Outcome Valence Research Articles

Curiosity or savouring? Information seeking is modulated by both uncertainty and valence.

Curiosity is pervasive in our everyday lives, but we know little about the factors that contribute to this drive. In the current study, we assessed whether curiosity about uncertain outcomes is modulated by the valence of the information, i.e. whether the information is good or bad news. Using a lottery task in which outcome uncertainty, expected value and outcome valence (gain versus loss) were manipulated independently, we found that curiosity is overall higher for gains compared with losses and that curiosity increased with increasing outcome uncertainty for both gains and losses. These effects of uncertainty and valence did not interact, indicating that the motivation to reduce uncertainty and the motivation to maximize positive information represent separate, independent drives.

Single-trial modeling separates multiple overlapping prediction errors during reward processing in human EEG

Learning signals during reinforcement learning and cognitive control rely on valenced reward prediction errors (RPEs) and non-valenced salience prediction errors (PEs) driven by surprise magnitude. A core debate in reward learning focuses on whether valenced and non-valenced PEs can be isolated in the human electroencephalogram (EEG). We combine behavioral modeling and single-trial EEG regression to disentangle sequential PEs in an interval timing task dissociating outcome valence, magnitude, and probability. Multiple regression across temporal, spatial, and frequency dimensions characterized a spatio-tempo-spectral cascade from early valenced RPE value to non-valenced RPE magnitude, followed by outcome probability indexed by a late frontal positivity. Separating negative and positive outcomes revealed the valenced RPE value effect is an artifact of overlap between two non-valenced RPE magnitude responses: frontal theta feedback-related negativity on losses and posterior delta reward positivity on wins. These results reconcile longstanding debates on the sequence of components representing reward and salience PEs in the human EEG.

The influence of contextual factors on the subjective value of control.

The propensity to perceive and exert control in our environment contributes to both our adaptive behavior and general well-being. Prior studies have shown that humans have an inherent behavioral bias toward control-conferring environments and that this bias translates into greater subjective affect and is protective of our well-being. As such, it is vital to understand contextual factors that can alter our preference for control. In our previous work, we demonstrated that the behavioral bias toward control can be captured experimentally as the subjective value of control using a novel Value of Control task. We adapted this task in two experiments to study whether one's subjective value of control is (a) tied to overestimation of success probability or outcome magnitude (Experiment 1) and (b) affected by the contextual valence of a decision (e.g., gain, loss; Experiment 2). Using a within-subjects design (Experiment 1), we found that participants showed similar behavioral bias toward control regardless of whether probability or magnitude was manipulated, suggesting that the perception of control can increase both how much a reward is subjectively worth and the probability estimation for obtaining the given reward. Using a between-subjects design (Experiment 2), we showed that when the outcome was framed as a potential loss, participants significantly lowered their subjective value of control, suggesting that outcome valence plays a role in shaping how much perceived control influences our behavior. Collectively, these findings offer further insight into the malleability of an individual's perception of control and drive to perform control-seeking behaviors. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Autonomic arousal tracks outcome salience not valence in monkeys making social decisions.

The evolutionary and neural underpinnings of human prosociality are still being identified. A growing body of evidence suggests that some species find the sight of another individual receiving a reward reinforcing, called vicarious reinforcement, and that this capacity is supported by a network of brain areas including the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the amygdala. At the same time, analyses of autonomic arousal have been increasingly used to contextualize and guide neural research, especially for studies of reward processing. Here, we characterized the autonomic pupil response of eight monkeys across two laboratories in two different versions of a vicarious reinforcement paradigm. Monkeys were cued as to whether an upcoming reward would be delivered to them, another monkey, or nobody and could accept or decline the offer. As expected, all monkeys in both laboratories showed a marked preference for juice to the self, together with a reliable prosocial preference for juice to a social partner compared to juice to nobody. However, contrary to our expectations, we found that pupils were widest in anticipation of juice to the self, moderately sized in anticipation of juice to nobody, and narrowest in anticipation of juice to a social partner. This effect was seen across both laboratories and regardless of specific task parameters. The seemingly paradoxical pupil effect can be explained by a model in which pupil size tracks outcome salience, prosocial tendencies track outcome valence, and the relation between salience and valence is U-shaped. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

A latent profile analysis of teachers’ causal attribution for academic success or failure

In educational contexts, interpersonal attributional theory (Weiner, 2019) posits that teachers’ beliefs about the causes underlying their students’ academic performance vary along the causal dimensions of locus of causality, stability, personal controllability, and others’ controllability. Based on this framework, this study aimed at identifying teachers’ attribution profiles based on their perceptions about the causes of their students’ achievements. Two hundred eighty-nine experienced and novice French primary school teachers reported their causal beliefs about a student’s success or failure at a reading test, as well as their emotional and behavioral reactions to their student’s outcome. The data were analyzed using latent profile analyses, which identified five teachers’ attribution profiles that varied on the four causal dimensions. The results showed that profile memberships were greatly determined by the student’s outcome valence: three teachers’ attribution profiles were especially related to failure and two additional profiles to success. Profile memberships were associated with various cognitive, emotional, and behavioral reactions in line with the interpersonal attributional theory of motivation. The powerless profile — high external and uncontrollable attributions — indicated the lowest level of helping behavior. The conscientious profile — high internal and controllable attributions — indicated the highest levels of pride and student’s responsibility. Overall, these results partially support Weiner’s interpersonal attributional theory of motivation using a person-centered approach.

Neural signatures of arbitration between Pavlovian and instrumental action selection.

Pavlovian associations drive approach towards reward-predictive cues, and avoidance of punishment-predictive cues. These associations "misbehave" when they conflict with correct instrumental behavior. This raises the question of how Pavlovian and instrumental influences on behavior are arbitrated. We test a computational theory according to which Pavlovian influence will be stronger when inferred controllability of outcomes is low. Using a model-based analysis of a Go/NoGo task with human subjects, we show that theta-band oscillatory power in frontal cortex tracks inferred controllability, and that these inferences predict Pavlovian action biases. Functional MRI data revealed an inferior frontal gyrus correlate of action probability and a ventromedial prefrontal correlate of outcome valence, both of which were modulated by inferred controllability.

Age differences in decision making under known risk: The role of working memory and impulsivity.

This study examined whether age differences in risky decision making are dependent on known probability and value of outcomes (i.e., the expected value [EV]), the valence of anticipated outcomes (gains or losses), and individual differences in working memory and impulsivity. We used a task that varied risk independently from EV so that taking risks could be advantageous or disadvantageous. Results indicated differential developmental courses for the sensitivity to EV and outcome valence from early to late adolescence. An increase in risk-advantageous but a decrease in risk-disadvantageous behavior was obtained between early-to-mid and late adolescence. All adolescents showed higher risky behavior when losses rather than gains were expected. Age differences in the sensitivity to EV were fully mediated by individual differences in working memory but not by self-reported impulsivity, suggesting that decision making under known risk is strongly limited by the maturation of cognitive control processes. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

The impact of social anxiety on feedback-based go and nogo learning

The term “Pavlovian” bias describes the phenomenon that learning to execute a response to obtain a reward or to inhibit a response to avoid punishment is much easier than learning the reverse. The present study investigated the interplay between this learning bias and individual levels of social anxiety. Since avoidance behavior is a hallmark feature of social anxiety and high levels of social anxiety have been associated with better learning from negative feedback, it is conceivable that the Pavlovian bias is altered in individuals with high social anxiety, with a strong tendency to avoid negative feedback, especially (but not only) in a nogo context. In addition, learning may be modulated by the individual propensity to learn from positive or negative feedback, which can be assessed as a trait-like feature. A sample of 84 healthy university students completed an orthogonalized go/nogo task that decoupled action type (go/nogo) and outcome valence (win/avoid) and a probabilistic selection task based upon which the individual propensity to learn from positive and negative feedback was determined. Self-reported social anxiety and learning propensity were used as predictors in linear mixed-effect model analysis of performance accuracy in the go/nogo task. Results revealed that high socially anxious subjects with a propensity to learn better from negative feedback showed particularly pronounced learning for nogo to avoid while lacking significant learning for nogo to win as well as go to avoid. This result pattern suggests that high levels of social anxiety in concert with negative learning propensity hamper the overcoming of Pavlovian bias in a win context while facilitating response inhibition in an avoidance context. The present data confirm the robust Pavlovian bias in feedback-based learning and add to a growing body of evidence for modulation of feedback learning by individual factors, such as personality traits. Specifically, results show that social anxiety is associated with altered Pavlovian bias, and might suggest that this effect could be driven by altered basal ganglia function primarily affecting the nogo pathway.

Proximity Bias: Motivated Effects of Spatial Distance on Probability Judgments

One of the most ubiquitous human judgments is that of probabilistic predictions. Past research has shown that probabilistic predictions are influenced by spatial distance: people judge spatially near events as more likely to occur than faraway ones. We show that outcome valence also matters, and document under what conditions the reverse effect occurs. Across eight hypothetical and incentive-compatible studies (combined N = 3,403), we provide evidence of a novel proximity bias, whereby spatial distance and event valence jointly influence probability judgments. When estimating the probability of negative outcomes (contracting a disease), people judge near events as less likely to occur than distant ones. Conversely, when estimating the probability of positive outcomes (meeting an attractive date), people judge near events as more likely to occur than distant ones. We attribute these findings to people’s motivations to approach physically close, positive events, and avoid close, negative events. These results are robust across several contexts, populations, and manipulation and measurement of spatial distance. Overall, the proximity bias we document deepens our understanding of the antecedents of probability judgments.

Do we “fear for the worst” or “Hope for the best” in thinking about the unexpected?: Factors affecting the valence of unexpected outcomes reported for everyday scenarios

Though we often “fear the worst”, worrying that unexpectedly bad things will happen, there are times when we “hope for the best”, imagining that unexpectedly good things will happen, too. The paper explores how the valence of the current situation influences people's imagining of unexpected future events when participants were instructed to think of “something unexpected”. In Experiment 1, participants (N = 127) were asked to report unexpected events to everyday scenarios under different instructional conditions (e.g., asked for “good” or “bad” unexpected events), and manifested a strong negativity bias in response to non-valenced instructions (i.e., being asked to “think of the unexpected” with no valence given). They mainly reported quite “predictable” unexpected outcomes that were negative; however, a post-test (N = 31) showed that the scenarios used were predominantly positive. In Experiment 2 (N = 257), when participants were instructed to think of “something unexpected and bizarre”, under the same instructional manipulations as Experiment 1, this negativity bias was replicated. In Experiment 3, using a design in which positive/negative materials were matched (verified by a pre-test, N = 60), it was found that when participants (N = 102) were given negative scenarios, they reported more positive events than they do when they are given positive scenarios. Though responding still retained an overwhelming negative bias, this result provided some evidence for a weaker valence-countering strategy; that is, where a negative scenario can lead to positive unexpected events being mentioned, and a positive scenario leads to negative unexpected events being reported. The implications of these results for people's projections of unexpected futures in their everyday lives is discussed.

Sensory attenuation of action outcomes of varying amplitude and valence.

Stimuli caused by self-initiated actions are perceived as less intense than those caused externally; this effect is called sensory attenuation (SA). In two experiments, we aimed to assess the impact of the amplitude of outcomes and its affective valence on SA and explicit ratings of sense of agency. This allowed us to test the predictions of the available SA frameworks and better understand the link between SA, affect, and agency. The results indicated that SA can be reversed, and such sensory amplification is driven by low-amplitude and positive-valence outcomes. We also show that intentional action influences the perceived valence of outcomes, and that modulations of explicit sense of agency are divergent from those of SA. Our study shows that valence influences the processing of the amplitude of intentional action outcomes and suggests that none of the currently available frameworks give full justice to SA's variability.

The Event-Related Potentials Responding to Outcome Valence and Expectancy Violation during Feedback Processing.

Feedback-related negativity (FRN) is believed to encode reward prediction error (RPE), a term describing whether the outcome is better or worse than expected. However, some studies suggest that it may reflect unsigned prediction error (UPE) instead. Some disagreement remains as to whether FRN is sensitive to the interaction of outcome valence and prediction error (PE) or merely responsive to the absolute size of PE. Moreover, few studies have compared FRN in appetitive and aversive domains to clarify the valence effect or examine PE's quantitative modulation. To investigate the impact of valence and parametrical PE on FRN, we varied the prediction and feedback magnitudes within a probabilistic learning task in valence (gain and loss domains, Experiment 1) and non-valence contexts (pure digits, Experiment 2). Experiment 3 was identical to Experiment 1 except that some blocks emphasized outcome valence, while others highlighted predictive accuracy. Experiments 1 and 2 revealed a UPE encoder; Experiment 3 found an RPE encoder when valence was emphasized and a UPE encoder when predictive accuracy was highlighted. In this investigation, we demonstrate that FRN is sensitive to outcome valence and expectancy violation, exhibiting a preferential response depending on the dimension that is emphasized.

Temporal dynamics of real-world emotion are more strongly linked to prediction error than outcome.

Primarily based on laboratory studies, theories of affect propose that emotions are driven by the valence of outcomes as well as the difference between the outcome itself and the expected outcome (i.e., the prediction error [PE]). Yet no work has assessed the drivers of emotion using real-world, personally meaningful events on timescales over which human emotion unfolds. We developed an event-triggered, ecological momentary assessment procedure measuring positive and negative affect (PA and NA, respectively) in university students as they received exam grades for which they had made predictions. We split data into exploratory and confirmatory samples, and built computational models predicting the time course of PA and NA and demonstrate that a model incorporating both exam grade and grade PE accounted for the time course of PA and NA better than a model solely using exam grades. Further, grade PEs were stronger predictors of the time course of PA and NA than the grades themselves. Similarly, the effects of PEs also persisted longer for NA than PA. These data indicate that deviations from expectations are critical determinants of the temporal dynamics of real-world emotion. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Feeling in Control: The Role of Cardiac Timing in the Sense of Agency

The sense of agency describes the experience of controlling one’s body to cause desired effects in the world. We explored whether this is influenced by interoceptive processes. Specifically, we investigated whether the sense of agency changes depending on where, in the cardiac cycle (systole or diastole), the action was executed and where the outcome of the action occurred. In two experiments, participants completed decision-making task to win/lose money. Explicit (ratings of control) and implicit (temporal judgement) measures of agency were differentially affected by cardiovascular state. Implicit agency scores were affected by the cardiac phase at the point of action execution. Explicit ratings of control were affected by the type of (free vs. instructed) and by outcome valence (win vs. lose). The time of the action was uniformly distributed across the cardiac cycle. These results show interoceptive impact on agency, but that cardiac cycle may affect explicit and implicit agency differently.

Expected value and sensitivity to punishment modulate insular cortex activity during risky decision making

The exact contribution of the insula to risky decision making remains unclear, as are the specific outcome parameters and inter-individual characteristics that modulate insular activity prior to a risky choice. This fMRI study examines the contributions of outcome valence, magnitude, probability, and expected value (EV) to insular activity during risky decision making, and explores the influence of sensitivity to reward and to punishment, and anxiety, to insular activity. Participants (N = 31) performed a gambling task requiring choice between two roulettes with different outcome magnitude, probability and EV, under gain and loss conditions separately, and filled questionnaires assessing sensitivity to punishment/reward, and state/trait anxiety. Parametric analyses were conducted to examine the modulation of brain activity during decision making in relation to each task parameter. Correlations were examined between insular activity and psychometric questionnaires. EV of the selected roulette was associated with right posterior insula activation during decision making. Higher sensitivity to punishment was associated with lower bilateral insular activation. These findings suggest that the right posterior insula is involved in tracking the EV of a risky option during decision making. The involvement of the insula when making risky decisions also appears to be influenced by inter-individual differences in sensitivity to punishment.

Reflecting on the Past, Looking Towards the Future: The Effects of Case Analysis on Forecasting

ABSTRACT Prior research has demonstrated the importance of forecasting to creative problem-solving performance. Less is known about how case analysis and outcome valence impact forecasting performance. In this study, 266 participants were asked to assume the role of a Marketing Director of a clothing company and develop a marketing campaign for entering a new market. Prior to developing this final campaign, participants were asked to analyze company cases, develop an outline of their plan, and forecast the implications of this plan. Although manipulations did not impact final problem solutions, analysis of weaknesses of present company operations and generation of positive outcomes were found to contribute to the highest levels of forecasting. In turn, forecasting was found to predict the quality, originality, and elegance of final marketing plans. The implications of these findings for encouraging people to engage in forecasting are discussed.

Using reinforcement learning models in social neuroscience: frameworks, pitfalls and suggestions of best practices.

The recent years have witnessed a dramatic increase in the use of reinforcement learning (RL) models in social, cognitive and affective neuroscience. This approach, in combination with neuroimaging techniques such as functional magnetic resonance imaging, enables quantitative investigations into latent mechanistic processes. However, increased use of relatively complex computational approaches has led to potential misconceptions and imprecise interpretations. Here, we present a comprehensive framework for the examination of (social) decision-making with the simple Rescorla–Wagner RL model. We discuss common pitfalls in its application and provide practical suggestions. First, with simulation, we unpack the functional role of the learning rate and pinpoint what could easily go wrong when interpreting differences in the learning rate. Then, we discuss the inevitable collinearity between outcome and prediction error in RL models and provide suggestions of how to justify whether the observed neural activation is related to the prediction error rather than outcome valence. Finally, we suggest posterior predictive check is a crucial step after model comparison, and we articulate employing hierarchical modeling for parameter estimation. We aim to provide simple and scalable explanations and practical guidelines for employing RL models to assist both beginners and advanced users in better implementing and interpreting their model-based analyses.

Processing Facial Expressions That Conflict With Their Meanings to an Observer: An Event Related Potential Study

As social signals, identical facial expressions can be perceived differently, even oppositely, depending on the circumstances. Fast and accurate understanding of the information conveyed by others’ facial expressions is crucial for successful social interaction. In the current study, we used electroencephalographic analysis of several event-related potentials (ERPs) to investigate how the brain processes the facial expressions of others when they indicate different self-outcomes. In half of the trial blocks, a happy face indicated “Win” and an angry face indicated “Lose.” In the other half of the blocks, the rule was reversed. The results showed that the N170 could distinguish expression valence and the N300 could distinguish outcome valence. The valence of the expression (happy or angry) and the valence of the outcome (Win or Loss) interacted with each other in the early, automatic perceptual processing stage (N1) as well as in the later, cognitive evaluation stage (P300). Standardized Low-Resolution Electromagnetic Tomography (sLORETA) results indicated that the N1 modulation only occurred for happy faces, which may relate to automatic emotion regulation, while the interaction on P300 was significant only for angry faces, which might be associated with the regulation of negative emotions.

Asymmetric coupling of action and outcome valence in active and observational feedback learning

Learning to execute a response to obtain a reward or to inhibit a response to avoid punishment is much easier than learning the reverse, which has been referred to as “Pavlovian” biases. Despite a growing body of research into similarities and differences between active and observational learning, it is as yet unclear if Pavlovian learning biases are specific for active task performance, i.e., learning from feedback provided for one’s own actions, or if they persist also when learning by observing another person’s actions and subsequent outcomes. The present study, therefore, investigated the influence of action and outcome valence in active and observational feedback learning. Healthy adult volunteers completed a go/nogo task that decoupled outcome valence (win/loss) and action (execution/inhibition) either actively or by observing a virtual co-player’s responses and subsequent feedback. Moreover, in a more naturalistic follow-up experiment, pairs of subjects were tested with the same task, with one subject as active learner and the other as observational learner. The results revealed Pavlovian learning biases both in active and in observational learning, with learning of go responses facilitated in the context of reward obtainment, and learning of nogo responses facilitated in the context of loss avoidance. Although the neural correlates of active and observational feedback learning have been shown to differ to some extent, these findings suggest similar mechanisms to underlie both types of learning with respect to the influence of Pavlovian biases. Moreover, performance levels and result patterns were similar in those observational learners who had observed a virtual co-player and those who had completed the task together with an active learner, suggesting that inclusion of a virtual co-player in a computerized task provides an effective manipulation of agency.

Internal control beliefs shape positive affect and associated neural dynamics during outcome valuation

Experiencing events as controllable is essential for human well-being. Based on classic psychological theory, we test how internal control beliefs impact the affective valuation of task outcomes, neural dynamics and ensuing behavioral preferences. In three consecutive studies we show that dynamics in positive affect increase, with a qualitative shift towards self-evaluative pride, when agents believe they caused a given outcome. We demonstrate that these outcomes engage brain networks processing self-referential information in the cortical midline. Here, activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex tracks outcome valence regarding both success as well as internal control, and covaries with positive affect in response to outcomes. These affective dynamics also relate to increased functional coupling between the ventral striatum and cortical midline structures. Finally, we show that pride predicts preferences for control, even at monetary costs. Our investigations extend recent models of positive affect and well-being, and emphasize that control beliefs drive intrinsic motivation.