oral traditions or occasionally copied from older manuscripts which have not survived. The Sasanian inscriptions dealt with in this project are therefore the oldest extant Pahlavi data. European interest in Pahlavi can be said to have started with the memoirs of Anquetil-Dupperon in 1763,1 although copies of some of the inscriptions had been made by other European travelers at least one century before that date.2 As the official language of the Sasanian kings and the written language of Zoroastrian priests in Iran, Pahlavi has been of lively interest to the Parsis in India from the time of their emigration until the present day. Unlike the Indians and Greeks, the Iranian people did not produce grammarians of their own language; the few grammars written by Persian scholars during the early period of Arab dominance were in Arabic and on the Arabic language. Middle Iranian is particularly poor in grammatical studies; the few references mentioned in this paper are out of print, lack sufficient details, or both. Apart from infrequent publications on particular aspects of the Pahlavi language (mainly notes on vocabulary) and notes and comments on editions of individual texts and inscriptions, the Pahlavi language and literature in g neral has been dealt with by Haug (1870), West (1896), Salemann (1930), and more recently by Henning (1958) and Boyce (1968). The Pahlavi inscriptions gathered in our collection, together with the book-Pahlavi texts, provide the middle link in the chain of linguistic continuity between Old Pe sian and New Persian. For this reason, Pahlavi is often referred to as Middle Persian. This textual material is significant for both historical and linguistic reasons. For historical purposes, the inscriptions provide a firsthand record of an era when Persia, as a major power, was a principal in the struggle for world supremacy between the East and the West.3 T linguistic significance cannot be exaggerated. Persian is a rare language that provides direct continuity in recorded texts from before five centuries B.C. to the present day. The importance of this material for historical linguistics, linguistic change, Indo-European studies, and other linguistic studies is obvious. The collected volume contains all the known inscriptions in Pahlavi or Middle Persian of the Sasanian era, which extended over four centuries from about A.D. 226 until the dynasty was routed by the Muslim Arabs in A.D. 651. The inscriptions are records sponsored by various rulers of the dynasty, including its founder, concerning their wars, conquests, administration, names of the nobles and lords serving under them, and so forth. The lists of names reveal the social structure and the protocol of the early Sasanian period. Of particular interest are inscriptions of the chief priest of the early period, Kartir, who served under four or five kings. Although he was unknown to history until the discovery and deciphering of his inscriptions in relatively recent times, they make clear that he

A Comparative Investigation of the Personality of Sixth-Grade Gifted Children and a Norm Group of Children

COUNTRY'S number one asset in the curI rent race for world supremacy probably is the ability of its manpower to surpass that of others in creative thinking. Therefore, increasing em phasis has been placed on earlier recognition and development of the child who has the highest po tential for producing this creative thinking. Cre ativity is not limited to the gifted, but it is likely to be developed in those who are gifted. Some people still tend to think of the gifted child as an eccentric, bright little fellow with bulging forehead and large horn-rimmed glasses. Parents may even remark that they are glad their children are just average. When told they have a child of high intelligence, they sometimes be come concerned that the child will know than they. In fact many people, even teachers, seem unable to recognize superior mentality. The child who conforms best to the teacher's standards of behavior is sometimes rated as the most intelli gent of his group ; and the aggressive, pos sibly brighter child, who refuses to do more of the same problems, is labeled average in intelli gence and, besides that, troublesome. Psychologists, teachers, parents, and others recognize the importance of personality and its emotional components as they are related to maxi mum development of innate intelligence and they recognize also the difficulty of studying it. Terman reports a weakness in his monumental work on the gifted : A satisfactory evaluation of the unique character of genius as a whole can be attempted only when an x-dimensional method of psychological measurement has been devised and perfected.1 One of the major problems involved in making an adequate study of the personality of the gifted, or any group, has been the lack of a good measur ing instrument. Various techniques both projec tive and objective have been devised. Probably one of the most promising of the latter type results from research by R. B. Cattell2 and others using the factor analysis approach. The scale developed first was called the Sixteen Personality Factors test and was prepared for adults. Scales appropri ate for children have followed.

The so-called Injunctions of Mani, translated from the Pahlavi of Denkart 3, 200

The discovery made in Chinese Turkistan, at the beginning of this century, of a mass of Manichæan fragments, in part remnants of Mānī's long-lost bible, lent a keen zest to the study of that old-time heresy which struggled for world supremacy in religion during the early Christian centuries. As a would-be rival to Christianity and Zoroastrianism Mānī's syncretic creed was anathematized by Church Fathers and Zoroastrian priests alike. The story of how these fragments of the missing Manichæan literature were found at Turfan and elsewhere in Eastern Turkistan is well known to scholars, while those who are interested in the subject are familiar with the work since done on them by specialists.