US Economic Sanctions Research Articles

The Effect of Economic Sanctions on Treatment of Thalassemia Major Referring to Selected Medical Centers in Fars Province

Background: In the list of sanctions, as a destructive political tool against some countries, drug trade is not officially prohibited, but according to existing reports, patients in sanctioned countries are having difficulty obtaining the drugs they need in practice. The purpose of this study was to investigate the effect of US and EU economic sanctions against Iran on the treatment of thalassemia major patients in Iran. Methods: To achieve the objectives of the study, 249 major thalassemia patients referred to five treatment centers in Fars province (August, 2019), who were treated with Deferasirox oral medications (Osveral or Exjade) and injectable forms (desferal), were studied and the type of medication used, their access to these drugs, and serum ferritin levels before and one year after the last economic sanction, were recorded in a Demographic information form. Data were analyzed by SPSS software using Kappa coefficient. Results: The results of the study showed that after the latest Iranian sanction, the types of medications used changed from foreign and injectable (Desferal and Exjade) to Iranian medication (Osvral), but serum ferritin levels did not change significantly. Conclusions: During the economic sanctions, the use of Iranian oral iron repellent drugs could reduce the health system’s budget for the annual cost of treating thalassemia major patients. © 2020, Advanced Scientific Research. All rights reserved.

Coronavirus Disease 2019 in 5 Neighboring Limited-Resource Countries: A Financial and Health Threat

Coronavirus Disease 2019 in 5 Neighboring Limited-Resource Countries: A Financial and Health Threat

Sanctioned to Death? The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Life Expectancy and its Gender Gap

We empirically analyse the effect of UN and US economic sanctions on life expectancy and its gender gap in target countries. Our sample covers 98 less developed and newly industrialised countries over the period 1977–2012. We employ a matching approach to account for the endogeneity of sanctions. Our results indicate that an average episode of UN sanctions reduces life expectancy by about 1.2–1.4 years. The corresponding decrease of 0.4–0.5 years under US sanctions is significantly smaller. In addition, we find evidence that women are affected more severely by the imposition of sanctions. Sanctions not being ‘gender-blind’ indicates that they disproportionately affect (the life expectancy of) the more vulnerable members of society. We also detect effect heterogeneity, as the reduction in life expectancy accumulates over time and countries with a better political environment are less severely affected by economic sanctions. Finally, we provide some evidence that an increase in child mortality and Cholera deaths as well as a decrease in public spending on health care are transmission channels through which UN sanctions adversely affect life expectancy in the targeted countries.

Sanctioned to Death? The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Life Expectancy and Its Gender Gap

We empirically analyze the effect of UN and US economic sanctions on life expectancy and its gender gap in target countries. Our sample covers 98 less developed and newly industrialized countries over the period 1977–2012. We employ a matching approach to account for the endogeneity of sanctions. Our results indicate that an average episode of UN sanctions reduces life expectancy by about 1.2–1.4 years. The corresponding decrease of 0.4–0.5 years under US sanctions is significantly smaller. In addition, we find evidence that women are affected more severely by the imposition of sanctions. Sanctions not being gender-blind indicates that they disproportionately affect (the life expectancy of) the more vulnerable members of society. We also detect effect heterogeneity, as the reduction in life expectancy accumulates over time and countries with a better political environment are less severely affected by economic sanctions. Finally, we provide some evidence that an increase in child mortality and Cholera deaths as well as a decrease in public spending on health care are transmission channels through which UN sanctions adversely affect life expectancy in the targeted countries.

Enforcing US Economic Sanctions: Why Whale Hunting Works

No country in the world employs economic sanctions more than the United States. The way the US government enforces these sanctions can have billion-dollar ramifications for companies, alter global ...

CONSEQUENCES OF IRAN’S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE NUCLEAR DEAL FOR EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY

The circumstances of Iran’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was signed between Iran and the six great powers in 2015, were considered. It is indicated that the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 and US economic sanctions against Iran were the main reasons for Tehran’s phased withdrawal from the nuclear deal. It was noted that the assassinations of two well-known Iranian figures at the beginning and at the end of 2020 – General Qasem Soleimani and nuclear physicist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh provoked Iran to completely abandon the provisions of the JCPOA and to radicalize its nuclear policy. The implications of Iran’s gradual withdrawal from the nuclear deal for the security of Euro-Atlantic structures are analyzed. It has been proven that the risks associated with the development of the Iranian nuclear program were relatively insignificant during 2019. However, these risks began to increase in 2020 and especially at the beginning of 2021. The circumstances of Iran’s decision on possible increasing the uranium enrichment level to 20% and on the probable limiting the access to Iranian nuclear facilities for international inspectors were considered. It is analyzed whether such a decision of Iran can bring this country closer to obtaining nuclear weapons. It is concluded that, most likely, despite the technical capabilities, Iran will not make a political decision to produce an atomic bomb in the near future to avoid its complete isolation. Therefore, the potential nuclear conflict with Iran does not yet threaten to Euro-Atlantic security. Differences in attitudes towards the Iranian nuclear program between the United States and its European NATO allies during Donald Trump’s presidency are traced. The prospects for a change in the American position toward Iran during Joseph Biden’s presidency are assessed. The article analyzes the difficulties that the United States and its allies may face in the course of negotiations with Iran during the presidency of J. Biden. It is indicated that the influential conservative elements in Iran may delay Iran’s return to the nuclear deal in order to bargain for better conditions. It is concluded that the United States and its allies should respond to possible Iranian provocations by economic sanctions rather than by forceful actions, which could lead to an escalation that is dangerous for the Euro-Atlantic security.

Реакция Исламской Республики Иран на выход США из Совместного всеобъемлющего плана действий

В мае 2018 г. президент США Д. Трамп заявил о выходе Соединенных Штатов из Совместного всеобъемлющего плана действий, принятого в 2015 г. для решения иранской ядерной проблемы. В данной статье анализируется то, как на этот шаг прореагировало руководство Ирана, его население, и каковы перспективы достижения целей, которые ставил перед собой официальный Вашингтон. Помимо внутриполитических соображений и укрепления союзнических отношений с Израилем и Саудовской Аравией, Д. Трамп рассчитывал, что его инициатива как минимум приведет к изменению внешней политики Ирана, а как максимум — к смене власти в Тегеране в результате недовольства населения своим бедственным положением. Очевидно, что американское руководство просчиталось. Экономическая ситуация в Иране действительно ухудшилась, но все основные направления внешней политики исламской республики остались в силе, при этом Иран стал наращивать свое сотрудничество с Сирией, Россий и Китаем. Усилилась и антиизраильская риторика официальных иранских властей. Новые экономические санкции со стороны США привели к росту антиамериканских настроений, вместо того чтобы подстегнуть антиправительственные выступления. Таким образом, в очередной раз в своей истории в случае внешнего давления иранцы сплачиваются вокруг своего руководства.

Precision-guided or blunt? The effects of US economic sanctions on human rights

This study analyzes the consequences of economic sanctions for the target country’s human rights situation. We offer a political economy explanation for different types of human rights infringements or improvements in reaction to economic shocks caused by sanctions. Based on that explanation, we derive hypotheses linking sanctions to four types of human rights: economic rights, political and civil rights, basic human rights, and emancipatory rights. We use endogenous treatment regression models to test those hypotheses by estimating the causal average treatment effect of US economic sanctions on each type of human rights within a uniform empirical framework. Unlike previous studies, we find no support for adverse effects of sanctions on economic rights or basic human rights, once the endogenous selection of sanctioned countries is modelled. With respect to women’s rights, our findings even indicate a positive effect of sanctions that is associated with improvements in women’s economic rights. Only our results for political rights and civil liberties suggest significant deterioration under economic sanctions. We conclude that it is important to account for the potential endogeneity of economic sanctions and to distinguish different dimensions of human rights, as the effects of economic sanctions along those dimensions may vary considerably.

Precision-Guided or Blunt? The Effects of US Economic Sanctions on Human Rights

This study contributes to the literature that analyzes the consequences of economic sanctions for the target country’s human rights situation. We offer a political economy explanation for different types of human rights infringements or improvements in reaction to economic shocks caused by sanctions. Based on this, we derive hypotheses linking sanctions to four types of human rights: economic rights, political and civil rights, basic human rights, and emancipatory rights. We use endogenous treatment-regression models to estimate the causal average treatment effect of US economic sanctions on each type of human rights within a uniform empirical framework. In contrast to previous studies, we find no adverse effects of sanctions on economic rights, political and civil rights, and basic human rights, once the endogenous selection into sanctions is modeled. With respect to women’s rights, our findings even indicate a positive relationship. Emancipatory rights are, on average, strengthened when a country experiences sanctions by the US. Our findings are robust and we find little evidence for effect heterogeneity between types of target countries or sanctions. Most importantly, this study shows that the endogeneity of treatment assignment must be modeled when the consequences of sanctions are studied empirically.

Are UN and US economic sanctions a cause or cure for the environment: empirical evidence from Iran

The present study was performed to empirically investigate the short- and long-term effects of multilateral-unilateral UN–US economic sanctions on the natural environment of Iran. It is benefited from autoregressive distributed lag methodology for empirical analysis during 1973–2017. The results revealed that only unilateral economic sanctions of the US are indeed damaging to the target Iran’s CO2 emissions. Although US economic sanctions cause short-term improvements in Iran’s environment, it results in long-term deteriorating effects. Moreover, the detrimental long-term effects of UN–US’s severe sanctions on the environment are stronger than their mild sanctions. The results obtained also suggest both short- and long-term U-shaped (EKC) association between per capita GDP and CO2 emissions. Granger causality tests indicate a one-way causality from US unilateral economic sanctions toward CO2 emissions. The results suggest the potential and importance of the effects of lifting sanctions on controlling CO2 emissions and sustainable development in Iran.

The compliance dilemma: economic sanctions and the AIPN Model Form International Joint Operating Agreement

Abstract The current AIPN Model Form International JOA (the ‘Model Form’) does not sufficiently address circumstances and issues arising from economic sanctions, and the global contemporary trend demonstrates a significant increase in the use of sanctions by both multi-national governing bodies and nation-states. The USA implements unilateral economic sanctions more than any other country, and because US sanctions are often designed to prevent petroleum-related business with targeted countries and parties. Accordingly, this article (i) analyzes the impact US economic sanctions may have on the ability of international JOA members to both comply with sanctions and protect their interests under the JOA, and (ii) proposes certain definitions and a number of additional provisions the Model Form can adopt to address the issues arising from economic sanctions and protect the each party's interests.

Sanctioned to Death? The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Life Expectancy and its Gender Gap

We empirically analyze the effect of UN and US economic sanctions on life expectancy and its gender gap in target countries. Our sample covers 98 less developed and newly industrialized countries over the period 1977–2012. We employ a matching approach to account for the endogeneity of sanctions. Our results indicate that an average episode of UN sanctions reduces life expectancy by about 1.2–1.4 years. The corresponding decrease of 0.4–0.5 years under an average episode of US sanctions is significantly smaller. In addition, we find evidence that women are affected more severely by the imposition of sanctions. Sanctions not being “gender-blind” indicates that they disproportionately affect (the life expectancy of) the more vulnerable members of society. We also detect effect heterogeneity, as the reduction in life expectancy accumulates over time and countries with a better political environment are less heavily affected by economic sanctions. Finally, we provide some evidence that an increase in child mortality and Cholera deaths as well as a decrease in public spending on health care are transmission channels through which UN sanctions adversely affect life expectancy in the targeted countries.

Economic Sanctions and Human Rights: Quantifying the Legal Proportionality Principle

The proportionality principle, as the cardinal principle of international law, includes a necessity and a proportionality test, both of which rest on empirical premises. The necessity test involves an assessment of whether a legal sanction is well-suited to achieve its objective. The proportionality test questions the causal link between the sanction and the human rights situation in the country against which the sanction is aimed. This study analyzes the empirical basis of the proportionality principle by examining the consequences of economic sanctions for the target country’s human rights situation. We use endogenous treatment‐regression models to test the empirical basis of the proportionality principle by estimating the causal average treatment effect of US economic sanctions on different types of human rights within a uniform empirical framework. We find that economic sanctions do not pass the legal necessity test in cases where the purpose of the sanctions is to improve the human rights situation. On the contrary, we find that such sanctions actually lead to a deterioration of the human rights situation. Moreover, our finding that the sanctions have no effect on basic, economic, and emancipatory human rights calls into question the dominant view that economic sanctions are disproportionate. On a general note, our study underscores the empirical contingencies of a core legal principle under international and national law.

Focus: An unprecedented challenging situation!

In the last nine months - and especially after the massive popular protests at the turn of 2017-2018 - a struggle has arisen across Iran’s industry and workforce, one which has gained fierce impetus and which shows no sign of abating any time soon. In addition to their urgent demands for unpaid wages and salaries, working people have also targeted the policies of regime which have brought about the widespread privatisation and plunder of national resources; attempts to remove requirements for occupational safety and the right to form independent union organisations; continual efforts to raid the social security fund and the retirement schemes paid for by workers; and government schemes for the deregulation of labour markets and labour relations. The growth and spread of the workers’ protest movement has been one of the important features of the country's political scene in recent months. The implementation of anti-popular policies such as privatisation and economic liberalisation has imposed very tough conditions for the working class, who can no longer bear this situation. The strike of the workers at Hepco, the Haftappeh sugar cane complex workers and that of the truck drivers, as well as the onslaught by law enforcement and security forces on the workers of the Ahvaz National Steel Industrial Group - along with and dozens of other protests and strikes - reflect the growing grievances of Iran’s working people. In addition to the strikes and meetings in workshops and factories throughout the country, some significant protests took place at some of the most important industrial-manufacturing plants which employ a considerable number of industrial and technical workers. These include Hepco, Polyacryl, various parts of the national railways, parts of the operational phases of the South Pars gas field, Tabriz Machine Tools Manufacturing Company, Kerman copper mining and the refineries in Elam and Kermanshah. The atmosphere in these key manufacturing plants is filled with discontent, tension and volatility. The growing number of protests by teachers, who form an integral part of the trade union movement in Iran, must also be mentioned. These have been violently crushed by the regime’s security forces in recent weeks. Their main demands include job security, fair wages, abolition of temporary contracts, payment of unpaid and late wages and opposition to privatisation. Prospect of US economic sanctions These protest movements are taking place in the wake of the political developments and challenges affecting Iran which arise from the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) nuclear agreement. This is resulting in a realignment of the regime’s political forces and factions and is therefore deemed to be very important. Poverty, unemployment and lack of job security are the main factors behind these protests. Continuous devaluation of the currency coupled with inflation has brought more poverty to an already struggling working class. Over the past 3 months Iranian currency has lost half its exchange value. Workers complain that their wages are in rials (Iranian currency) while their expenditures are in US dollars. According to official statistics, the accommodation price index in Tehran has increased some 33 percent in the last 12 months prior to last winter. Over the same period, the housing rental index has increased by 26.6 percent. Furthermore, prices of goods and services have increased by 35 percent resulting in an ever higher cost of living and more hardship. Even Faramarz Toufighi, the workers’ representative on the official ‘Supreme Labour Council’ acknowledges that the situation is catastrophic: It is anticipated that by the first of August the inflation for items in the basket of living consumer goods will be dazzling. A leap of 40 percent in poultry prices, a 30 percent jump in meat prices, a 18 percent jump in rice and oil prices, and a 28 percent jump in housing and … indicates that government agencies have given up all attempts to control the spiralling inflation. He predicts that: 83 percent of workers live under the existence threshold. Given the recent policies of the US administration in attempting to torpedo the 5+1 nuclear deal with Iran and renewed threats of economic sanctions - and even military intervention - the economy has been seriously affected. The flight of capital in recent months...

Focus: An unprecedented challenging situation!

In the last nine months - and especially after the massive popular protests at the turn of 2017-2018 - a struggle has arisen across Iran’s industry and workforce, one which has gained fierce impetus and which shows no sign of abating any time soon. In addition to their urgent demands for unpaid wages and salaries, working people have also targeted the policies of regime which have brought about the widespread privatisation and plunder of national resources; attempts to remove requirements for occupational safety and the right to form independent union organisations; continual efforts to raid the social security fund and the retirement schemes paid for by workers; and government schemes for the deregulation of labour markets and labour relations. The growth and spread of the workers’ protest movement has been one of the important features of the country's political scene in recent months. The implementation of anti-popular policies such as privatisation and economic liberalisation has imposed very tough conditions for the working class, who can no longer bear this situation. The strike of the workers at Hepco, the Haftappeh sugar cane complex workers and that of the truck drivers, as well as the onslaught by law enforcement and security forces on the workers of the Ahvaz National Steel Industrial Group - along with and dozens of other protests and strikes - reflect the growing grievances of Iran’s working people. In addition to the strikes and meetings in workshops and factories throughout the country, some significant protests took place at some of the most important industrial-manufacturing plants which employ a considerable number of industrial and technical workers. These include Hepco, Polyacryl, various parts of the national railways, parts of the operational phases of the South Pars gas field, Tabriz Machine Tools Manufacturing Company, Kerman copper mining and the refineries in Elam and Kermanshah. The atmosphere in these key manufacturing plants is filled with discontent, tension and volatility. The growing number of protests by teachers, who form an integral part of the trade union movement in Iran, must also be mentioned. These have been violently crushed by the regime’s security forces in recent weeks. Their main demands include job security, fair wages, abolition of temporary contracts, payment of unpaid and late wages and opposition to privatisation. Prospect of US economic sanctions These protest movements are taking place in the wake of the political developments and challenges affecting Iran which arise from the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) nuclear agreement. This is resulting in a realignment of the regime’s political forces and factions and is therefore deemed to be very important. Poverty, unemployment and lack of job security are the main factors behind these protests. Continuous devaluation of the currency coupled with inflation has brought more poverty to an already struggling working class. Over the past 3 months Iranian currency has lost half its exchange value. Workers complain that their wages are in rials (Iranian currency) while their expenditures are in US dollars. According to official statistics, the accommodation price index in Tehran has increased some 33 percent in the last 12 months prior to last winter. Over the same period, the housing rental index has increased by 26.6 percent. Furthermore, prices of goods and services have increased by 35 percent resulting in an ever higher cost of living and more hardship. Even Faramarz Toufighi, the workers’ representative on the official ‘Supreme Labour Council’ acknowledges that the situation is catastrophic: It is anticipated that by the first of August the inflation for items in the basket of living consumer goods will be dazzling. A leap of 40 percent in poultry prices, a 30 percent jump in meat prices, a 18 percent jump in rice and oil prices, and a 28 percent jump in housing and … indicates that government agencies have given up all attempts to control the spiralling inflation. He predicts that: 83 percent of workers live under the existence threshold. Given the recent policies of the US administration in attempting to torpedo the 5+1 nuclear deal with Iran and renewed threats of economic sanctions - and even military intervention - the economy has been seriously affected. The flight of capital in recent months...

The Changing Energy Landscape: The Persian Gulf and South Asia

Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 41, No.4, Summer 2018 The Changing Energy Landscape: The Persian Gulf and South Asia Gawdat Bahgat* Since the dawn of the twenty-first century the broad Middle East has witnessed fundamental overlapping changes that are likely to have significant implications on the entire region and the rest of the world for a long time. Oil prices were mostly high up to 2014. High prices meant massive accumulation of revenues in the coffers of producing countries. This massive wealth has been transformed into political muscles, and leverage. Saudi Arabia was able to use its then, growing economy and oil revenues to establish itself as a major regional power. Two other developments contributed to Riyadh’s ascendency. First, traditional Arab powerhouses like Egypt, Syria, and Iraq have grown poorer and weaker. Their relative weakness has left a ‘power vacuum’ in the Arab world. With its large economy and strong Arab/Islamic credentials, Riyadh is well positioned to claim leadership of the Arab world. Second, for decades most Saudi monarchs were old and adopted very conservative policy both at home and abroad. Since 2015, the young Crown Prince Muhamad Bin Salman (MBS), has consolidated his power and established himself as the de-facto leader. Under his leadership the Saudi domestic and foreign policy has become much more assertive than in previous decades. Domestically, MBS has challenged the religious establishment and other members in the royal family. Regionally, he started a war in neighboring Yemen and imposed embargo on Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) fellow Qatar. In 25 *Gawdat Babgat served as a professor of political science at Indiana University of Pennsylvania from 1995 to 2009 where he also was the Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies. In 2006–07 he earned the Distinguished Faculty Award for research. Bahgat has published numerous books, chapters, and articles on various subjects including oil politics, nuclear proliferation and the Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea regions. His works have been translated in several languages. In 2010, Bahgat began teaching at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C. 26 short, since 2015 MBS has established himself as one of the most influential (and controversial) leaders in the entire Middle East. On the other hand, Iran, another major energy powerhouse, has witnessed key geo-economic and geo-strategic changes. Since the mid1980s , Tehran has been accused of seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. Iran has always categorically denied these accusations. Several rounds of negotiations failed to bring a successful diplomatic conclusion. This failure made Iran subject to severe and comprehensive US, EU, and UN economic sanctions. These sanctions dealt a heavy blow to the country’s hydrocarbon sector, but failed to slow the nuclear program. With the election of President Hasan Rouhani in 2013 the political dynamics in Tehran have changed. Iran successfully negotiated a nuclear deal (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action JCPOA) with global powers. Accordingly, the nuclear-related sanctions have been lifted. Though Iran has never been completely isolated, since the implementation of the JCOPA (January 2016) relations with foreign powers (minus US) have grown tremendously. Tehran has enjoyed growing economic and strategic interactions with most Asian and European powers. As a result Oil and gas production has risen and the Islamic Republic economic outlook is promising. Despite significant challenges, Iran has grown more confident and more assertive both economically and politically in the last few years. This paper is divided into three sections. The first one examines the key changes in the global energy outlook, followed by a discussion of how Riyadh, Tehran, and other Middle East producers have responded to these changes. The concluding section addresses the implications on South Asia region, particularly China, India, and Pakistan. The Emerging Global Energy Landscape For several decades, oil has been the dominant source of energy around the world and Middle Eastern producers have been the main force shaping production and prices. The birth of the oil industry is generally attributed to the famous well drilled for oil in 1859 by Colonel Edwin L. Drake at Titusville, Pennsylvania.1 In addition, it is claimed that F.N. Semyenov was the first to drill a well...

A Perfect Impasse? Cuba's Move Towards the Market and the United States' Move Towards Cuba

AbstractThis article first analyses the internal economic trajectory of the Cuban economic reforms and evaluates their effectiveness in delivering the extensive and intensive development needed to correct Cuba's structural and economic imbalances. It concludes that without the lifting of the US economic sanctions success will at best be only partial, with serious implications for long‐term stability. The article then evaluates the reasons for the US economic sanctions against Cuba and argues that while the embargo policy might have failed to topple the Cuban communist regime, it has served other, largely unacknowledged, purposes that are important in explaining why the policy has persisted. The article concludes by suggesting that the US is not likely to jettison the sanctions regime while Cuba's single‐party, state‐led economic system remains. At the same time, Cuba is not likely to jettison its single‐party system while the sanctions remain.

D’un droit défensif à un droit coopératif : la nécessaire réforme de notre justice pénale des affaires

L’année 2014 a été marquée par deux affaires dans lesquelles de grandes entreprises françaises ont eu à verser des sommes conséquentes au ministère américain de la Justice (DOJ) au titre d’amendes transactionnelles. Les deux grandes entreprises françaises ont peut-être payé pour leurs fautes mais aussi ‒ voire surtout ‒ pour leur mauvaise compréhension d’une nouvelle règle du jeu du « business mondial ». Ces deux affaires illustrent l’apparition d’un nouveau paradigme en droit des affaires, largement inspiré par la culture du droit américain, qu’il est urgent de saisir pour adapter notre droit. Cet enjeu est devenu crucial pour la protection de nos entreprises à l’heure du droit global. Il l’est d’autant plus que le nouveau modèle en construction est en perpétuelle mutation et qu’il est nécessaire de s’adapter rapidement. À cette fin, il convient de détailler les enseignements de ces affaires, non seulement en vue de transformer notre système de justice mais, plus profondément encore, notre culture, et de la mettre ainsi au diapason de notre temps.

The impact of US sanctions on poverty

In this paper, we analyze the effect of US economic sanctions on the target countries' poverty gap during the period 1982–2011. Econometrically, we employ a matching approach to account for differences in the countries' economic and political environment and the likelihood of being exposed to US sanctions. Our results indicate that US sanctions are adversely affecting those living in poverty as we observe a 3.8 percentage point (pp) larger poverty gap in sanctioned countries compared to a control group that is as close as possible in terms of observable pretreatment characteristics. In addition, we show that the impact of sanctions on poverty (i) increases with the severity of sanctions, (ii) is larger for multilateral sanctions than for unilateral sanctions imposed by only the United States, and (iii) is long-lasting as the poverty gap increases over the first 21years of a sanction regime.

A Policy Long Past Its Expiration Date: US Economic Sanctions Against Cuba

The embargo against Cuba is the oldest and most comprehensive U.S. economic sanctions regime against any country in the world. It comprises a complex patchwork of laws and presidential determinations imposed over half a century. Presidents have tightened or relaxed it to suit their own strategy—some seeking to punish the Cuban regime by economic pressure, other seeking to improve relations by resorting to soft power rather than hard. The impact of U.S. sanctions has also varied, at times inflicting serious harm on the Cuban economy, and at times being merely as an expensive annoyance. But the embargo has never been effective at forcing Cuba's revolutionary regime out of power or bending it to Washington's will.