This study investigates the effects of exposure to violent conflict on trust among young adults in Ethiopia, using novel individual-level conflict data collected via audio computer-assisted self-interviewing. Overall, we find that greater exposure to violence decreases trust towards individuals living in the same neighbourhood but has no significant effect on generalized trust or trust in individuals from other neighbourhoods. The decline in local neighbourhood trust is pervasive across men and women and across ethnic groups, and is observed for both direct personal victimization and indirect exposure through family, friends, and witnessed events. We also find that low levels of exposure to violence may foster higher local trust, whereas higher levels of exposure lead to substantial declines. Finally, conflict exposure is significantly associated with deteriorations in mental health, lower perceived neighbourhood safety, physical displacement, and greater food insecurity, pointing to potentially plausible channels through which violent conflict may weaken trust within local communities. • We study the effects of exposure to violent conflict on trust among young adults in Ethiopia using novel individual-level ACASI data. • Greater exposure to violence decreases trust towards individuals living in the same neighbourhood. • No significant average effects on generalized trust or trust in individuals from other neighbourhoods. • Local trust declines across men and women, across ethnic groups, and for direct and indirect exposure; low exposure may foster higher local trust. • Mental health, safety, displacement and food insecurity are plausible pathways linking conflict exposure to lower local trust.

Climate, livelihood insecurity, and violent conflict over fishing access in coastal Bangladesh

ABSTRACT This article examines the case of Northern Ireland, considering how the IRA was persuaded to abandon violence and adopt a peaceful approach to Irish reunification. In doing so, it utilises Zartman’s “ripeness theory”—not only his idea of a “Mutually Hurting Stalemate,” but also his emphasis on the need for conflicting parties to conceive a “Way Out” of armed conflict. The latter notion is largely ignored by Zartman’s critics, and stressing its importance in the Northern Ireland case allows the piece to make a wider and novel contribution to the debate on “ripeness” in conflict resolution. Specifically, the article shows how constitutional Irish nationalist actors—the SDLP, the Dublin government, and Irish-American elites—offered a way for republicans to align with them in a peaceful approach towards a united Ireland. This allowed the IRA leadership to present its rank and file with a viable, political alternative to violence, minimising dissent from those who claimed that a change in strategy surrendered the ideal of Irish reunification. In turn, republican leaders were able to steer their movement towards peaceful politics without significant splits—a process which may have implications for other regions where ethnonationalism has created violent conflict.

Objectives: The objective of this article was to analyse available evidence on ethnic diversity being a major predictor of violent conflict, with a special focus on Nigeria as it is a multi-ethnic nation. It was envisioned to make contribution to cohesion hypothesis that suggested a link between inequalities along ethnic lines and group cohesion with grievances that might lead to violent conflict. It also aimed at discussing the implication of violent conflict for economic development, and how it could be managed or prevented. Methods: A literature survey of papers available from 2003 to 2018 was carried out through ScienceDirect, Google Scholar and Scopus to identify and comparatively analyse a corpus of literature on violent conflict and ethnic diversity. Results: The study indicated a contraction in body of literature that critically examined the impact of ethnic diversity on violent conflict as only seven articles were identified for comparative analysis. Meanwhile, the analysis yields two viewpoints: those having evidence in support of economic variables as predictors of violent conflict or civil war and those in support of ethnic diversity. Conclusions: The findings of this review are good for developing countries like Nigeria where ethnic and religious diversity might be an excuse for the persistent violent conflict. Now policy makers can be aware that there is more to conflict than ethnic and religious diversity. The policy implication might be the need for competent governance system and policies that address grievances; with a lot of effort to reduce poverty among citizens.

Conflict early-warning systems (CEWS) enhanced by big data analytics represent a transformative approach to predicting and preventing violent conflict. This study explores the intersection of ethics, accuracy, and governance in the deployment of such systems, emphasizing their interdependence within complex socio-technical environments. Drawing on existing literature and multi-context evidence, the paper examines how big data sourced from social media, satellite imagery, and transactional records improves predictive capabilities through advanced methodologies such as machine learning, anomaly detection, and probabilistic forecasting. However, these innovations introduce critical challenges, including data bias, privacy violations, lack of transparency, and risks of political manipulation. The study highlights the importance of robust evaluation metrics, data quality assurance, and model interpretability in ensuring predictive reliability. It further analyzes governance frameworks, focusing on accountability mechanisms, stakeholder involvement, and legal compliance necessary for responsible deployment. Empirical evidence reveals mixed predictive performance, underscoring the limitations of current models and the need for methodological rigor and reproducibility. Ultimately, the paper argues that while big data significantly enhances early-warning capacities, its effectiveness depends on embedding ethical safeguards and governance structures that ensure fairness, trust, and accountability. The study contributes to the literature by offering a comprehensive framework that integrates technical performance with ethical and institutional considerations. Keywords: Conflict Early-Warning Systems (CEWS), Big Data Analytics, Political Violence Prediction, Algorithmic Governance, and Ethical AI.

The relationship between land and violent conflict in Africa has long been a focal point for scholarly inquiry and development policy. According to an influential neo-Malthusian narrative, violent land conflicts erupt when land scarcity, population pressure, and state failure combine. In this paper we join a growing corpus of researchers arguing that the links between violent conflict and land scarcity are not linear, but embedded in complex and entangled social, economic and political processes. Using an extended case-study approach we explore land disputes in the Panzi neighbourhood of Bukavu, which is situated in the conflict-affected eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo and appears to embody a neo-Malthusian crisis. We present three main findings.<br/>First, we demonstrate how large-scale violent conflict can create opportunities for new actors to reconfigure the political order, generating struggles and negotiations over public authority and land rights among a multitude of more or less self-proclaimed public authorities and land claimants.<br/>Second, we show that although armed conflict reconfigures the links between public authority and land rights, it does not radically change how land is governed, or how people gain and hold on to property. Both before and after major political ruptures, people gain land rights through daily negotiations with competing public authorities.<br/>Third, we show that these struggles and negotiations do not take place on a level playing field. Rather, well-connected and wealthy actors with access to military power tend to fare better in such contests.<br/>Based on our research, we conclude that land scarcity functions as a contextual amplifier, rather than a direct cause of violent conflict. However, more research and conceptual work is needed to better understand this link.

ABSTRACT The impact of Colombia’s intractable conflict on children has been profound; this includes forced recruitment, bereavement, displacement, and the imposition of limited and war-like views on their identities and futures. The exacerbation of violence and fixed dichotomies has shaped children’s language, playground, and predispositions. Educational sites have been paramount in counteracting such rigidities and effects, including local libraries. Using a continuous ethnographic approach over a 5-year period, this study examines the initiatives of a local library in Putumayo, Colombia, in response to violent conflict. The first ethnographic encounter took place in 2019 for a two-month period and a second one in 2024 for two weeks. Participant observation and unstructured interviews have been used to understand the experiences of local libraries when facing conflict. The study included 15 participants and traced connections with other members of the ecosystem (e.g. social movements). This study shows how local libraries promote non-violent modes of existence, dynamic notions of peace and responses to emerging challenges in the face of conflict and cycles of violence. Local libraries mobilise peace strategies such as theatre, games, cultural activities and everyday encounters, challenging the emergence of new cycles of violence and responding to emerging challenges.

War, peace, and entrepreneurship: An institutional and socio-cognitive perspective on how violent conflict affects (necessity) entrepreneurship

Abstract This article examines how violent conflict shapes the willingness of potential migrants to accept lower-skilled work (occupational downgrading). It uses an innovative survey module administered to high-skilled youth in Myanmar to elicit migration decisions for skill-preserving and lower-skilled jobs and to quantify the wage-equivalent value that prospective migrants attach to maintaining skill-appropriate employment. Exposure to conflict reduces the compensating wage differential (the additional wage premium individuals typically demand to accept lower-skilled work), indicating greater amenability to occupational downgrading. The study exploits the sudden announcement of military conscription during the survey as a plausibly exogenous shock to the amenity value of staying, as well as variation in exposure to violent conflict. The results indicate that heightened security concerns increase individuals’ willingness to migrate, even at the cost of skill-appropriate job matching. Effects are pronounced for disadvantaged groups, including women, ethnic minorities, and those with weaker migration networks, suggesting that conflict may worsen labor market outcomes and widen gaps in the gains from migration.

ABSTRACT This paper addresses the question as to whether interethnic marriages reduce cattle rustling and its related violence in rural Kenya? Previous findings on the relationship between interethnic marriages and violent conflicts in rural areas are mixed. On the one hand, contacts resulting from interethnic marriages can build closer ties among ethnic groups. On the other hand, inter‐group competition resulting from closer interaction may breed friction, especially in communities with a history of deep inequalities and injustices. At the centre of this dialectical relation lies the question of the mitigating effect of interethnic border markets. We use randomised perception survey data to compare the rate of interethnic marriages among the Luo, Abakuria and Maasai and measure the prevalence of cattle rustling and its related violence, notably killings, within the three ethnic cleavages (i.e., Luo—Abakuria, Abakuria—Maasai, Maasai—Luo). The survey is complimented with qualitative data. Results show that the overall interethnic marriage rate is 1.9 out of 3, indicating that interethnic marriage is relatively common, albeit constricted. The qualitative data complement the results and shed light on critical nuances resulting from cultural and political factors in interethnic relations in Kenya.

The authors of this article map the position of women in armed conflicts from World War II to the present day in light of sexually motivated crimes. Through an analysis of selected cases, the study offers a critical reflection on how female sexuality has become politicized, while victims of sexual violence have long been overlooked and marginalized in terms of both social and legal interest. Through the lens of feminist legal theory, the authors point to the marginalization of sexual violence and the response of the international community in gradually addressing the issue of sexual violence in conflicts. An analysis of the Geneva Conventions and the case law of selected ICTY and ICTR cases points to the transformation of sexual violence from a marginalized phenomenon to an internationally punishable war crime and crime against humanity.

The Russo-Ukrainian war, the potential expansion of the EU’s border on the eastern shore of the Black Sea, the ongoing pressing need for the diversification of the EU’s energy resources, the strategic interest in gaining access to the vast reserves of critically important minerals in Central Asia and, finally, the recent outbreak of a new violent conflict in Iran, have all turned the Black Sea region into an important strategic hotspot for the EU. As the ‘buffer zone’ between the EU and Russia, which is likely to remain a security challenge for Europe for some time to come, becomes thinner, the EU needs to seriously upgrade its policy on the Black Sea region. This article reviews the EU’s approach. It argues that while the EU’s new strategy for the region offers promise, its implementation will require the EU to live up to its potential as a geopolitical actor in this volatile space.

ABSTRACT Natural resource abundance has been linked to major violent conflicts in the world. Collier and Hoeffler [Collier, P., and A. Hoeffler. 1998. “On Economic Causes of Civil war.” Oxford Economic Papers 50 (4): 563–573. https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/50.4.563] were the first to discuss distributional concerns among different groups and their potential to instigate violence in the presence of natural resources. We have considered the dynamics between the dominant and minority groups in determining the shares in natural resources, and then have adapted the framework by Elbadawi and Soto [Elbadawi, I. A., and R. Soto. 2015. “Resource Rents, Institutions, and Violent Civil Conflicts.” Defence and Peace Economics 26 (1): 89–113. https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2013.848579] for explaining the motivation for exploitation and rebellion. We modified the game by incorporating institutional cost into the baseline analysis. The derived outcomes depict that institutional accountability for exploitation and aggression can be instrumental in neutralising the effect of natural resource rents on political violence. Further, the relationship is also explored empirically for a sample of 80 countries from 1990 to 2021. The empirical analysis demonstrates the importance of institutional accountability in the mitigation of political violence, while acknowledging that the current state of political constraints is insufficient.

Abstract Countries emerging from civil war often experience protests and police repression. While scholars have assumed that most people oppose forceful police responses, frequent instances of repression in conflict-affected countries points to substantial public support. This study examines variation in public support for police use of force against protests in conflict-affected regions of Colombia. Prior research has focused on community policing, personal interactions, or wartime experiences to explain attitudes toward police. We posit that in volatile postwar settings, attitudes also reflect perceptions of evolving security threats. Through a survey experiment conducted after nationwide protests in Colombia, the study finds increased support for police repression when protestors are linked to ongoing insecurity—due to violent tactics or association with coca growers, a group associated with organized crime. Further analysis shows that support for protest repression reflects perceptions of current threat from a changing security environment rather than prior wartime experiences. These findings suggest that evolving security concerns in post-conflict environments shape public opinion of police, leading to increased tolerance for police repression in response to perceived threats. They contribute to explaining police repression in democracies and reveal how threat environments shape public attitudes in countries affected by violent conflict.

Abstract Scholars of intrastate armed conflict have devoted significant attention to violent self-determination conflicts, frequently characterizing them as particularly pernicious. Not only do they promote significant government repression, but also efforts to resolve them often fail. This study aims to understand the conditions under which rebel groups adopt varying levels of self-determination claims, which can range from non-self-determination goals to local governance, territorial autonomy, or even more expansive ones, such as complete independence from the parent state. While adopting expansive self-determination claims may render strategic advantages, such as increased mobilization and loyalty, it may jeopardize rebel groups’ chances of negotiation with the government. Given this tradeoff of pursuing expansive self-determination claims, this paper theorizes that the rhetorical flexibility of self-determination claims is driven by contextual and organizational constraints faced by rebel groups. Contextually, we argue that rebel groups are generally likely to pursue more expansive self-determination claims in states with higher levels of democracy, since democratic institutions constrain violent state responses and provide more open and accessible channels for political participation by rebel actors. In terms of organizational structure, we theorize that highly centralized rebel groups are less likely to pursue expansive self-determination claims in democratic regimes to increase the chances of negotiation with the government. This, we suggest, is because centralized rebel groups are better able to attain mobilization and loyalty without relying on expansive self-determination claims. Statistical analyses using a novel dataset on issues raised by rebel groups provide empirical support to our claims.

ABSTRACT Violent conflict is often assumed to undermine democratic legitimacy and increase public support for authoritarian alternatives. Yet, empirical evidence remains limited, particularly in the context of developing democracies. Using the case of Nigeria, Africa’s largest democracy, this study examines the effect of violent conflict on attitudes toward military rule. It employs an instrumental variable strategy that leverages proximity to international borders as a source of exogenous variation in conflict exposure. Contrary to conventional expectations, findings indicate that individuals exposed to higher levels of violence are significantly less likely to support military rule. These results are robust to alternative operationalizations of violent conflict. Further analysis reveals that reduced support for military rule among individuals exposed to violence does not automatically translate into greater support for democracy. This study hence contributes to broader debates on regime legitimacy and authoritarian attitudes in fragile states.

Health-seeking in fragile and conflict-affected settings: how armed violent conflict shapes maternal and child health-seeking behaviours.

Violent conflict disrupts economic activity, alters household income, and reshapes everyday consumption behaviour. This study examines the impact of the 2023 Manipur violence on eating-out behaviour among restaurant consumers in a conflict-affected setting. The analysis focuses on four key conflict-related factors: income status, mobility restrictions, purchase-choice limitations, and stressful environment, and evaluates their influence on changes in the frequency of restaurant visits. Using primary survey data collected from 161 respondents across selected restaurants in the valley region, the study employs a logistic regression framework to estimate the relationship between these factors and consumer behaviour while controlling for demographic characteristics and prior eating-out habits. The results indicate that income decline, mental stress, and disruptions in online delivery services significantly affect consumption behaviour. Perceived insecurity also plays a stronger role than mobility restrictions such as curfews. In addition, prior eating-out habits emerge as a key determinant, suggesting that established consumption routines are particularly vulnerable to disruption during conflict. The findings provide micro-level evidence on how violent conflict influences discretionary consumption through economic, behavioural, and technological channels. The study contributes to the literature by highlighting the vulnerability of emerging service sectors in conflict-affected regions and underscores the importance of restoring stability, mobility, and consumer confidence for post-conflict economic recovery.

This article examines the ways that Indonesian visual art and culture created after the 1965–1966 killings engages with collective memory, state power, and the politics of visuality. Drawing on ethnographic interviews with Indonesian artists, this article analyzes how the New Order regime utilized propaganda and visual culture to promote an official memory of the 1965–1966 mass killings, and how contemporary artists have since created counter-visual narratives that challenge this hegemonic memory. Using Nicholas Mirzoeff’s concept of “The Right to Look,” I argue that visuality is an important consideration in struggles over memory after an atrocity or violent conflict. By situating these cases within broader debates in memory studies, this research also highlights how visual culture shapes public understanding after an atrocity and opens space for dialogue and historical accountability.

A protracted refugee crisis has unfolded in the Bangladesh–Myanmar borderlands over the past few decades. Within this context, our paper examines the translocal dynamics of gendered violence that Rohingya refugees are subjected to and compelled to navigate. Drawing on a ‘nested understanding’ of gendered violence that incorporates insights from feminist scholarship, peace and conflict studies and human geography, we undertake three analytical steps. First, we examine how violent conflict, displacement, containment and marginalisation, as well as growing insecurity driven by the rising influence of armed groups, have created conditions conducive to gendered violence. Second, we demonstrate how Rohingya women have persistently been subjected to diverse forms of gender-based violence throughout their lives and displacement trajectories, and how they cope with such traumatic experiences and which strategies they employ to protect themselves. Third, we identify new forms of gendered violence that Rohingya men are confronted with, particularly forced recruitment into armed groups, which has significant repercussions for both men and women, and the wider Rohingya community. In light of these findings, we contend that an explanation of gendered violence in Bangladesh’s refugee camps cannot be limited to an analysis of local conditions alone. Rather, it must also account for the disruptive ‘cascades of violence’ across borders as well as the contestations of power relations and gender roles. This necessitates a translocal perspective that recognises displaced people’s agency while acknowledging the violent orders of borderlands.