True Belief Research Articles

Altercentric Memory Error at 9Months But Correct Object Memory by 18Months Revealed in Infants' Pupil.

It was recently proposed that infants have a memory bias for events witnessed together with others. This may allow infants to prioritize relevant information and to predict others' actions, despite limited processing capacities. However, when events occur in the absence of others, for example, an object changes location, this would create altercentric memory errors where infants misremember the object's location where others last saw it. Pupillometry presents a powerful tool to examine the temporal dynamics of such memory biases as they unfold. Here, we showed infants aged 9 (N=97) and 18months (N=79) videos of an agent watching an object move to one of two hiding locations. The object then moved from location A to B, which the agent either missed (leading to her false belief) or witnessed (true belief). The object subsequently reappeared either at its actual or, surprisingly, its initial location. As predicted by the altercentric theory, 9-month-old infants expected the object where the agent falsely believed it to be and not where it really was, as indicated in their pupil dilation. In contrast, 18-month-old infants seemed to remember the object's actual location. Infants' memory errors did not predict correct action anticipation when the agent reached into one of the locations to retrieve the object. This indicates that infants show altercentric memory errors at a young age, which vanish in the second year of life. We suggest that this bias helps young infants to learn from others, but recedes as they become more capable of acting on the world themselves.

Artificial Knowledge: Emergence of a New Paradigm

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the emergence process or a new paradigm in the theory and practice of knowledge management. It is the paradigm of artificial knowledge. This new paradigm changes the semantic spectrum of the concept of knowledge as it has been used so far in knowledge management systems. Artificial knowledge is completely differentiated from human knowledge and can no longer be considered a justified true belief. Artificial knowledge is a product of artificial intelligence technology. The paper performs a semantic analysis of the new concept and its features by comparison with human knowledge. Also, the paper presents a bibliometric analysis of the most significant publications discussing artificial knowledge and artificial intelligence. The bibliometric analysis is done using VOS viewer, a specialized software program for such research. The present paper shows that researchers in knowledge management face the emergence of a new paradigm.

Understanding Gender Differences in Acceptance of Intimate Partner Violence Against Women: Are Women Truly More Accepting Than Men?

A surprisingly consistent finding from the global health literature on physical intimate partner violence against women (IPVAW) indicates that women self-report greater agreement with statements justifying IPVAW than men. This pattern has been interpreted as evidence of women's internalization of inequitable gender norms and used to support the development of intervention programs that target harmful beliefs about the acceptability of IPVAW among men and women. Here, we propose an alternative explanation that apparent gender differences in the acceptance of IPVAW reflect an artifact of social desirability bias. To investigate this proposition, we utilize attitudinal data on IPVAW from 317 married couples in Northwestern, Tanzania, combining a conventional self-report measure and a novel indirect wife-reported measure of men's attitudes, which we suggest represent a more accurate representation of men's true beliefs. Consistent with prior studies, comparisons of self-reported beliefs indicate that women report greater acceptance of IPVAW than men. However, the direction of this difference is reversed when men's beliefs are measured using indirect wife-reported estimates, with men accepting IPVAW more than women. Our results provide a parsimonious explanation to a widely reported, but paradoxical, finding in the IPVAW literature, and highlight the inadequacies of self-report data in research on sensitive topics. We suggest that future studies of IPVAW more strongly weigh the relevance of social desirability bias and invest in the continued development of indirect and mixed-methods designs in the measure of IPVAW attitudes and behavior.

Role of Theory of Mind in children’s derivation of ad hoc conversational implicatures

ABSTRACT Previous literature suggests that four-year-old children can derive ad hoc scalar implicatures, but it remains unclear whether they do so by taking into account the speaker’s perspective. This research investigated this issue by testing children’s ability to derive ad hoc implicatures in conditions in which the speaker had either a false or a true belief about relevant aspects of the communicative context. The participants were typically developing four-, five-, and six-year-olds and a group of adults. Although performance improved with age, all children struggled in the false belief condition, suggesting that they did not take the speaker’s perspective into account when they derived ad hoc implicatures.

Three People Make a Tiger: the Illusory Truth Effect is Detrimental to a Network’s Likelihood of Reaching True Beliefs

ABSTRACT The illusory truth effect is exhibited when repeated exposure to a statement increases an individual’s credence in that statement. While most investigations of the illusory truth effect focus on individuals’ belief formation, humans typically form beliefs within a social structure. This is particularly relevant because various social structures can give rise to repeated exposure to statements; e.g. one or two foundational papers might always be cited by a particular lab. So, how does the illusory truth effect influence learning and belief formation in a group? This paper uses network models to investigate this question. These models show that the illusory truth effect can be very detrimental to a group’s belief formation. The effect causes networks to prematurely settle on a belief, in part, through repeated exposure data points that are not independently generated. Previous research has indicated that the probability of such failures is near zero when networks are large or scientists are forced to explore unpopular and risky science. However, simulation results show that the harmful consequences of the illusory truth effect are robust even in large networks with mandatory exploration.

Epistemic Deprivation

Abstract It is often claimed that gender data gaps (GDGs) are unjust, but the nature of the injustice has not been interrogated. We argue that injustices arising from such data gaps are not merely socio-political but also epistemic: they arbitrarily skew the epistemic landscape in favour of one group over another. GDGs place a greater epistemic burden on women and gender minorities; they have to do more to avoid error and the pay-off is worse: they have a smaller pool of true beliefs on which to act. We suggest that there are both pragmatic and conceptual reasons to differentiate the injustice arising from GDGs from other more familiar varieties (such as testimonial and hermeneutical injustice), and so we introduce the new concept of epistemic deprivation to capture this injustice.

What does it mean to decolonise the curriculum: is it possible?

ABSTRACT What does decolonising the curriculum (DtC) entail and is it possible in the current context? I distinguish between a thick and thin idea of DtC. Thick DtC acknowledges that alternative knowledge systems exist, other than our western view of knowledge as ‘justified true belief’. Thick DtC calls for recognition of epistemic injustice to indigenous people when their culture is downgraded as inferior, which may amount to epistemicide (De Sousa Santos). The language of colonisation plays a part in this process. Adopting the colonisers’ language can distort indigenous knowledge. Thin DtC is where minor modifications are made to curriculum content to include contributions of indigenous minorities and racialized people and/or an acknowledgement of the wrongs done to colonised people. While thin DtC is to be welcomed, it is not sufficiently radical to combat the wrongs done in repressing or ignoring indigenous knowledge systems and therefore cannot compensate for epistemic injustice.

Epistemology in the Age of Large Language Models

Epistemology and technology have been working in synergy throughout history. This relationship has culminated in large language models (LLMs). LLMs are rapidly becoming integral parts of our daily lives through smartphones and personal computers, and we are coming to accept the functionality of LLMs as a given. As LLMs become more entrenched in societal functioning, questions have begun to emerge: Are LLMs capable of real understanding? What is knowledge in LLMs? Can knowledge exist independently of a conscious observer? While these questions cannot be answered definitively, we can argue that modern LLMs are more than mere symbol-manipulators and that LLMs in deep neural networks should be considered capable of a form of knowledge, though it may not qualify as justified true belief (JTB) in the traditional definition. This deep neural network design may have endowed LLMs with the capacity for internal representations, basic reasoning, and the performance of seemingly cognitive tasks, possible only through a compressive but generative form of representation that can be best termed as knowledge. In addition, the non-symbolic nature of LLMs renders them incompatible with the criticism posed by Searle’s “Chinese room” argument. These insights encourage us to revisit fundamental questions of epistemology in the age of LLMs, which we believe can advance the field.

Burdens of reliabilism: a reply to Goldberg

Abstract Sanford Goldberg has recently proposed a solution to the swamping problem for process reliabilist truth-monism (PRTM). In short, he argues that reliably formed true beliefs have a property he calls the ‘modal reliability property’, the epistemic value of which is explained in terms of the value of true belief but is not swamped by it. He offers two arguments to this effect. I claim that both of his arguments are valid, but they employ premisses the truth of which needs to be explained. However, it is not obvious how a proponent of PRTM could explain them without abandoning her preferred order of explanation. I do not argue that it is impossible in principle to discharge this burden. However, I do claim that Goldberg has yet to show us that it is possible. The result is that the swamping problem is no less problematic for PRTM than it was previously.

On the value of changing your mind

Abstract We are all capable of arriving at views that are driven by corrupting non-epistemic interests. But we are nonetheless very skilled at performing a commitment to epistemic goods in such cases. I call this the “Problem of Mere Epistemic Performance,” and it generates a need to determine when these commitments are illusory and when they are in fact genuine. I argue that changing one’s mind, when done in response to the evidence and at a likely cost to oneself, is the best indication that an agent is committed to epistemic goods and that they are genuinely in the game of giving and asking for reasons. This is because changing one’s mind in this way goes as far as we can in eliminating the possibility that the agent has an ulterior motivation for their epistemic practices. Moreover, this account shows that the consensus view of the ideal epistemic agent is mistaken. The ideal agent must have false beliefs or deficient epistemic practices because only then do they have the opportunity to change their mind and establish a commitment to epistemic goods – a commitment that even an agent with only true beliefs and maximal justification or understanding may lack.

Why Natural Language Processing is Not Reading: Two Philosophical Distinctions and their Educational Import

This paper explores two important ways in which close reading differs from natural language processing, the use of computer programming to decode, process, and replicate messages within a human language. It does so in order to highlight distinctive features of close reading that are not replicated by natural language processing. The first point of distinction concerns the nature of the meaning generated in each case. While natural language processing proceeds on the principle that a text’s meaning can be deciphered by applying the rules governing the language in which the text is written, close reading is premised on the idea that this meaning lies in the interplay that the text prompts within readers. While the semantic theory of meaning upon which natural language processing programs are based is often taken for granted today, I draw from phenomenological and hermeneutic theories, particularly Wolfgang Iser and Hans-Georg Gadamer, to explain why a different theory of meaning is necessary for understanding the meaning generated by close reading. Second, while natural language processing programs are considered successful when they generate what epistemologists call true beliefs about a text, I argue that close reading aims first and foremost at the development, not of true belief, but of understanding. To develop this distinction, I draw from recent scholarship on the epistemology of education, including work by Duncan Pritchard, to explain how understanding differs from true belief and why attainment of the latter is less educationally significant than the former.

Talking down the competitors: How do investment banking relationships influence analysts' forecasts?

AbstractOur study reveals that financial analysts issue more pessimistic forecasts for their investment banking clients' competitors than for unrelated firms. Our evidence is consistent with this behavior stemming from analysts' strategic incentives rather than their true beliefs. We find that analysts' pessimism for the client's competitors is more pronounced when the client is more important to analysts' brokerage houses, when high uncertainty prevents competitors from detecting analysts' strategic motives, and when analysts' brokerage houses are less prestigious. Additionally, we explore the economic consequences of the pessimism from the perspectives of the covered firms, brokerage houses, and financial analysts. Finally, we consider the impact of the 2003 Global Analyst Research Settlement. Overall, our results demonstrate that issuing pessimistic forecasts for clients' competitors is an understudied channel through which analysts curry favor with their investment banking clients.

On Mentioning Belief-Formation Methods in Sensitivity Subjunctives

According to the sensitivity account of knowledge, S knows that p only if S’s belief in p is sensitive in the sense that S would not believe that p if p were false. The sensitivity condition is usually relativized to belief-formation methods to avoid putative counterexamples. A remaining issue for the account is where methods should be mentioned in sensitivity subjunctives. In this paper, I argue that if methods are mentioned in the antecedent, then the account is too strong to accommodate inductive knowledge; if methods are mentioned in the consequent, then the account is too weak to eliminate some luckily true beliefs from the realm of knowledge. Therefore, the strategy to relativize the sensitivity condition is undermined by inductive knowledge and some luckily true beliefs.

Luck and normative achievements: Let not safety be our guide

Abstract It is a well-worn platitude that knowledge excludes luck. According to anti-luck virtue epistemology, making good on the anti-luck platitude requires an explicit anti-luck condition along the lines of safety: S knows that p only if S’s true belief that p could not have easily been mistaken. This paper offers an independent, virtue epistemological argument against the claim that safety is a necessary condition of knowledge, one that adequately captures the anti-luck platitude. The argument proceeds by way of analogy. I focus on two paradigmatic kinds of normative achievements that also exclude luck: (i) – having a doxastically justified belief and (ii) – performing a morally worthy action. I then show that while (i) and (ii) exclude luck, they are nevertheless susceptible to what I call “modal luck.” I then move on to show that knowledge, or at least some instance of knowledge, is a normative achievement, which I claim provides strong reasons to expect that knowledge is also susceptible to modal luck. Since safety entails that knowledge is incompatible with modal luck, the argument provides strong reasons to reject safety as a necessary condition of knowledge.

The Epistemic Cost of Opacity: How the Use of Artificial Intelligence Undermines the Knowledge of Medical Doctors in High-Stakes Contexts

Artificial intelligent (AI) systems used in medicine are often very reliable and accurate, but at the price of their being increasingly opaque. This raises the question whether a system’s opacity undermines the ability of medical doctors to acquire knowledge on the basis of its outputs. We investigate this question by focusing on a case in which a patient’s risk of recurring breast cancer is predicted by an opaque AI system. We argue that, given the system’s opacity, as well as the possibility of malfunctioning AI systems, practitioners’ inability to check the correctness of their outputs, and the high stakes of such cases, the knowledge of medical practitioners is indeed undermined. They are lucky to form true beliefs based on the AI systems’ outputs, and knowledge is incompatible with luck. We supplement this claim with a specific version of the safety condition on knowledge, Safety*. We argue that, relative to the perspective of the medical doctor in our example case, his relevant beliefs could easily be false, and this despite his evidence that the AI system functions reliably. Assuming that Safety* is necessary for knowledge, the practitioner therefore doesn’t know. We address three objections to our proposal before turning to practical suggestions for improving the epistemic situation of medical doctors.

The Problem of the Value of Knowledge

The problem of the value of knowledge is one of the most discussed in epistemology in recent times. Why should we strive to acquire knowledge, and not just true beliefs or relevant information about the subject of our cognitive interest? It is not hard to show that knowledge has certain instrumental value; but defenders of the idea in question usually mean that knowledge is valuable regardless of its practical consequences. It is not easy to justify this position, though. Some believe that knowledge is a better guide to truth than just true beliefs, or even that knowledge guarantees truth. Others try to identify intrinsic properties of knowledge which can give knowledge additional value due to having their own relevant value. Yet others deny that knowledge has special value that distinguishes it cognitively from true belief, at least universally. Many agree that it can be shown that the possession of knowledge of one kind or another is more valuable than just believing the proposition which is true. But it is much more difficult to show that knowledge is universally more valuable due to some of its own properties, rather than circumstances. But those, who talk about special value of knowledge, normally mean some intrinsic and universal value to be reflected in definition. The article examines several popular explanations of the special epistemic value of knowledge and identifies their shortcomings. The author believes that it is easier for some types of knowledge than for some others to show how knowledge is more valuable than just true belief. The most primitive as well as the most abstract types of knowledge are most often functionally indistinguishable from the corresponding true beliefs. Meanwhile, many types of knowledge have modal functional differences from the corresponding true beliefs, and it is possible to show why they may have additional epistemic value. However, in its universal form, this idea is most likely impossible to defend.

Desires and beliefs: the development of second-order Theory of Mind reasoning in preschoolers and in school-age children.

Theory of Mind development is crucial for social life. Most studies on the development of this skill have focused on first-order recursive thinking, while the transition to second-order thinking remains relatively unexplored. To address this gap, we administered a novel second-order Theory of Mind task to 59 children between the ages of 5 and 8 years. This task manipulated desires (desire to obtain, "positive desire," vs. desire to avoid, "negative desire") and beliefs (true vs. false) based on previous studies of first-order scaling. Results indicate that the tasks involving positive desire seem to be easier than negative counterparts, and that the tasks involving true belief are easier than those involving false belief. All children performed below chance level in negative desire and in false belief conditions, while only older participants performed above chance level in true belief - positive desire condition. There was also a significant main effect favoring positive desire and true belief. Our findings provide preliminary evidence for the developmental acquisitions of second-order recursive thinking about the understanding of desires and beliefs.

Understanding and veritism

AbstractMy interest is in an apparent tension between two epistemological theses. The first is veritism, which is roughly the claim that truth is the fundamental epistemic good. The second is the idea that understanding is the proper goal of inquiry. The two theses seem to be in tension because the former seems to imply that the proper goal of inquiry should be truth rather than understanding. And yet there is a strong prima facie case to be made for thinking that properly conducted inquiry aims at an elevated epistemic standing like understanding rather than merely true belief. I suggest that this putative tension is one of the reasons why veritism is these days not widely endorsed. As I show, however, there is in fact no tension between these two claims, at least once they are each properly understood. Indeed, I will be suggesting that there is a plausible conception of veritism which would explain why intellectual exemplars seek out understanding in inquiry.

Exploring The Question of Why Knowledge Is Often Supposed to Have More Value Than Justified True Belief

Exploring The Question of Why Knowledge Is Often Supposed to Have More Value Than Justified True Belief

Hadits-Hadits Tentang Kafa’ah dan Mahar Pendekatan Sosiologis dan Teologis Normatif

The issue of kafa'ah in marriage is very important in order to foster harmony in married life. Why is it so important to pay attention? because it is often found that families who have been running a household, after many years, problems suddenly arise, which are only discovered later as a result of a lack of compatibility in terms of economics, morals, social strata, education and hobbies. Marriages are carried out only with the capital of likes and likes, mutual love and true belief that with this capital they will be happy. Hadiths about kafa'ah and dowry provide guidance on the importance of equality and responsibility in marriage. Sociologically, the concepts of kafa'ah and dowry help maintain stability and harmony in the household and society. From a normative theological perspective, both of them emphasize the importance of maintaining religious values and justice in marriage. Even though there have been changes in the interpretation and application of these concepts in modern society, the essence of Islamic teachings regarding kafa'ah and dowry remain relevant as guidelines for living a blessed domestic life.