The early modern period constituted a transitional phase between the Middle Ages and the modern age, characterised partly by procedural thinking surviving the Middle Ages. Procedural thinking, a worldview characteristic of many periods of history, posits that God is the creator and governor of the world who adjudicates his people through the events he causes. An exemplification of this type of thinking is evident in the conceptualisation of ‘procedural just war thinking’, wherein God employs the medium of warfare to evaluate the behaviour and actions of His adherents. The religious wars of the early modern period, including the wars against the Muslim Turks and the Christian wars of religion, provided an ideal environment for the development of procedural just war thinking, extending from Scotland to Germany and Hungary. This article explores the early modern Protestant procedural just war thinking including German, Scottish and Hungarian ideas. To this end, this article examines the work of Martin Luther (1483–1546) and Gáspár Károli (1529–92) on the explanation of Ottoman victories on the one hand, and Alexander Leighton (1570–1649) and Mihály Tolnai (1640–?) on the relationship of God and His army, on the other.

The conversion of dynamic systems from impediments to strategic advantages played a substantial role in the U.S. military’s technological research and development during the Cold War. From signal interpretation with remote sensing systems to telecommunications to algorithms, media and information theory, harmonic systems, and even the weather, the unintended consequences of both dynamic systems in nature and technological attempts to control the same led to innovations and accidents, aesthetic developments and prediction advances that furnish large swaths of our current global sensorial domain. The role of randomness within complex dynamic systems accounts for the opportunities and impediments these systems offer. This article looks at a range of unlikely and seemingly disparate sites of technological development by the Department of Defense and national governmental propaganda projects during the Cold War, including electronic music, avant-garde composition, information theory and weather. The constant drive for superiority in C3I (command, control, communications and information) within the episteme that constituted Cold War thinking, discourse and institutions emerged in failed attempts at control, especially full-domain control, that provided unforeseen opportunities for aesthetic production and complex prediction modelling of natural forces.

The Just War tradition (JWT) is viewed in this paper as a corpus of ideas that discusses the morality and ethics of war. It has changed throughout more than 1,500 years, making it a complicated one. The Just War tradition is broad and multifaceted, yet it is confined within some essential principles that determine its boundaries. It differs from pacifism in that it holds that wars can occasionally be justified and from realism, which views war as outside the purview of moral judgment, in that it holds that both the choice to go to war and the tactics used in conducting it are subject to moral inspection. Within such confines, just war theorists disagree with one another not only about subtleties of the theory but also over fundamental issues like whether or not a war may be justified by something other than the necessity of defending oneself against an already-initiated armed attack. This paper's main goal is to provide a clear and comprehensive understanding of the JWT, the conditions under which it permits and restricts acceptable damages and the moral conundrums these arguments raise. Regarding modern just war theory, one of the central concerns is whether war can be fought and damage done for "humanitarian" or "cosmopolitan" purposes, including protecting human rights. Stated differently, the question is whether there exists a clear and present need to conduct war. This paper lays out the main problems with the use of violence, evaluates the cosmopolitan and anti-cosmopolitan contributions to Just War thinking, and ends with some observations on the suitability of Just War thinking and its connection to cosmopolitanism.

The literature on the ethics of drones is vast, but little attention has been paid to the centrality of consent. Where consent is discussed, it tends to be in the controversial US context. To correct this oversight, this article advances the notion of the drone contract – the reciprocal relationship between a host state and drone-wielding state to permit drone use in the territory of the former by the latter. Why would a host or drone-wielding state enter the drone contract? Why would a host state remove consent? Why would the drone-wielding power accept the removal of permission? To answer these questions, the article conceptualizes the drone contract and explores drone use in the Sahel as a paradigm case to explore the contours of consent. Drawing insights from contractarian just war thinking and Charles Mills’s The Racial Contract , it identifies two types of consent: colorblind (based on the assumptions shaping the state-based international system and the laws of war) and racialized (steeped in colonial legacies that sometimes frame the drone contract, particularly when Western powers are involved). These shades of consent shape how drone-wielder and drone host perceive drone violence, offering insights in debates about drone violence and just war theory.

The Just War tradition (JWT) is viewed in this paperas a corpus of ideas that discusses the morality and ethics of war. It has changed throughoutmore than 1,500 years, making it a complicated one. The Just War tradition is broad and multifaceted, yet it is confined within some essential principles that determine its boundaries. It differs from pacifism in that it holds that wars can occasionally be justified and from realism, which views war as outside the purview of moral judgment, in that it holds that both the choice to go to war and the tactics used in conducting it are subject to moral inspection. Within such confines, just war theorists disagree with one another not only about subtleties of the theory but also over fundamental issues like whether or not a war may be justified by something other than the necessity of defending oneself against an already-initiated armed attack. This paper's main goal is to provide a clear and comprehensive understanding of the JWT, the conditions under which it permits and restricts acceptable damages and the moral conundrums these arguments raise. Regarding modern just war theory, one of the central concerns is whether war can be fought and damage done for "humanitarian" or "cosmopolitan" purposes, including protecting human rights. Stated differently, the question is whether there exists a clear and present need to conduct war. This paper lays out the main problems with the use of violence, evaluates the cosmopolitan and anti-cosmopolitan contributions to Just War thinking, and ends with some observations on the suitability of Just War thinkingand its connection to cosmopolitanism

This study examines how racism has influenced US policy toward China. It uses the narrowing power gap between China and the US, the differences in their political systems, and the impact of the evolution of US domestic affairs as independent variables. We introduce domestic racism and racial hierarchy ideology (DRRHI) and international racism and racial hierarchy ideology (IRRHI) as intervention variables. Domestically, in the face of political and social conflicts triggered by DRRHI, a tough policy toward China has become beneficial for both the US Democratic and Republican parties. Internationally, deep-rooted IRRHI hinders the US from accepting the loss of its leading position in the international system and the rise of China. To maintain the DRRHI and IRRHI, the US regards China as its major strategic competitor. Cold War thinking, whole-of-government containment policies, alliance systems, stigmatization strategies, and human rights attacks, all of which are based on DRRHI and IRRHI, remain important components of US policy toward China.

China and United States relations have long been a focal point of global attention, with both nations—one the largest capitalist country and the other the largest socialist developing nation—exerting profound influence on world politics. This study explores the alternating patterns of cooperation and rivalry between the two countries, examining the deeper motivations behind their interactions and potential impacts on future international relations. Using case studies, it analyzes key historical events of collaboration and conflict to better understand the dynamic nature of their relationship. The research highlights the complex interplay of national interests, security concerns, and international cooperation, and concludes that the cyclical pattern of cooperation and competition may persist. To break this cycle, both nations must abandon Cold War thinking, draw lessons from history, and adopt flexible diplomacy. Both China and United States must assume greater responsibility in international affairs and support sustainable development for mutual benefit if they are to maintain a stable relationship that is essential to both nations as well as to world peace and prosperity.

Artificial intelligence, as a key driver of the new wave of technological revolution, has become a focal point in global strategic competition. This study analyzes strategic reports published by U.S. think tanks regarding China’s AI development to explore their cognitive characteristics and developmental trends, providing insights for China to formulate response strategies.[Method/Process] 78 representative reports from nine U.S. think tanks were selected as samples. By employing topic modeling methods (LDA and DTM) and textual analysis, the core themes of the reports were categorized and their evolution analyzed. The study systematically examined the U.S. think tanks’ AI strategies regarding China from three dimensions: innovation drivers, security governance frameworks, and the construction of international discourse power. It also compared the differences in strategic characteristics between the Trump and Biden administrations.[Result/Conclusion] The study found that U.S. think tanks’ AI strategies concerning China exhibit comprehensiveness and interdisciplinarity, with a focus on innovation development in areas such as education, technology research, economic markets, and national security, as well as on security governance frameworks including ethics, legal regulations, and social impacts. While think tanks during the Trump administration were guided by Cold War thinking, those under the Biden administration shifted toward technological governance and global rule competition. Based on the cognitive characteristics of U.S. think tanks, it is recommended that China enhance intelligence analysis, strengthen independent technological innovation, and promote international dialogue and cooperation to safeguard its technological advantages and global discourse power.

Cooperation, Competition, and Cold War Thinking in German Music Studies of the 1950s and 1960s

ABSTRACTDiscussion of the ethics of war has long been a subject of essays published in the Journal of Religious Ethics (JRE). This essay focuses on three recent books that deal with various aspects of that topic. It begins with a discussion of Lisa Cahill's advocacy for peacebuilding as an expression of Christian discipleship, then turns to works on the topic of limited force by Daniel Brunstetter and Christian Braun. It concludes with comments about the role of theology in these works, and stresses the importance of statecraft for just war thinking.

ABSTRACT Russia's full-scale (re)invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022 has energised longstanding security concerns of the Baltic states. To ensure their security, NATO implemented an enhanced Forward Presence to deter Russian military aggression. This article questions the utility of NATO's conventional deterrent posture rooted in Cold War thinking and argues that its deterrent function is limited, given Russia's different strategic outlook towards the Baltics in contrast to Ukraine. The following analysis explores Russia's strategic interests and why Moscow pursues different goals towards the Baltics in the geo-strategic realm, juxtaposing them with Russia's unflinching approach toward Ukraine. Further, the article argues that Russia relies more on active measures and unconventional tools of statecraft to exert influence on NATO member states such as sabotage, intimidation, cyber-operations, and malign influence. The implication is that Russia's hybrid approach requires a multifaceted strategy that should be updated from NATO's posture in the Baltics.

It has been argued that Elizabeth Anscombe's writings on killing and just war in the 1950s and early 1960s were highly influential, not only on just war theorists (such as Michael Walzer and Thomas Nagel), but also on the recovery of just war thinking among the US and British military. In researching the sources for Anscombe's thought, it became clear that Donald MacKinnon's unknown early writings on social ethics and war inspired and influenced Anscombe's earliest thought on justice in war. In this article, I focus on MacKinnon's and Anscombe's prophetic analysis of the role of the Church and the lay faithful under the spectre of war.

ABSTRACT Russia’s poor military performance in the early stages of the full-scale war in Ukraine (2022-) has been attributed to various causes. This article considers its possible intellectual causes. Reviewing public Russian military and security discussions on new wars in the years prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion, it argues that Russian operational planning on Ukraine aligned with key assumptions in Russian thinking about new wars. In particular, the Russian leadership's failure to acknowledge Ukrainian agency, its misguided emphasis on non-kinetic means and its mistaken assumption that Western states would be unwilling to respond forcefully to Russian aggression followed key tenets of Russian new war thinking. This raises questions about the relationship between Russian military theorizing and Russian military action, and how a prevailing intellectual paradigm shaped Russian perceptions about the reasonability of the invasion plan.

This article makes an argument about the right place of the likelihood of success principle in just war thinking. Its analysis is grounded in a neoclassical reading of just war that is applied to the ongoing Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. The article starts with an exploration of the status of the likelihood of success principle in contemporary just war thinking. Noting that the difficulty of applying this principle has been pointed out by various thinkers, the chapter adapts the distinction between the so-called deontological and prudential just war principles found in neoclassical just war thinking. This distinction holds that the deontological principles hold primary importance within the logic of just war, and the prudential principles, including likelihood of success, are of secondary importance only. The article continues with an assessment of the practical implications of this distinction by applying it to two different types of warfare, namely so-called “wars of necessity” and “wars of choice.”

ABSTRACT Studying the military thinking and military history of the Middle Ages, one can observe several forms of warfare ideologies. Three of these ideologies are the holy war ideology, the ideology of ordeal (or iudicium Dei), and the traditional just war theory. Every such ideology has the common characteristic of a stronger or weaker link to concepts of a Christian God, religion, or church. Beyond this common characteristic, the ideologies differ from each other in some key respects. The holy war ideology applies first and foremost the concept of God, traditional just war theory applies the concept of justice, and the ideology of ordeal relies on both the concepts of God and justice. This article presents the ideology of ordeal as a form of just war thinking, and describes its features through historical examples, through its essence, and in contrast to other ideologies.

We typically see child soldiers as not morally responsible because of their age and/or because they are victims of adult exploitation. Work on child soldiers and their moral responsibility is relatively sparse within just war thinking and political philosophy (Thomason in Ethical Theory Moral Pract, 19:115–127, 2016a; Thomason in Seeing child soldiers as morally compromised warriors [Online]. The Critique. Available: http://www.thecritique.com/articles/seeing-child-soldiers-as-morally-compromised-warriors/ [Accessed 2 April 2020], 2016b), and instead focuses mostly on whether child soldiers are liable to attack (McMahan, in Gates, Reich (eds) Child soldiers in the age of fractured states, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, PA, 2010; Vaha in J Military Ethics, 10:36–51, 2011). This paper brings these two areas together. Many of us have the intuition that combatants should exercise at least some constraint when fighting against child soldiers. I will argue that, contra McMahan (2010), exercising restraint in this way is a requirement of justice. I will argue that agents can be more or less liable to attack (liability to attack is on a spectrum) in defensive killing cases depending on how morally responsible they are for the threat they cause. I will outline how, whilst child soldiers are not wholly responsible for the threat they cause to combatants, their responsibility is also not completely diminished. I will argue that child soldiers are therefore liable to attack, but to a lesser extent than fully responsible agents. I will show that combatants fighting against child soldiers are therefore required, as a matter of justice, to use the most proportionate method of attack which may not always be to kill the child soldier. I will conclude that combatants are therefore required, as a matter of justice, to exercise a degree of restraint when fighting against child soldiers.

In this paper, we draw attention to an unintended but severe side effect of just war thinking: the fact that it can impose barriers to making peace. Investigating historical material concerning a series of conflicts in China during the early twentieth century, we suggest that operating in a just war framework might change actors' identities and interests in a way that makes peacemaking an unavailable action. But since just war theory places significant normative constraints on how long wars can be continued, it might thus be self-defeating, in the sense that those who adopt it may undermine the very goals which it is supposed to serve. Whether this finding calls for a revision of existing ethical frameworks governing warfare will depend on whether there are possible alternatives to just war theory that perform better at reining in unjust violence.

The essay seeks to complement Hans-Herbert Kögler’s article on the moral case for supporting Ukraine in its current defence against aggression from Putin’s Russia. To do so it tries to offer a more adequate account of what Kögler calls the politico-national and symbolic-ideological standing of Russia in this conflict. On the political side, the article points out the neoliberal, securitized and, in the final analysis, criminal character of Putin’s regime. Analysing the national aspect, it pictures Russian society as a morally corrupt, atomized and depoliticized one, which, at the same time, is a hostage of the terrorist regime. Finally, on the ideological aspect, it calls in question Kögler’s claim about the importance of Dugin’s Eurasian ideology, arguing for the impossibility to promote any essentialist ideology in the extremely atomized contemporary Russian society. The moral case for supporting Ukraine consists in defending Ukraine, Russia and, in final analysis, humanity from the morally corrupting and physically destroying influence of Putin’s terrorist regime.

Just war thinking features the history of warfare from the beginning up to the 20th century. Just war thinking, however, did not have one unique frame, but it appeared in many forms. The theory of judgement of God, the mission-related theory, the law enforcement theory, the revolutionary, and finally, the regular war theory were the important forms of historical just war thinking. This article presents these theories and classifies them with the help of the main concepts of Saint Thomas Aquinas and the principal concepts of justice.

This article makes moral sense of the Western withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. It does so by applying classical just war thinking. The classical bellum justum, it argues, can make a distinctive contribution toward evaluating the decision to leave Afghanistan, a decision that continues to be discussed controversially. The article points out that classical just war thinking did not introduce distinct moral categories beyond jus ad bellum, such as jus in bello or jus post bellum. Exactly because classical just war thinking was meant to apply to all phases of a war, the article goes on to argue, it provides important lessons for just war as a tool of statecraft that seeks to inform political decision-making. Applying the wisdom that is encapsulated in the classical bellum justum to the withdrawal decision in Afghanistan, the article, although it is critical of its execution, generally sides with the Biden administration's course of action.