Vertical Tax Research Articles

Behavioural patterns of leaders versus followers in setting local sales tax policy

AbstractSales tax has been a popular revenue source for local governments in 38 US states. In this fiscal climate, both horizontal and vertical tax competition are frequently observed. Local governments are concerned about adverse impacts thereof on their revenue as mobile shoppers react to tax rate changes by purchasing in lower‐tax jurisdictions. So far, few studies have accounted for potential endogeneity in the behavioural patterns of leaders versus followers in setting local sales tax policy. Using a 40‐year panel dataset from Texas, this study identifies leader municipalities in changing sales tax rates and examines how municipalities asymmetrically respond to multi‐tiered rate changes. The findings depict a crowding‐out story in vertical tax competition and reveal crowding‐in effects in horizontal competition, with leader municipalities immune to both effects.

The Deterrence Effects of Tax Whistleblower Laws: Evidence from New York’s False Claims Acts

In this study, we provide evidence on the effects of state tax whistleblower laws. We exploit a novel 2010 amendment to New York’s False Claims Acts (FCA) that explicitly extended whistleblower incentives to corporate income tax whistleblowers. We identify treated firms (firms exposed to New York’s FCA) using establishment-level data and descriptive analyses. Using a sample of firms exposed to New York and neighboring states, we find evidence that New York’s FCA reduced state tax avoidance. In cross-sectional tests, we find that effects are increasing in firms that grant fewer employee stock options and industry regulation, consistent with deterrence increasing in employee and regulator monitoring. We also find evidence that New York’s FCA deterred federal tax avoidance, consistent with positive vertical tax externalities. Next, we focus on particular tax strategies and find evidence of a reduced probability of Double Irish tax structures, reduced relationships to tax planning banks, reduced use of special purpose vehicles, and reduced outbound tax-motivated income shifting. We also find evidence that firms with the lowest (highest) cost of relocation (1) reduced (did not change) establishment counts in New York but (2) did not change (reduced) state tax avoidance. Finally, we disentangle general ex ante deterrence from ex ante peer deterrence using hand-collected New York tax whistleblower press releases from the Attorney General. We find evidence of both types of deterrence. Overall, this study provides policy-relevant evidence on the deterrence effects of tax whistleblower laws. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting. Funding: Y. Lee acknowledges financial support from the College of Business at California State University, Long Beach. S. Ng acknowledges financial support from Singapore Management University. T. Shevlin acknowledges financial support from the University of California, Irvine [the Paul Merage Chair and the Merage School of Business]. A. Venkat acknowledges financial support from the McCombs School of Business at the University of Texas, Austin. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.02999 .

Heterogeneous capital tax competition in a federation with asymmetric tax compliance

Abstract In a federal country with two regions, consumers can decide not only the region where to invest, but also the type of capital investment. We analyse how such decision is affected by the fact that a first type of capital is taxed at a regional level while a second one is taxed at a federal level with tax compliance for federal taxation varying across regions. A standard horizontal tax competition arises for the first type of capital across regions. Instead, vertical tax competition arising between the regional and the federal level is not standard because there is not tax base overlap between the two tiers of government. However, both regional and federal tax bases are affected by tax policies decided by each level of government via capital movements from one type of capital towards the other one. Our main result shows under which conditions an increase in federal taxation in response to an increase in tax noncompliance may be less severe than in a set-up with only one type of capital because of capital flights arising not only across regions, but also across different types of capital investment.

Специфика и проблемы налогового стимулирования малых ИТ-компаний в России

Since 2021, Russian IT companies have been stimulated by enhanced tax incentives, which allow one to pay corporate income tax only to the federal budget as well as pay social security contributions at a heavily reduced rate. While medium and large businesses get benefits from the new government support, small enterprises are traditionally supported through the simplified taxation system, which offers alternative tax measures. For this reason, the purpose of the article is to identify problems which could arise when new incentives are distributed in the economy. Based on the structure of the IT industry and the conditions of reducing taxes, it is argued that fairness of taxation is broken as small IT (software) companies constitute the majority and, at the same time, have little chance to be included in the tax incentive scope. The new privileges addressed to IT companies actually favor some businesses with high turnovers, and even the favorable simplified taxation system cannot completely eliminate distortions in the tax burden level. Along with this, sub-central governments have a strong motivation to raise their tax revenues within the framework of vertical tax competition. There is a need to make the tax system more neutral as well to harmonize tax regimes, and the article provides relevant proposals.

Tax Decentralization – Approaches to Vertical Tax Revenue Structuring in the Public Sector

Tax Decentralization – Approaches to Vertical Tax Revenue Structuring in the Public Sector

Court of Justice

This overview highlights the ECJ’s decision on the possibility of resident subsidiaries of a non-resident parent company to integrate a horizontal tax group without dissolving a pre-existing vertical tax group.

Stay or Go? Intra-government Tax Competition and Firms’ Location Decisions in China

ABSTRACT The impact of the intra-government (vertical) tax competition on firms’ location choices is seldom studied in the literature. In this paper, we use the local corporate income tax revenue retention rate to represent the outcome of the vertical tax strategic interactions between the central and local governments in China. Theoretically and empirically, we find that a higher local corporate income tax revenue retention rate attracts newly-established firms, even when we simultaneously take into account the effect of the horizontal tax competition, i.e., the local effective corporate income tax rates. Such positive effect of the local corporate income tax revenue retention rate on firms’ location decisions is robust to a battery of sub-sample analyses and alternative model specifications, and is heterogeneous across firms with different ownership structures. This effect is more prominent in provinces with weaker agglomeration forces as well.

An exploratory approach for enhancing vertical and horizontal equity tests for ad valorem property tax valuations using geographically weighted regression

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to enhance the estimation of vertical and horizontal inequity within property valuation. Property taxation is a crucial source of finance for local government around the world – based on a presumptive tax base underpinned by estimates of property value, inaccurate real estate valuations used for such ad valorem or value-based property tax calculations potentially lead to a variety of costs, both financial and other, for tax payers and governments alike. More common are increased costs in time, staff and, in some cases, legal fees. Some governments are even bound by acceptability thresholds to promote fairness, equitability and overall government accountability with respect to valuation.Design/methodology/approachThere exist a number of vertical inequity measurements that have undergone academic testing and scrutiny within the property tax industry since the 1970s. While these approaches have proved successful in detecting horizontal and vertical inequity, one recurring disadvantage pertains to measurement error/omitted variable bias, stemming largely from a failure to accurately account for location. A natural progression within property tax research is the application of a more spatially local weighted modelling approach to examine vertical and horizontal inequity. This research, therefore, specifies a geographically weighted regression (GWR) methodology to detect and measure vertical inequity in property valuations.FindingsThe findings show the efficacy of using more applied spatial approaches for vertical tax estimation and indeed the limitations of employing conditional mean estimates coupled with delineated boundaries for assessing property tax inequity. The GWR model findings highlight the more fluctuating nature of vertical inequity across the Belfast market for the apartment sector both in a progressive and regressive sense and at different magnitudes. Moreover, the results reveal spatial clustering in the effects and are indicative of systematic inequities related to location inferring that spatial (horizontal) tax inequities are not random. The findings further show increased GWR model predictability overall.Originality/valueThis research adds to the existing literature base for evaluating both vertical and horizontal inequity in value-based property taxation at the intra-neighbourhood level. This is accomplished by modifying the Birch–Sunderman approach by transforming the traditional OLS model architecture to a GWR model, thereby allowing coefficient estimates of inequity to vary not only across a jurisdiction, but also at a more local level, while incorporating property characteristic variables. This arguably allows assessors to identify specific geographical areas of concern, saving them money, time and resources on identifying, addressing and correcting for inequity.

Heterogeneous vertical tax externalities and macroeconomic effects of federal tax changes: The role of fiscal advantage

How do state tax rates respond to federal tax shocks? This paper presents a novel mechanism of heterogeneous vertical tax externalities across state-levels of fiscal advantage, showing that tax increases can be expansionary – even without their reinvestment. States rich in natural resources have a fiscal advantage in the inter-state competition over production factors which allows them to respond better to increases in federal taxes and, consequently, attract capital from other parts of the nation. We add heterogeneity in fiscal advantage levels to an otherwise standard model of vertical tax externalities and horizontal tax competition. The model shows that, irrespective of federal redistribution, the contractionary effect of a federal tax increase can be overturned in fiscally advantaged states, through an increase in their tax base. Using the case of the U.S., and narrative-based measures of federal tax shocks a-la Romer and Romer (2010), we provide empirical evidence for the various aspects of this mechanism. Specifically, our baseline estimates indicate that, controlling for federal transfers, a 1% increase in the GDP share of capital-related federal taxes at the beginning of a year increases the growth rate of the per capita tax base by approximately 0.7% in high fiscal advantage states at the end of it.

A Theoretical Study on the Application of the "Vertical Tax Equity"

A Theoretical Study on the Application of the "Vertical Tax Equity"

Do State Sales Taxes Crowd Out Local Option Sales Taxes?

Abstract Currently, sales taxes are imposed at both the state and local levels in 37 US states. In these environments, vertical tax competition occurs as governments share a common sales tax base, and local jurisdictions have autonomy over sales tax rates. As cash-strapped states look to sales taxes for additional revenues, local governments may worry about potentially adverse revenue impacts, as consumers react to combined tax rate increases. This study examines state-municipal and county-municipal fiscal spillovers using an empirical approach that accounts for endogenous tax policy leadership and voter tax fatigue. Employing comprehensive longitudinal data from Oklahoma, we find that state tax hikes significantly crowd out future rate increases for the large group of jurisdictions that are designated as followers. Leader jurisdictions are not found to display crowd-out tendencies, a result that is consistent with recent work suggesting that leaders may be less influenced by vertical fiscal externalities than other jurisdictions.

A comparison of stated preference methods for the valuation of improvement in road safety

This paper studies analytically a tax reform where federal gasoline and car taxes are replaced by tolls decided by local authorities. This is particularly relevant in countries with high gasoline taxes like the EU or countries that introduce gasoline taxes like China. One of the major barriers in the reform is the allocation of revenues: when the goal of the federal government is to keep the gasoline tax revenue constant, a vertical tax conflict reduces the efficiency gains of the new instruments. Another barrier is the presence of spillovers: it elicits tax-exporting behavior by regional governments and the high taxes overly discourage traffic. We find the efficiency loss of the first barrier to be small and spillover inefficiency to be larger. When infrastructure capacity is flexible, the spillover inefficiency tends to be larger if pricing and capacity decisions are decentralized and smaller if only pricing or capacity decisions are decentralized.

Empirical Analysis and Countermeasures of Interprovincial Tax Transfer in China

The reform of the Tax-sharing System in China only regulates the vertical tax distribution relationship between the central government and the local government, but the horizontal tax distribution contradiction between the local governments is increasingly prominent. This paper takes China as an example, using data and empirical models, combined with theoretical analysis, discusses the problems of tax transfer and tax coordination among different regions in a country, which is essentially the problem of the deviation from tax and tax sources. This paper calculates the degree of deviation between regional tax and tax sources by the method of proportion difference, and makes an empirical analysis of the factors affecting tax transfer, including market size, labor cost, trade cost, urbanization level, degree of opening. It explains the phenomena, causes, impacts and harm on economic development of tax transfer among regions in China. Those impacts include: increasing regional disparities and hindering regional coordinated development, widening the gap in public services between regions, stimulating the irrational investment behavior and scale expansion of local governments, distorting economic indicators is not conducive to scientific decision-making, deteriorating the natural environment of the resource-providing place, influencing the construction of the harmonious society. Then make the suggestion that the macro level top-level design plan and policy should be adopted at the national level: improve the tax distribution system for horizontal transfer payments, improve the vertical financial transfer payment distribution system, reform the tax system appropriately according to the principle that the tax is consistent with the tax source, improve the tax collection and management system, improve the management of corporate consolidated tax payment, promote the reform of the price mechanism of resource elements and solving the problem of the resource pricing distortion, reform the performance evaluation indicators of local governments to prevent vicious tax competition, replace regional tax incentives with industrial tax incentives.

Corporate taxes and vertical tax externalities: Evidence from narrative federal tax shocks

The empirical aspects of vertical tax externalities have been studied fairly extensively, but with little consensus – a fact that may relate to difficulties in isolating exogenous components in tax setting policy. Adopting the case of the US and using a narrative approach (Romer and Romer, 2010), I study the vertical effects of federal tax shocks. I find that vertical tax externalities are modest in their size and are only present in corporate taxation. In particular, I estimate that a $1 billion increase in federal tax revenues reduces total state corporate tax revenues by approximately $27 million. Non-corporate state tax revenues do not seem to be affected by federal tax shocks. Taking a state micro-level approach and using firm-level business activity data, I show that the findings point to the erosion of states’ corporate tax bases.

What can European experience teach us for Belgian transport policy?

This paper discusses the European experience with respect to the pricing and regulation of transport services, and it draws lessons for Belgian policy making. We review the role of fuel excises, distance charges and other vehicle taxes, fuel efficiency regulation, low emission zones, etc., and we emphasize the need for new pricing instruments (distance charges, road pricing, cordon pricing) to cope with local externalities such as congestion and local pollution. These instruments allow much more decentralization of policy decisions, but they also increase the risk of horizontal and vertical tax competition.

Evolution of Tax Fairness: From Principle of Finansial Theory to Global Taxation Concept // Evolucija pravičnosti poreza: Od načela finansijske teorije do globalnog koncepta oporezivanja

Principle of tax fairness belongs to social-political principles of financial theory. Its application in tax systems of modern countries should ensure a uniform taxation “between the equals” and a redistribution of income and wealth “between the unequals”. The horizontal tax fairness implies that the “equals should be taxed equally”, meaning that the individuals with the same economic force (income, revenue, property) should contribute in equal way to the state for public goods and services received in return. The vertical tax fairness is ensured in a way that individuals are taxed in accordance with their economic force, meaning that the better off should pay higher taxes. Globalisation of financial and economic flows has caused a transformation of principle of tax fairness from national principle necessary for designing a fair national tax system into a global concept of fair taxation, that should ensure a fair distribution of tax burden between countries.

Can fiscal equalisation mitigate tax competition? Ad valorem and residence-based taxation in a federation

In this paper, we revisit the combined effect of horizontal and vertical tax externalities in a federal context, extending the theoretical framework of Keen and Kotsogiannis (Am Econ Rev 92(1):363–370, 2002) by allowing for ad valorem and residence-based taxation. When taxes are levied ad valorem rather than per-unit firstly, we find the interaction between both types of externalities is more ambiguous than commonly understood. As a result, and contrary to earlier findings, fiscal equalisation mechanisms such as the representative transfer system (RTS) fail to fully internalise the tax externalities. Given these limitations, we derive the conditions under which a standard RTS will either: (1) at least nudge politicians in the right direction; (2) realise no welfare gains at all; (3) considerably overshoot the second-best efficiency mark causing welfare loss. Lastly, we find that when taxation is residence-based rather than source-based, a different kind of competition emerges where tax cuts are aimed at stimulating outward factor flows, rather than attracting inward flows.

Theoretical Framework of the Model Fiscal Federalism in the Russian Federation: Essence, Principles, Genesis

This article analyzes the distinctive features of the modern stage of development of financial relations in the Russian Federation directly associated with the formation of the model of federalism, the key and system-forming role of which as a set of constitutional and legal principles and rules of a federal state is currently of paramount importance for intergovernmental and fiscal relations. The author believes that a key factor in the formation of linkages between the federal budget, the budgets of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and local budgets, the financial capacity of the respective levels of the government is their economic incentives through grants, non-tax revenue and, basically, income tax, characterized by vertical and horizontal balance amounts and tax obligations, as well as monitoring legitimate and expedient use of financial resources. This study provides an author's definition of fiscal federalism as a group of legal rules governing a particular kind of public relations that reflect the interaction of public and private finance in part of the accumulation, distribution and use of tax revenues and delineation of spending commitments between the elements of the budgetary system and appropriate levels of public authority. This conclusion stems from the analysis of the aggregate installed in the Russian Federation, the essential conditions of taxation, as well as characteristics and distinctive features in terms of approach to federalism as a political-legal, fiscal, economic and socio-cultural characteristics of federal State.

What Drives Vertical Fiscal Interactions? Evidence from the 1980 Crude Oil Windfall Act

What drives vertical tax externalities? Previous studies focused on the standard common-pool problem. In this paper we study a new potential channel: complementarities between state and federal public goods. First, we illustrate its potential key role in determining the sign of the vertical reaction through a standard model of horizontal tax competition with vertical fiscal interactions. Second, we propose a novel strategy for identifying it, by considering an empirical design that confines the common-pool channel to specific locations. We implement this design through a quasi-natural experiment: the 1980 U.S. Crude Oil Windfall Act, which increased federal tax collections from sale of crude oil, thereby affecting the tax base of oil rich states specifically. This latter feature enables attributing the vertical fiscal reactions of the remaining states to the complementarity channel. Following this strategy, we decompose the vertical tax externalities arising from this federal tax change, and find that: (i) state and federal public goods are, on average, complementary, with complementarity being most apparent in transportation-related expenditures; (ii) the complementarity channel takes a considerable share in the overall vertical fiscal reaction, approximately 60% in the majority of our estimates; (iii) both the complementarity and common-pool effects increase state tax rates; (iv) complementarity (common-pool) affects state corporate (property) tax rates most strongly.

COMPETITION IN TAXATION AND THE FORMS OF ITS IMPLEMENTATION AMONG THE SUBJECTS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

The article considers competition in taxation as the condition for territories’ development and the forms of its implementation among regions. Studies of the theoretical aspects of competition in taxation emergence allowed concluding that primarily social relations are its basis. The author defines the concept of competition in taxation as the process of competitive privileges regulation while dealing with public law establishments to share the tax base by attracting mobile production factors and other advantages to achieve sustainable competitiveness. The author also adds her own features to the classification of competition in taxation. The application of this classification helps deeper understanding of this phenomenon in its versatility. Considering tax competition among the Russian Federation subjects in finance-budget sphere allowed seeing several stages in the development of competence in taxation among regions from its implementation through violence to the correct application of fiscal policy tools. The research revealed the main prerequisites of the development of regional competition in taxation in Russia, and provided the ways and measures of its regulation among the RF regions by the state. The duality of the implementation of regional taxation competition’s inner potential is demonstrated through the main directions of its ultimate impact via the fiscal and regulation functions. Considering the forms of the implementation of tax competition among the RF regions provided the opportunity to prioritize among the regional taxes, which allow influencing the competitive advantages of the territories in order to attract investors in their regions. The review of the regulations of all regional authorities allowed making a conclusion about the existence of different positions on participation in competition in taxation. The research demonstrated that most efficient and available forms of taxpayer involvement are establishing additional benefits on regional taxes, differentiation of the income tax rate (its regional part), and that most regions using the tools of competition in taxation bet on the increase of investment attractiveness of their territory Highlights 1. Competition in taxation is the process of regulation of competitive privileges in the process of social establishments interaction aimed at the sharing of tax bases at the expense of involving mobile production factors and other advantages in order to achieve and keep sustainable competitiveness 2. It is expedient to add two more characteristics — the parameters’ size and the vector of the impact — to the tax competition classification 3. The vertical tax competition by offering tax benefits has objective limitations at the present stage in the Russian Federation 4. There are various positions among the subjects of the Russian Federation on participating in tax competition, most regions rely horizontal competition in taxation through the means that support investment activity at their territory For citation Troyanskaya M. A. Competition in Taxation and the Forms of its Implementation among the Subjects of the Russian Federation. Journal of Tax Reform , 2017, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 182–198. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15826/jtr.2017.3.3.039 Article info Received October 1, 2017 ; accepted November 13, 2017