Trust Game Experiment Research Articles

Revisiting the effect of trustworthy face and attractive appearance on trust and trustworthiness behavior

ABSTRACT In a trust game experiment with Chinese participants, we investigate the effects of trustworthy faces and attractive appearances on trust and trustworthiness behaviour. The participants played the role of trustor and made decisions on how much money to transfer to their paired trustees while looking at the trustees’ photos presented on a large screen. After that, the trustees decided how much money to return to their paired trustors. Results indicate that trust decisions are influenced by both a trustworthy face and an attractive appearance. In addition, a gender effect on trust decisions was found. Men are more trusting than women are, regardless of whether their counterparts are male or female. However, females are less likely to trust their male counterparts than female counterparts. Finally, it is observed that the trustees with a more attractive appearance are more likely to betray the trust they have, while this is not the case for those with more trustworthy faces.

Who discriminates? Evidence from a trust game experiment across three societies

Who discriminates? Evidence from a trust game experiment across three societies

Politically motivated interpersonal biases: Polarizing effects of partisanship and immigration attitudes

We demonstrate effects of political preferences on interpersonal interactions in the environment of the highly unstable and volatile party system of the Czech Republic. The effects of partisanship on interpersonal relations are compared to the effects of attitudes on a salient issue. Two experiments confirm the potential of political partisanship to affect the individual’s ingroup preferences and outgroup biases, which can influence willingness to converse with others in the context of an unstable party system. In a conjoint experiment, dis/agreement on immigration has comparable effects on interpersonal interactions. Avoidance of interactions with out-partisans is amplified when out-partisans talk about politics often. The patterns of ingroup preferences and outgroup biases are replicated in a trust game experiment. Both partisanship and immigration attitudes influence how subjects interact with others. Given the political context, the study provides a hard test of politically motivated ingroup and outgroup biases stemming both from party and policy preferences.

Trusting when risk and ambiguity create opportunities for exploitation

This article studies the effect of uncertainty on reciprocity and trust using an experimental trust game in which the trustor’s transfer is lost with some probability. Only the trustee will observe whether the transfer is lost or not. As a result, when not receiving anything back, the trustor cannot differentiate between a lost transfer and a selfish trustee. The results show that self-serving decisions of trustees increase with uncertainty. This increase is not driven by trustees who use their informational advantage and return zero. Instead, trustees continue to return positive amounts, but share less under uncertainty. Trustors also reduce transfers with increasing uncertainty. The data supports that risk attitudes, less sharing with trustees and the anticipation of trustee decisions contribute to this finding on trustor decisions.

Betting on a brand: How can trust game experiments inform a brand trust research agenda?

AbstractFor brands to succeed, they often need consumers to trust them. This has prompted marketing and consumer behaviour researchers to examine what makes certain brands more trusted and how brands can identify themselves as trustworthy. For over 25 years, experimental economists, behavioural scientists and others have examined interpersonal trust using an exercise—the trust game—where participants put money at risk based on how trustworthy they think other people are. This research has remained largely separate from work on brand trust, but this critical review aims to identify findings and concepts from trust game‐based research that are relevant to brand trust, and starts to develop an integrated research agenda for the future. In particular, it looks at how brand trust is measured, how brand trust might (or might not) be distinguished from transactional risk, and the heuristics and biases behind brand trust judgements and how these relate to brands' attempts to signal their trustworthiness.

Does trust break even? A trust-game experiment with negative endowments

The Trust Game literature is quite extensive; those experimental studies consider situations where a trustor risks an endowment to become wealthier when trustworthiness pays off. In the worst case, the trustor leaves the experiment with no payment. Our study contrasts that situation to a treatment in which trust and trustworthiness might help to escape an inevitable financial loss. Both the trustor and trustee might break even or even leave the experiment with a positive outcome. We find slightly more trust in our treatment than in the established design; however, we find no difference in trustworthiness.

Promise keeping and reliance damage

This paper experimentally investigates the hypothesis that promise-keeping behavior is affected by the “reliance damage” that a counterpart would suffer as a result of a breach. Reliance damage is defined as the difference between the counterfactual benefit that the counterpart would have obtained had they not relied on the promise and that which they would obtain following a breach. We discuss two motivational mechanisms that could drive such an effect. One is that people intrinsically dislike causing reliance damage per se. The other is that people dislike causing regret in another person. We experimentally test these ideas in the context of an experimental trust game. Our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that promise keeping is affected by reliance damage, and that the underlying mechanism involves a desire not to cause regret in others.

Trustors’ disregard for trustees deciding quickly or slowly in three experiments with time constraints

Many decisions in the economic and social domain are made under time constraints, be it under time pressure or forced delay. Requiring individuals to decide quickly or slowly often elicit different responses. Time pressure has been associated with inefficiency in market settings and market regulation often requires individuals to delay their decisions via cooling-off periods. Yet, recent research suggests that people who make reflective decisions are met with distrust. If this extends to external time constraints, then forcing individuals to delay their decisions may be counterproductive in scenarios where trust considerations are important, such as in market and organizational design. In three Trust Game experiments (total number of participants = 1872), including within- and between-subjects designs, we test whether individuals trust (more) someone who is forced to respond quickly (intuitively) or slowly (reflectively). We find that trustors do not adjust their behavior (or their beliefs) to the trustee’s time conditions. This seems to be an appropriate response because time constraints do not affect trustees’ behavior, at least when the game decisions are binary (trust vs. don’t trust; reciprocate vs. don’t reciprocate) and therefore mistakes cannot explain choices. Thus, delayed decisions per se do not seem to elicit distrust.

Who Discriminates? Evidence from a Trust Game Experiment Across Three Societies

Who Discriminates? Evidence from a Trust Game Experiment Across Three Societies

Effects of Inequality on Trust and Reciprocity: An Experiment With Real Effort.

The purpose of this paper is analyzing whether trust and reciprocity are affected by how rich the partner is or how well the partner performed several tasks with real effort. A trust game (TG) experiment is designed with three treatments. First, a baseline Treatment B in which subjects play a finitely repeated TG. Second, in a Treatment H with history, subjects know the partner’s wealth level reached in the past. Third, in a Treatment E with effort the individual endowment with which the TG is played is endogenous and results from the subject’s performance in three different real effort tasks (maths, cognitive and general knowledge related). The data analysis highlights the importance of past wealth levels (Treatment H) as well as endowment heterogeneity (Treatment E), on the actual levels of trust and reciprocity. Specifically, it is observed that the decision of trustors is positively affected by positive past experienced reciprocity. Moreover, trustors are sensitive to how much money the trustee accumulates each round in Treatment H, trusting more the ones that have accumulated less compared to themselves. In contrast with that, it is remarkable in Treatment E that trustors are sensitive to the endowment level of the trustees, trusting more the partners that have got a higher than own endowment, probably considering that a person that performed better in the tasks is a better partner to trust. As far as second players’ behavior, as the amount received from the trustor increases it is less likely that the trustee reciprocates with higher than or with the egalitarian amount. In Treatments H and E, the probability that the trustee reciprocates with higher amount that the one received increases when inequality in endowment/accumulated earnings favors the trustor. Additional results come from analysis of personality archetypes and socio-demographic variables.

Media effects on the perceptions of robots

This study utilizes the media persuasion perspective to investigate the connection of media exposure of robots on the general attitude and trust toward robots of people from different cultural backgrounds. Study 1 utilized 2016 survey data from Finnish care workers (N = 3800). Study 2 used two 2019 datasets from the adult population of the United States (N = 1003; N = 969), and Study 3 involved a trust game experiment on robots (n = 331). Results showed that the overall media exposure of robots is linked to a positive general attitude toward robots, but only fact-based media channel exposure had a positive impact on trust in robots. Results suggest that the experience of robots gained through media exposure is a relevant factor affecting people's perceptions of robots. The findings contribute to the discussions on media effects and have practical implications for gaining evidence about the precursors of accepting robots.

Trusting the Trust Game: An External Validity Analysis with a UK Representative Sample

Using a nationally representative sample of 1052 respondents from the United Kingdom, we systematically tested the associations between the experimental trust game and a range of popular self-reported measures for trust, such as the General Social Survey (GSS) and the Rosenberg scale for self-reported trust. We find that, in our UK representative sample, the experimental trust game significantly and positively predicts generalised self-reported trust in the GSS. This association is robust across a number of alternative empirical specifications, which account for multiple hypotheses corrections and control for other social preferences as measured by the dictator game and the public good game, as well as for a broad range of individual characteristics, such as gender, age, education, and personal income. We discuss how these results generalise to nationally representative samples from six other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries (France, Germany, Italy, Korea, Slovenia, and the US).

The mechanisms of trust formation under different conditions of political identity: An experiment among Taiwanese voters

Trust and cooperation within and between political identity groups are important issues for building a healthy civil society and democratic development. However, this research problem has seldom been analyzed under different political identity conditions by means of experimental design in Taiwan. Presidential elections have reproduced the polarization between two groups of voters supporting different presidential candidates. Therefore, in this article the authors are interested in whether political identity matters in trust exchanges among strangers. This study applies a three-stage trust game experiment to examine how trust is developed within pairs of subjects with either the same or different political identity. In the first stage subjects were randomly matched in pairs as trustor and trustee, and their political identities were not disclosed. In the second stage the pairs were still randomly matched, but each subject was informed of their partner’s political identity. In the final stage each subject could choose the preferred political identity of his/her partner. There were two mechanisms of trust-behavior formation under different identity conditions. The first mechanism was political identity. Supporters of presidential candidate Ma Ying-Jeou were more trustful than supporters of candidate Tsai Ing-Wen. Under the condition of subjects knowing their partner’s political identity, the identity effect became strongly significant in stages 2 and 3 of the experiment, especially for that of the Ma–Ma group. The second mechanism was mutuality. The mutuality effect was very significant in all three stages of the trust experiment, and that effect was stronger for those who voted for Tsai.

The Effects of Corruption on Teens’ Contributions to the Public Good and the Fight Against COVID-19

This study aims to identify the factors that influence teenagers’ likelihood to contribute to the public good during a public health crisis. I hypothesized that students from countries with higher rates of corruption would be less likely to contribute financially and through personal health measures to combat the current COVID-19 pandemic. Using an electronic survey, I gathered data from 276 high school students in seven countries where there are varying levels of corruption. The data includes demographics (age, gender, religiosity), personal COVID-19 remediation behaviors, and answers to two game theory experiments. The two experiments were the Public Goods Game, a classic experiment in behavioral economics, and the Government Trust Game, a variant of my own creation modeled after the Trust Game experiment. Analyses of these data reveal global consistency in teens’ willingness to contribute financially to the public good, regardless of the level of perceived local corruption. However, in more corrupt environments, there exists less trust among teens that their peers will donate as generously, less trust of government to provide a positive return on financial contributions, and less pro-sociality of health behaviors. Additionally, subjects who were more trusting of their community, practiced more pro-social health behaviors. I conclude that teenagers’ financial altruism is not affected by perceived corruption, but trust that others are equally altruistic, and willingness to take pro-social health precautions, is highly dependent on corruption. My results also indicate that the establishment of trust in more corrupt communities may be key in slowing the spread of COVID-19 and future public health crises.

Do elicited promises affect people's trust? —Observations in the trust game experiment

Promises and promise keeping play an important role in our daily life as well as in various economic situations, but maybe not all promises are voluntary and spontaneous. We examine experimentally the impact of elicited promises on trust and cooperation using the trust game. We find that, in general, elicited promises have no significant influence on the trust and trustworthy behavior. When subjects are classified into different social preference types, we find that promises can increase the amount returned by selfish types and decrease the amount returned by reciprocal types. Moreover, we analyze promise keeping and its influence factors. The results show that elicited promises are not very credible. When we exclude the observations where trustees receive nothing, about 41% of trustees break their promises. Promise keeping is also relevant to subjects’ social preferences.

Can Resident Village Assistance of the First Secretary Enhance the Social Capital in Village? A Field Experiment Study

In recent years, a total of 255,000 village working teams have been dispatched across the country, and more than 2.9 million cadres of party & government agencies and state-owned enterprises & institutions above the county level have been selected to serve as first secretaries or village cadres, and there are currently 918,000 cadres on duty （Xi Jinping, 2020）. These cadres have become the “vanguard” in poverty alleviation and rural revitalization, and the production and living conditions in the countryside have been greatly improved due to the activities of carrying out bridges and roads, renovating village and alleviating poverty. More importantly, these cadres in villages are also at the grassroots level extensively forging ties of interest, emotion, and cooperation, so that rural households can be connected and help each other, and the relationship between cadres and groups gets closer （Han Jun, 2018）. From the perspective of social capital theory, the implicit and imperceptible social trust between people, and the political trust between cadres and groups are the core elements of the collective action capacity of rural communities, which will affect the revitalization and development of rural areas at a deeper level.In view of this, by using field experiment technology, this article selects three villages with the first secretary in Shandong as the experimental group, and selects a neighboring village with roughly the same economic and social development level and without the first secretary as the control group. It measures and compares the trust level of the two groups of tested villagers by implementing adjusted trust game experiment, and analyzes the impact of the first secretary’s assistance on villagers’ social and political trust. The study finds that villagers in the experimental group show higher social trust compared with villagers in the control group, and villagers trust the first secretary more compared with the village party branch secretary although the village party branch secretary is a local cadre and the first secretary in the village is an external force embedded in the village. Further research also finds that the work of the first secretary in the village can significantly enhance the social trust of low-trust villagers and villagers’ positive evaluation of the assistance of the first secretary in the village, especially the praise of the work of economic construction and social development is positively correlated with their trust on the first secretary. This article proposes some policy suggestions for promoting the rural revitalization strategy from the perspective of the capacity building of rural communities.

Investment Risk, Information Disclosure, and Market trust—Based on trust game experiment research

Investment Risk, Information Disclosure, and Market trust—Based on trust game experiment research

Socially Appropriate Intervention: A Cross-Country Investigation of Third-Party Norm Enforcement

The enforcement of social norms is considered as a main motivation for third-party intervention. We provide direct evidence for this theory in a cross-country experimental trust game with a sender, a receiver, and a third party who can punish or reward the receiver at own cost. As a novelty we share a norm relevant information – the sender’s expectation – with the third party and manipulate the level of norm uncertainty by having the third party to interact with players from the same country versus from a different country. Our results suggest that third parties respond to the norm relevant information when deciding on the intervention, and more so when they intervene players from a different country. These results support the role of social norms in motivating third-party intervention.

Trust Toward Robots and Artificial Intelligence: An Experimental Approach to Human-Technology Interactions Online.

Robotization and artificial intelligence (AI) are expected to change societies profoundly. Trust is an important factor of human–technology interactions, as robots and AI increasingly contribute to tasks previously handled by humans. Currently, there is a need for studies investigating trust toward AI and robots, especially in first-encounter meetings. This article reports findings from a study investigating trust toward robots and AI in an online trust game experiment. The trust game manipulated the hypothetical opponents that were described as either AI or robots. These were compared with control group opponents using only a human name or a nickname. Participants (N = 1077) lived in the United States. Describing opponents with robots or AI did not impact participants’ trust toward them. The robot called jdrx894 was the most trusted opponent. Opponents named “jdrx894” were trusted more than opponents called “Michael.” Further analysis showed that having a degree in technology or engineering, exposure to robots online and robot use self-efficacy predicted higher trust toward robots and AI. Out of Big Five personality characteristics, openness to experience predicted higher trust, and conscientiousness predicted lower trust. Results suggest trust on robots and AI is contextual and it is also dependent on individual differences and knowledge on technology.

Breaches of Trust Change the Content and Structure of Religious Appeals

Considerable work suggests that social and environmental pressures can influence religious commitment, the content of beliefs, and features of ritual. Some ecologically minded theories of religion posit that crosscultural variation in beliefs and practices can be partly explained by their utility in addressing persistent threats to cooperation and coordination. However, little experimental work has assessed whether or not socioecological pressures can generate systematic variation in the content and structure of specific beliefs. Here, we assess the causal pathway between social ecology and beliefs by experimentally examining whether or not the content of freely elicited beliefs about God’s concerns change because of breaches of trust. We find that riskily investing in others and receiving no return or delaying the outcome in an economic Trust Game experiment increases the chances of claiming that greed angers God. These results suggest that religious cognition flexibly attends to social ecology and can therefore plausibly evolve in ways that address breaches in cooperative pursuits.