United Front Work Research Articles

The Anti-Japanese Armed Forces of Mongolian Nationality: The Development of the New Third Division

During the Anti-Japanese War, as a Mongolian anti-Japanese armed army established with the help of the Simon Working Committee of the Communist Party of China, the newly organized Third Division played a key role in Suiyuan and Ikchao League. In the Bailingmiao Uprising, Suiyuan Resistance War and Ikchao League Resistance War, the newly formed third Division of the National Revolutionary Army promoted the Anti-Japanese War situation in Inner Mongolia to deepen. As a member of the Mongolian Communist Party, Ulanfu led the united front and political work in the New three Divisions, and promoted the development of the united front work of the Communist Party of China in the Ikchao League and Suiyuan area. The experience of the United front of the new three divisions has important implications for the Communist Party of China in dealing with the relations between minority armies.

China’s Taiwan integration policy: The limitations of top-level design in the Xi era

Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has undergone a significant shift in its approach toward Taiwan, moving from a strategy characterized by economic concessions to one focusing on integration. Xi’s new strategic approach for the state’s united front work vis-a-vis Taiwan is characterized as ‘top-level design’ which divides such work vertically. The central government is responsible for developing policies and appointing competent functional agencies to collaborate with the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office on implementing China’s Taiwan policy while local governments are tasked with implementation. The CCP has designated Fujian Province an experimental site for policy trials towards realizing its Taiwan integration policy. Accordingly, this article examines the effectiveness of these united front operations in Fujian. Despite the provincial government’s diverse initiatives and substantial resources, implementation outcomes have fallen short of expectations. This study’s most salient finding indicates that, within the CCP’s top-level design framework, provincial officials lack both the willingness and capacity to implement policies on Taiwan. The incentive structure designed for government officials fails to motivate them, while their newly delimited authorization constrains them.

Innovation and Development of United Front Work for Returnee Students in the New Era: A Comparative Study of Six Universities in Nanjing

Innovation and Development of United Front Work for Returnee Students in the New Era: A Comparative Study of Six Universities in Nanjing

A Study on the Construction of Cultural Identity of Chinese Students Studying Abroad under the "Belt and Road" Initiative

The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative, a centennial plan, are significantly displaying Chinese civilization worldwide. The dissemination of civilization is merely a process, while the recognition of civilization enables the world to breathe in unison with China, share a common destiny, and connect hearts and minds. The alignment of people's hearts and minds is achieved through righteousness and justice. In this context, how to promote China and gain global recognition is one of the core tasks of China's diplomacy, united front work, and the long-term implementation of the Belt and Road strategy. International students coming to China for study are an important force in spreading Chinese civilization, values, and the Chinese model to the outside world. While imparting scientific and cultural knowledge, schools need to conduct implicit cultural education to establish correct values and worldviews. It is essential to cultivate international students' recognition of Chinese culture, Chinese territory, and the path of development with Chinese characteristics. The aim is to ignite a spark that can start a prairie fire, laying a foundation for building a friendship of "long-term coexistence, mutual supervision, mutual trust, and shared honor and disgrace" between China and the world in the future.

The Paradox of Exchange: Institutional Asymmetry and the Limitations of Religious United Front Work across the Taiwan Strait

This article investigates how cross-strait distinction in religious governance affects Beijing’s united front work in Taiwan’s popular religious community. Due to shared spiritual lineages, Taiwanese temples are considered especially receptive to Chinese influence. Based on fieldwork and in-depth interview data collected over the years between 2013 and 2024, this article argues that institutional asymmetry has resulted in constant challenges limiting the effectiveness of cross-strait religious united front work. First, the centralised Chinese politico-religious order has limited the agency of the Chinese religious establishment in prioritising the CCP’s political imperative over religious logic. Second, decentralised Taiwanese temples have created coordination problems for cross-strait brokers whose agendas are not always aligned with Beijing. Finally, Taiwanese temple leaders abiding by communal religious traditions have deployed pragmatic coping strategies to sideline Beijing’s political intentions. Hence, Beijing’s efforts to initiate and repurpose cross-strait religious exchanges as instances of unity have paradoxically generated conflicting narratives within the Taiwanese popular religious community.

Qin Gang’s disappearance and shifts in party–state relations in China’s foreign policymaking

The June 2023 disappearance of China’s then-foreign minister Qin Gang for unknown reasons has caused speculation internationally about the country’s domestic political dynamics and about the party–state relations in foreign policy. Notably, the Chinese Communist Party has been more active internationally since President Xi Jinping began his third term in office in 2022 via organisations including the International Liaison Department and United Front Work Department.

New Measures for Governing Religions in Xi’s China

With the incorporation of the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) into the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) United Front Work Department in 2018, religious affairs have been brought back into the direct control of the Party. While SARA has retained its name, it is no longer an independent state agency. Five further legal measures were introduced from 2019 to 2021. This review essay examines these legal changes in order to update the dominant understanding of Xi Jinping’s attempt to reshape religious order in the hands of the CCP. The specific creation of regulations on Islamic affairs and the Internet also responds to Xi’s perceived problems regarding religious affairs in the contemporary era. Under the new measures, the state has demanded clear administration of religious groups, creating functions and positions like those in the Party’s branches. Beijing has further increased its control over religious personnel by establishing files on each of them, including details of any misconduct, in order to assess their trustworthiness. This essay concludes that the CCP continues to work toward the final eradication of religions in a Marxist manner and that China’s practices differ from existing international legal norms to which, at least nominally, China adheres as a signatory.

Chinese Global Orders: Socialism, Tradition, and Nation in China–Russia Relations

While many use rational IR theory to explain Chinese foreign policy behavior, this paper follows global IR to employ interpretivist theory to examine how Chinese elites understand their country’s role in the world. In particular, it explores the Chinese global order ideas of socialism, tradition, and nation through a comparative analysis of how they work in China–Russia relations, especially after China’s 20th Communist Party Congress in 2022. The first section presents a critical analysis of the realist understanding of the China–Russia–U.S. strategic triangle. It argues that the socialist concept of “united front work” better explains Chinese (and Russian) policy in terms of short-term “tactical triangles.” To probe China’s long-term global order ideas, the second section explores narratives of tradition to examine the concentric circles model of global order seen in Chinese tianxia and Russian Eurasianism. To understand these competing Russocentric and Sinocentric global orders, the third section explores how each country’s official historiography highlights narratives of the nation and especially how national rejuvenation requires correcting the “national humiliation” of lost territories. Rather than see these narratives in a linear chronological history — i.e., from tradition to socialism to nationalism — this paper considers how they overlap in socialism, tradition, and nation, a non-linear dynamic triad of global order ideas. It concludes first that further research is necessary to examine the interrelation of these three narratives: while nation and tradition are often employed to support the overarching narrative of socialism in recent years, this could certainly change. The conclusion then argues that while these narratives may be coherent theoretically, they have not been very successful in achieving Beijing and Moscow’s foreign policy objectives.

Spies and lies: how China's greatest covert operations fooled the world

Over the past few years, Alex Joske has played a pivotal role in identifying China's instruments of political influence and covert interference in Australia. Working with colleagues at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute and with the academic Clive Hamilton, he has shed light in particular on the activities of the United Front Work Department: the body that aims to co-opt or control Chinese diaspora communities in support of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Joske's new book, Spies and lies, goes further, exploring how the CCP's intelligence agency, the Ministry of State Security (MSS), has tried to shape western policies towards China since the 1980s. In 13 chapters, the author tells the stories of a series of leading spies, outlining the tactics the MSS employs, and exploring the various ‘front organizations’ that it uses to cultivate powerful, wealthy or influential foreigners, especially in the United States. Joske makes two main arguments. First, he suggests that western analysts have misconceived and misunderstood China's intelligence effort, focusing too much on its clandestine work—running agents and obtaining secrets—and not enough on its influence operations. Second, he argues that these operations have been ‘stunningly successful’ in manipulating western elites into thinking that China was safe to engage with, politically and economically, and that the CCP would in time create a more liberal form of government (p. 7).

the diaspora: China's united front work and the hyperlink networks of diasporic Chinese websites in cyberspace

ABSTRACT In recent years concerns have emerged regarding the loyalty of ethnic Chinese residing outside of China and whether they are agents of foreign influence. China has also recently declared its ambition to be an ‘Internet superpower’ and use the internet for political goals. This article will therefore explore the role of the internet in China's diaspora engagement efforts. By adopting an Information Technology (IT)-informed approach, this article seeks to provide insights to the following question(s): Does China engage in diaspora engagement on the internet, to what extent, and what are the implications of such? An in-depth look at a representative sample of Chinese-language websites outside of China reveals ‘dual-track messaging’ approaches where non-political (i.e. business) news exists alongside overtly political messages. This strongly suggests that the Communist Party of China's (CPC) United Front work to co-opt the diaspora is also taking place via cyberspace, in addition to traditional media sources.

INCREASING CENTRALISATION IN CHINA: A BANE FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH

This article contends that increasing centralisation of decision-making in China will undermine the country’s future economic growth. It highlights the declining role of private enterprises and the increasing role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the economy, and the extension of Communist Party influence in both SOEs and the private sector through the Party’s Organization Department and United Front Work Department. It argues that the increasing role of the state in the economy over the past decade has stifled growth through a decline in ‘total factor productivity’ because of increasing misallocation of resources. Centralisation, with associated losses in efficiency, objectivity, agility, speed and finesse regarding allocations of risks and investment, has debilitated decentralised decision-making and reduced the incentives for undertaking risks and innovation. The article argues that increasing Party control over the SOEs and the private sector will negatively impact the corporate structure and management decisions, exacerbate the fundamental problems of corporate governance and limit or hamper innovation.

From ‘Sticks’ to ‘Carrots’ and ‘Nets’, then to ‘Needles’: The Evolution of the CPC’s Policy towards Taiwan

This article traces the evolution of the Communist Party of China’ policy towards Taiwan and identifies the major characteristics of different leaderships in the history of CPC. With the major goal to manipulate the domestic politics of Taiwan to prevent it from moving further towards independence, the CPC has, within the framework of national strategy, used the carrot (promised benefits or attraction based on positive values), the stick (military actions or threats, blockades and coercive policies in international politics, etc.), the net (relationships, networks and United Front work; developing local collaborators) and the needle (infiltration, sabotage and disinformation warfare) interchangeably with different emphases depending on the strategic environments it faced. The CPC’s policy towards Taiwan, thus demonstrates flexibility in the choice of tactics but remains constant in its strategic goals.

Research on the United Front Work based on Social Life Status of Floating Population of Xinjiang – A Case Study of Dikouzhuang, Jinan

Starting from the representative multi-ethnic community Dikouzhuang where floating population of Xinjiang lived, it combination with existing research and practice of multi-ethnic community management, then discusses the integration and resistance in management.

"Patriots Governing Hong Kong" and the Innovation of Practice Path to Cultivate the Chinese National Community Consciousness

The basic meaning of "patriots ruling Hong Kong" is that Hong Kong people who love China and love Hong Kong govern Hong Kong society to ensure the smooth implementation of the "One Country, Two Systems" system and the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in Hong Kong and maintain the long-term prosperity and stability of Hong Kong society. There is a logical connection between "patriots governing Hong Kong" and Hong Kong's united front work, which has firmly established the consciousness of the Chinese nation's community. "patriots governing Hong Kong" strengthens the awareness of patriotism and love of Hong Kong and helps to forge the consciousness of the Chinese nation's community. The main path for the innovation and development of the Chinese nation’s community consciousness is to promote the generation and development of the national outlook + national outlook + historical outlook + cultural outlook in Hong Kong and Macau, and to promote the industrial chain + supply chain + innovation chain + value in the construction of the Greater Bay Area The “multi-chain integration” of chain + united front chain promotes the exchanges and integration of ethnic groups and ethnic groups in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area in the people's livelihood-oriented + science and education-oriented + demonstration leadership.

The Chinese Communist Party’s exploitation of the Second United Front: intelligence and counterintelligence on a middle force territory

ABSTRACT This article examines how the Chinese Communist Party exploited its alliance with the Kuomintang during the Sino-Japanese War to expand its power. Specifically, how the Chinese Communists capitalized on differences between the Kuomintang National Government and Guangxi regional militarists to create a new intelligence base that enabled united front work, propaganda campaigns, revitalization of Communist organizations, and augmentation of underground logistics network. Analysis will also cover the Kuomintang’s counterintelligence operations. I hope to demonstrate why the Chinese Communists succeeded in using the opportunity to strengthen itself and what ultimately terminated Communist covert activities in the targeted region.

Institutional Changes, Influences and Historical Junctures in the Communist Youth League of China

AbstractThe Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regards the Communist Youth League (CYL) as a critical and distinctive mass organization that acts as an “assistant” and “reserve army” for the Party. This article uses the analytical concepts of historical institutionalism and critical junctures to discuss the changes in the CYL during the post-Mao period. We focus on two critical junctures: 1982, when the CYL became a route to rapid promotion for cadres, and 2016, after which its cadres had fewer opportunities for promotion and the CYL was pushed back to its original role in youth United Front work. We also find that the CYL has refined its United Front methods to attract talented young people by offering them services. This reflects the efforts of the CCP regime to adapt to circumstances and ensure its survival.

The Legal Dimension of the Relation Between the Chinese Communist Party and the Private Economy. A Perspective of the Article 19 of the Company Law

Abstract Chinese economic development has been driven, among other factors, by the gradual expansion of the private economy and the establishment of Chinese-based multinational corporations recognized as “champions” of the Chinese economy. At the same time, the Chinese Communist Party strives to maintain proper coordination mechanisms over the Chinese private economy, in order to ensure the harmonization between private and public interests. Does such policy direction, pursued by the Chinese leadership, rely on legal mechanisms? Does the Chinese Communist Party have legal instruments at its disposal in order to carry out coordinative functions concerning the private economy? The issue, although acknowledged by several scholars, has been rarely the object of a comprehensive legal analysis, taking into account the interactions between the different legal formants of the Chinese system. The purpose of this paper is to sketch an outline of the main legal mechanisms empowering the Chinese Communist Party to supervise and coordinate the activity of private economic operators. Starting from the assessment of some recent developments, embodied in «Opinions on Strengthening the United Front Work in the Private Economy in the New Era» issued in September 2020, the analysis will try to identify some of the most relevant legal provisions aimed at ensuring Party supervision over the private economy, in particular Art. 19 of the Company Law. Such provisions will be analyzed not only within the context of the recent developments of Chinese economic law, but also with regard to its practical applications by courts, in order to define the scope, in concrete, of Party activities in the private economy. The information gathered and analyzed will then be taken as conceptual basis to draw some conclusions regarding the structural role of the Chinese Communist Party in the development of Chinese commercial and economic law.

Red Scare Three

This article documents the history of united front work in Canada. It demonstrates how the Chinese Communist Party has long been engaged in a persistent campaign of interference in our politics and how the Canadian political establishment has been slow in recognizing this fact. It also seeks to explain why this realization was so slow in coming. Finally, it concludes by offering two alternative visions for how Canada might address this threat now that it has been recognized and makes a brief case for which is preferable.

An Analysis of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and Its Formation Process from the Perspective of Game Theory

The united front is a magic weapon for the victory of the revolution, construction and reform of the Communist Party of China. The formation process of the united front is a kind of game, starting from the perspective of game theory, using the assets exclusiveness theory of economics, combining the Nash equilibrium and historical events, building a game model, analyzing the Anti-Japanese National United Front and its formation process, are of great significance to improve the scientific cognition level of historical research work and united front work.

China’s Xinjiang propaganda and united front work in Turkey: actors and content

Depuis que le Parti communiste chinois (PCC) a remanié, sous tous ses aspects, sa gouvernance sur le Xinjiang en 2016, ses politiques ont eu un impact pour ainsi dire sur tous les aspects de la vie des Ouïghours, des Kazakhs et des autres communautés ethniques de la région. La crise du Xinjiang est devenue un point de friction important entre une partie de la communauté internationale et la République populaire de Chine (RPC), contraignant le PCC à multiplier les efforts pour endiguer cette crise. Cet article explore les acteurs et contenus de la propagande et du travail du Front Uni mené par le PCC en Turquie pour orienter le débat public et les sujets liés au Xinjiang. Cette recherche examine principalement les développements récents dans les relations sino-turques ; la communication des acteurs centraux de la RPC avec les audiences turques ; les efforts du PCC pour établir des liens avec les acteurs politiques locaux et coopter leurs discours publics et réseaux médiatiques ; les mécanismes de communication opérés par l’organisation de visites officielles de journalistes turcs au Xinjiang ; et la propagande du CCP et le travail du Front Uni qui visent les Ouïghours résidant en Turquie, en particulier les commerçants et les étudiants. La discussion resitue les acteurs du CCP turcs et chinois examinés ici dans les systèmes de gouvernance respectifs. Enfin, l’article offre plusieurs exemples de tentatives du PCC d’adapter au contexte local sa propagande et son travail de Front Uni en choisissant le thème de l’Islam. Cette recherche s’appuie sur des sources écrites et des entretiens de l’auteur avec des informateurs ouïghours à Istanbul et Ankara menés en mai, juin et août 2019.