E-voting, also known as electronic voting, is the practice of casting a ballot or voting using digital technology. ‎Verifiability and anonymity are two important considerations in this situation. The study aims to find the optimal balance between these two crucial concepts, specifically the method of value range area (trade-off) between anonymity and verifiability in e-voting protocols. High levels of e-voting verifiability and anonymity are combined in this value range. ‎The result should be an electronic voting system that protects voters' rights to privacy while promoting confidence in ‎and transparency surrounding election outcomes. This study evaluated several current e-voting protocols to see which ‎ones came closest to the ideal harmony between anonymity and verifiability, utilizing verifiability calculation metrics ‎and anonymity calculation metrics. The balancing area was divided into 4 areas in this investigation. The study's area ‎of balance between verifiability and anonymity can demonstrate that the e-voting protocol is in the ideal category ‎region for such a protocol. After examining numerous e-voting procedures, some issues have finally been identified. ‎The e-voting protocol is ideal because Area 2 is the area where anonymity and verifiability have ideal degree values. ‎E-voting enhancement verifiability protocols are examples of protocols that achieve the perfect balance between ‎anonymity and verifiability‎.

Complex and important decisions are often made with advice from a committee of experts. But how do a committee’s “rules of engagement” affect the way individuals discuss, how they vote, and ultimately the quality of their collective recommendation? Compiling verbatim transcripts from U.S. Food and Drug Administration advisory committee meetings, we study how a 2007 switch from sequential to simultaneous voting procedures changed discussions, information exchange, and decision making. Consistent with past findings, we show that, compared with a sequential voting protocol, simultaneous voting led to a reduction in the likelihood of unanimous votes. Importantly, we show novel evidence that the majority of this reduction in unanimity was mediated by changes in discussion patterns—specifically, by the increased diversity of information surfaced during discussions. We also find evidence of behavioral and linguistic changes that support our theory that voting protocols changed the incentives for members to elicit more diverse information from each other: under simultaneous voting, members exhibited greater equality in talking time, directed a greater proportion of questions to each other, and adopted language that was more positive, authentic, and equal in projecting status and confidence. Finally, we show that recommendations under simultaneous voting were more likely to be accurate, as drugs recommended and approved were less likely to encounter safety-related postmarket events. In sum, voting protocols affect the incentives for individuals to engage in robust discussions, leading to marked improvements in how information is exchanged between individuals, and in the process by which groups of experts arrive at joint recommendations. This paper was accepted by Sridhar Tayur, entrepreneurship and innovation. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03649 .

Postal voting is a frequently used alternative to on-site voting.Traditionally, its security relies on organizational measures, andvoters have to trust many entities.In the recent years, several schemes have been proposed to addverifiability properties to postal voting, while preserving vote privacy. Postal voting comes with specific constraints. We conduct a systematic analysis of this setting and we identify a list of generic attacks, highlighting that some attacks seem unavoidable. This study is applied to existing systems of the literature. We then propose Vote&Check, a postal voting protocol which provides a high level of security, with a reduced number of authorities. Furthermore, it requires only basic cryptographic primitives, namely hash functions and signatures. The security properties are proven in a symbolic model, with the help of the ProVerif tool.

With an electorate of 52m the German Social Elections (Sozialwahl) is arguably one of the largest single elections in the European Union. It elects representatives of all people under social security and has been conducted through postal voting only for decades. In 2023 eVoting was introduced as an additional voting channel for the first time. This paper focuses specifically on the eVoting part, particularly the technical requirements and the voting protocol used. It analyses them against general voting principles and the relevant Recommendation of the Council of Europe.

As democratic processes increasingly transition to digital environments, safeguarding voter privacy and maintaining electoral integrity have become paramount. This study investigates the application of Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) as a cryptographic framework for developing secure and private electronic voting systems. A comparative performance evaluation was conducted between ZKP-based voting protocols and traditional systems, focusing on key metrics such as validation time, privacy leakage index, and memory usage. Quantitative data analysis, supported by statistical methods including mean comparisons and standard deviation assessments, highlights the superiority of ZKP-based systems in minimizing information leakage while maintaining verifiability. Although ZKP protocols introduce higher memory consumption, the trade-off results in substantially enhanced voter anonymity and reduced validation latency. The findings suggest that ZKPs provide a scalable and efficient solution to the dual challenge of transparency and privacy in digital voting infrastructures. This research contributes to the growing body of work on cryptographic voting technologies and underscores the importance of balancing security with performance in the design of future e-voting systems. Keywords: Zero-Knowledge Proofs, E-voting, Cryptography, Privacy, Secure Voting Systems, Digital Democracy, Voter Anonymity, Cryptographic Protocols, Electoral Integrity, Privacy-Preserving Computation

Quantum-Resistant Zero-Knowledge Proof Blockchain Electronic Voting System

Building Efficient and Flexible Voting Protocols: An Approach to Fairness and Anonymity

Novel quantum voting protocol for four-particle entangled states based on superdense coding

The growing threat posed by quantum computing to traditional cryptographic systems demands a radical redesign of digital voting architectures. This review explores the development of a post-quantum blockchain voting protocol, emphasizing the integration of zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) to ensure data privacy, voter anonymity, and verifiable election integrity. The study synthesizes advancements in lattice-based and hash-based cryptographic algorithms capable of withstanding quantum attacks and evaluates their applicability within decentralized ledger frameworks. Particular attention is paid to the role of ZKPs—such as zk-SNARKs and zk-STARKs—in constructing tamper-resilient, end-to-end verifiable voting systems without compromising performance or transparency. Through critical analysis of recent protocols, consensus mechanisms, and deployment models, this paper identifies key design principles for scalable, secure, and inclusive e-voting infrastructures. The review concludes with strategic recommendations for transitioning from prototype systems to robust electoral frameworks in anticipation of the quantum era.

Based on voting protocols and debate minutes for the Carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) hearings in the European Parliament in 2022–2023 the cases where positions of MEPs from political groups “Identity and Democracy” and “European Conservatives and Reformists” coincided with those of parliamentarians from other parties (particularly opponents from “The Left” and “The Greens”) were analysed. These actions bypassing the “sanitary cordon” were explored together with the content of the CBAM, which made possible to identify the main motivations of MEPs’ voting. Such cases of solidary vote allowed to evaluate the strength of this barrier, the applicability of theories of two-dimensional nature of ideological space and the prospects of coordinated actions of selected parties after the European parliament elections 2024. These ad hoc coalitions were facilitated by the differences in attitudes to amendments. Among significant factors ensured Eurosceptic MEPs to express the same views were reluctanсe to transfer additional competences to the EU bodies and willingness to support the European industry. Supranationality and deindustrialisation are considered to be more imminent threats than climate change. The article explores a two-dimensional structure of ideological space of the given activity. Close relations between left-wing and right-wing parties could be explained by similarity of political views (i. e Euroscepticism in attributed not only to far-right politicians).

Semi-quantum voting protocol with decentralization of vote verification and traceability

Abstract As a special voting method, one‐vote veto voting also has a wide range of applications. A veto means that when the voting council puts forward a proposal, it cannot pass unless all the voters agree to it. If there is a no vote, the proposal will be rejected, but no one will know how anyone else votes. In most existing quantum anonymous one‐vote veto voting protocols, an absolutely honest third party is generally required to assist the voting. However, it is difficult to find a fully trusted third party in reality. In addition, the existing quantum anonymous one‐vote veto protocol does not consider the attack from the insider voters. Therefore, based on the characteristics of entanglement swapping between the Cat state and Bell state, the authors propose a new quantum anonymous one‐vote veto protocol, which can not only calculate the voting result quickly and effectively but also demonstrate higher security.

Card-based cryptography is a research field for realizing cryptographic protocols using a deck of physical cards. Shinagawa et al. proposed a regular n-sided polygon card, which can hold a value from 0 to n-1\\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \\usepackage{amsmath} \\usepackage{wasysym} \\usepackage{amsfonts} \\usepackage{amssymb} \\usepackage{amsbsy} \\usepackage{mathrsfs} \\usepackage{upgreek} \\setlength{\\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \\begin{document}$$n-1$$\\end{document}, and constructed an addition protocol over Z/nZ\\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \\usepackage{amsmath} \\usepackage{wasysym} \\usepackage{amsfonts} \\usepackage{amssymb} \\usepackage{amsbsy} \\usepackage{mathrsfs} \\usepackage{upgreek} \\setlength{\\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \\begin{document}$$\\mathbb {Z}/n\\mathbb {Z}$$\\end{document} and a voting protocol with v voters and c candidates when v<n\\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \\usepackage{amsmath} \\usepackage{wasysym} \\usepackage{amsfonts} \\usepackage{amssymb} \\usepackage{amsbsy} \\usepackage{mathrsfs} \\usepackage{upgreek} \\setlength{\\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \\begin{document}$$v<n$$\\end{document}. In this paper, we propose an addition protocol over Z/mnZ\\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \\usepackage{amsmath} \\usepackage{wasysym} \\usepackage{amsfonts} \\usepackage{amssymb} \\usepackage{amsbsy} \\usepackage{mathrsfs} \\usepackage{upgreek} \\setlength{\\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \\begin{document}$$\\mathbb {Z}/mn\\mathbb {Z}$$\\end{document} using regular n-sided polygon cards. Technically, we introduce a cyclic integer encoding and a rot-and-shift shuffle to extend the modulus from n to mn. In addition, we construct two voting protocols with v voters and c candidates using regular n-sided polygon cards. Our first voting protocol requires c(⌈v+1n⌉+v+1)\\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \\usepackage{amsmath} \\usepackage{wasysym} \\usepackage{amsfonts} \\usepackage{amssymb} \\usepackage{amsbsy} \\usepackage{mathrsfs} \\usepackage{upgreek} \\setlength{\\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \\begin{document}$$c(\\lceil \\frac{v+1}{n} \\rceil + v + 1)$$\\end{document} cards and v+1\\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \\usepackage{amsmath} \\usepackage{wasysym} \\usepackage{amsfonts} \\usepackage{amssymb} \\usepackage{amsbsy} \\usepackage{mathrsfs} \\usepackage{upgreek} \\setlength{\\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \\begin{document}$$v+1$$\\end{document} shuffles without restriction. Our second voting protocol reduces the number of cards to ⌈v+1n⌉n+v+1\\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \\usepackage{amsmath} \\usepackage{wasysym} \\usepackage{amsfonts} \\usepackage{amssymb} \\usepackage{amsbsy} \\usepackage{mathrsfs} \\usepackage{upgreek} \\setlength{\\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \\begin{document}$$\\lceil \\frac{v+1}{n} \\rceil n + v + 1$$\\end{document} when v<n\\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \\usepackage{amsmath} \\usepackage{wasysym} \\usepackage{amsfonts} \\usepackage{amssymb} \\usepackage{amsbsy} \\usepackage{mathrsfs} \\usepackage{upgreek} \\setlength{\\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \\begin{document}$$v < n$$\\end{document} and c≤n\\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \\usepackage{amsmath} \\usepackage{wasysym} \\usepackage{amsfonts} \\usepackage{amssymb} \\usepackage{amsbsy} \\usepackage{mathrsfs} \\usepackage{upgreek} \\setlength{\\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \\begin{document}$$c\\le n$$\\end{document}.

The Ethereum blockchain-based electronic voting (e-voting) systems can emerge as a viable strategy in this era of contemporary democracies to revolutionize political elections and augment the efficacy of the electoral process. There are myriad advantages that the Ethereum blockchain has to offer, from fairness to increased voting rates. Unlike traditional voting protocols, the Ethereum blockchain can assure substantial cost savings and eliminate the necessity for electoral intermediaries. The use of the Ethereum blockchain in political contexts also ensures that elections are held with integrity while preserving the voters’ privacy. Due to its popularity, provision of smart contracts logic, and various promising advantages, this systematic review aims to examine the potential deployment of decentralized e-voting systems integrated with Ethereum blockchain technology for democratic political elections. A systematic literature review (SLR) and the PICO approach, which stands for population, intervention, control, and outcomes, were adopted in this study to systematically analyze the existing literature. Key technological approaches identified in the voting system include the hybrid blockchain and privacy-preserving score voting. Among the noteworthy findings are the following: while adoption and complexity remain challenges across numerous e-voting frameworks, scalability, end-to-end security, enhanced efficiency, and effectiveness are key benefits. An exploration into the prospective future innovations, such as the integration of artificial intelligence and big data analytics into the Ethereum blockchain, was also included to further improve the reliability of the e-voting systems. It is believed that the Ethereum blockchain has a promising transformative impact on electoral politics and democratic processes, presenting a ray of hope for future elections.

Abstract Constitutional courts operate under a framework of formal and informal rules. While formal rules have been extensively studied, our understanding of informal rules remains limited. Courts often rely on internal practices, traditions and unwritten customs developed over time, posing a significant challenge due to their hidden nature. Numerous constitutional courts lack detailed voting protocols in their statutes and internal regulations, leaving essential aspects to the court's discretion, such as, inter alia, the voting order, deliberation style, outcome versus issue voting and tie-breaking protocols. By employing a case study of strategic breaching of informal voting protocols in the Mexican Supreme Court, this article highlights the complexity of enforcing informal voting rules given that external actors may be unaware of them, along with other factors. Even when informal rules are broadly known, certain circumstances may diminish the efficacy of informal sanctions addressing their breach. Thus, key judicial players, such as chief justices or judge-rapporteurs, may take advantage of the informal rules of voting protocols to advance their policy preferences.

Card-based cryptography is a secure computation protocol realized by using physical cards. There are two models on card-based cryptography: public and private models. We adopt private one that allows players to handle cards privately. While much of the existing works for card-based cryptography use two-colored cards, it is also a vital task to construct an efficient protocol with playing cards. In the public model, 2n cards are necessary for any n-bit input protocol since at least two cards are required to express a Boolean value. It holds true for both two-colored and playing-card settings. On the other hand, the private model enables us to construct a protocol with fewer than 2n cards. However, all existing protocols that achieve such properties are only in the two-colored setting. This paper shows that the private model enables us to construct a protocol with fewer than 2n cards using the playing cards. We first show two-bit input protocols with fewer than four cards for logical operations, AND, OR, and XOR. Furthermore, we show a three-input majority voting protocol using only three cards, which is constructed by combining our AND and OR protocols. Notably, our proposed protocols require no randomness. All operations are deterministic and depend only on players’ private inputs.

Most e-voting schemes make use of central servers. Users are obliged to trust these servers, which represent a vulnerability of the scheme. In the last few years, a very small group of schemes has been published that overcomes this handicap by using a peer-to-peer (P2P) approach. These are known as boardroom e-voting schemes, whereby users take the role of the servers. They act as managers of the process: they cast votes, keep a record of them, and verify the cryptographic operations made by others. Nevertheless, ballots must fulfill certain constraints which conflict with the possibilities of recent debate tools. These tools allow users to decide what to vote on, thus enabling the ballot frame to remain unknown before the voting process. The scheme presented here is a new boardroom voting protocol. It provides privacy, eligibility, and verifiability among other relevant features. The key advantage of this system is its high degree of flexibility, due to the absence of a need to impose any constraint on the ballots. This paper includes experimental results with two debate groups.

An SGX-based online voting protocol with maximum voter privacy

Security Analysis and Improvements on a Semi-Quantum Electronic Voting Protocol

New Blockchain-Based Publicly Traceable Self-Tallying Voting Protocol