24 | International Union Rights | 26/4 ANALYSIS | UN BINDING TREATY DRAFT The Draft Treaty is taking clear shape and this is a key time for trade unionists to continue to engage with technical legal aspects of the drafting In July 2019, the ‘Revised Draft of the Legally Binding Instrument’ was released from the UN Human Rights Council’s Working Group on Business and Human Rights, updating the so-called ‘Zero Draft’ of July 2018. Many welcomed the new draft as a step forward, but others were quick to seize upon a number of ambiguities and puzzling choices that seem to depart from the broad consensus of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). The document now has a coherent shape and focus, but fails to produce clarity on a number of technical legal points. These must be addressed if the Draft is to create a meaningful international standard. The following represent my own views (broadly starting with the highest priority points, moving towards those that are either less urgent or viable) on which changes trade unionists should consider pushing for in the Draft. Due diligence and stakeholder issues The continuing move towards a legally mandated form of binding due diligence can be welcomed by unions. It promises opportunities for participation and engagement, and is the only mechanism that seeks to avoid and prevent harm, rather than merely compensate for harm that has occurred. It is built upon the idea of voluntary due diligence that was central to the UNGPs. It is understood by and – more or less – supported by significant sections of the business community, at least to a degree. Properly mapped out, binding due diligence holds the potential to improve corporate planning so as to identify and avoid risks, improve communication with stakeholders, and to establish better participation for all affected by corporate activities (notably, of course, those working in their supply chains). It also backs this up with real accountability for failures to identify and avoid risks. Crucial to effective due diligence, however, are requirements for stakeholder involvement in corporate planning. Trade unionists should consider calling for the following improvements: • Groups identified as ‘at risk’ should include trade unions (Articles 5(3)b and 14(4)). • Groups identified as ‘to be consulted’ should include trade unions (Article 5(3)b). • The form that Article 5(3)b consultation takes should be better defined so as to give stakeholders a genuine opportunity to influence decision-making. • The outcomes of consultation do not have a mechanism requiring that they be integrated into due diligence planning. This is in contrast to the outcomes of impact assessments, which are specifically integrated into due diligence planning under Article 5(3)a. An equivalent link placing consultation outcomes at least on a par with impact assessment outcomes should be established. • There should be an explicit link between Article 5 due diligence for parent companies and Article 6 legal liability concerning harm arising as a result of due diligence failures (discussed further below). • There should be a clear statement under Article 5 (and therefore linked also to Article 6(6)) to the effect that parent companies should not be able to divest themselves of due diligence obligations by simply outsourcing that responsibility to a third party monitor or by paying little or no attention to their supply chains. Liability, jurisdiction, and applicable law Victims of harm need access to courts and judicial processes, and effective remedies must be available that are appropriate and commensurate to the harm suffered. The latest Draft does give a useful framework around which to discuss what liability might look like under the Treaty, but there are surprising gaps and a lack of clarity concerning how and in what circumstances parent company liability towards victims overseas might arise. Changes in the following areas ought to be investigated: • Article 6(6) outlines a civil liability track for victims. It covers situations where one company is controlled or supervised by another, and (in the alternative) also situations where a company should foresee or should have foreseen harm caused by a company with which it has a ‘contractual relationship’. This second strand of liability seems to arise where the parent company...
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