ABSTRACT This article examines the impact of natural resources on civil wars by focusing on the challenges faced by armed groups attempting to profit from Myanmar's opium sector. Economic theories of conflict hold that the presence of lootable resources can prolong civil wars by providing non‐state armed groups with the resources and incentives to challenge the state. However, the emphasis on the presence of lootable resources and the capabilities of armed groups overlooks how these groups convert resources into wealth. This study examines Shan State in Myanmar during the first three decades of its post‐World War II opium boom. While the increased opium production in Shan State offered a potential revenue stream for the dozens of non‐state armed groups, the remnants of Chiang Kai‐Shek's Kuomintang forces dominated the trade. Drawing on the ‘politics of passage’, an approach attentive to the competing claims on trade in war zones, this article examines the various impediments faced by armed groups attempting to profit from the opium trade. Its findings indicate that revenue generation by armed groups was much more challenging than economic theories of civil war suggest. The article highlights a need to move beyond the mere presence and extraction of resources by powerful armed groups and to pay closer attention to the mundane but formidable challenges of profiting from a valuable resource sector.

This article explores one of the most complex issues in modern geopolitics: why do states use existential threats as a reason for war (casus belli)? How can we tell when such claims are based on genuine security concerns or when they are rhetorical tools hiding geopolitical interests? Using Jonathan Swift`s satirical allegory about the Lilliputians and Blefuscans, who go to war over a dispute about which end of a boiled egg should be broken, the author highlights a key dilemma: even in a world dominated by "naked power," states cannot act without legitimizing discourse, yet this discourse always remains ambiguous. Three ongoing conflicts are examined: the Russian-Ukrainian War (20142026), the US invasion of Iraq (2003), and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A comparative analysis reveals six common patterns in how justifications for war are constructed: framing history through shared traumatic memories, dehumanizing opponents through language, reframing self-defense as preventive, invoking civilizational rhetoric, reversing the roles of aggressor and victim, and selectively applying international law norms. The study shows that even in cases of outright aggression, aggressor states often convincingly portray themselves as victims  an essential way to gain support and reduce international condemnation. It underscores a fundamental asymmetry: the 2003 Iraq War was based on false threats; Russia`s invasion of Ukraine was justified with fabricated NATO threats; and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains highly complex, with both sides holding deeply rooted existential threat narratives, yet power imbalances lead to uneven responses. These findings highlight the importance of the Swiftian Paradox as an analytical framework and raise critical questions about how discourse is used to justify violence in the twenty-first century. Keywords: Swift`s paradox, casus belli, legitimisation of war, security discourse, existential threats, geopolitical rhetoric, enemy construction, realism, critical theory, international conflicts.

The Mahabharata narrates events and aftermath of the Kurukshetra War, which revolves around perpetual conflict between good and evil, represented by the Pandava and Kaurava brothers of the legendary Bharata dynasty, respectively. The article explores how The Mahabharata, with a profound repository of prudent thoughts and battle tactics, serves as a strategic guide for the military, presenting insights that align with modern principles of war. The Kurukshetra War, the central conflict in the Sanskrit epic, offers a plenitude of strategic lessons that reverberate with modern military doctrines and principles outlined by theorists like Carl von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. Using comparative and descriptive analysis of secondary sources, the research investigates key strategic dimensions such as Shalya's implementation of psychological warfare tactics, Lord Krishna's exemplary war leadership apparent in his strategic counsel, including the Bhagavad Gita discourse, Guru Drona's sophisticated battle formations (Vyuha Rachana), and Bheeshma Pitamah's application of proportional force through controlled engagement, and strategic exclusion of Karna from combat operations. Lord Krishna’s diplomatic maneuvers and tactical propaganda emulate modern‑day asymmetric warfare and intelligence operations. Dharma Yuddha (righteous war) perception is scrutinized in the context of just war theory, highlighting ethical dilemma that persistently challenges contemporary military leaders. These strategies are analyzed for their theoretical foundations and practical applications within the context of ancient Eastern military doctrine. In doing so, the study explores lessons on leadership motivation, ethical decision‑making, and the strategic relevance of war, positioning it as a substantial resource for military scholars, strategists, and policymakers.

What do the costumes that soldiers wear have to do with the ethics of war? This article tackles this question. It argues that military uniforms operate as a site and source of ethics of war discourse, reproducing codes of conduct as the dress code. It advances an account of the uniform as a material interface where the ethics shows itself in aesthetic form, and vice versa. It elaborates this position via a case study of the 2018 decision of the Australian Defence Force to respond to the commission of war crimes by its members by tightening uniform regulations – specifically by banning patches that displayed death symbology (e.g. the Grim Reaper logo, Punisher emblem, etc.). While critics and former military personnel have derided this move as superficial, we suggest that it reflects a sophisticated attempt to leverage dress code as a means of reinforcing ethical code. We build on this insight to mount a case for a new approach to the ethics of war. Contemporary ethics of war scholarship focuses predominantly on textual sources, treating them as if they are the only vector of ethical reasoning about war. This overlooks the reality that ethical positions bearing on war are routinely transmitted via a range of non-textual conduits, including material, aesthetic, and ritual practices. The argument, which we develop over the course of this article, is that ethics of war scholars should widen their aperture to account for the full range of forms that ethical claims about the use of force assume.

Abstract After 1945, the risk associated with nuclear war demanded new ways of thinking about victory and defeat on the modern battlefield. President Eisenhower’s strategy of massive retaliation had the paradoxical effect of increasing the need for limitations on the means employed and the objectives pursued in war to avoid escalation to an existential conflict. Scholarship on the theory of limited war in U.S. history has varied over the last eight decades, but the term remains as poorly understood as it is widely used. The tendency to frame limited war in isolation from the political realities of the early nuclear age has led to revisions of its meaning that associate the concept with strategic failure. This perception is detached from the origins of limited war in modern history and deserves reconsideration in scholarly debates about the means, ends, and scope of wars.

The Java War (1825–1830) was not only interpreted as a political and military conflict between Prince Diponegoro and Dutch colonialism, but also as a space that showed the active role of women in the struggle. One of the most prominent manifestations is the existence of the Estri Soldiers, a women's army formed since the era of Raden Mas Said (Mangkunegara I) and has a strategic role in the defense of the Kingdom of Mataram. This research aims to reveal the contribution of the female soldiers in the military, social, and political dimensions of the Java War through the framework of Carl von Clausewitz's guerrilla war theory, Hannah Arendt's whole society approach, the concept of Women, Peace and Security (WPS), and strategic feminism. The method used is qualitative with a literature study of the main works of Peter Carey & Vincent Houben (2016) as well as other archival and secondary sources. The results of the study show that Estri Soldiers are not only supporting actors, but also frontline combatants with combat skills, elite guards of the king, logistics managers, and agents of symbolic diplomacy. This role affirms that women are an integral part of the total war strategy, with significant political impact in maintaining the legitimacy of power. Through the lens of WPS, it was also found that Estri Warriors had realized gender-based participation, protection, and prevention long before the concept was formulated at the global level. This research emphasizes the importance of an inclusive reconstruction of historical narratives, in which women are placed not as objects of war, but as strategic subjects in national defense.

International humanitarian law regulates armed conflict through a framework of customary and treaty-based norms, with the Geneva Conventions imposing legally binding duties on conflict parties to safeguard civilians and civilian objects. Despite this normative framework, enforcement mechanisms continue to demonstrate limited effectiveness, particularly in protracted armed conflicts. This study examines alleged violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention during the 2023, armed conflict in the Gaza Strip and evaluates the capacity of existing international humanitarian law enforcement mechanisms to protect Palestinian civilians. The research further analyzes avenues for strengthening judicial accountability through international criminal justice processes. Employing a socio-legal research design, the study integrates just war theory and law enforcement theory and applies qualitative descriptive-analytical methods to primary and secondary legal materials. The findings demonstrate that, first parties to the conflict committed serious breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention affecting civilian protection. Second, international enforcement mechanisms, including international judicial institutions, operated ineffectively due to political interference and limited State compliance. Third, expansive interpretations of military necessity weakened accountability for grave breaches of international humanitarian law. The study concludes that strengthening enforcement requires restricting such interpretations and ensuring the consistent implementation of international criminal court decisions to enhance legal accountability.

Abstract Orwell was not a philosopher by training. Still, his writing contains insightful reflections on a variety of topics that are of perennial interest to academic philosophers. These topics include social class, work, imperialism, socialism, democracy, totalitarianism, politics, liberty, equality, free expression, art, literature, metaphor, technology, the nature of truth, the ethics of war, and the power of language, among others. This article provides an introduction both to Orwell’s thought on these topics and to the ways in which academic philosophers have interpreted and used Orwell’s writing in fields ranging from epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language to political philosophy, ethics, and aesthetics.

Abstract The principle of civilian protection in war is ancient, yet precarious. Its precarity is evident in George Orwell’s writings—he derides military realism, denounces antiwar pacifism, and argues for area bombing that does not distinguish between civilians and warfighters. I contend that Orwell’s position is consistent and preempts contemporary debates within just war theory. The idea that we ought to protect innocents in war is not inherently contradictory, but is precarious and so subject to abandonment in times of great political violence. This supports Orwell’s argument that while war is sometimes the lesser evil, it is nonetheless always evil, because it invites us to abandon our foundational moral principles. We must take this point more seriously when reasoning about war.

This paper seeks to foster an interpretative dialogue between Judaism and Christianity on an audacious theological dynamic: the shift from an ethics of war to an ethics of peace. Beginning with a hermeneutical examination of a brief midrashic text from the Tanhuma collection, the article argues that the dynamic momentum initiated by the midrash, suggesting a path of transformation from war to peace, finds a powerful echo and development in a contemporary Catholic theological movement rooted in Augustine’s notion of “bellum iustum,” as reoriented by the Magisterial teaching’s emphasis on “just peace” from Pope Benedict XV onward. The authors suggest that the early midrashic dynamic, and the theological audacity it expresses—which will be further explicated—is enriched and given new dimensions when brought into conversation with the Church’s current effort to move beyond the traditional framework of “just war” toward a renewed insistence on peace as the primary ethical horizon. This case study highlights the potential for mutual theological enrichment when the inner movements of both traditions are brought into dialogue.

The article investigates how, in the second half of the seventeenth and throughout the eighteenth century, the Habsburg monarchy legitimized wars against the Ottoman Empire and how the transformation of that legitimization was reflected in wartime and peacetime messages addressed to different audiences — their own subjects, allies, and the Christians in the Ottoman provinces in the Balkans. Through an analysis of imperial manifestos and proclamations, it traces the shift from the traditional concept of bellum iustum and crusading rhetoric 93 to rationalized, legally and pragmatically grounded Kriegserklärungen premised on breaches of peace treaties and the balance of power. Propaganda practices — appeals to Orthodox and Catholic communities in the Balkans, calls for “liberation,” and later promises of religious freedom and humanity for potential Muslim subjects — are interpreted as instruments for legitimizing Habsburg expansion and for mobilizing local support. A comparative approach also reveals the influence of Russian rhetoric and the role of the press in shaping public opinion. The study demonstrates that sustaining a successful military-political presence in the Balkans required deliberately constructed public messages that synthesized legal, religious, and diplomatic arguments. Keywords: Habsburgs, Holy Roman Empire; Ottoman Empire; declaration of war, propaganda; the Balkans.

ABSTRACT Just War Theory provides a foundational ethical and legal framework for evaluating the legitimacy of armed conflict. However, its application to cyberspace presents challenges rooted in the underlying assumptions of kinetic warfare that shape its traditional interpretation. Cyber operations often unfold without clear attribution, occur at high speed, and impact dual-use infrastructure where civilian and military systems intersect. These characteristics disrupt traditional applications of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, particularly the principles of legitimate authority, discrimination, proportionality, and military necessity. The growing role of non-state actors, the asymmetry of cyber capabilities, and the global interdependence of digital infrastructure further complicate ethical and legal analysis. This article revisits classical just war principles and evaluates their applicability to the digital domain through contemporary case studies and legal scholarship. It proposes a Cyber Conflict Assessment Framework (CCAF) to support preliminary ethical and legal assessments of cyber operations. The framework integrates traditional just war principles with cyber-specific indicators, offering structured guidance for norm development, policy formation, and operational risk assessment. By fostering ethical coherence and legal accountability in cyberspace, the article contributes to ongoing efforts to uphold a rules-based international order in the context of modern conflict.

Purpose This paper aims to examine the ethical fault lines of contemporary warfare through a critical engagement with Kantian moral universalism and Machiavellian political realism, using the Russo−Ukrainian war as a focal point for normative analysis. It addresses the moral crisis in the international order, where strategic imperatives increasingly overshadow commitments to human rights, legal restraint and ethical norms. Design/methodology/approach This study develops the concept of principled pragmatism – a normative framework that navigates the tension between moral obligation and political necessity without collapsing into either moral absolutism or strategic amorality. Drawing on pragmatist ethics, just war theory and historical case analysis, the approach integrates philosophical inquiry with empirical examination of the Russo−Ukrainian war. Findings This research demonstrates that principled pragmatism, informed by historical awareness and contextual sensitivity, can reconcile ethical accountability with realist security imperatives. It argues that such a framework is both normatively defensible and institutionally viable in a fragmented and competitive international environment. Originality/value By synthesizing Kantian and Machiavellian traditions within a pragmatic ethical lens, this paper reframes the Russo−Ukrainian war not merely as a geopolitical rupture but as a critical juncture for restoring the moral architecture of international politics. It offers a recalibrated vision of the global order built on legal enforceability, inclusive multilateralism and moral responsibility.

The US-China trade war is a trade conflict that has an impact on the global economy. In this trade war, the hegemon state becomes the main global focus. Therefore, the US-China trade war reflects the rivalry between two superpowers that influence global economic stability. This trade war creates uncertainty for economies around the world. This research examines the concept of hegemonic stability theory in the US-China trade war which reflects the rivalry between hegemons. This research uses a qualitative descriptive method. This research also uses the theory of hegemonic stability in the international system. Moreover, this research used literature study techniques to obtain relevant data. The results show that the US-China trade wars have an impact on the global economy. This study finds that Canada and Australia suffer from trade disruption, while Vietnam benefits from investment diversion. The emergence of China as a new and great economic power proves the hegemonic stability though, that a world with more than one dominant player causes chaos, especially in the world economy.

What critiques of just war theory can teach us about Rita Floyd’s theory of morally mandatory securitization

The Duty to Secure: From Just to Mandatory Securitization (2024) extends Just Securitization Theory (JST), originally developed in The Morality of Security: A Theory of Just Securitization (2019), with a theory of the moral obligation to use emergency measures to safe valuable referent objects from objective existential threats. Morally mandatory securitization includes prescriptions setting out when the duties to secure and to securitize apply, on who has such duties, and to whom . In this article, I defend the theory against five critics. All of these see value in and need for the general project of rethinking the ethics of securitization, but all disagree with some aspects. Including, the theory’s communitarian roots, the usage of revisionist just war theory to derive moral principles, and/or the attempt to refocus the responsibility to protect (RtoP) norm. I use the available space to defend my choices. I conclude by pointing out directions for future research on the ethics of securitization.

This paper examines hybrid warfare as a distinct geopolitical phenomenon that cannot be fully addressed within conventional theories of war or security studies. Grounded in the framework of geopolitical realism, hybrid warfare is defined as a coordinated set of actions targeting an adversary’s core geopolitical domains. Unlike traditional warfare, it unfolds simultaneously across political, economic, informational, cyber, and cultural spheres, aiming to erode societal resilience and weaken state sovereignty. The study highlights the key technologies of hybrid warfare, including cyber operations, disinformation, economic pressure, and the instrumentalization of energy resources, as well as its primary actors—states, non-state groups, and transnational networks. These actors exploit structural vulnerabilities to undermine legitimacy and stability without relying exclusively on military force. It is argued that hybrid warfare functions both as a strategic doctrine and as a flexible toolkit for achieving geopolitical dominance while avoiding large-scale kinetic confrontation. As such, it illustrates the transformation of contemporary power politics, where decisive struggles increasingly occur outside conventional battlefields.

Abstract In his De Jure et Officiis Bellicis et Disciplina Militari libri tres , the Dutch-Spanish jurist Balthazar de Ayala (1548–1584) took it upon himself to develop a just war theory carefully tailored to the exigent circumstances of the Dutch Revolt. Given how the conflict was undoubtedly fueled by fervent disagreements on matters of faith, it is remarkable how Ayala’s dissertation seems to have provided the blueprint of a practicable just war doctrine unshackled from its moral tethers. Rather than solely focusing on what was just, Ayala instructed Farnese on the finer points of what rendered a war legal, simultaneously trying to keep the restoration of the one true faith clearly in view. Through a careful analysis of his source material, this article will attempt to demonstrate that – despite the obfuscation caused by his Augustinian frame of reference – Ayala’s treatise contains an innovate attempt at secularisation of just war theory.

This study examines the moral limits of obedience in military ethics through a reinterpretation of Clausewitz’s On War, particularly regarding the relationship between a soldier’s compliance, the teleological purpose of war, and the moral agency of individuals within the chain of command. The research responds to concerns about the persistent strength of absolutist obedience doctrines in modern military institutions, which—across numerous historical cases such as My Lai and Abu Ghraib—have contributed to atrocities and the delegitimization of war. Using a qualitative method based on literature study and conceptual-critical analysis, this article analyzes Clausewitz’s texts, the doctrine of Auftragstaktik, historical investigation reports, and contemporary literature on military ethics, just war theory, and strategic leadership. The findings demonstrate three key points. First, Clausewitz views war as a political instrument directed toward teleological ends such as the restoration of order and the achievement of peace; therefore, obedience holds moral value only insofar as it supports these highest strategic purposes. Second, the analysis of the My Lai massacre and the abuses at Abu Ghraib confirms that blind obedience produces moral and strategic failure when orders are executed without rational judgment or ethical reflection. Third, integrating Clausewitz’s ideas with the principles of Auftragstaktik generates two new normative concepts—critical obedience and ethical disobedience—which position soldiers as responsible moral agents rather than mere executors of commands. These concepts offer an ethical foundation for modern military professionalism, particularly within the context of multidomain warfare and the complex frictions of contemporary conflict. Theoretically, this research contributes original insight to the field of military ethics by proposing a teleological framework that fills gaps in just war studies, professional military ethics, and character education for soldiers. This approach opens new pathways for developing military ethics curricula, reforming command doctrines, and establishing protective mechanisms for soldiers when confronted with erroneous or immoral orders.

In a recent exchange in this journal on responsibility for healthcare scarcity in Gaza, McMahan argues that bioethicists should unconditionally condemn Hamas yet insists that the group's actions do not diminish the protections owed to civilians. He further argues that Israel bears the greatest responsibility for civilian suffering, having violated the principles of proportionality, necessity and discrimination. On this basis, he maintains that while all parties must be held accountable for breaches of ethical and humanitarian norms, Israel's conduct should be condemned as unjust, impermissible and as carrying the primary burden of responsibility. In this response, I argue that McMahan's position suffers from several shortcomings: it relies on controversial sources while not engaging with credible alternatives, and it privileges a particular strand of just war theory while failing to present alternative frameworks, many of which are likely unfamiliar to bioethicists. This is unsurprising, given that McMahan has developed one of the most influential contemporary theories of just war. Nevertheless, if bioethicists are to issue judgements on the allocation of responsibility in armed conflict and to condemn the conduct of warring parties, they would be better equipped to do so through rigorous engagement with the full range of available evidence and through measured consideration of the diverse ethical frameworks that govern war and armed conflict.