Strengthening the water rights trading market is crucial for sustainable development. At present, water rights trading shows a weak marketization trend. This article analyzes the pricing strategy of a water rights trading platform in the water rights trading market, with the two-sided market theory as the core analytical framework. The Hotelling game model is used as the core analytical tool, and the article systematically analyzes the interaction mechanism between sellers and buyers on the platform. It also explores the impact of two-sided network externalities on the platform’s pricing behavior. We adopt MATLAB-based parameter analysis for numerical simulation. This simulation verifies the validity of the constructed pricing model based on the Hotelling game model. This research makes an innovative contribution by integrating the Hotelling game model with the theory of two-sided markets. The study shows that under the one-sided pricing model, the platform’s profit is positively correlated with the cross-network externality coefficient of the fee-paying party. As the intra-group network externality associated with the fee-paying party intensifies, the platform tends to reduce its optimal pricing for the fee-paying party. Furthermore, the platform’s optimal pricing strategy and core operational parameters under the two-sided fee-charging model exhibit non-monotonic relationships. Accordingly, expediting the construction of a two-sided market-oriented water rights trading platform will lay a solid foundation for implementing pricing regulation and attaining profit maximization goals. These findings provide targeted references for water resource managers and contribute to the sustainable development of China’s water rights trading market.ernality coefficient of the fee-paying party. As the intra-group network externality associated with the fee-paying party intensifies, the platform tends to reduce its optimal pricing for the fee-paying party. Furthermore, the platform’s optimal pricing strategy and core operational parameters under the two-sided fee-charging model exhibit non-monotonic relationships. Accordingly, expediting the construction of a two-sided market-oriented water rights trading platform will lay a solid foundation for implementing pricing regulation and attaining profit maximization goals. These findings provide targeted references for water resource managers and contribute to the sustainable development of China’s water rights trading market.

ABSTRACT In the current digital landscape, non-vessel-operating common carriers (NVOCCs) are increasingly migrating to digital freight platforms (DFPs). However, pricing decisions for these platforms remain underexplored, particularly in the presence of demand volatility and other external risks. This study aims to obtain optimal pricing strategies for DFPs with different risk attitudes to maximize profits in a two-sided market. This study proposes mathematical formulations based on the Hotelling model to examine the pricing mechanisms of DFPs. Our findings reveal that when users are partially multihoming, the prices of shippers and carriers are negatively correlated with risk sensitivity. Higher cross-group externalities amplify the impact of platform risk attitudes on pricing, whereas greater price sensitivity diminishes it. Our results indicate that the optimal pricing strategy is dynamic with respect to the changes in platform risk attitudes. Additionally, in a multihoming environment, DFPs should aim to maintain risk neutrality to maximize profits.

Advertising strategies for innovation capability sharing: A two-sided market analysis

A celebrated impossibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) shows that any truthful mechanism for two-sided markets that maximizes social welfare must run a deficit, resulting in a necessity to relax welfare efficiency and the use of approximation mechanisms. Such mechanisms in general make extensive use of the Bayesian priors. In this work, we investigate a question of increasing theoretical and practical importance: how much prior information is required to design mechanisms with near-optimal approximations?

ABSTRACT A two-sided marketplace with network effects, such as an online food delivery platform, faces challenges when buyers impose disutility on each other while competing for shared resources. To reduce this disutility, the platform can exercise greater control over transactions, charge sellers a higher transaction fee, or both, but these strategies have trade-offs. Using a game-theoretic model, we show that a market in our setting can be divided into two distinct types based on the relative strength of buyers’ same-side negative externality and cross-side positive network effect. Our study provides several interesting insights. First, when buyers face relatively weak same-side negative externality, the platform can exert more effort to improve their experience, even when effort becomes costlier. Second, it may decrease its effort despite an increase in buyers’ same-side negative externality in both types of markets. In either case, the platform’s profit is not necessarily hurt. Furthermore, transaction fee can decrease with an increase in the cross-side positive network effect.

<p>Beyond Cash: An Empirical Study of Mobile <span>Merchant Payment Services</span></p>

Measure Frictional Sorting *

The Design of Centralized Matching Systems on Two-Sided Platforms: Evidence from the Ride-Hailing Market

Demand or Infrastructure First? Chicken-Egg Problem in the Italian BEV Market

Pricing and investment by a two-sided monopoly platform

The rise of crowdfunding has transformed the funding landscape for startups, offering an alternative to conventional financing avenues. This study focuses on equity crowdfunding and investigates the dynamics of herding behavior among investors and its influence on campaign success. We analyze 680 equity crowdfunding campaigns from Wadiz, the largest platform in South Korea (2016–2021). In contrast to traditional funding, equity crowdfunding creates a two-sided market through its platform-based service, fostering interactions between entrepreneurs seeking funds and investors seeking opportunities. The time-limited nature of campaigns further encourages sequential decision-making and potential herding behavior. Unlike prior studies that have predominantly emphasized entrepreneurial and campaign-related factors, this study highlights the pivotal role of investor behavior, recognizing fellow investors as valuable signaling entities within the platform. Using OLS regression, logistic regression, interaction analysis, and Propensity Score Matching (PSM), we find that early participation by professional investors increases the odds of campaign success by approximately 14%. Furthermore, the effect is more pronounced in the IT industry, where information asymmetry is especially severe. Our findings demonstrate the signaling role of professional investors in mitigating information asymmetry and improving campaign outcomes, providing actionable insights for entrepreneurs, investors, and platforms in the evolving landscape of equity crowdfunding.

Exemplified by EcoStruxure from Schneider and CASICloud, production-capacity-sharing platforms typically operate as two-sided platforms. These platforms contribute to carbon emission reductions while generating revenue through uniform membership fees, fixed service charges, or commission fees applied to one or both sides of the platform. As B2B platforms, however, they must determine whether to offer online payment options to participants on both sides of the market. We employ the theory of two-sided markets and the method of comparative analysis, developing a two-sided market model to investigate: (1) the platform’s optimal payment method selection strategies and (2) how same-side network externalities and user online search costs affect platform performance. We examine two payment modes: M mode (offline payments only) and F mode (combined offline/online payments). The F mode comprises two sub-modes—FF (two-sided users choose to pay offline) and FN (two-sided users choose to pay online)—determined by users’ payment preferences on each side. We conduct pairwise comparisons of the platform’s membership fee, fixed service fee, and online service level between: (i) FF and M modes and (ii) FN and M modes. Our results indicate that the optimal payment method selection varies across market conditions, with each mode demonstrating superior performance under specific market characteristics. The FF mode consistently yields higher profits compared to the M mode. When suppliers’ expected revenues fall below a certain threshold, the FN mode outperforms the M mode in terms of profit generation. Conversely, the M mode becomes preferable above this threshold. Furthermore, the effects of same-side network externalities and search costs vary significantly across different payment modes. Under the M mode and the FF1 mode, the effects of the same-side network externality on the platform’s membership fee are associated with two-sided users’ online search costs, which are more monotonous. Under the FN1 and FN2 modes, both the same-side network externality and two-sided users’ online search costs impact the platform’s optimal strategies monotonously, but they are not always the same in these two modes.

Background: In Nepal, there are several emerging mobile app-based delivery platforms that help grow micro-enterprise businesses and make the local economy vibrant. Some delivery services include Pathao, Indrive, and Yango, which deliver products from the point of origin to the customer, thus helping to sell the products. These platforms have global networks and are successfully taking the market in Nepal in the recent period. This digitalisation of the economy through digital platforms and the rise of micro-enterprising activities in the country is an emerging concept that is only limitedly discussed in the literature. Objectives: Grounded in Two-Sided Market Theory, this research aims to identify opportunities, challenges, and policy gaps while using these delivery platforms in the country. Method: This research applies a literature-review research method, reviewing literature related to journals, policies, and reports. Finding: Findings show that the use of mobile apps to find delivery vehicles and riders has increased business sales of SMEs effectively and efficiently. The SMEs have found more customers, and their business catchment has expanded. The growth of digital platforms is helpful in transforming the conventional economy toward a more virtual and advanced generation. Despite this, many customers lack digital awareness to use these apps. This intervention in the Nepali market needs to scale up with trustworthy mechanisms. Conclusion: A business ecosystem is essential, that networks four stakeholders: government oversight, mobile-app intermediary services, micro-entrepreneurs delivering products to customers, and customers. This will ensure that customers receive their desired goods through convenient and trustworthy mechanisms, promote the SMEs, and contribute to the local and national economy. Novelty of the Study: This study contributes to the limited literature on how mobile app-based delivery mechanisms support the growth of SMEs in developing nations. The application of Two-Sided Market Theory uniquely interprets how mobile apps act as intermediaries between delivery platforms and SMEs to expand their customer reach and scale their operations. This study is important for informing evidence-based policymaking to strengthen digitalisation efforts within the SME sector.

This paper employs the Prisoner’s Dilemma framework to analyze the self-destructive price war between China’s food delivery duopoly, Meituan and Ele.me. This intense competition, characterized by deep subsidies and mutual financial losses, presents a quintessential case of how rational individual strategies lead to collectively suboptimal outcomes in a two-sided market. The analysis first describes the current competitive situation, framing the platforms’ strategic choices within a payoff matrix where “defection” (price-cutting) is the dominant strategy, leading to a stable but inefficient Nash Equilibrium. It further examines the significant barriers to cooperation, including some regulations, the threat of new entrants, and profound information asymmetry. To break this deadlock, the study proposes strategic interventions aimed at altering the fundamental payoff structure, such as competing on non-price dimensions (e.g., service quality, ecosystem integration) and fostering institutional transparency to lower the barriers to cooperation. The study concludes that transcending this dilemma is imperative for the industry’s sustainable development, providing a strategic roadmap for managers to transition from destructive competition to a virtuous cycle of innovation. The findings offer actionable insights for stakeholders in oligopolistic two-sided markets globally that are susceptible to similar competitive traps.

This entry presents the history, geography, business, regulations, and the roles of gig workers, platform/algorithms, and employers, focusing primarily on the USA and the EU. The gig economy is informally referred to also as the fourth industrial revolution or the 1099 economy, emphasising sharing, freelance, or platform work; it is a complex and changing business model and regulatory environment. In practice, the gig economy refers to a tripartite relation between workers, platforms/apps, and employers, leading to a two-sided market, where algorithms match supply and demand for paid labour and clients. It is only recently that the gig economy has started to be conceptualised, and its implications, challenges, and impacts are captured in economic law and society, including the power dynamics related to the interplay between economics, technology, regulation, and communities. Conceptually, the gig economy is important, as small paid work has always been present in society for all types of workers and beneficiaries. This new business model of on-demand work has some perceived advantages, such as freedom of work, under-regulation, efficient use of capital, driving down costs, and improving services. However, there is a dualisation of anti-power between workers and non-employers that may lead to precarious work, less free workers, and shadow corporations that distort the market using game changers like digital management algorithms. Currently, the size of the gig economy comprises 154–435 million gig workers out of the world’s 3.63 bn workers, with a market size of USD 557 bn, and is still expanding.

Many video platforms (e.g., TikTok and Bilibili) choose to provide bullet screens on their video content. With the different types of bullet screen features, platforms face the challenge of choosing an appropriate bullet screen strategy, especially when consumers have different preferences for bullet screens. To address this challenge, this paper constructs a game-theoretic model to analyze the optimal bullet screen strategy for video platforms with two-sided market characteristics. Although there are some arguments that bullet screens can be detrimental to the platform’s advertising business, our study shows that when the bullet screen feature can attract more consumers, it is beneficial for both the platform and the advertisers. Additionally, we found that as consumers’ attention levels toward bullet screens increase or the proportion of bullet screen preference consumers rises, the video platform will enhance the quality of bullet screens provided to consumers and raise advertising pricing for advertisers. However, the platform’s profits do not necessarily increase accordingly and are also influenced by the platform’s bullet screen cost coefficient. Our comparative analysis of the three bullet screen models reveals that when consumers in the market are ad-fatigued, the model that allows bullet screens to cover ads is the optimal choice for the platform, and when there are differences in the cross-side network effects of advertiser to consumers, the model that maximizes the platform’s profits depends on the size of the cross-side network effects of advertiser to consumers. Our study provides important managerial insights for video platforms, especially on how to provide bullet screens under two-sided market structures. In future research, we will strive to better integrate consumer attention theory with theoretical modeling.

In the last ten years, digitally mediated platforms have changed the way that work is matched, tracked, and paid for in ride-hailing, last-mile deliveries, online freelancing, and creative economies. This study integrates international scholarship, comparative regulation, and illustrative instances (Meituan, Didi, Uber, and Douyin/TikTok) to evaluate the impact of platformization on labor market structure. I contend that platforms expedite a transition from conventional employment to varied non-standard arrangements, facilitated by algorithmic management and two-sided market principles that redistribute risk from employers to employees. The effects are mixed: platforms make it easier to get started and create more flexible income opportunities, but they also make it harder for employers to take responsibility, make income less stable, and put workers under opaque, data-driven control. A review of policies in the EU, the U.S., China, Singapore, Spain, and the U.K. shows that there is more agreement on five regulatory levers: (1) presumptions of employment or intermediate dependent contractor statuses; (2) portability of social protection with shared financing; (3) transparency and human oversight for algorithmic systems; (4) data access to enable enforcement and collective bargaining; and (5) targeted inclusion of youth, women, and migrants. The paper ends with a macro-structural framework that connects platform governance to labor market segmentation. It also suggests a policy mix for China (quasi-employment pilots, co-financed social insurance, algorithmic audits, and sectoral dialog) to improve job quality without hurting the growth benefits of the digital economy.

The rapid development of the digital economy has propelled third-party payment to reshape the payment ecosystem, posing significant challenges to the intermediary business of commercial banks. This study aims to clarify the mechanisms through which third-party payment affects banks' intermediary business, holding practical significance for banks to cope with challenges and achieve transformation. Based on the two-sided market theory, game theory, and information asymmetry theory, this paper constructs an analytical framework to examine the impact of three dimensions: competition, innovation, and customer behavior. The findings indicate that third-party payment erodes the market share of bank intermediary businesses through advantages in convenience, low cost, and scenario ecosystems. Its technological leadership forces banks to accelerate digital transformation, promoting business innovation. Furthermore, the shift in customer payment habits accelerates the diversion of intermediary business. Empirical evidence shows the impact is significant but not disruptive, exhibiting sectoral differentiation. Recommendations include that commercial banks strengthen technology application, build open ecosystems, and deepen cooperation with third-party payment providers. Regulators should balance innovation incentives with risk prevention, improving the management of reserve funds and data security to foster a healthy payment system.

In the era of the digital economy, the platform economy has become a core driver of economic growth, and data resources, as a key production factor, profoundly affect the operation and development of platforms. This paper takes platform enterprises as its research object and, based on theories such as two-sided market theory, network effect theory, and data asset theory, systematically analyzes the impact mechanisms of data resources on platform user growth, business expansion, innovative development, and the construction of competitive advantages. Combining the practical experience of platform data utilization, it identifies challenges in data quality, security and privacy, data integration, and talent reserve, and proposes targeted optimization strategies. The research aims to enhance the theoretical framework of the platform economy and provide theoretical and practical guidance for platform enterprises to effectively utilize data resources, as well as for government oversight.

Purpose This study explores the market dynamics of reselling platforms within the broader context of online retailing, focusing on how buyers and sellers interact in a two-sided market environment. The goal is to examine how buyers and sellers perceive and engage with reselling platforms differently, focusing on their distinct behavioural patterns and satisfaction drivers within a two-sided market context. Design/methodology/approach Structural equation modelling was used to analyse survey data from 682 active users who have experience with reselling platforms. This approach enabled a detailed examination of the factors influencing user perceptions, trust and satisfaction in the digital retail environment. Findings The results reveal meaningful differences between buyers and sellers in terms of trust, perceived value and platform engagement, underscoring the need for differentiated strategies that accommodate both sides of the market. Buyer–seller interactions showed distinct patterns, underscoring the need for differentiated platform strategies in the retail sector. The findings highlight how platform-specific retail features shape user experience and engagement in resale commerce. Originality/value This study contributes to the retailing literature by extending two-sided market theory to the under-researched domain of reselling platforms. It offers both theoretical and practical insights into consumer behaviour in the resale market and provides strategic guidance for retail platform managers seeking to enhance competitiveness and user engagement.