Union Decertification Research Articles

Basics of Union Decertification

Basics of Union Decertification

The Committee for Cultural Freedom and the Roots of McCarthyism

Among the most controversial aspects of John Dewey's career as a public intellectual was his conflict with the Communist Party and its various front groups. John Dewey and Sidney Hook co-founded the Committee for Cultural Freedom that directly exposed that pretense of the Popular Front, which excluded the Soviet Union from the list of totalitarian states. In the process, Dewey became embroiled publicly with Corliss Lamont and privately (to a large degree) with Franz Boas. Besides policy toward the Soviet Union, the New York Teachers' Union's decertification emerged as a central issue. In the process, Dewey exhibited both intellectual integ- rity and courage by opposing threats to both academic freedom and the democratic process.

Defining "Ministerial Aid": Union Decertification under the National Labor Relations Act

The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA'' gives employees the right to select their union representatives. For a variety of reasons, however, unionized employees sometimes become dissatisfied with the representation their incumbent union provides them. The NLRA permits employees to petition to remove their incumbent union through a process called Unfortunately, few employees know about decertification; fewer still know how to start the process. Moreover, union representatives, who normally would offer employees guidance about their rights under federal labor law, have no incentive to help employees with decertification. And, while employers might be willing to help, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) has interpreted the NLRA to forbid any except aid from the employer. The prohibition against substantial employer imposes strict limits on the employer's actions, and yet the legal standards used to apply the prohibition are uncertain and vague. This uncertainty harms the interests of employees in two ways. First, employers may be reluctant to provide even legitimate assistance to employees seeking to decertify their union. Second, when employers do help, the NLRB often overturns the employees' decision to decertify because, in its judgment, the employer provided too much assistance, whether through actions that alone were than ministerial or through a combination of too many trivial acts of assistance. Because most cases have involved more than one form of assistance, and the Board and reviewing courts have considered the actions only in combination, the decisions provide little guidance as to whether an individual act is permissible or how many permissible acts together become impermissible.

The Growth of Union Decertification: A Test of Two Nonnested Theories

This article tests two rival theories of the growth of union decertification: a neoclassical and an institutionalist. Both perform well when they are independently tested against the data. However, Cox nonnested hypothesis tests indicate that when these two theories are tested against each other, the institutionalist theory is superior to (i.e., variance encompasses) the neoclassical theory.

UNION DECERTIFICATION RESEARCH: REVIEW AND THEORETICAL INTEGRATION

We present a comprehensive literature review and critique of union decertification research, and develop a theoretical framework that should prove useful for future research. The framework incorporates three theoretical viewpoints from several research traditions: the expected utility, social‐political, and workplace voice perspectives. We provide suggestions for how each viewpoint can be modeled in future research. Additionally, although some previous decertification research was theoretically rich, the empirical findings across prior studies were ambiguous and inconsistent. We analyze the reasons for the ambiguous and inconsistent prior findings, and note how future research can avoid or minimize the empirical problems of the past.

Union Decertifications's Impact on Shareholder Wealth

Recent research correlated share price declines in financial markets with union organizing. Investors seemingly anticipate a redistribution of earnings away from shareholder returns toward employee compensation. The markets discount security prices accordingly. But were that the case, union decertification activity should correlate with persistent, abnormally high returns on equity investments. Failure to find returns that are both abnormally high and persistent invites an alternative explanation that is consistent with the data from both studies. This study finds that firms that retained union representation in decertification cases actually outperformed those that ousted the bargaining agent in a partitioned sample comparison.

Union decertification election outcomes: Bargaining unit characteristics and union resources

Previous analysis using aggregate data has concluded that union decertification activity is “exclusively a product of market conditions.” We employ data disaggregated by local (county) labor market which permits a preliminary investigation of the importance of potential nonmarket influences that are not measurable using aggregate data, namely, the type of bargaining unit, the type of union, the type of employer, and proxies for union resources. It also allows a more precise specification of the labor market characteristics previously found to influence decertification. Our results confirm the importance of market conditions in decertification activity and outcomes, but they also suggest that the likelihood of decertification is much greater in independent unions and in industry-county combinations in which the typical employee works part-time and has limited alternative income opportunities. Institutional characteristics of the union and employer, individual characteristics of bargaining unit members, and local economic conditions are important determinants of decertification.

Determinants of Decertification Activity: An Interstate Analysis

In this paper, a model of union decertification activity in the U.S. is estimated for 1960, 1970, 1975, and 1980. Cross‐state data permit the use of regressors capturing the effects of demographic, political, and organizational factors not included in previous research on decertification. The estimated results confirm these effects. Tests for stability over the pooled sample periods 1960–1970 and 1975–1980 show some variability in the strength of the variables' effects.

Determinants of Decertification Activity: An Interstate Analysis

In this paper, a model of union decertification activity in the U.S. is estimated for 1960, 1970, 1975, and 1980. Cross‐state data permit the use of regressors capturing the effects of demographic, political, and organizational factors not included in previous research on decertification. The estimated results confirm these effects. Tests for stability over the pooled sample periods 1960–1970 and 1975–1980 show some variability in the strength of the variables' effects.

Equity market response to union decertification petitions and elections

The effect of union decertification elections on the valuation of corporations is examined using a standard event study methodology. Cumulative abnormal daily common stock returns for 203 NYSE and AMEX listed firms are estimated for the day on which a petition for a decertification election is filed and for the day on which the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) certifies the decertification election outcome. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that successful union decertifications increase firm valuation and unsuccessful ones reduce firm valuation. The primary carrier of valuation information is the date the NLRB confirms the decertification election results. The petition file date yields little, if any, information about the firm’s capitalization.

Correlates of Voting Behavior in a Union Decertification Election

The article presents a study pertaining to the relationship between selected demographic and attitudinal variables and employee voting behavior in a union decertification election. The study was co...

CORRELATES OF VOTING BEHAVIOR IN A UNION DECERTIFICATION ELECTION.

The article presents a study pertaining to the relationship between selected demographic and attitudinal variables and employee voting behavior in a union decertification election. The study was co...

The influence of macroeconomic variables on the probability of union decertification

This study focuses on the role macroeconomic factors play in explaining the proportion of decertification elections lost by the union movement in the postwar period. Previous research has neglected the importance of such macroeconomic variables. Our results indicate that the union-nonunion wage differential, inflation, strikes, state of the labor market, and union density are related to the phenomenon of decertification.

The effects of right-to-work legislation on union outcomes: Additional evidence

The authors reexamine the role of open shop legislation in affecting union outcomes. New indices of union success are employed which include election voting behavior, the size of newly certified units, and the rate of union decertification. Three competing hypotheses are empirically tested: (1) the free rider argument predicting lower membership levels in right-to-work (RTW) areas; (2) the saturationist hypothesis predicting a higher level of organizing activity in RTW areas as a result of large concentrations of unorganized workers; and, (3) the hypothesis that legislation is vitiated by distinct organizing behaviors in RTW and nonRTW areas. Empirical results, based on SMSA data from 35 states, tend to provide support for hypotheses (2) and (3). Recently, RTW areas have experienced more prounion outcomes, and the union returns to regional attributes (measured by Chow tests) are found to be distinct in the two areas.

Do state right to work laws affect union decertification activity?

In an earlier article ["Union Decertification -Some Recent Trends," The Employee Relations Law Journal, Vol. 5, No. 4, Spring 1980, pp. 533-48], the authors identified and discussed changes in five proxies for measuring the level of decertification activity from 1948 through 1978. The five measures were: number of decertification petitions fried, number of decertification elections held, number of decertification elections resulting in deunionization, number of eligible voters in decertification elections, and the number of eligible voters in units decertified. Additional research by the authors has been devoted to analyzing the various determinants of aggregate decertification activity and the resuits of this effort will be made available in the near future. In the meantime, tile question of whether state fight-to-work (SRTW) laws affect decertification activity has been examined in several cross-sectional regressions and the results of this effort are reported below. Theoretically, decertification activity should decrease in the presence of SRTW laws. In RTW states, a unionized employee can give up his union membership to avoid paying dues while retaining union negotiated benefits. In non-RTW states, a union member, faced with a union shop provision in the contract, must decertify the union to escape payment of dues. Since the employee can avoid the costs of union fees and dues in RTW states while retaining his job, there is a lower return to decertification. In non-RTW states, without decertification, the employee would have to leave his job to escape the out-of-pocket costs associated with the union. So, the employee covered by a union shop clause in a non-RTW state is more likely to join his colleagues to petition for a decertification election in order to avoid the fees and dues associated with the union. The only other alternative to decertification is to quit or be terminated. Therefore, it is expected that, after accounting for the other variables, decertification activity will be lower in states having RTW laws, i.e., the coefficient on RTW dummy should be negative. In the past, data on decertification activity have been reported only at the national or aggregate level, but in more recent years, individual state data have been made available in NLRB reports. Years 1970-1974 were selected to test for the impact of SRTW's on decertification activity. The model specified let total decertification petitions filed per million union members in each state be a function of the unemployment rate, per capita income, percentage of the work force unionized, and total work stoppages for each state. A SRTW dummy was introduced for each of the states having such laws. Cross-sectional regressions were then completed for the indicated years. The coefficient on the SRTW dummy was significantly negative for the 1971 regression but was insignificant in all of the other tests. This lack of consistent significance on the SRTW dummy implies that the presence or absence of these laws has little impact on decertification activity. Other things equal then, decertification activity will be just as high in RTW states as in non-RTW states. Once a union member perceives that the expected benefits of retaining the union as a bargaining agent are below the various costs, avoidance of continued unionization via the decertification process is selected over "free rider" status in RTW states and over paying dues and fees in non-RTW states.

Union Decertification in the U.S.: 1947–1977

Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and SocietyVolume 19, Issue 1 p. 100-107 Union Decertification in the U.S.: 1947–1977 JOHN C. ANDERSON, JOHN C. ANDERSON *The authors are, respectively, Assistant Professor, School of Business and Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, Kingston, Canada; Assistant Professor, School of Business Administration and Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, Berkeley; and Coordinator, Center for Labor Research and Education, Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, Los Angeles.Search for more papers by this authorCHARLES A. O'REILLY III, CHARLES A. O'REILLY III *The authors are, respectively, Assistant Professor, School of Business and Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, Kingston, Canada; Assistant Professor, School of Business Administration and Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, Berkeley; and Coordinator, Center for Labor Research and Education, Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, Los Angeles.Search for more papers by this authorGLORIA BUSMAN, GLORIA BUSMAN *The authors are, respectively, Assistant Professor, School of Business and Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, Kingston, Canada; Assistant Professor, School of Business Administration and Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, Berkeley; and Coordinator, Center for Labor Research and Education, Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, Los Angeles.Search for more papers by this author JOHN C. ANDERSON, JOHN C. ANDERSON *The authors are, respectively, Assistant Professor, School of Business and Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, Kingston, Canada; Assistant Professor, School of Business Administration and Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, Berkeley; and Coordinator, Center for Labor Research and Education, Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, Los Angeles.Search for more papers by this authorCHARLES A. O'REILLY III, CHARLES A. O'REILLY III *The authors are, respectively, Assistant Professor, School of Business and Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, Kingston, Canada; Assistant Professor, School of Business Administration and Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, Berkeley; and Coordinator, Center for Labor Research and Education, Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, Los Angeles.Search for more papers by this authorGLORIA BUSMAN, GLORIA BUSMAN *The authors are, respectively, Assistant Professor, School of Business and Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, Kingston, Canada; Assistant Professor, School of Business Administration and Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, Berkeley; and Coordinator, Center for Labor Research and Education, Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, Los Angeles.Search for more papers by this author First published: January 1980 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-232X.1980.tb00158.xCitations: 13AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Citing Literature Volume19, Issue1January 1980Pages 100-107 RelatedInformation

Union Decertification: An Exploratory Analysis

Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and SocietyVolume 18, Issue 1 p. 59-69 Union Decertification: An Exploratory Analysis I. CHAFETZ, I. CHAFETZSearch for more papers by this authorC. R. P. FRASER, C. R. P. FRASER *The authors are, respectively, Law Student, Queens University, and Assistant Professor, Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, University of British Columbia (on leave)Search for more papers by this author I. CHAFETZ, I. CHAFETZSearch for more papers by this authorC. R. P. FRASER, C. R. P. FRASER *The authors are, respectively, Law Student, Queens University, and Assistant Professor, Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, University of British Columbia (on leave)Search for more papers by this author First published: January 1979 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-232X.1979.tb00954.xCitations: 9 Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume18, Issue1January 1979Pages 59-69 RelatedInformation

Union Decertification and the Salaried Approach: A Workable Alternative

Union Decertification and the Salaried Approach: A Workable Alternative

Union Decertification: Bucking the Trend

(1977). Union Decertification: Bucking the Trend. Hospital Topics: Vol. 55, No. 3, pp. 14-15.

The Effect of Right-to-Work Laws on Unionization in the United States

State right-to-work laws, the subject of considerable controversy in the industrial relations field, typically state that no person will be required to become a union member or, conversely, be required to abstain from union membership as a condition of obtaining or retaining employment. Little hard evidence exists on the effect of right-to-work laws. Meyers (1955) concludes that in Texas the law does not appear to have had a noticeable impact on union strength. Kuhlman (1955) finds that the Virginia law has caused little change in hiring practices, and he cites lack of enforcement as a major cause. Novit (1969), in examining Indiana as the only state to pass a right-to-work law and subsequently repeal it, argues that the law was ineffective because unions found ways to circumvent its restrictions. During the period 1957-65 when the law was in force in Indiana, there was a dramatic increase in the agency shop which allows nonunion workers but which requires all employees to pay union dues. A Fortune (1957) survey of employers and union leaders in states with right-to-work laws concluded that the laws had little effect on overall union strength. In many states the laws were not being enforced, and in some instances employers were unwilling or unable to avoid de facto union shops. For example, in Arizona it was reported that the