Why and how do autocracies discursively conduct digital astroturfing against their populations? As these regimes increasingly co-opt social media to manipulate online political discourse, the current political disinformation literature continues to privilege a Cold War paradigm, focusing on countries that dominate Western foreign policy priorities and concerns. Its normative underpinnings overshadow other understudied cases that have also been weaponizing social media to manipulate domestic online discourses. Concurrently, findings from ethnographic interviews and big data approaches remain theoretically disconnected from the long-held logics of regime stabilization. I argue that regime digital astroturfing follows offline events that spark online discourses with collective action potential. In countering these discourses, regime-linked digital astroturfers exploit social media affordances to discursively cheerlead the regime and devalue regime challengers to create a semblance of popular support for the former. I adopt a mixed-methods approach informed by Contextual Text Coding to examine 14,430 tweets linked to the Royal Thai Army in February 2020 to subject my central propositions to empirical scrutiny. My findings demonstrated that astroturfing efforts on Twitter throughout this period, which discursively cheerleaded the military/autocratic regime of General Prayut Chan-o-cha and devalued their pro-democratic opposition with negative frames, were spurred by a mass shooting incident in the city of Korat that exposed the ruling elites to widespread online backlash. This contribution deepens case-specific knowledge about an understudied case in the literature and also strengthens our understanding about the adaptations of authoritarian legitimation strategies in the digital era and the militarization of social media communication.
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