People are more likely to judge repeated (vs. novel) information as true. This illusory truth effect is commonly attributed to increased processing fluency, with perceptual and semantic aspects of repetition assumed to enhance perceptual and conceptual fluency, respectively. While prior research has shown that the truth effect is affected by the temporal gap between presentations, the cognitive mechanisms underlying this effect-and how they are shaped by retention interval-remain insufficiently understood. In Experiment 1 (N = 75), we manipulated repetition (repeated vs. new statements) and retention interval (10 min vs. 1 week) within participants. Using diffusion modeling, we found that repetition increased drift rate, reduced nondecision time, and induced a bias toward "true" responses-suggesting contributions from both conceptual and perceptual fluency. These effects diminished with increasing retention interval. In Experiment 2 (N = 81), participants judged the validity of one-word answers to previously shown questions, allowing separate measurement of reading times and tighter control over nondecision time. When modeling only the answer-related response times, repetition did not affect drift rate, but the repetition-enhanced response bias remained. Reading times for repeated questions were reduced, indicating facilitated encoding. An additional analysis using total trial reaction times (reading + response time) revealed a repetition effect on drift rate, suggesting that information accumulation may begin during question reading. Together, these findings indicate that the illusory truth effect results from a combination of perceptual facilitation, response bias, and increased speed of information accumulation supporting the truthfulness of a statement-each contributing at different stages of the decision process. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).

Warning and contextual mechanisms in the illusory truth effect.

The FAIR (Findable, Accessible, Interoperable, and Reusable) data principles form the foundation of the open data movement. However, while many current practices ensure data are findable and accessible, true interoperability and reusability remain limited. This paper introduces the Truth Effect Database (TED), a large-scale, trial-level, open database harmonizing data from illusory truth effect studies designed to enhance interoperability and reusability. TED currently integrates data from 59 studies in 29 publications, spanning 12,249 participants and 808,231 trials, accounting for a wide range of dispositional and contextual variables. To promote usability, TED focuses on user-friendly data submission using a custom entry website and data extraction using the R package acdcquery. These tools guide researchers through both data entry and retrieval, eliminating the need for direct interaction with the database's internal structure. We illustrated the utility of TED through Bayesian multilevel analyses, highlighting substantial variance in the illusory truth effect at the subject level, moderated by the delay between exposure and judgment phases in truth effect paradigms. Beyond this first demonstration, TED provides the foundation for a wide range of future research. These include (living) meta-analyses, simulation-based power analyses, rigorous replication and reanalysis of existing studies, and the validation and development of formal cognitive models. As an open and extensible infrastructure, TED serves as a blueprint for sustainable, community-driven database development in psychological science.

• Five studies (N = 4,337) test fact-check label corrections on brand misinformation. • No evidence was found that correcting misinformation causes a familiarity backfire. • Stronger corrections even reverse the harmful effect of repeated misinformation. • Corrections benefit unknown brands more than well-known global brands. • Correction cues are effective, even when absent in later misinformation encounters. Misinformation poses a growing threat to firms, distorting consumer beliefs and damaging brand evaluations. A common corrective strategy involves attaching fact-checking labels to false claims, yet concerns persist that such corrections may backfire by strengthening familiarity with the misinformation. Across five studies (N = 4337), this article systematically compares the competing effects of repetition and correction on belief in corporate misinformation and brand evaluations. Repetition reliably increases belief in misinformation (illusory truth effect), while correction typically offsets this effect and even reverses it with strong, unambiguous labels. This research finds no evidence of a familiarity backfire effect: in none of the studies, repetition increases belief in the misinformation more than correction reduces it. While brand evaluations are less affected by repetition, they do decline following exposure to misinformation and are only partially restored by corrections. The article further examines how brand familiarity and the timing of assessment shape these effects. Corrections are effective both immediately and after a delay, and benefit unfamiliar brands more than familiar ones. Finally, corrections issued at first exposure, reaching new audiences, also reduce belief in misinformation without backfiring during future exposures. These findings inform managerial decisions on misinformation response and contribute to understanding how misinformation familiarity and correction compete in shaping consumer judgments.

Over the last four decades, studies provided evidence that individuals tend to rate statements as being more truthful when they are re-exposed to them, the so-called 'illusory truth effect'. In light of a growing number of studies published since the previous meta-analysis in 2006 and concern of publishing biases, we conduct a meta-analysis on 182 studies and 366 effect sizes (N = 31,184 participants) published from 1977 to 2025. After correcting for small-study effects, we observe a small illusory truth effect (g = 0.37, 95% confidence interval [0.30, 0.44]), with a substantial within and between-study heterogeneity. Here, we show that multiple variables accounted for such heterogeneity, including the type of item, the instructions during the first exposure, the presence of veracity cues, and the duration of presentation on first exposure to the statement. We highlight the importance of the initial exposure and discuss practical implications regarding the current misinformation crisis.

This study investigates how people perceive and evaluate true and false news in their natural environment using a novel experience sampling methodology with real-time news streaming. The sample consisted of 110 participants who evaluated news headlines on their smartphones throughout the day for two weeks, receiving notifications when new content was published. The study employed a custom-developed server that captured RSS feeds from major news outlets. The server used AI (the Open AI “gpt-4-0125-preview” model) to generate modified versions of news stories on the fly, including misinformation variants. Participants evaluated news live under experimentally manipulated conditions that included time constraints for reading the news. They also provided information about their environmental context and individual characteristics. The results showed that false news items were generally rated as less accurate than true news, but this discernment decreased under time constraint. Higher digital literacy and greater satisfaction with the political system were associated with rating false news as less accurate, whereas higher dogmatism was linked to higher perceived accuracy of false news. Familiarity was also related to higher accuracy ratings for both true and false news, meaning participants rated both types of news as more accurate when they felt familiar with it, consistent with the illusory truth effect. Integrating experimental AI-guided, real-time news generation and streaming offers a novel and much-needed approach to studying misinformation perception, providing externally valid insights into how real-world factors influence people’s ability to detect and respond to false information in their daily lives.

During crises such as wars, pandemics, and economic or technological disasters, disinformation spreads faster and wider than accurate information, amplifying social anxiety and undermining institutional trust. Its effects are driven by cognitive biases (illusory truth effect, confirmation heuristics), group identity congruence, and emotional triggers. The aim of this study is to integrate these psychological mechanisms and assess the effectiveness of inoculation (prebunking) and cognitive (accuracy-prompt) interventions in countering crisis-related disinformation. A preregistered multi-wave online experiment with a 2×2×2 factorial design was conducted on a sample of about 2000 adults from Ukraine and Central/Eastern Europe. Results indicate that repeated exposure amplifies the illusory truth effect; congruence with social identity increases credibility; threatening emotional tone enhances virality. Stand-alone interventions (prebunking or accuracy prompts) reduced belief and sharing intention by about 10–15%, whereas their combination achieved more than a 20% reduction with lasting effects. Age, need for cognition, and conspiratorial beliefs moderated susceptibility to disinformation. These findings demonstrate that combined preventive strategies can substantially strengthen societal informational resilience during crises. Keywords: Disinformation, infodemic, illusory truth effect, social identity, emotional triggers, prebunking, accuracy prompts, informational resilience, crisis communication

The repetition-based truth effect refers to the phenomenon that repeated statements are more likely to be judged as true than new statements. Fazio et al. (Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 144(5), 993-1002, 2015) developed two multinomial processing tree (MPT) models to account for truth judgments. The knowledge-conditional model assumes that repetition leads to a shift in response bias conditional on the absence of knowledge. In contrast, the fluency-conditional model assumes that knowledge is used only when not relying on processing fluency, which results in reduced discrimination performance. We study the formal properties of the competing models using receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves and highlight important auxiliary assumptions and identifiability constraints. In three experiments, we extended the classic truth-effect paradigm to validate and test different model versions by manipulating the base rate of true statements in the judgment phase. The results support the notion that repetition results in reduced discrimination performance. However, the alternative model conceptualizing the truth effect as a response bias cannot be rejected when assuming different knowledge for true and false statements.

ABSTRACT In line with the feelings-as-information theory, a body of research demonstrates more positive (negative) judgments in positive (negative) affective states. Similarly, it has been shown that people who experience positive (negative) affect also tend to judge incoming information as more likely being true (false). Following the argumentation of affect-congruent judgments, we assume that judging information as being true itself possesses a positive affective component. In a truth effect study, we implemented two judgment phases (10 min and 1 week after first exposure) in which 75 participants judged the truth of in total 120 (new and repeated) statements. Addressing the present research question, we assessed spontaneous facial reactions via electromyography after participants provided their truth judgments in each trial. Results reveal corrugator relaxations after judging information as true (vs. false), indicating increased positive affect. Importantly, this finding was unaffected by the repetition status and subjective confidence regarding judgments.

This article seeks to understand how racial cues in social media narratives influence individuals’ discernment of falsehoods and their engagement with such content. Built on multiple frameworks, such as motivated reasoning and the illusory truth effect, this study conducted a novel survey experiment that manipulated two types of racial cues: racial identifier (the primary subject was illegal immigrants vs people in general) and issue framing (crime vs economy). Results showed that explicit racial identifier—specifying the subject to be illegal immigrants—boosted people’s capacity to discern false narratives, especially those about the economic issue. We also uncovered the moderating roles of analytical thinking (cognitive reflection (CR) and actively open-minded thinking (AOT)) and the racial diversity of one’s personal contacts, which, in general, indicated a buffering effect. These findings underscore the importance of cognitive and network-based factors in combating false information about socially marginalised groups in the USA.

Repeated exposure to information increases the credibility of this information, a well-studied phenomenon called the truth effect. While this phenomenon has been studied extensively by passively exposing people to preselected information pieces, in real-world contexts, people often sample information actively (e.g., by clicking on a headline on social media). In the present research, we propose and demonstrate in eight preregistered experiments (N = 953) that such active sampling of information increases the truth effect, leading to an enhanced belief in information one had initially been exposed to following one's active choice. We further test both stimulus-based explanations (i.e., people are more likely to sample information that is perceived to be more plausible) and processing-based explanations (i.e., sampling information boosts cognitive processes that also increase the truth effect), with evidence favoring the latter account. Overall, our findings imply that repeated exposure to information has a more profound influence on people's beliefs in settings where people actively choose which information they are exposed to. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).

Repetition increases the perceived truth of information. This illusory truth effect is a well-documented and robust phenomenon. Although research has primarily focused on trivia statements, the effects of repetition on belief have also been identified for consequential statements such as fake news headlines. Moreover, research reveals repetition increases accuracy ratings for conspiracy statements. However, in past work, the illusory truth effect was smaller for conspiracy statements than trivia statements. This result raises the intriguing possibility that there is something unique about conspiracy statements relative to trivia statements that makes them more resistant to the effects of repetition. However, this difference in the illusory truth effect between conspiracy and trivia statements may be due to differences in baseline plausibility rather than anything specific about conspiracy statements. Overall, the conspiracy statements were seen as less plausible than the trivia statements (both true and false trivia statements) in the prior experiment. In this registered report, we examined the illusory truth effect for conspiracy and trivia statements using the same procedure as in previous research, but we matched the statements on baseline plausibility. In line with our hypothesis, the effect of repetition on perceived truth was similar for conspiracy and trivia statements when they were equally implausible (or plausible). Results from this study replicate the generality of the illusory truth effect to statements that can cause harm and suggest that the psychological effect of repetition on truth ratings is equivalent for equally implausible (or plausible) conspiracy and trivia statements.Supplementary InformationThe online version contains supplementary material available at 10.3758/s13423-025-02836-w.

Abstract The illusory truth effect, in which repeated exposure increases trust regardless of accuracy, poses significant challenges to the perceived trustworthiness of health information in digital environments. Although repetition is known to enhance cognitive fluency, little is known about how different modalities influence this effect. Drawing on cognitive fluency and dual‐coding theories, this research investigates how repetition and modality interact to shape trustworthiness judgments of health information. Three online experiments were conducted to examine users' perceived trustworthiness of health information across different conditions. Experiment 1 the effect of repetition on messages varying in truthfulness (true vs. false) and familiarity (familiar vs. unfamiliar). Experiments 2 and 3 examined the role of modality (text‐only, text‐and‐image, short video) and cross‐modal repetition. Results show that, in the text‐only condition, an unfamiliar true message is perceived as more trustworthy than other information. Repetition significantly increases perceived trustworthiness in text‐and‐image and short video formats, albeit with diminishing returns after two exposures. Cross‐modal repetition further amplifies such trustworthiness effects. These findings extend theoretical understanding of the illusory truth effect in multimodal health information environments and offer practical insights for designing interventions to reduce the spread of misinformation on social media.

Repeated exposure to information increases receptivity to it, even when prior knowledge is present, according to the illusory truth effect. Fazio et al. provided empirical support for this phenomenon and proposed a model that posited dominance of fluency cues, relative to knowledge utilization. This model better elucidated participants' behaviors than an alternative model assuming precedence of knowledge processes over fluency-related mechanisms. The present research builds on this by refining models and testing them with new and existing data. While reanalysis of existing data revealed comparable performance of both models, new data from two experiments (N = 324), introducing conditions conducive to discerning between the two models, uncovered compelling evidence in support of the model that assumes knowledge processes' precedence. The discrepancy between Fazio et al. and our findings is discussed, and we encourage future research to explore avenues for resolving the relative roles of knowledge and fluency.

Conventional teaching methods often fail to foster emotional engagement among students, thereby limiting active participation and the development of self-confidence, particularly in Pancasila and Citizenship Education (PPKn). Alongside this, the rise of digital technology has significantly influenced elementary education, including the adoption of interactive tools such as Wordwall, as implemented at SDN Balimester 06 Pagi, East Jakarta. This study aims to evaluate the effect of Wordwall-based Truth or Dare card media on enhancing the self-confidence of fifth-grade students in PPKn learning. A quasi-experimental design with a pre-test and post-test control-group model was employed, involving 60 students, equally divided into experimental and control groups. The experimental group utilized the Wordwall-based Truth or Dare media, while the control group continued with conventional learning methods. The findings revealed a significant improvement in students’ self-confidence within the experimental group, as reflected in their increased activeness, willingness to express opinions, and participation in class discussions. These results indicate that interactive digital media such as Wordwall can serve as an innovative learning strategy to create an engaging and enjoyable classroom atmosphere. AbstrakMetode pengajaran konvensional sering kali kurang mampu membangun keterlibatan emosional murid sehingga menghambat partisipasi aktif dan perkembangan kepercayaan diri murid, khususnya pada mata pelajaran Pendidikan Pancasila dan Kewarganegaraan (PPKn). Selain itu, perkembangan teknologi digital telah membawa perubahan signifikan dalam praktik pendidikan di sekolah dasar, salah satunya dengan adanya penggunaan media wordwall seperti yang terjadi di SDN Balimester 06 Pagi, Jakarta Timur. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengevaluasi pengaruh media kartu Truth or Dare berbasis Wordwall terhadap peningkatan sikap percaya diri murid kelas V dalam pembelajaran PPKn. Penelitian ini menggunakan desain kuasi-eksperimen dengan model pre-test dan post-test control group, melibatkan 60 murid yang dibagi dalam kelompok eksperimen dan kontrol. Kelompok eksperimen menggunakan media Truth or Dare berbasis Wordwall, sedangkan kelompok kontrol tetap menggunakan metode konvensional. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan adanya peningkatan signifikan pada kepercayaan diri murid pada kelompok eksperimen. Peningkatan ini dapat dilihat dari murid yang lebih aktif, berani berpendapat, dan terlibat dalam diskusi kelas. Dengan demikian, media digital interaktif seperti Wordwall dapat menjadi alternatif strategi pembelajaran inovatif yang mendukung suasana belajar menyenangkan.Kata Kunci: pendidikan Pancasila dan kewarganegaraan; sikap percaya diri; truth or dare; wordwall

The effects of inoculation interventions and repetition on perceived truth in younger and older adults.

With reading comprehension skills continuing to decline globally and locally, understanding the cognitive factors that are associated with it has become increasingly important. This study explored the relationship between cognitive biases and reading comprehension among 62 second-year Bachelor of Secondary Education students at Partido State University-College of Education. Using a descriptive-correlational design, the research aimed to describe the relationship between students’ susceptibility to six cognitive biases—anchoring bias, confirmation bias, cognitive overload bias, the Dunning-Kruger effect, the illusion of truth effect, and the recency effect—and their reading comprehension levels. Data were collected through an expert-validated 5-point Likert scale questionnaire and secondary data from the university’s Reading Center. Statistical analysis revealed that while students demonstrated varying levels of susceptibility to specific cognitive biases, no statistically significant relationship was found between these biases and their reading comprehension levels. These findings suggest that while cognitive biases may influence how students engage with texts, they do not directly predict reading comprehension performance in this sample. The study underscores reading as a complex cognitive task and recommends continued research into other contributing factors, such as metacognitive awareness, language proficiency, and motivation, to better support student literacy. Future studies may consider alternative methods or mixed designs to explore this relationship more comprehensively.

The finding that repeating a statement typically increases its perceived validity is referred to as the truth effect. Research on individual differences in the magnitude of the effect and its correlates is scarce and has yielded rather mixed results. However, any search for replicable relations between the truth effect and other cognitive or personality variables is bound to fail if the truth effect cannot be measured reliably at the individual level and if the effect is not a stable phenomenon. We conducted two experiments investigating the split-half reliability and test-retest stability of the truth effect. To operationalize the magnitude of the effect, Experiment 1 used the between-items criterion and Experiment 2 used the within-items criterion of the truth effect (Dechêne et al., 2010). In both experiments, the truth effect's test-retest stability was found to be very low, probably due to a highly insufficient reliability of the measures that were used. While there may be meaningful and stable individual differences in the truth effect, our findings raise concerns about the usefulness of established indices and standard measures of the truth effect for personality and individual difference research.

Abstract The best strategy for getting away with lying is to lie small by only deviating from the truth as much as is necessary to achieve the intended deception. Why then do some demagogues lie big? One set of views has it that the only difference between small and big lies concerns the size of their contents. They claim that the purpose of big lies is the formation of false beliefs in their literal contents via counterfactual reasoning, conspiracy theories, or the illusory truth effect. The negative part of this paper questions these accounts. The positive part proposes a different explanation for why demagogues use big lies and argues that big lies may serve three distinct purposes for demagogues: they reinforce their supporters’ deeply held beliefs, test the loyalty of their close followers, or publicly demonstrate the demagogue’s power. For a big lie to serve these purposes, genuine belief in the lie is not required – in fact, few are likely to believe it. What matters is that the demagogue’s supporters publicly endorse the lie. We contend that they do so, either because they interpret them as motivational statements or use them to express or justify their shared emotions or convictions.

“Consistent with views of a climate skeptic”: Counterattitudinal alignment salience protects against illusory truth.