The unauthorised use of data in the training of generative AI models presents significant legal challenges, particularly under intellectual property (IP) and privacy laws. These frameworks frequently grapple with the intricate relationship between data ownership and AI innovation, resulting in ongoing debates regarding optimal protection and enforceability. This article delves into the considerable potential of unjust enrichment as an alternative legal doctrine for resolving disputes arising from such unauthorised data use. We explore how the concept of unjust enrichment captures the wrongfulness of unauthorised data use in a manner distinct from IP infringement and privacy violations. Furthermore, we analyse the extent to which gain-based restitution for unjust enrichment may prove more advantageous than existing remedies, including legal, equitable and statutory options. We contend that by shifting the emphasis from establishing wrongful conduct to recovering benefits obtained unjustly, unjust enrichment offers a pragmatic and equitable framework that reconciles the rights of data owners with the interests of AI developers.

Article 57 of the National Health Insurance Act mandates that the National Health Insurance Service shall recover the amount equivalent to the insurance benefits or costs thereof from individuals, quasi-medical institutions, medical device vendors who received benefits through fraudulent or other improper means, and from medical institutions that received insurance benefit costs. Following amendments, the scope of medical institutions subject to this recoupment of unjust enrichment now encompasses not only those opened in violation of Article 33, Paragraph 2 of the Medical Service Act(especially unqualified opening of a medical institution) but also those established and operated by borrowing the license name of another physician in violation of Article 4, Paragraph 2 of the Medical Service Act. While the former case is subject to criminal penalties under the Medical Service Act, there are no corresponding criminal provisions for the latter. Consequently, the Supreme Court has traditionally held that institutions violating Article 4, Paragraph 2 of the Medical Service Act are not subject to the National Health Insurance Act's recoupment disposition for unjust enrichment. This reasoning was based on the premise that there is no fundamental difference, as the institution was still established by a qualified medical professional, and it is difficult to conclude that the medical treatment provided by the nominal license holder had a qualitative difference as a normal benefit provided for the treatment of disease. However, in a recent decision based on a similar factual background —where the violation pertained to Article 4, Paragraph 2 of the National Health Insurance Act and the nominal lender performed normal medical services — the Supreme Court ruled that the institution is subject to the recoupment disposition for unjust enrichment, without explicitly clarifying its judgment on the nature of the medical institution. This paper intends to examine these two conflicting judgments of the Supreme Court. By reviewing the provisions of the National Health Insurance Act and the Medical Service Act, as well as the prevailing judicial precedents and academic positions, this study aims to critically analyze the problems and propose improvements regarding the recoupment disposition of unjust enrichment under the National Health Insurance Act.

The phenomenon of odious debt has long posed a dilemma for international law and global financial governance. Although many developing and post-conflict countries have endured the burden of illegitimate loans contracted by authoritarian regimes, the concept of “odious debt” has not been formally recognized under international law. This raises a fundamental legal and ethical question: should successor governments and their citizens be bound by debts incurred without popular consent, often used to finance repression, corruption, or wars against their own populations? Against this background, the present study explores the legitimacy of odious loans and their broader implications for financial sovereignty, human rights, and sustainable development. The study concludes that odious debt remains primarily a moral and political principle rather than a binding legal rule. Nevertheless, its recognition could serve as a foundation for greater financial justice and international accountability. The findings underscore that such debts undermine development, violate human rights, and perpetuate inequality, while creditor states often evade responsibility. The research recommends advancing toward codification of the doctrine within international agreements, clarifying its legal bases through principles such as unjust enrichment and abuse of rights, and creating mechanisms for debt repudiation or cancellation. Ultimately, embedding the principle of odious debt into international financial governance could not only relieve debtor states of unjust obligations but also promote sustainable development and protect future generations from the consequences of illegitimate borrowing.

On the face of it, the law of restitution is an integral part of both English and French law, based on the law of obligations and ‘alternative’ remedies for breach. However, the terminology if not the substance is surprisingly though subtly different. The English terminology pre-supposes a more objective analysis as to whether any enrichment sanctioned by restitution is ‘unjust’ whereas its French counterpart seems to take a more subjective approach to analyse each instance of ‘unjustified’ enrichment. This paper will seek to illustrate the legal framework as to restitution in English and French law, but also to deconstruct this semantic differentiation.

My learned colleague and I tangle with each other on the libertarian analysis of crime, punishment, property rights, and unjust enrichment. I maintain an objective four-part theory of punishment: two teeth for a tooth (first one tooth and then a second tooth), third, costs of capture, and then, finally, fourth, payment for scaring the victim. But no more. Once the miscreant has undergone his full, very draconian punishment, no more should be taken from him. If he wins a lottery for $1 million after paying for the ticket with a stolen $5, he may keep this money, pro vided he has fully paid his punishment debt. Dominiak maintains, in contrast, that the law-breaker may not benefit from his crime, and this would appear to be a para digm case of just that.

Constitutionalising the Law of Unjustified Enrichment

A stealth issue in many close copyright fair use cases is the potential invalidity of second comers’ copyrights under 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the secondary use is ultimately held to infringe the derivative work right. Section 103(a) of the Copyright Act says, in effect, that no copyright exists in any part of a derivative work in which the first work’s expression was “used unlawfully.” Courts have largely ignored § 103(a). But recent cases, such as Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith (2023), have raised the profile of § 103(a). This Article traces the origins, history, and case law on § 103(a), highlighting its ambiguity and significant ramifications in cases in which it was arguably relevant. By exploring the expansive range of possible interpretations and applications of § 103(a), the Article argues that a careful reading of the statutory text, in keeping with its legislative history, reveals the dual purpose of § 103: to prevent infringers from being unjustly enriched when they take protected expression from earlier works and to provide protection to the original expression contributed by derivative work authors. When courts understand this dual purpose, they can and should limit the extent to which § 103(a) should invalidate copyrights, especially in close cases of derivative work infringement and fair use rulings. When invalidations of copyrights would be inequitable as to good faith secondary uses of source works, would result in windfalls to source work authors, or would otherwise be contrary to fundamental principles of copyright law, this Article argues that the best reading of § 103 would apply it narrowly to achieve copyright’s goal of promoting the “progress of science.”

Abstract This case note examines the recent case D’Aloia v Persons Unknown and others [2024] EWHC 2342 (Ch), which affirmed the status of cryptoassets as property under common law, and applied traditional legal principles, including unjust enrichment and constructive trust, to address crypto fraud involving Tether (USDT). This case note also highlights the tension between established legal doctrines and blockchain’s technical realities, emphasizing the need for evolving legal frameworks, including remedial constructive trusts and proportional recovery methods, to adapt to crypto-litigation challenges.

Abstract Generative AI technology is taking the world by storm. The development of technology enabling creation and manipulation of content has give facilitated a substantial rise in the proliferation of deepfakes. Whereas in the past content creation and manipulation required a certain level of expertise, today deepfake technology is easily accessible and enables the quick and seamless creation of highly believable content. This technology has many positive applications: for example, in healthcare, education, cultural preservation and the entertainment industry. But deepfake technology is also used to deceive and cause harm. Deepfake technology is used to create sexual deepfakes that humiliate and harm primarily women and girls, to engage in fraudulent activities, and to generate disinformation undermining trust in democratic processes and institutions. This Article suggests analyzing the deepfake dilemma through the lens of the doctrine of unjust enrichment. Under this doctrine a party which has become enriched at the expense of another must make restitution of benefits it received. An enrichment-based approach may offer several advantages, particularly when compared to harm-based remedies. First, it may be easier to identify the defendant in an unjust enrichment case, as the defendant is the company developing the underlying technology and there is no need to identify the individual who created the deepfake. Second, a lawsuit under unjust enrichment may be filed by various plaintiffs, thus, obivating the need to identify the individual harmed by a deepfake. Finally, it may be easier to identify and quantify the profits which are monetary, current and concentrated within a small number of companies. We argue that under certain circumstances viewing the deepfake challenge through the lens of unjust enrichment can allow for a realignment of the financial incentives of the companies developing deepfakes technology with broader social goals and values, encouraging them to develop technology that is less harmful and more responsible.

ABSTRACT This article sheds light on the contemporary puzzle of mistaken payments. What is the normative basis of the transferor’s right to receive their money back? Under what conditions (if at all) should this right be denied by the transferee? While joining the growing literature which doubts the predominant unjust enrichment rationale, the article also doubts the existing accounts which aim to situate mistaken payments within the Kantian universe. Instead, the article offers an alternative. Specifically, it argues that an exercise of unpacking the nature of mistaken payments through a Kantian lens must engage with the following three focal points: (1) the nature of money and bank accounts; (2) the nature of the wrong committed by the transferee within the transferor-transferee relationship; and (3) the nature of the wrong committed by the transferor within that relationship. The refined Kantian framework does not just elucidate the nature of liability of mistaken payments, but also coherently situates the various doctrines and concepts which are inherent to those payments within its borders.

The possessor's right to claim reimbursement of expenses from the rightful owner under Article 203 of the Korean Civil Act is generally recognized only in cases where the possessor lacks lawful authority—such as a contractual right—to occupy the property, and is therefore obligated to comply with the owner's demand for restitution. If, at the time of incurring the expenses, the possessor held a lawful title to possession based on a contractual relationship, they may assert a claim for reimbursement of those expenses under the applicable legal provisions or principles against the counterparty to the contract—but not against the owner under Article 203 of the Korean Civil Act. Accordingly, the Supreme Court views Article 203 as a special provision governing expense reimbursement between the possessor and the rightful owner, taking precedence over general provisions like unjust enrichment. This position has also sparked considerable academic debate regarding the legal nature of Article 203. Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court, in its recent decision decided December 24, 2024 (2020Da275744 and 2020Da275751, hereinafter referred to as “the Judgment”), held that a possessor may claim reimbursement for beneficial expenses incurred on land either when the rightful owner demands restitution under Article 213 of the Civil Act or when the possessor actually returns the land to the rightful owner. However, if the rightful owner merely seeks the implementation of the transfer of ownership registration procedure based on recovery of true title—without demanding restitution of possession—the possessor's right to claim reimbursement for beneficial expenses has not yet arisen, unless the possessor actually returns possession of the land. Furthermore, in cases involving the relationship between the possessor and the rightful owner, the Judgment held—without detailed reasoning—that a claim for restitution of unjust enrichment under Article 741 of the Civil Act cannot be exercised. However, even if Article 203 is considered a provision that prevails over claims for unjust enrichment, if the specific case does not satisfy the requirements of Article 203, it would be a more equitable interpretation to examine the validity of the unjust enrichment claim—based on its distinct requirements—especially in light of the incomplete coverage of Article 203. Given the need for more advanced discussion on the role of the right to claim reimbursement of expenses, it is time to adopt a forward-looking perspective regarding whether it can coexist with the right to claim restitution of unjust enrichment.

BackgroundThis study analyzes Saudi Arabia’s 2022–2023 reforms to the Commercial Agency Law through legal, economic, and comparative lenses. The pre-reform regime—marked by rigid nationality limits, procedural burdens, and litigation-prone termination rules—constrained market entry and investor confidence.MethodsUsing a doctrinal approach to statutes and implementing regulations, triangulated with Saudi judicial practice and policy instruments, we benchmark Saudi reforms against the UAE and UK. A Shariah lens clarifies howgharar (uncertainty),fasakh (rescission), and unjust enrichment (akl al-māl bil-bāṭil) shape agency disputes.ResultsKey changes include more flexible nationality rules, end-to-end digital registration and renewal, clearer termination/compensation standards, and formal recognition of arbitration (including SCCA). Together these measures enhance contractual predictability and lower compliance frictions, with early indications of improved market transparency and investor sentiment.ConclusionsThe reforms signal a hybrid model—liberalization aligned with global practice while preserving a Shariah-grounded identity. Remaining priorities include consistent judicial application, practitioner training, clearer guidance, and GCC coordination. We propose thematically grouped policy steps to consolidate gains and support Vision 2030’s diversification agenda.

As an important strategic resource, personal information data not only possesses personality interests, but also contains great economic potential. However, the problem of personal information leakage has become increasingly serious. Whether it is the traditional tort remedy or the“risk-based damage theory”, such problems are faced with practical or theoretical dilemmas, such as the difficulty of determining “damage” and the excessive burden of proof. Based on this, this article advocates the improper enrichment law as the core, to build a new type of personal information leakage relief path. First of all, unjustified enrichment relief path has the value of legitimacy and practical operability, through the personal information leakage is divided into “active leakage” and “passive leakage” of two kinds of situations, will be recognized as the rights and interests of infringement of unjustified enrichment, and based on the Chinese law, the law of unjustified enrichment is the most effective way to protect the rights and interests of the people of China. By classifying personal information leakage into “active leakage” and “passive leakage”, identifying it as unjustified enrichment, and based on Chinese law, interpreting the constituent elements and legal effects of unjustified enrichment on the basis of infringement of rights and interests, it not only can give full play to the complementary function of unjustified enrichment, but also can realize the relief of the subject of information.

This study aims to evaluate the effectiveness of debt restructuring in syariah banking by exploring three key perspectives i.e., institutional policy, customer perception, and Islamic legal scholarship. Using BJB Syariah Majalengka as a case study, the research investigates how the bank’s restructuring mechanisms align with Fatwa DSN-MUI No. 48/DSN-MUI/II/2005 and principles of Fiqh Muamalah. The study employs a qualitative approach, combining document analysis, in-depth interviews with bank officials and fiqh scholars, and structured questionnaires distributed to customers who have undergone restructuring. The findings reveal that BJB Syariah has implemented debt restructuring through rescheduling, restructuring, and reconditioning while maintaining the syariah-compliant framework. From the customers’ perspective, debt restructuring is perceived as a supportive solution during financial hardship, yet knowledge gaps about their rights and obligations persist. Meanwhile, fiqh scholars emphasize that the legitimacy of restructuring hinges on justice, transparency, and the avoidance of prohibited elements such as riba, gharar, and unjust enrichment (dzulm). This triangular perspective highlights the need for stronger integration between policy, customer literacy, and shariah oversight.

The article examines legal and practical aspects of civil law contract termination in Russian civil law, focusing on the interplay between termination claims and damages recovery, which creates reciprocal obligations. It describes the impact of current realities on the economic situation faced by business entities. The author ana-lyzes existing legislation, judicial practice, and explores specific features of unjust enrichment application, in-cluding an analysis of the growing caseload trend in arbitration courts. Particular attention is paid to doctrinal approaches, limitations of freedom of contract principle, and admissibility conditions for unilateral termination. Through comparative legal analysis, the study investigates termination regulation in legal systems of Germany, France, Italy, Qatar, England, United States and China.

The article focuses on the legal protection of individuals in unmarried cohabitation who, during the course of the relationship, assumed the primary role in childcare and household management, thereby limiting their earning capacity. This role may lead to a loss of economic self-sufficiency without any legal compensation. The author analyzes whether Czech law allows for the compensation of such non-monetary contributions through claims based on unjust enrichment, innominate contracts, or provisions on partnerships. The conclusion is that these legal instruments are not designed for settling relationships arising from intimate cohabitation and that their application is problematic, conceptually inconsistent, and burdened with evidentiary uncertainty. A comparative look at the legal frameworks in Ireland, Scotland, and England reveals potential models for reflecting the division of family roles and the economic consequences of cohabitation within a legal context. The article aims to contribute to the academic d

Abstract This article is concerned with the question whether a defendant in an unjust enrichment action can reduce or eliminate its liability by establishing that it could have obtained the enrichment (or part of it) from the claimant in a way that would not have given rise to liability. The answer in principle ought to be no. In arguing for that conclusion, I consider the meaning of “enrichment” and “loss”, the nature of the change of position defence and the basis of liability for unjust enrichment in cases involving ultra vires charges by public authorities and the taking of money without consent by private defendants.

Since The Moorcock case in 1889, the boat of implied terms has encountered storms and instability from scholarly debates. The key contentious issues orbit around the role of reasonableness, necessity, contract interpretation, and the continued relevance of the traditional tests. Historically, courts have used two main tests to imply terms into contracts: Lord Bowen’s Business Efficacy Test and Lord Mackinnon’s Officious Bystander Test. However, in Belize Telecom Ltd (2009), Lord Hoffmann opined that implying terms in contract is simply part of interpreting the contract as a whole, rather than applying the traditional tests: in response to this approach, a significant weight of judicial authority supports the view that Belize should not be perceived as a relaxation of the traditional tests towards implication of terms. While debates have continued on whether implied terms of fact should be a distinct process or simply part of contract interpretation, the UK Supreme Court in Barton v Morris (2023) held that if a term is sufficiently express, the doctrine of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit cannot be used to imply a term that possibly contradicts the express term––this is somewhat different from the position of law in Nigeria. This article is an illuminating synthesis of these differences: it charts a stable and harmonized course that smoothens out the rough patches which accrued over the years via intense legal polemics.

This paper presents a detailed comparative analysis of contemporary fatawa on the Shariah ruling regarding the utilisation of pledged property (maal marhoon). In classical Islamic jurisprudence, the use of pledged assets by the pledgee (mortgagee) has been a matter of significant debate. The majority of scholars prohibit such utilisation, considering it a form of unjust enrichment or riba (usury), unless the benefit is directly linked to safeguarding or maintaining the pledged item. However, certain jurists allow limited usage if it is agreed upon and does not result in exploitation.In the contemporary context, with the expansion of Islamic banking, collateral-based financing, and the increasing need for secured transactions, the question of benefiting from pledged property has regained importance. Various contemporary fatwa councils have issued detailed rulings reconciling classical positions with modern financial practices.

The scientific works are studied, as well as the provisions of the current legislation of the Republic of Poland in terms of the regulatory and legal definition of the concept of corruption. The theoretical justifications of Polish scientists regarding the need to consider the phenomenon of corruption through the prism of processes inherent in today's socio-economic realities are established. Common and distinctive features of the method of legally enshrining the definition of “corruption” in the legislation of Ukraine and the Republic of Poland are identified. The absence of a definition of the concept of “illegitimate benefit” and a broad interpretation of its forms due to the use of the attribute “any” are revealed. Therefore, the establishment of property and personal benefit and, as a result, its illegality is a rather general and unclear process that requires recourse to judicial practice. The article emphasizes the differences in the legislative definition of the terms “unlawful benefit” and “unlawful advantage”, as well as their definitions in the theory of criminal law. Even though the Civil Code of the Republic of Poland contains the concept of “unlawful advantage”, the use of its features when establishing “unlawful benefit” is erroneous. Unlawful advantage is a special (separate) type of unjust enrichment, which significantly narrows the list of possible forms of unlawful benefit. It is found that bringing a person to criminal liability for committing acts of corruption is possible not only by applying the legal norms of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Poland, but also by applying the provisions of other laws. Some legislative acts were identified that contain an indication of the unlawful behaviour of a person and possible forms of punishment in the event of committing such an act (Laws of the Republic of Poland “On Pharmaceutical Law” and “On Reimbursement of Medicinal Products, Special Food Products and Medical Products”). It was established that despite the provision of a separate Chapter XXIX “Crimes against the activities of state bodies and local self-government bodies” in the Criminal Code of the Republic of Poland, there are some articles from other Chapters that indicate criminal liability for corruption offenses (electoral, administrative, economic, creditor, tender, etc. corruption). The provisions of several Polish laws establishing criminal liability for corruption-related offenses have been analysed. Discrepancies have been identified between the Ukrainian and Polish legal systems, particularly in the area of extra-codified criminal law provisions. Drawing on the analysis of current Polish legislation and the doctrinal positions of Ukrainian criminal law, potential approaches for incorporating foreign experience to address specific issues have been proposed.