Unmarked Term Research Articles

Grammaticalization of qәl ‘gourd’ in Amharic

The Amharic word qəl ‘gourd’ represents a rare case where a plant term serves as the source of a grammaticalization chain. The development occurred in two stages, first metaphoric change, then grammaticalization proper: gourd > skull/head > Intensive (never Plain) Reflexive (‘he himself, etc.’). This process was entangled with the grammatical evolution of two other words, ras and gəll. Ras, which is the basic unmarked term for ‘head’, as such underwent the basic unmarked grammaticalization into a Plain Reflexive (and only secondarily into an Intensive Reflexive). The other word, gəll ‘separate, individual’, phonetically quite similar to qəl but with no etymological connection to ‘head’, grammaticalized directly to the meaning ‘one’s own, by oneself’, thence secondarily to an Intensive Reflexive (but never a Plain Reflexive). Thus two near-synonyms (qəl, ras ‘head’) underwent two parallel grammaticalizations, but yielding different results: qəl, unlike ras, was never a Plain Reflexive. Why? The distinctive semantic evolution of qəl, I suggest, was partly driven by its phonetic similarity to the historically unrelated gəll, which also was never a Plain Reflexive. The phonetic similarity helped to foster a semantic attraction between the two grammaticalizing morphemes.

The Cultural Significance of Timbre Analysis

This article is in three interrelated parts. In Part 1, I present a methodology for analyzing timbre that combines spectrogram analysis and cultural analysis. I define a number of acoustic timbral attributes to which one may attune when analyzing timbre, organized as oppositional pairs of marked and unmarked terms, in order to both aid in spectrogram analysis and account for some of this cultural and perceptual work.In Part 2, building from Allan Moore’s definition of four functional layers in pop texture, I argue for the adoption of a fifth layer, which I term thenovelty layer.I study its construction in 1980s hit singles via the Yamaha DX7 synthesizer. The novelty layer is imbued with several layers of semiotic significance: it functions in opposition to the melodic layer, comprises instruments whose timbral characteristics are more resistant to blending with the rest of the ensemble, and often uses “world instruments” in 1980s popular music. This latter point is a reflection of the problematic treatment of world music by 1980s music culture. I use my approach to timbre analysis to define the timbral norms for the novelty layer as opposed to Moore’s other layers.In Part 3, I create a dialogic narrative analysis of “Do They Know It’s Christmas?” by Band Aid (1984) that demonstrates what it might mean to transgress these norms. This analysis, in acknowledging the problematic cultural associations of the song, illustrates the rich discourse that can be produced when timbre is made central to the analytical process.

La magnitud de los elefantes indios en las batallas de Rafia (Polibio V 84.5-6) y de Magnesia (Livio XXXVII 39.13) ¿Dónde está el error?

Hasta la colonización de África, ha estado vigente la opinión de que los elefantes indios de Antíoco III, que derrotaron a los libios de Ptolomeo IV en la batalla de Rafia (217 a. C.) descrita por Polibio, eran de tamaño superior. Tito Livio lo confirma a propósito de la batalla de Magnesia (190 a. C.). Sin embargo, el empleo de μέγεθος sugiere un significado diferente de magnitudo, de manera que el error atribuido a Polibio no es tal. Mientras el historiador romano se atiene a la idea de la corpulencia individual de una y otra especie de elefantes, el griego tiene en cuenta la magnitud del conjunto de la unidad táctica. La clave interpretativa está en el doble valor del término no marcado de la oposición privativa que forman μέγεθος y πλῆθος, magnitudo y multitudo; pues los dos primeros vocablos representan, además del tamaño individual específico, el concepto genérico de magnitud.

Gender Inequalities and Language Expression in Education

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Tomato tomahto: European perspectives on information science

ABSTRACT'And oh, if we ever part, then that might break my heart’ (Gershwin and Gershwin, ).In the lyric, ‘tomato tomahto', the marked, or explicitly differentiated term, is tomahto, corresponding more to the English rather than the United States pronunciation. The marked term of a contrast characteristically designates the exception or minor term and the distinctions contained in the unmarked term may be implicitly, and incompletely, understood. Analogously, information science has often been implicitly based in the United States and influenced by American modes of thought, while European, including English, developments have been the occasionally marked and often minor term.This panel explores European perspectives on information science, explicitly and implicitly contrasting them with United States perspectives, from a base in a number of languages and in Europe and beyond.The panel employs diverse and complementary viewpoints and should make for a lively discussion. It concludes, in sympathy with Gershwin, that cooperation and integration, corresponding to increasing globalization, is the way forward.The combination of European and beyond and United States perspectives on information science is especially appropriate for the first ASIS&T Annual Meeting outside North America.

Exilic Suffering: Music, Nation, and Protestantism in Cold War South Korea

In Cold War South Korea, the unmarked term “music” (eumak) came to signify Western classical music, and a host of ambiguous terms, including “folk music” (minsogeumak), “traditional music” (jeontongeumak), “indigenous music” (hyangtoeumak), and “national music” (gugak), emerged to categorize traditional practices that were rapidly disappearing from everyday cultural terrain. This West-centric development in musical culture has been euphemistically called “cosmopolitanism,” and in some cases, considered an index of national progress in the “race to modernization.” This paper attempts a critical reckoning of a specifically Cold-War form of cosmopolitanism by examining musicians who were at the center of this mid-century development: Christian Korean composers who left the North to flee the persecution of Christians by communist officials between 1945 (Korea’s independence from Japan) and 1953 (the end of the Korean War). I argue that the exiled composers were strategically positioned to construct secular and sacred music practices that reinforced the official cultural policy of the nascent U.S.-South Korea coalition. This exilic cultural work involved not just reconciling anticommunist nationalism with Western music idioms but also a related project of discouraging alternative conceptions of national (and nationally important) music. I first investigate how Christian exiles became the poetic voice of Cold War official culture through their elevated status in this culture’s institutions and narratives. Secondly, I consider the politics of this official culture, examining the music styles, genres, and compositions that were promoted or repressed. As I will show, Cold War music culture in South Korea was shaped by a confluence of mid-century international and intra-national politics, and Christian exiled composers were situated at the convergence of these mid-century concerns.

Commentary on “Pathological Narcissism and the Obstruction of Love” by David Kealy and John S. Ogrodniczuk

Although in popular parlance narcissism has a pejorative connotation, in actuality narcissism connotes a spectrum that ranges from healthy-normal to pathological. The same behavior may reflect a developmental stage at one age and pathology at another. In this brief commentary, I reflect on the different types of narcissism and wonder what aspects of American culture have relegated the unmarked term as pejorative. As an unmarked term, without a qualifying adjective, narcissism suggests pathology. As a developmental stage, primary narcissism reflects the infant’s view of the world as centering around him/herself. This is the time for the development of a secure attachment that supportive adults encourage. This is also the time when unreliable parental figures block such development, a precursor to pathological narcissism and challenges in developing love relationships. When primary narcissism becomes confronted with such unreliability as to prevent need satisfaction or with downright abuse, the individual may develop pathological narcissism. Without an ability to trust his/her caretakers, the child is prematurely forced to rely on him/ herself. The need to deal with unreliable or abusive others during the primary narcissism stage prevents the true development of self-esteem and the ability to modulate him/herself. Instead, the insecurity may be covered with the palimpsest of a false self. Hence, swings between grandiosity and inferiority rock the individual. For self-protection, he/ she keeps others at a distance while envying the easy love relationships of those who have a secure, resilient sense of self. Both inappropriate grandiosity and inferiority reflect the lack of modulation for those who

Intérêt du lambeau musculocutané infrahyoïdien pour la reconstruction après chirurgie de l’oropharynx par voie transorale robot-assistée

An attempt is made to define the relation between marked and unmarked terms on a propositional level. Two sentences are in the semantic relation of private opposition if the first sentence, the marked one which has a particular presupposition, entails the second sentence, the unmarked one, and if the second sentence does not entail the presupposition of the marked sentence, or the second sentence presupposes the negation of this presupposition. The relation of privative opposition, so defined can be used to define the notion of proper assertion and to explain some derivations of non-literal meaning.

Assumed to be Universal: The Leap from Data to Knowledge in theAmerican Political Science Review

The language scholars use to describe research findings has potentially enormous implications for how a science of politics develops. Consider the history of marked and unmarked terms in the American Political Science Review. Modifiers that mark reported data as spatially or temporally “different” (versus linguistically leaving the data unmarked and thus implying that the information is universal and “normal”) reflect predominant power relations. Marking, furthermore, can contribute to future power relations. Finally, knowledge claims that are made without acute attention to the marking of data are likely to be faulty. Because the implications for a science of politics are neither politically nor analytically innocent, political scientists should reveal (rather than conceal) and foreground (rather than background) the geographic and temporal origins of their data.

Cognitive and Pragmatic Motivations for the Dissymmetry between Deictic Expression and Denoting Expression in Person Deixis

This paper aims at explaining the dissymmetry between deictic expression and denoting expression under the frame of Markedness Theory, in terms of which the opposition between marked term and unmarked term is motivated by cognitive and pragmatic factors. The paper first distinguishes deictic expression from denoting expression, and then defines the dissymmetry between deictic expression and denoting expression in the category of person deixis. Finally, the paper explores the pragmatic and cognitive motivations for the dissymmetry under the frame of Markedness Theory. Examples in this paper reveal that, in the course of people’s cognition, participants take themselves as reference points to achieve referring, and the dissymmetry of the use of person deixis is determined by its accessibility in speakers’ mind; from the pragmatic angle, observing pragmatic principles is another reason for the dissymmetry between deictic expression and denoting expression in person deixis.

Lexical neutralisation: a case study of the lexical opposition ‘day’/‘night’

This article is concerned with the adoption the principle of neutralisation into the field of the lexicon. Its starting point is the way the concept of lexical neutralisation is defined in the writings of E. Coseriu. In the central focus are questions on the semantic status of the unmarked term of neutralisable lexical oppositions. It is argued that Coseriu’s claim that the unmarked term has two linguistic valeurs at the same time (specific/oppositive and neutral/generic) is problematic from a strictly structural–functional point of view because it contradicts with the postulate that language-specific meanings are homogeneous and unitary. The article explores the possibility of an alternative structural–functional approach to the semantic variation of the unmarked term that may be more consistent with this postulate. In addition, the general claim that neutralisations are always unidirectional (one of the terms of an opposition can semantically encompass another, but not vice versa) is also explored with regard to the lexicon domain. As a case study, Coseriu’s often-mentioned lexical example Tag/ Nacht in German is analysed using historical and current corpus data. The principle of neutralisation predicts that only Tag can have the neutral meaning ‘24-h period’, whereas the term Nacht is excluded from being used in a neutral way. First, our analysis shows that this principle might be true for present-day German but does not account for earlier stages of German and other Germanic languages (diachronic argument). Second, examples derived from a non-European language (Basketo) show that the unidirectional neutralisation relation between the lexical units for ‘day’ and ‘night’ does not hold universally (typological argument). From these empirical findings, conclusions are drawn regarding a general semantic theory of neutralisation.

Négation d'un terme marqué et procédés de modalisation

This paper focuses on statements such as Cette critique n'est pas infondée, Ce n'est pas faux, interpreted in relationship to Cette critique est fondée, C'est vrai; in other words, a given statement that combines negation with a marked term is opposed to the corresponding positive one with the unmarked term. The author shows that, eventhough such negative statements do not necessarily function as litotes, they systematically express the speaker's attitude towards the viewpoint that corresponds to the positive statement with the unmarked term. This is precisely the role they play not only when used in concessive structures, but also in "question-answer" types of interactions.

Deaf college students' comprehension of relational language in arithmetic compare problems.

In this study of deaf college students' performance solving compare word problems, relational statements were either consistent or inconsistent with the arithmetic operation required for the solutions. The results support the consistency hypothesis Lewis and Mayer (1987) proposed based on research with hearing students. That is, deaf students were more likely to miscomprehend a relational statement and commit a reversal error when the required arithmetic operation was inconsistent with the statement's relational term (e.g., having to add when the relational term was less than). Also, the reversal error effect with inconsistent word problems was magnified when the relational statement was a marked term (e.g., a negative adjective such as less than) rather than an unmarked term (e.g., a positive adjective such as more than). Reading ability levels of deaf students influenced their performance in a number of ways. As predicted, there was a decrease in goal-monitoring errors, multiple errors, and the number of problems left blank as the reading levels of students increased. Contrary to expectations, higher reading skills did not affect the frequency of reversal errors.

The Marking of Sex Distinctions in Polynesian Kinship Terminologies

The Marking of Sex Distinctions in Polynesian Kinship Terminologies1 Per Hage and Jeff Marck Abstract In Greenberg's cognitive-linguistic theory of kinship universals, it appears that sex, unlike generational distance and genealogical closeness, may not be marked on a consistent basis. This paper presents some systematic evidence on the subject. In Polynesian kinship terminologies, the male point of view predominates. The widespread unmarked status of terms for male child in particular may reflect an emphasis on patrilineal succession in Polynesian societies. 1. Introduction. In Greenberg's (1966) cognitive-linguistic theory of kinship universals, it appears that sex, unlike generational distance and genealogical closeness, is not marked on a consistent basis.2 "In a number of instances the male term has zero expression where the corresponding female term has an additional morpheme, but the data on neutralizations give conflicting evidence. Further, Lounsbury (1968) in a pioneering contribution on the subject, describes the feminine as unmarked in Iroquois in consonance with purely linguistic facts" (Greenberg 1966:105). In the only cross-cultural study bearing on the problem, Nerlove and Romney (1967) found no conclusive evidence for male or female as the universally marked category in sibling terminologies. In a reanalysis of Nerlove and Romney's data, Kronenfeld (1996) suggested that the marking of male and female kin terms might be correlated with matrilineal and patrilineal descent, respectively, but no evidence was adduced for this hypothesis. In this paper, we present some systematic evidence on the subject. In Polynesian kinship terminologies, the male point of view predominates. The widespread unmarked status of terms for male child in particular may reflect an emphasis on patrilineal succession in Polynesian societies. [End Page 156] 2. Marking Hypotheses. Marking refers to an asymmetric relation between two terms of an opposition. The concept applies to all aspects of language—phonological, grammatical, and lexical-semantic. In general, the unmarked term is "simpler in form, more common in usage, and more elaborated in terms of subtypes" (Moravcsik and Wirth 1986:2). Three different hypotheses can be entertained regarding the marking of sex in PN kinship terminologies. 1. Male terms are unmarked. Greenberg (1990), in a later statement of his theory of kinship universals, and, earlier, Nerlove and Romney (1967) assume that male is usually unmarked. In Iroquois, an apparent counterexample, female is unmarked for grammatical, that is, nonsemantic reasons. In the Nerlove and Romney study, only five out of a cross-cultural sample of 245 sibling terminologies were marked one way or the other for sex. Other sets of kinship terms or the application of other marking criteria may give different results. Given an assumption of "universal asymmetry in cultural evaluation of the sexes" (Rosaldo 1974:17), kinship terminologies should reflect a male (unmarked) point of view. 2. The marking of male and female terms depends on context. According to Waugh (1982:310), "markedness values are always context sensitive where the context may be a given culture. ... In our culture for example ... 'female' is marked when found in the context of a professor or doctor, but 'male' is marked when found in the context of a nurse or secretary." Waugh's argument, although it makes no reference to the domain of kinship, is intended to apply to semantic structures in general. In the present case, context might refer to different subdomains of PN terminologies, for example, uncle terms as opposed to child terms, or to entire terminologies, for example, historically conservative as opposed to more innovative PN terminologies. 3. Neither male nor female terms are marked. In a comparative analysis of gender relations in hierarchical societies, Ortner (1981) argues that women in Polynesian, as opposed to New Guinea societies, have a relatively high status. In Polynesia, the "encompassing" structure of descent rather than the opposing structure of marriage alliance generates rank and prestige. According to Ortner (1981:394), Polynesian women are thought of first of all as kinswomen—as daughters, sisters, and aunts rather than wives, lovers, and mothers. Polynesian societies are said to have a "relatively low elaboration of cultural conceptions (both formal ideology and general folklore) of female inferiority; Polynesians simply do not express, in word or deed, many notions of women as...

The Marking of Sex Distinctions in Polynesian Kinship Terminologies

The Marking of Sex Distinctions in Polynesian Kinship Terminologies1 Per Hage and Jeff Marck Abstract In Greenberg's cognitive-linguistic theory of kinship universals, it appears that sex, unlike generational distance and genealogical closeness, may not be marked on a consistent basis. This paper presents some systematic evidence on the subject. In Polynesian kinship terminologies, the male point of view predominates. The widespread unmarked status of terms for male child in particular may reflect an emphasis on patrilineal succession in Polynesian societies. 1. Introduction. In Greenberg's (1966) cognitive-linguistic theory of kinship universals, it appears that sex, unlike generational distance and genealogical closeness, is not marked on a consistent basis.2 "In a number of instances the male term has zero expression where the corresponding female term has an additional morpheme, but the data on neutralizations give conflicting evidence. Further, Lounsbury (1968) in a pioneering contribution on the subject, describes the feminine as unmarked in Iroquois in consonance with purely linguistic facts" (Greenberg 1966:105). In the only cross-cultural study bearing on the problem, Nerlove and Romney (1967) found no conclusive evidence for male or female as the universally marked category in sibling terminologies. In a reanalysis of Nerlove and Romney's data, Kronenfeld (1996) suggested that the marking of male and female kin terms might be correlated with matrilineal and patrilineal descent, respectively, but no evidence was adduced for this hypothesis. In this paper, we present some systematic evidence on the subject. In Polynesian kinship terminologies, the male point of view predominates. The widespread unmarked status of terms for male child in particular may reflect an emphasis on patrilineal succession in Polynesian societies. [End Page 156] 2. Marking Hypotheses. Marking refers to an asymmetric relation between two terms of an opposition. The concept applies to all aspects of language—phonological, grammatical, and lexical-semantic. In general, the unmarked term is "simpler in form, more common in usage, and more elaborated in terms of subtypes" (Moravcsik and Wirth 1986:2). Three different hypotheses can be entertained regarding the marking of sex in PN kinship terminologies. 1. Male terms are unmarked. Greenberg (1990), in a later statement of his theory of kinship universals, and, earlier, Nerlove and Romney (1967) assume that male is usually unmarked. In Iroquois, an apparent counterexample, female is unmarked for grammatical, that is, nonsemantic reasons. In the Nerlove and Romney study, only five out of a cross-cultural sample of 245 sibling terminologies were marked one way or the other for sex. Other sets of kinship terms or the application of other marking criteria may give different results. Given an assumption of "universal asymmetry in cultural evaluation of the sexes" (Rosaldo 1974:17), kinship terminologies should reflect a male (unmarked) point of view. 2. The marking of male and female terms depends on context. According to Waugh (1982:310), "markedness values are always context sensitive where the context may be a given culture. ... In our culture for example ... 'female' is marked when found in the context of a professor or doctor, but 'male' is marked when found in the context of a nurse or secretary." Waugh's argument, although it makes no reference to the domain of kinship, is intended to apply to semantic structures in general. In the present case, context might refer to different subdomains of PN terminologies, for example, uncle terms as opposed to child terms, or to entire terminologies, for example, historically conservative as opposed to more innovative PN terminologies. 3. Neither male nor female terms are marked. In a comparative analysis of gender relations in hierarchical societies, Ortner (1981) argues that women in Polynesian, as opposed to New Guinea societies, have a relatively high status. In Polynesia, the "encompassing" structure of descent rather than the opposing structure of marriage alliance generates rank and prestige. According to Ortner (1981:394), Polynesian women are thought of first of all as kinswomen—as daughters, sisters, and aunts rather than wives, lovers, and mothers. Polynesian societies are said to have a "relatively low elaboration of cultural conceptions (both formal ideology and general folklore) of female inferiority; Polynesians simply do not express, in word or deed, many notions of women as...

Linguistic Evidence for Primogeniture and Ranking in Proto-Oceanic Society

Linguistic Evidence for Primogeniture and Ranking in Proto-Oceanic Society1 Per Hage The presence of a seniority distinction in Proto-Oceanic sibling terminology has been used as evidence for primogeniture and ranking in Proto-Oceanic society. Cross-culturally, however, sibling terminologies with the seniority distinction are very common, found in egalitarian as well as ranked societies. A stronger argument can be made. If Proto-Oceanic society was based on primogeniture and ranking, the term for elder sibling should be marked in Oceanic terminologies. There is both diachronic and synchronic evidence in support of this hypothesis. Kirch (1997) suggests that one explanation for the rapid and extensive Lapita (Oceanic) expansion was a ranking system based on a rule of primogeniture in which "first-born sons inherited rights to the ancestral house and its estate. In such societies junior siblings frequently adopt a strategy of seeking new lands to settle where they can found their own 'house' and lineage, assuring their own offspring access to quality resources" (Kirch 1997:65). This scenario is consistent with Bell-wood's (1995) more general theory that a "founder-focused ideology" was the motive for the earlier Malayo-Polynesian expansion. As evidence for a ranking system, Kirch cites the presence of a seniority distinction in Proto-Malayo- Polynesian (PMP) sibling terminology, in the contrast set *kaka 'elder sibling' versus *Sua(n)ji 'younger sibling', and the continuation of this distinction in a great many Oceanic (OC) terminologies. Cross-culturally, however, sibling terminologies with the seniority distinction are very common, found in egalitarian as well as ranked societies (Murdock 1968). A stronger argument is possible. Although very little research has been done on markedness in kinship terminologies, it appears that seniority, like sex, is not marked on a universal basis.2 If [End Page 366] Proto-Oceanic and Proto-Malayo-Polynesian society was based on primogeniture and ranking, the term for elder sibling, which designates successor and heir, should be marked in OC and MP terminologies. There is both diachronic and synchronic evidence in support of this hypothesis. As shown in table 1, PMP, POC, and Proto-Polynesian (PPN) sibling terminologies have the same four categories with terms for elder parallel (same sex) sibling, younger parallel sibling, man's sister, and woman's brother (Blust 1980; Pawley 1981; Marck 1996). PPN terms are reflexes of POC terms, and POC terms are derived from PMP terms. Click for larger view View full resolution TABLE 1. SIBLING TERMS IN PROTO-MALAYO-POLYNESIAN (PMP), PROTO-OCEANIC (POC), AND PROTO-POLYNESIAN (PPN)* In the evolution of PN sibling terms there is, as Clark (1975) has shown, a pattern of semantic simplification in which the seniority distinction is lost first, then the sex distinction, and, finally, the parity distinction ending with a single term for sibling. For cognate terms there is "a fairly consistent pattern of semantic survival where one term extends to a larger category and ousts another. Thus *tahina replaces *tuakana; *tuanga'ane replaces *tuafafine and *tahina replaces *tuanga'ane ..." (Clark 1975:86). Clark suggested, although he did not pursue the matter, that an explanation for this pattern "might be sought in terms of semantic markedness" (1975:86). Markedness or marking refers to a hierarchical relation between two terms of an opposition. The concept applies to all levels of language-phonological, grammatical, and lexical-semantic. Three criteria of marking, from Greenberg (1966, 1990 [1980]), are applicable to the analysis in this paper. 1. Par excellence expression. The unmarked term may represent the entire category or the opposite of the marked term. For example, in English (and in many other languages) man = 'human being' and man = 'male human being' (unmarked) versus woman = 'female human being' (marked). [End Page 367] 2. Contextual neutralization. In certain contexts only the unmarked term appears. For example, in German phonology voice is neutralized in the final position for obstruents. 3. Syncretization. When two sets of categories intersect, distinctions that are present in the unmarked category are absent or neutralized in the marked category. In the English pronominal system, a gender distinction in the singular (he, she, it) is neutralized in the plural (they). If merger...

Introduction

IntroductionSpecial Cluster: New American Studies in Science and Technology: Essays in Cultural Historicism Richard Grusin (bio) As it completes its third year of publication, Configurations is still in some senses defining what it means to be “a journal of literature, science, and technology.” In the very first essay of the journal’s very first issue, Joseph Rouse provides a cogent definition of the practice of “cultural studies of scientific knowledge,” which he situates in opposition both to “postpositivist history and philosophy of science” and to the “social constructivism” of “the Edinburgh ‘strong programme,’ the Bath constructivist-relativist approach, applications of discourse analysis to science, and ethnographic laboratory studies.” 1 Despite the inaugural or originary force of this paper’s placement, however, it is not at all clear that Configurations has restricted itself to work in that (inter)discipline. Nor is it clear that the three essays in this cluster would fall under Rouse’s rubric of “cultural studies of scientific knowledge.” In assembling this cluster, then, my hope has been in part that these papers would contribute to and help expand the ongoing definition of what it means for Configurations to call itself “a journal of literature, science, and technology.” Perhaps the most obvious way in which these essays can contribute to the definition of the journal’s identity is in their shared focus on the role of science and technology in the cultural construction of the idea of America in the decades surrounding the turn of the twentieth century. Although Configurations has published special [End Page 349] issues on the cultural construction of Russia or of cyberspace, this cluster represents its first coordinated effort to focus on America. For most of the journal’s first three years, the idea of America has remained unspoken, despite the fact that Configurations is basically an American journal: edited by American academics, and published by an American academic press, for an audience made up mostly of Americans. Americanness has been, in some sense, an unmarked term in much of the journal’s discussion of science and technology—even functioning as a kind of absent or unseen other in the special issue on “Communities of Science and Culture in Russian Science Studies.” These papers will, I hope, initiate the discussion of the idea of America in Configurations—that is, of how the idea of America both defines and is defined by the network of relations among literature, science, and technology. Less obvious than their shared focus on American science, technology, and culture are the methodological or theoretical affinities among the three essays. All three authors were trained at Berkeley in the late seventies and early eighties, during the emergence of the new historicism in Renaissance and American literary studies. “New historicism” has been defined in opposition to an older historicism in which history was seen as a neutral or unproblematic context against which to interpret literary texts. Unlike this older historicism, new historicism extended to history the poststructuralist axiom that everything is a text; consequently, it turned to history, not as a source of facts or events or statistics, but as a source of textual analogues to the literary texts that were their primary focus. In so doing, new historicism also recognized that literature itself was historically constructed—that is, that it was the product of economic, political, and social (i.e., of ideological) practices. Consequently, literature was seen as a contested site, an arena where the ideological conflicts of history were played out. As second-generation new historicists, each of the authors can be said to practice what I would like to call “cultural historicism.” Unlike much first-generation new historicism, in which the literary was singled out as a privileged (if still ideologically and culturally constructed) site of analysis, each of these three papers treats the literary as one cultural discourse among others. The aim of these essays in cultural historicism, then, is not to focus primarily on the ways in which literature plays out the cultural and ideological conflicts of history. Rather, each focuses on the way in which certain myths of American cultural origin are played out across a number of diverse and heterogeneous discourses and technologies of representation...

Gender and the political interview in an Australian context

Research in the area of gender/sex differences of women's and men's language has been characterised by typologies of pairs of antonymous adjectives (e.g. public/private; assertive/ passive etc.). These descriptions, while preferable to pairs of marked and unmarked terms (e.g. male/not male), contribute to the persistence of static stereotypes for women and men, e.g. ‘women are more comfortable in private forms and contexts of discourse owing to their cooperative, facilitative nature, etc’. The context for the investigation reported here is the public arena, i.e. televised media interviews, a setting in which a growing number of Australian women participate as journalists and interviewers. The question for this investigation is not centred upon access to the public context but rather on the nature and diversity of participation within a gendered situation. In this paper, investigation of the turn-taking and questioning strategies of two prominent media personalities (a woman and a man) reveal differing outcomes according to the gendered context. The constraints and freedoms that impinge on the interviewer's style are, however, distinct in the construction of information exchange and image creation processes of the political interviews. Thus women's participation in the Australian media today involves a delicate balance of individuality and compliance.

Oppressive Texts, Resisting Readers and The Gendered Spectator: The New Aesthetics

At the heart of recent feminist theorizing about art is the claim that various forms of representation-painting, photography, film-assume a "male gaze." The notion of the gaze has both a literal and a figurative component. Narrowly construed, it refers to actual looking. Broadly, or more metaphorically, it refers to a way of thinking about, and acting in, the world. In literal terms, the gaze is male when men do the looking. Men look both as spectators and as characters within works. In figurative terms, to say that the gaze is male refers to a way of seeing which takes women as its object. In this broad sense, the gaze is male whenever it directs itself at, and takes pleasure in, women, where women function as erotic objects. The feminist claim is that most art, most of the time, places women in this position. In Laura Mulvey's words, man is the bearer of the gaze, woman its object. ' Feminist theory, like many other theories, takes as one of its basic tenets that no vision, not even artistic vision, is neutral vision. All vision is colored by the "spectacles" through which we see the world. The notion that all seeing is "a way of seeing" contrasts sharply with the traditional realist assumption that observation can be cleanly separated from interpretation, at least under certain ideally specified conditions. In part, feminism can be understood as reiterating a familiar, but still important, objection to the naive notion of the innocent eye. As E.H. Gombrich convincingly argues, observation is never innocent. In his words, "whenever we receive a visual impression, we react by docketing it, filing it, grouping it in one way or another, even if the impression is only that of an inkblot or a fingerprint. ... [T]he postulate of an unbiased eye demands the impossible. "2 Observation is always conditioned by perspective and expectation. Yet, the feminist claim that our representations inscribe a male gaze involves more than a denial of the eye's innocence. It involves asserting the central role that gender plays in formulating those expectations. Feminism insists, moreover, that these expectations are disproportionately affected by male needs, beliefs and desires. Both men and women have learned to see the world through male eyes. So, for example, women throughout their lives expend enormous amounts of time and energy and money making themselves "beautiful." In undertaking this costly process, women judge themselves according to internalized standards of what is pleasing to men. As Sandra Bartly observes, adolescent girls "learn to appraise themselves as they are shortly to be appraised." In this sense, the eyes are female, but the gaze is male.3 Feminism objects to seeing the world "through male eyes." It equates the male gaze with patriarchy. Patriarchy defines a social system "marked by the supremacy of the father and the legal dependence of wives and children. "4 Under such a system, women depend not only for status and privilege, but for their very identity, upon men. The assumption is that this arrangement oppresses women. It also, as both feminist and non-feminists have argued, oppresses men, although not necessarily in the same way as it oppresses women. This oppression occurs at the symbolic as well as the material level. Women, as the first editorial of the film journal, Camera Obscura, announced, "are oppressed not only economically and politically, but also in the very forms of reasoning, signifying and symbolical exchange of our culture. "5 Thus, to take a familiar but powerful example, in English "he" functions as the unmarked term, "she" as the marked term.

Oppressive Texts, Resisting Readers and the Gendered Spectator: The New Aesthetics

At the heart of recent feminist theorizing about art is the claim that various forms of representation-painting, photography, film-assume gaze. The notion of the gaze has both literal and figurative component. Narrowly construed, it refers to actual looking. Broadly, or more metaphorically, it refers to way of thinking about, and acting in, the world. In literal terms, the gaze is male when men do the looking. Men look both as spectators and as characters within works. In figurative terms, to say that the gaze is male refers to way of which takes women as its object. In this broad sense, the gaze is male it directs itself at, and takes pleasure in, women, where women function as erotic objects. The feminist claim is that most art, most of the time, places women in this position. In Laura Mulvey's words, man is the bearer of the gaze, woman its object. ' Feminist theory, like many other theories, takes as one of its basic tenets that no vision, not even artistic vision, is neutral vision. All vision is colored by the spectacles which we see the world. The notion that all is a way of seeing contrasts sharply with the traditional realist assumption that observation can be cleanly separated from interpretation, at least under certain ideally specified conditions. In part, feminism can be understood as reiterating familiar, but still important, objection to the naive notion of the innocent eye. As E.H. Gombrich convincingly argues, observation is never innocent. In his words, whenever we receive visual impression, we react by docketing it, filing it, grouping it in one way or another, even if the impression is only that of an inkblot or fingerprint. ... [T]he postulate of an unbiased eye demands the impossible. 2 Observation is always conditioned by perspective and expectation. Yet, the feminist claim that our representations inscribe male gaze involves more than denial of the eye's innocence. It involves asserting the central role that gender plays in formulating those expectations. Feminism insists, moreover, that these expectations disproportionately affected by male needs, beliefs and desires. Both men and women have learned to see the world male So, for example, women throughout their lives expend enormous amounts of time and energy and money making themselves beautiful. In undertaking this costly process, women judge themselves according to internalized standards of what is pleasing to men. As Sandra Bartly observes, adolescent girls learn to appraise themselves as they shortly to be appraised. In this sense, the eyes female, but the gaze is male.3 Feminism objects to the world through male eyes. It equates the male gaze with patriarchy. Patriarchy defines social system by the supremacy of the father and the legal dependence of wives and children. 4 Under such system, women depend not only for status and privilege, but for their very identity, upon men. The assumption is that this arrangement oppresses women. It also, as both feminist and non-feminists have argued, oppresses men, although not necessarily in the same way as it oppresses women. This oppression occurs at the symbolic as well as the material level. Women, as the first editorial of the film journal, Camera Obscura, announced, are oppressed not only economically and politically, but also in the very forms of reasoning, signifying and symbolical exchange of our culture. 5 Thus, to take familiar but powerful example, in English he functions as the unmarked term, she as the marked term.