United Nations Assistance Mission For Rwanda Research Articles

Marchal, Lemaire and Dewez v. Mukeshimana-Ngulinzira and Others; Belgian State v. Mukeshimana-Ngulinzira and Others

179State responsibility — Imputability — International Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility — International Law Commission Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations — Imputability in context of United Nations peacekeeping operations — Responsibility of troop-contributing countries — Ultimate control — Effective controlWar and armed conflict — Non-international armed conflict — United Nations — Peacekeeping — United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), 1993 — Rwandan genocide — The law of Belgium

The Endless Debate over the 'G Word'

I am an infantry officer in the Canadian Army of the Canadian Armed Forces. In 1993–1994, I served as the personal staff officer to then Major-General Romeo Dallaire, the Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). As such, I was a witness, a bystander, and an occasional rescuer and helper to what the Organization of African Unity labeled ‘‘the Preventable Genocide.’’ One of the major reasons the genocide in Rwanda was not prevented or stopped was the endless debate in April, May, and June 1994, when the majority of attention and effort was focused on debating whether or not genocide was taking place in Rwanda instead of on preparing and conducting a multi-disciplinary (including military) intervention to stop the killing. For days, weeks, and months the discussions went back and forth between those who labeled the catastrophe a genocide, and demanded that the international community live up to its obligations under the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG) and intervene to suppress the genocide, and those who argued that the situation in Rwanda was not a genocide but ‘‘just gross violations of human rights, crimes against humanity and war crimes’’ (as if these were acceptable crimes to ignore). The failure to intervene permitted the genocide to largely run its course, consuming between 500,000 and 1 million innocent men, women, and children. On too many occasions, especially during the genocide in Rwanda and the current genocide in Darfur, the organs of the international community have been far more focused on conducting some form of academic or legal debate over the use of the word ‘‘genocide’’ to describe these catastrophes than on focusing our attention and efforts toward actually doing something to stop the killing. Never were we more frustrated and saddened in Rwanda during the genocide than when we were informed on a Friday that the Security Council had adjourned for the weekend, without decision. We knew that while the diplomats and bureaucrats would be enjoying the culinary delights of Manhattan, another 10,000 to 20,000 innocent men, women, and children would die while the world discussed, debated, contemplated, and, inevitably, let the genocide run its course. While the determination of genocide is not a matter to be taken lightly, it must also not become an excuse to procrastinate while thousands are dying. As a witness to the events of 1994, I have had to live with the failure of the international community to identify the catastrophic killings in Rwanda as genocide in a sufficient matter of time in order to intervene to stop the killing and save Rwandan lives. I have also had to live with my own role as a member of UNAMIR for our failure, for my failure, to prevent or stop the genocide. I do not wish to see the same mistake made again, and, therefore, I appreciate the opportunity the editors of this new professional journal have given me to presenting this opinion piece on the current situation in Darfur. I do not claim to be a genocide scholar or an expert in anything other than my chosen profession, and I do not consider my opinions any more valid

Beyond rwanda and kosovo: The interactive dynamics of international peacekeeping and Ethnic Mobilisation

Within the past few decades there has been a significant increase in multilateral interventions in ethnic conflicts in the name of peacekeeping. Most hope that these operations will assist in conflict resolution and reduce violence. However, recent examples indicate that this may not always be the case. This paper explores why international efforts to contain, curtail and resolve ethnic conflicts may not prove successful and even backfire. This enquiry is addressed by employing a cross-national comparative analysis of the involvement of peacekeeping operations in two recent ethnic conflict situations. A sociological model of mobilisation is systematically applied to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in Rwanda (1994) and NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo (1999) to determine whether international actors addressed the primary components that led to mobilisation of the contentious parties. This work argues that the key to successful peacekeeping is to address the primary components of violence. The paper synthesises conflict studies with work on social mobilisation theory and research on peacekeeping, offering both theoretical and policy-relevant contributions to understanding the nexus between effective peacekeeping and factors leading to violent mobilisation.

Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda

Romeo DallaireToronto: Random House Canada, 2003. xxii, 562 pp, $39.95 cloth (ISBN 0-679-31171-8)This is General Romeo Dallaire's day-by-day account of his command of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in 1993-1994. The immediate roots of the conflict in that small nation date back to the First World War, when Belgium took trusteeship over the former German colony. The Belgians promoted the minority Tutsi tribe as the elite administrative class until revolution by the majority brought national independence in 1962. Violent repression by the new Hutu-dominated government caused hundreds of thousands of Tutsis to flee, mainly to neighbouring Uganda. The Tutsi repeatedly mounted cross-border attacks in an effort to bring down the regime and allow a return of the refugees to their homes. In 1990 the Rwandan Patriotic Front, led by Tutsis who had become capable soldiers in Uganda's internal conflicts, launched an offensive that would have defeated the Rwandan Government Forces but for the important military assistance the latter received from France, especially, and Belgium. French and Belgian support recognized the de facto authority of the majority, but also, to some extent, the politics of language: The Rwandan Patriotic Front, raised among Tutsis who had lived most of their lives in the former British colony of Uganda, was mainly English speaking.The United Nations Assistance Mission was conceived in great hope in 1993. Following stalemate on the battlefield, the warring parties committed themselves to the rapid creation of a joint transitional government and military demobilization. Both parties requested a UN force to supervise these undertakings. Nevertheless, from the moment Dallaire's command started operations in the fall of 1993, it became clear that agreement--if, in fact, it had ever existed--was crumbling, despite the best efforts of the mission, which stretched its restricted mandate and meagre resources to the very limit in order to curb violence.Rwandan government forces officers of extraordinary courage warned Dallaire that extremist Hutu Power elements within the government were assembling weapons caches and secretly training militia systematically to slaughter political moderates (the key element in the peace accords) and massacre the Tutsi population. Dallaire passed this information, much of which he was able to verify, to UN headquarters in New York and announced his intention to seize the weapons caches. Headquarters instantly instructed him to desist, and, as required under his limited mandate, to inform the Rwandan government--the very body implicated in the scheme--of all that he knew.With the hideous inevitability of a Greek tragedy, the massacres began to take place on the night of 6 April 1994. The trigger was the mysterious crash of the president's aircraft that night as it landed at Kigali airport, killing all on board. Dallaire's information was that the president, although an architect of Power, had already been usurped by more extreme elements. Colonel Theoneste Bagosora, whom Dallaire suspected of leading the extremist elements (and has since been indicted for crimes against humanity), barely suppressed a smirk as he delivered the news of the crash. Even as Dallaire negotiated with Bagosora at the government forces headquarters for the return of ten Belgian soldiers who had been seized by the Rwandan military, these peacekeepers were butchered.Although it was under a state of siege as militia and mobs took over the streets of Kigali and the Rwandan Patriotic Front and government forces reopened hostilities, the UN mission remained in place to keep communications open between the warring parties and provide such protection as it could to civilians. The mission ultimately sheltered perhaps 30,000 people, as compared to the estimated 800,000 tortured and murdered in the genocide. Dallaire finally departed in August 1994, after his most trusted officers had warned he was perilously close to collapse. …

The End of a Culture of Impunity in Rwanda? Prosecution of Genocide and War Crimes before Rwandan Courts and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

Following the death of Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana in a plane crash on 6 April 1994, Hutu extremists, members of the Presidential Guard, Rwandan army troops, theInterhamwe(‘Those who work together’) militia affiliated to the ruling party, the M.R.N.D. (Mouvement Révolutionaire National pour la Démocratie) and theImpuzamugambi(‘Those with a single purpose’) militia of the extremist CDR Party (Coalition pour la Défense de la République) began the systematic and widespread killings of Tutsi civilians in the capital Kigali. Hutu moderates were also targeted. Early victims of the violence included Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana along with ten Belgian soldiers of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). This incident prompted the withdrawal of UNAMIR which left the perpetrators of the genocide a free rein. Ministers and the President of the Constitutional Court were also killed within hours of the plane crash.