Value Of Something Research Articles

How emotions grasp value

AbstractIt's plausible that we only fully appreciate the value of something, say a painting or a blameworthy action, when we have a fitting emotional response to it, such as admiration or guilt. But exactly how and why do we grasp value through emotion? I propose, first, that a subject S phenomenally grasps property P only if what it is to be P is manifest in the phenomenal character of S's experience. Second, following clues from the Stoics, I argue that the phenomenal character of emotional experience is constitutively linked with its having directive content. More precisely, emotional experience directs us both to adopt a maxim for action – take certain characteristic kinds of action for an emotion‐specific end – and to treat something about the object as a presumptively decisive reason to take such action for such end. If we assent to what the experience proposes (or rational control gets bypassed), we are motivated to take the relevant action and have a corresponding evaluative belief. This picture of emotional cognition yields a natural conception of the evaluative fittingness conditions of emotions without the problematic assumption that they have a presentational phenomenology. Instead, it is precisely in virtue of the directive and valenced phenomenology of emotion that values are only fully manifest in emotional experience, since values are essentially action‐ and attitude‐guiding properties.

Implementasi Model Pembelajaran pada Mata Pelajaran PKN di SDN 106222 Tebing Tinggi


 Assessment is essentially a process of making decisions about the success of students, whether students are declared successful or fail in mastering a particular skill. Assessment and evaluation have similarities and differences. The similarity is that both have the meaning of assessing or determining the value of something. The difference is that assessment is used in a narrower context and is usually carried out internally, for example, like a teacher assessing student learning outcomes. The research method used in this study is a qualitative method. Qualitative method is a type of research that aims to comprehensively understand the phenomena experienced by the object of research, such as behavior, perceptions, motivations, actions, etc., through a special natural context. through specific natural contexts, and descriptions in scientific language and methods. This research results that first, is where the learning evaluation must be well planned, namely by determining and conveying the time for carrying out the learning evaluation. Second, the implementation of learning evaluation which is the execution step of the evaluation plan that was previously made. And, the last is the third stage which is no less important, whereas this is rarely carried out by other teachers in general, namely the analysis of the results of the PKN learning evaluation.
 Keywords: Evaluation, Learning, PKN

Evaluasi Pembelajaran PKN di MIS TPI Sumber Rejo

Assessment is essentially a process of making decisions about the success of students, whether students are declared successful or fail in mastering a particular skill. Assessment and evaluation have similarities and differences. The similarity is that both have the meaning of assessing or determining the value of something. The difference is that assessment is used in a narrower context and is usually carried out internally, for example, like a teacher assessing student learning outcomes. The research method used in this study is a qualitative method. Qualitative method is a type of research that aims to comprehensively understand the phenomena experienced by the object of research, such as behavior, perceptions, motivations, actions, etc., through a special natural context. through specific natural contexts, and descriptions in scientific language and methods. This research results that first, is where the learning evaluation must be well planned, namely by determining and conveying the time for carrying out the learning evaluation. Second, the implementation of learning evaluation which is the execution step of the evaluation plan that was previously made. And, the last is the third stage which is no less important, whereas this is rarely carried out by other teachers in general, namely the analysis of the results of the PKN learning evaluation.
 Keywords: Evaluation, Learning, PKN

A sensible experientialism?

AbstractExperientialism in aesthetics is the view that the artistic merit or the aesthetic value of something is determined by the final value of certain experiences of it. These are usually specified as experiences of it with understanding and appreciation. Until recently, experientialism was the dominant view. Not anymore. Experientialists are now subject to a barrage of objections, many of which they have not answered. Here I argue that all of these objections fail. I develop a new form of experientialism that is immune to them. It also has an independent rationale. It incorporates an account of the value of art appreciation that is plausible in its own right. And it endorses many of the core insights of anti‐experientialists, especially concerning the final value of good art. Those of us unconvinced by experientialism need to take this form of it seriously. I conclude by identifying some genuine problems it faces. Even these aren't clearly insoluble.

An Integrated Quality Education Management in the Perspective of the Qur’an Qs. As- Syu’ara’ Verses 181-183 in Tafsir Al-Misbah

This research was aimed at revealing and understanding the principle of customer satisfaction of the integrated quality education management in the Qur’an QS As-Syu’ara’ Verses 181-183, and the implication of the integrated quality education management. This study used content analysis where qualitative approach was employed. Integrated quality management on education was analyzed its component by consulting the messages and guides in the Qur’an QS As-Syuara’ Verses 181-183 interpreted in the tafseer Almisbach authorized by Indonesian Islamic scholar Prof. Dr. Quraish Shihab. Results show that quality management in education root on the Islamic teaching that to practice a continued improvement in the entire life. The quality appears as a daily worship that should improve day by day. Al Misbach provides guidance and enlightens that education management is complete measure. Accordingly, you don’t become one of the members of the groups of people who hurts oneself because of harming others, but weigh for yourself and for others using an accurate scale, don’t hurt others concerning their rights by reducing the quality or the value of something, and don’t make the evil on earth by becoming destroyers in any form after repair is made by Allah or also by human beings. If you give something to humans, thus perfect the scale and don’t you reduce the weight by giving them less than it should be.

Value Invariabilism and Two Distinctions in Value

Following Moore, value invariabilists deny that the intrinsic value of something can be affected by features extrinsic to it. The primary focuses of this paper are (i) to examine the invariabilistic thesis and expand upon how we ought to understand it, in light of contemporary axiological distinctions, and (ii) to argue that distinguishing between different kinds of invariabilism provides resources to undermine a prominent argument against variabilism. First, I use two contemporary axiological distinctions to clarify what kind of value the invariabilism debate concerns (final value). Then I show how the distinction between personal value and value simpliciter reveals different variabilistic theses, depending on what type of final value one thinks may be affected by extrinsic features. Using this insight, I challenge an argument for final value simpliciter invariabilism. Variabilists offer the example of the vicious being pleased as a counterexample to the claim that pleasure’s final value is invariant to contextual changes. The argument that I examine purports to show that this case actually supports invariabilism about pleasure’s final value simpliciter, because the best explanation for why the vicious being pleased is a fitting object of indignation is that the vicious person’s pleasure is finally valuable simpliciter. I argue that this argument fails because the vicious person’s pleasure being finally personally good for them better explains why an attitude of indignation is fitting. I address two objections and conclude with remarks about how my results might inform future research on value invariabilism.

“NEW TRENDS IN EVALUATION AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCEIN THE FIELD OF PRESENT EDUCATION SYSTEM.”

The word evaluation indicates finding out the value of something. It is directly related to education system. Evaluation is the act of placing value on something. Evaluation is the process of value judgement of something. Evaluation is one of the most important aspects of total education system. It is the process of determining the current status of an object. It is related to finding out the positive and negative value of an object. Evaluation is a systematic process. Education is a process of modification or changing behavior pattern of individuals. The soul aim of education is to develop all the qualities and potentialities of the child. It may be physical, mental, social, emotional, moral etc. here the teacher plays a very significant role to improve all the aspects in individuals. Evaluation is very important in education system because evaluation helps to judge the improvement of the students. It helps to judge the quality of teaching. Examination is a part of total evaluation process. In our ancient systems of education evaluation was done mainly through oral test, recitation of texts, reading of texts etc. But the term evaluation has come into prominent and systematic in recent years. There are many new trends in the evaluation process. Evaluation plays a very important role in education. The modern concept of evaluation provides a wider perspective and scope of use. Present education system is child centric and in this system of education the traditional examination system becomes outdated. So, various new trends are come into contact to the evaluation system. Educational evaluation is the process of analysis, identification and interpretation in any type of academic performance. Continuous and Comprehensive Evaluation, Formative Evaluation, Summative Evaluation etc. are some of the new trends in the evaluation and they have a great significance in the field of present education system.

Evaluasi Kurikulum sebagai Kerangka Acuan Pengembangan Pendidikan Islam

Evaluation in an action or process to decide value of something. The curriculum is a subsystem in education cannot be separated from the dynamics process in the society. The curriculum therefore, should be organized to prepare learners in facing the future obstacles. This article discusses the importance of curriculum evaluation in some aspects and giving the construction of understanding for all parties involved in education that the curriculum evaluation becomes reference frame of Islamic education as it is very important in the globalization era, such aspects as curriculum evaluation, and curriculum development, types of evaluation strategies, curriculum evaluation models. Therefore, this curriculum evaluation can be used as a measurement or be used as a fundamental reference by institutions, especially Islamic education.

On the Nature, Existence and Significance of Organic Unities

Many philosophers have endorsed G. E. Moore’s principle of organic unities – according to which the value of a whole must not be assumed to be the same as the sum of the values of its parts – claiming this principle to be of fundamental importance to ethics. In this paper, I cast doubt on the principle. In Section 1, I provide a provisional reformulation of the principle of organic unities and contrast such unities with mere sums of value. In Section 2, I do some groundwork in order to arrive at an account of the part–whole relation with which the principle of organic unities is concerned. In so doing, I provide some further reformulations of that principle. In Section 3, I discuss the isolation method that Moore proposes for determining the value of something, and then, in Section 4, I begin an extended discussion of a particular example of an alleged organic unity, namely, Schadenfreude. I explain why some philosophers claim that such pleasure constitutes an organic unity, but I also present reasons for denying this claim. In Section 5, I pursue one of these reasons in particular, a reason that appeals to the concept of what I call evaluative inadequacy, and, in Section 6, I seek to motivate this appeal by drawing on the relation between value and fitting attitudes. In so doing, I provide still further reformulations of the principle of organic unities. In Section 7, I entertain objections to my account of Schadenfreude, one of which requires one final reformulation of the principle of organic unities, and then, in Section 8, I discuss the more general objection that, even if my reasons for denying that Schadenfreude constitutes an organic unity are cogent, these reasons do not extend to other alleged organic unities, such as the related phenomenon of Mitleid. In the final section, I address the significance of the debate about whether the principle of organic unities is true.

Business Anthropology: Towards an Anthropology of Worth?

All the articles published in this issue of the JBA are concerned with values of one sort or another and with the ways in which people and organizations evaluate and valuate what is going on around them. Business and trading relations of all kinds invariably involve the negotiation of different values– whether it is the price of a commodity, the worth of a brand, or the uses to which ‘corporate culture’ is put. Some events, such as trade fairs, awards ceremonies, and competitions of various kinds, bring together different actors who ‘configure a field’ (Lampel and Meyer 2008) and engage in a ‘tournament of values’ (Appadurai 1986; Moeran 2010). In this respect, business anthropology is a corollary of the sociology of valuation and evaluation. According to this strand of thought, scholars are ‘concerned with how value is produced, diffused, assessed, and institutionalized across a range of settings’ (Lamont 2012: 203). Indeed, these are basic social processes, together with boundary work, standardization, commensuration, differentiation, closure, and exploitation (ibid.). They cut to the core of how it is that we negotiate and come to agree, or disagree, on the value of something. For anthropologists, what is attractive about the sociology of valuation and evaluation is that it focuses on (e)valuation as it occurs in social practices, and not inside the mind of an individual. The opinions on the anthropology of finance written by Daromir Page 1 of 8

Morality and human embryo research

The readers of EMBO reports will be familiar with the broad outlines of the debate about whether it is morally acceptable to destroy human embryos for the purposes of medical research. The Talking Point articles published here exemplify the two sides of this debate: Robert George and Patrick Lee argue that such research is inherently wrong, whereas Thomas Douglas and Julian Savulescu contend that there are no sound moral objections to it. Both parties address the issue from within the broad framework of philosophical ethics; however, their approaches are different. George and Lee present a systematic way of thinking about human embryos and their development, according to which these embryos are no different in kind from young children—or other human beings—and should therefore be treated with the same respect. By contrast, Douglas and Savulescu begin with a more ‘intuitive’ approach: they present some hypothetical thought experiments and reflect on current practices to show that our “moral intuitions” are “incompatible with the view that embryos are persons”, although they also try to show that the type of argument used by George and Lee is not convincing. These papers represent two different conceptions of moral theory. The approach of George and Lee is rationalist—the moral value of something depends basically on its essential nature—and, therefore, appeals to our ordinary unsystematic moral convictions are largely irrelevant. By contrast, the approach of Douglas and Savulescu exemplifies a form of moral empiricism in which they consider our unsystematic moral responses—or ‘intuitions’—not only to have some initial plausibility, but also to constitute the main source for considerations that we refine into moral judgments. The old dispute between rationalism and empiricism is here played out within the context of moral theory. In discussing these points of view, I start with the thesis by George and Lee that …

Engaging the consumer: The science and art of the value creation process

Regulatory engagement theory [Higgins, E. T. (2006). Value from hedonic experience and engagement. Psychological Review, 113, 439–460.] proposes that value is a motivational force of attraction to or repulsion from something, and that strength of engagement contributes to value intensity independent of hedonic and other sources of value direction. This paper reviews different sources of engagement strength, including dealing with challenges by opposing interfering forces and overcoming personal resistance, preparing for something that is likely to happen, and using “fit” or “proper” means of goal pursuit. We present evidence that each of these sources of engagement strength can intensify the value of something, and we show how stronger engagement can not only make something positive more positive but also make something negative more negative. We also discuss how these effects of stronger engagement on the value of something else are independent of actors' own personal experiences during goal pursuit. We then broaden regulatory engagement theory by describing the nature of these personal experiences from different sources of engagement strength—distinct positive experiences (e.g., feeling “pleasure” vs. feeling “right”) and distinct negative experiences (e.g., feeling “tension” vs. feeling “defiance”)—and consider the science and art of combining them with engagement strength for maximal persuasion and influence.

Assessment/Learning Outcomes III Track Summary

Assessment, by definition, is a means of estimating the quality or value of something. In this case assessment may be geared toward students directly in the form of enhancing learning, faculty in terms of better teaching, departments for improved curriculum development, and institutions for the purpose of public relations, resource allocation, and accreditation. This panel examined assessment in all of these cases, with a particular focus on assessment of learning outcomes. Learning outcomes are at the very essence of what we as teachers are trying to achieve and assessment provides us with ways to determine whether we are actually meeting these goals. The purpose of this track was to examine both assessment and learning outcomes and to develop ways to improve both. This article synthesizes the main findings of papers presented in the track together with the ensuing discussion. The article is split into five major topics: the role of assessment, the uses of assessment, the inevitability of assessment, approaches of assessment, and how we do assessment.

The values of life.

In Life's Dominion Dworkin aims at defusing the controversy about abortion and euthanasia by redefining its terms. Basically it is not a dispute about the right to life, but about its value. Liberals should grant that human life has not only a personal, but also an intrinsic value; conservatives should accept the principle of toleration which requires to let people decide for themselves about matters of intrinsic value. Dworkin fails, however, to distinguish between two kinds of personal value: (1) the value of something to a person, when he actually or dispositionally desires it, or finds it pleasant; and (2) the value of something to a person, when it's objectively contributes to his well-being, as defined by reference to his personal point of view, whether or not he ever perceives it as so contributing. He also fails to distinguish between two meanings of the concept of 'intrinsic value': (3) ultimate, i.e. non-instrumental personal value of kind (2); (4) the impersonal value of something which is not good-for-anybody, but simply good, i.e. not a constituent of someone's well-being. Dworkin argues that the human fetus from conception onwards has a value, that it is not a personal value of kind (1), and therefore must be an intrinsic value. But the value of the life of the fetus is not a personal value of kind (2) either and therefore not an intrinsic value of kind (3): it is normally a constituent of the well-being of the pregnant woman, but that doesn't constitute its value, and it is not good 'for' the fetus itself in the relevant sense, because it doesn't have a personal point of view. If, however, the fetus' life is allowed to have an intrinsic value of kind (4), the conservative cannot be refuted by appeal to the principle of toleration, for this only concerns intrinsic value of kind (3). The liberal, indeed, should recognize that the fetus' life has a value, but it is neither a personal value (1) or (2), nor an impersonal value (4), but rather a relational value which gradually develops from some point substantially later than conception.

Are Value Judgments Synthetic A Posteriori?

Concerning the epistemology of value judgments, I remain an unrepentant empiricist. They are synthetic a posteriori. Judgments of intrinsic value are about what is or would be liked or disliked for its own sake. Judgments of extrinsic value are about what is or would be liked or disliked for the sake of another, or, in other words, about whether (and to what extent) things' have a capacity to satisfy or frustrate our wants. Some conscious experiences have both intrinsic and extrinsic value, so the distinction between them is not mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. In what follows, I shall present some arguments which together will show that whether or not something is good or bad or has value is an empirical fact about it, as are whether or not it dissolves in water or shatters when it is struck. My analysis of value is naturalistic in the narrow sense that the value of something is one of its empirical characteristics, and in the broad sense that value is not something supernatural which must be revealed by a god or something nonnatural which must be intuited by those whose value sense is keen.