An H1N1 subtype swine influenza virus (SIV) was isolated from nasal swabs collected from pigs with suspected swine influenza (SI) on a farm in Guangdong, China. The virus, designated A/Swine/Guangdong/JJK/2025(H1N1) (abbreviated as JJK), underwent whole-genome sequencing and phylogenetic analysis, which confirmed that it is a triple-reassortant strain. The hemagglutination (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) genes originated from the Eurasian avian-like (EA) H1N1 lineage, the internal genes (PB2, PB1, PA, NP, and M) originated from the 2009 pandemic H1N1 lineage, and the NS gene originated from the triple-reassortant H1N2 lineage. Each of the eight gene segments showed the highest homology to a different reference virus. Analysis of key amino acid substitutions identified multiple mutations in proteins, such as HA, PB2, and PB1, that are associated with enhanced mammalian adaptation, increased virulence, and modulation of host immune responses. Animal pathogenicity testing demonstrated that JJK was significantly pathogenic in female BALB/c mice, with an MLD50 of 104.67 EID50/50 μL, and caused severe lung lesions with high viral loads. However, in piglets, infection elicited substantial increases in serum inflammatory cytokines (TNF-α, IFN-γ, IL-6, and IL-10) but produced only mild clinical signs and limited pulmonary inflammation. To address the need for continuous surveillance of these evolving lineages, this study characterizes the genetic features and differential pathogenicity of a reassortant H1N1 SIV in distinct animal models, providing essential evidence to support epidemiological surveillance, risk assessment, and integrated control strategies for SI in China.

In this comprehensive large-scale study, conducted from 2015 to 2019, 7,209 wild boars across South Korea were sampled to assess their exposure to influenza A viruses (IAVs). Of these, 250 (3.5%) were found to be IAV-positive by ELISA, and 150 (2.1%) by the hemagglutination inhibition test. Detected subtypes included 23 cases of pandemic 2009 H1N1, six of human seasonal H3N2, three of classical swine H1N1, 13 of triple-reassortant swine H1N2, seven of triple-reassortant swine H3N2, and seven of swine-origin H3N2 variant. Notably, none of the serum samples tested positive for avian IAV subtypes H3N8, H5N3, H7N7, and H9N2 or canine IAV subtype H3N2. This serologic analysis confirmed the exposure of Korean wild boars to various subtypes of swine and human influenza viruses, with some serum samples cross-reacting between swine and human strains, indicating potential infections with multiple IAVs. The results highlight the potential of wild boar as a novel mixing vessel, facilitating the adaptation of IAVs and their spillover to other hosts, including humans. In light of these findings, we recommend regular and frequent surveillance of circulating influenza viruses in the wild boar population as a proactive measure to prevent potential human influenza pandemics and wild boar influenza epizootics.

BackgroundInfluenza A virus infections can occur in multiple species. Eurasian avian-like swine influenza A (H1N1) viruses (EAS-H1N1) are predominant in swine and occasionally infect humans. A Eurasian avian-like swine influenza A (H1N1) virus was isolated from a boy who was suffering from fever; this strain was designated A/Shandong-binzhou/01/2021 (H1N1). The aims of this study were to investigate the characteristics of this virus and to draw attention to the need for surveillance of influenza virus infection in swine and humans.MethodsThroat-swab specimens were collected and subjected to real-time fluorescent quantitative polymerase chain reaction (RT‒PCR). Positive clinical specimens were inoculated onto Madin-Darby canine kidney (MDCK) cells to isolate the virus, which was confirmed by a haemagglutination assay. Then, whole-genome sequencing was carried out using an Illumina MiSeq platform, and phylogenetic analysis was performed with MEGA X software.ResultsRT‒PCR revealed that the throat-swab specimens were positive for EAS-H1N1, and the virus was subsequently successfully isolated from MDCK cells; this strain was named A/Shandong-binzhou/01/2021 (H1N1). Whole-genome sequencing and phylogenetic analysis revealed that A/Shandong-binzhou/01/2021 (H1N1) is a novel triple-reassortant EAS-H1N1 lineage that contains gene segments from EAS-H1N1 (HA and NA), triple-reassortant swine influenza H1N2 virus (NS) and A(H1N1) pdm09 viruses (PB2, PB1, PA, NP and MP).ConclusionsThe isolation and analysis of the A/Shandong-binzhou/01/2021 (H1N1) virus provide further evidence that EAS-H1N1 poses a threat to human health, and greater attention should be given to the surveillance of influenza virus infections in swine and humans.

ABSTRACTIn 2017, the Iowa State University Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory detected a reverse-zoonotic transmission of a human seasonal H3 influenza A virus into swine (IAV-S) in Oklahoma. Pairwise comparison between the recently characterized human seasonal H3 IAV-S (H3.2010.2) hemagglutinin (HA) sequences detected in swine and the most similar 2016–2017 human seasonal H3 revealed 99.9% nucleotide identity. To elucidate the origin of H3.2010.2 IAV-S, 45 HA and 27 neuraminidase (NA) sequences from 2017 to 2020 as well as 11 whole-genome sequences (WGS) were genetically characterized. Time to most recent common human ancestor was estimated between August and September 2016. The N2 NA was of human origin in all but one strain from diagnostic submissions with NA sequences, and the internal gene segments from WGS consisted of matrix genes originating from the 2009 pandemic H1N1 and another 5 internal genes of triple reassortant swine origin (TTTTPT). Pigs experimentally infected with H3.2010.2 demonstrated efficient nasal shedding and replication in the lungs, mild pneumonia, and minimal microscopic lung lesions and transmitted the virus to indirect contact swine. Antigenically, H3.2010.2 viruses were closer to a human seasonal vaccine strain, A/Hong Kong/4801/2014, than to the H3.2010.1 human seasonal H3 viruses detected in swine in 2012. This was the second sustained transmission of a human seasonal IAV into swine from the 2010 decade after H3.2010.1. Monitoring the spillover and detection of novel IAV from humans to swine may help vaccine antigen selection and could impact pandemic preparedness.IMPORTANCE H3.2010.2 is a new phylogenetic clade of H3N2 circulating in swine that became established after the spillover of a human seasonal H3N2 from the 2016–2017 influenza season. The novel H3.2010.2 transmitted and adapted to the swine host and demonstrated reassortment with internal genes from strains endemic to pigs, but it maintained human-like HA and NA. It is genetically and antigenically distinct from the H3.2010.1 H3N2 introduced earlier in the 2010 decade. Human seasonal IAV spillovers into swine become established in the population through adaptation and sustained transmission and contribute to the genetic and antigenic diversity of IAV circulating in swine. Continued IAV surveillance is necessary to detect emergence of novel strains in swine and assist with vaccine antigen selection to improve the ability to prevent respiratory disease in swine as well as the risk of zoonotic transmission.

The H1N1/pdm2009 virus is a new triple-reassortant virus. While Eurasian avian-like and triple-reassortant swine influenza viruses are the direct ancestors of H1N1/pdm2009, the classic swine influenza virus facilitate the spectrum of influenza A diversity in pig population when the reassortant events occurred during 1998 to April 2009. The factors that facilitate the final formation of this gene constellation for H1N1/pdm2009 virus from this complex gene pool remain unknown. Since a novel successful virus should efficiently replicate and transmit in their hosts, in this study, we estimated the adaptability of the codon usage patterns of the pool of genes from these lineages of swine influenza viruses to the human expression system. We found that the MP and NA genes of Eurasian avian-like swine influenza viruses, and the PB2, PB1 and PA genes of triple-reassortant swine influenza viruses were best adapted to the human codon usage pattern. As these genes participated in the development of H1N1/pdm2009, they might help in viral replication and strengthen its competitiveness during its emergence. After its emergence in the human population, a gradual optimization of codon usage patterns between 2009 and 2019 to the human codon usage for the H1N1/pdm2009 genes was detected. This reveals that ongoing adaptive evolution, after its original incursion, occurred to further increase the adaptability of overall gene cassette to human expression system.

This report describes the detection of a triple reassortant swine influenza A virus of H1avN2 subtype. It evolved from an avian-like swine H1avN1 that first acquired the N2 segment from a seasonal H3N2, then the M segment from a 2009 pandemic H1N1, in two reassortments estimated to have occurred 10 years apart. This study illustrates how recurrent influenza infections increase the co-infection risk and facilitate evolutionary jumps by successive gene exchanges. It recalls the importance of appropriate biosecurity measures inside holdings to limit virus persistence and interspecies transmissions, which both contribute to the emergence of new potentially zoonotic viruses.

Humans and swine are both affected by influenza viruses, and swine are considered a potential source of new influenza viruses. Transmission of influenza viruses across species is well documented. The aim of this study was to evaluate the seroprevalence of different influenza virus subtypes in veterinarians working for the Mexican swine industry, using a hemagglutination inhibition test. All sera tested were collected in July 2011. The data were analysed using a generalized linear model and a linear model to study the possible association of seroprevalence with the age of the veterinarian, vaccination status, and biosecurity level of the farm where they work. The observed seroprevalence was 12.3%, 76.5%, 46.9%, and 11.1% for the human subtypes of pandemic influenza virus (pH1N1), seasonal human influenza virus (hH1N1), the swine subtypes of classical swine influenza virus (swH1N1), and triple-reassortant swine influenza virus (swH3N2), respectively. Statistical analysis indicated that age was associated with hH1N1 seroprevalence (P < 0.05). Similarly, age and vaccination were associated with pH1N1 seroprevalence (P < 0.05). On the other hand, none of the studied factors were associated with swH1N1 and swH3N2 seroprevalence. All of the pH1N1-positive sera were from vaccinated veterinarians, whereas all of those not vaccinated tested negative for this subtype. Our findings suggest that, between the onset of the 2009 pandemic and July 2011, the Mexican veterinarians working in the swine industry did not have immunity to the pH1N1 virus; hence, they would have been at risk for infection with this virus if this subtype had been circulating in swine in Mexico prior to 2011.

Southern China has long been considered to be an epicenter of pandemic influenza viruses. The special environment, breeding mode, and lifestyle in southern China provides more chances for wild aquatic birds, domestic poultry, pigs, and humans to be in contact. This creates the opportunity for interspecies transmission and generation of new influenza viruses. In this study, we reported a novel reassortant H1N2 influenza virus from pigs in southern China. According to the phylogenetic trees and homology of the nucleotide sequence, the virus was confirmed to be a novel triple-reassortant H1N2 virus containing genes from classical swine (PB2, PB1, HA, NP, and NS genes), triple-reassortant swine (PA and M genes), and recent human (NA gene) lineages. It indicated that the novel reassortment virus among human and swine influenza viruses occurred in pigs in southern China. The isolation of the novel reassortant H1N2 influenza viruses provides further evidence that pigs are “mixing vessels,” and swine influenza virus surveillance in southern China will provide important information about genetic evaluation and antigenic variation of swine influenza virus to formulate the prevention and control measures for the viruses.

Novel triple-reassortant H1N1 swine influenza viruses in pigs in Tianjin, Northern China

PB1-F2 protein, the 11th influenza A virus (IAV) protein, is considered to play an important role in primary influenza virus infection and postinfluenza secondary bacterial pneumonia in mice. The functional role of PB1-F2 has been reported to be a strain-specific and host-specific phenomenon. Its precise contribution to the pathogenicity and transmission of influenza virus in mammalian host, such as swine, and avian hosts, such as turkeys, remain largely unknown. In this study, we explored the role of PB1-F2 protein of triple-reassortant (TR) H3N2 swine influenza virus (SIV) in pigs and turkeys. Using the eight-plasmid reverse genetics system, we rescued wild-type SIV A/swine/Minnesota/1145/2007 (H3N2) (SIV 1145-WT), a PB1-F2 knockout mutant (SIV 1145-KO), and its N66S variant (SIV 1145-N66S). The ablation of PB1-F2 in SIV 1145 modulated early-stage apoptosis but did not affect the viral replication in swine alveolar macrophage cells. In pigs, PB1-F2 expression did not affect nasal shedding, lung viral load, immunophenotypes, and lung pathology. On the other hand, in turkeys, SIV 1145-KO infected poults, and its in-contacts developed clinical signs earlier than SIV 1145-WT groups and also displayed more extensive histopathological changes in intestine. Further, turkeys infected with SIV 1145-N66S displayed poor infectivity and transmissibility. The more extensive histopathologic changes in intestine and relative transmission advantage observed in turkeys infected with SIV 1145-KO need to be further explored. Taken together, these results emphasize the host-specific roles of PB1-F2 in the pathogenicity and transmission of IAV. Novel triple-reassortant H3N2 swine influenza virus emerged in 1998 and spread rapidly among the North American swine population. Subsequently, it showed an increased propensity to reassort, generating a range of reassortants. Unlike classical swine influenza virus, TR SIV produces a full-length PB1-F2 protein, which is considered an important virulence marker of IAV pathogenicity. Our study demonstrated that the expression of PB1-F2 does not impact the pathogenicity of TR H3N2 SIV in pigs. On the other hand, deletion of PB1-F2 caused TR H3N2 SIV to induce clinical disease early and resulted in effective transmission among the turkey poults. Our study emphasizes the continuing need to better understand the virulence determinants for IAV in intermediate hosts, such as swine and turkeys, and highlights the host-specific role of PB1-F2 protein.

Influenza A virus (IAV) can infect avian and mammalian species, including humans. The genome nature of IAVs may contribute to viral adaptation in different animal hosts, resulting in gene reassortment and the reproduction of variants with optimal fitness. As seen again in the 2009 swine-origin influenza A H1N1 pandemic, pigs are known to be susceptible to swine, avian, and human IAVs and can serve as a ‘mixing vessel’ for the generation of novel IAV variants. To this end, the emergence of swine influenza viruses must be kept under close surveillance. Herein, we report the isolation and phylogenetic study of a swine IAV, A/swine/Korea/PL01/2012 (swPL01, H3N2 subtype). After screening nasopharyngeal samples from pigs in the Gyeongsangnam-do region of Korea from December 2011 to May 2012, we isolated the swPL01 virus and sequenced its all of 8 genome segments (polymerase basic 2, PB2; polymerase basic 1, PB1; polymerase acidic, PA; hemagglutinin, HA; nucleocapsid protein, NP; neuraminidase, NA; matrix protein, M; and nonstructural protein, NS). The phylogenetic study, analyzed with reference strains registered in the National Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI) database, indicated that the swPL01 virus was similar to the North American triple-reassortant swine strains and that the HA gene of the swPL01 virus was categorized into swine H3 cluster IV. The swPL01 virus had the M gene of the triple-reassortant swine H3N2 viruses, whereas that of other contemporary strains in Korea was transferred from the 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus. These data suggest the possibility that various swine H3N2 viruses may co-circulate in Korea, which underlines the importance of a sustained surveillance system against swine IAVs.

The 2009 H1N1 lineage represented the first detection of a novel, highly transmissible influenza A virus genotype: six gene segments originated from the North American triple-reassortant swine lineage, and two segments, NA and M, derived from the Eurasian avian-like swine lineage. As neither parental lineage transmits efficiently between humans, the adaptations and mechanisms underlying the pandemic spread of the swine-origin 2009 strain are not clear. To help identify determinants of transmission, we used reverse genetics to introduce gene segments of an early pandemic isolate, A/Netherlands/602/2009 [H1N1] (NL602), into the background of A/Puerto Rico/8/1934 [H1N1] (PR8) and evaluated the resultant viruses in a guinea pig transmission model. Whereas the NL602 virus spread efficiently, the PR8 virus did not transmit. Swapping of the HA, NA, and M segments of NL602 into the PR8 background yielded a virus with indistinguishable contact transmissibility to the wild-type pandemic strain. Consistent with earlier reports, the pandemic M segment alone accounted for much of the improvement in transmission. To aid in understanding how the M segment might affect transmission, we evaluated neuraminidase activity and virion morphology of reassortant viruses. Transmission was found to correlate with higher neuraminidase activity and a more filamentous morphology. Importantly, we found that introduction of the pandemic M segment alone resulted in an increase in the neuraminidase activity of two pairs of otherwise isogenic PR8-based viruses. Thus, our data demonstrate the surprising result that functions encoded by the influenza A virus M segment impact neuraminidase activity and, perhaps through this mechanism, have a potent effect on transmissibility. Our work uncovers a previously unappreciated mechanism through which the influenza A virus M segment can alter the receptor-destroying activity of an influenza virus. Concomitant with changes to neuraminidase activity, the M segment impacts the morphology of the influenza A virion and transmissibility of the virus in the guinea pig model. We suggest that changes in NA activity underlie the ability of the influenza M segment to influence virus transmissibility. Furthermore, we show that coadapted M, NA, and HA segments are required to provide optimal transmissibility to an influenza virus. The M-NA functional interaction we describe appears to underlie the prominent role of the 2009 pandemic M segment in supporting efficient transmission and may be a highly important means by which influenza A viruses restore HA/NA balance following reassortment or transfer to new host environments.

Influenza A virus is characterized by a genome composed of eight single-stranded, negative sense RNA segments, which allow for reassortment between different strains when they co-infect the same host cell. Reassortment is an important driving force for the evolution of influenza viruses. The ability of reassortment allows influenza virus to endlessly reinvent itself and pose a constant threat to the health of humans and other animals. Of the four human influenza pandemics since the beginning of the last century, three of them were caused by reassortant viruses bearing genes of avian, human or swine influenza virus origin. In the past decade, great efforts have been made to understand the transmissibility of influenza viruses. The use of reverse genetics technology has made it substantially easier to generate reassortant viruses and evaluate the contribution of individual virus gene on virus transmissibility in animal models such as ferrets and guinea pigs. H5, H7, and H9 avian influenza viruses represent the top three subtypes that are candidates to cause the next human influenza pandemic. Many studies have been conducted to determine whether the transmission of these avian influenza viruses could be enhanced by acquisition of gene segments from human influenza viruses. Moreover, the 2009 pdmH1N1 viruses and the triple reassortant swine influenza viruses were extensively studied to identify the gene segments that contribute to their transmissibility. These studies have greatly deepened our understanding of the transmissibility of reassortant influenza viruses, which, in turn, has improved our ability to be prepared for reassortant influenza virus with enhanced transmissibility and pandemic potential.

Molecular phylogeny and evolutionary dynamics of influenza A nonstructural (NS) gene

Influenza A virus is a hazardous virus and harm to respiratory tract. The virus infect birds, pigs, horses, dogs, mammals and humans. Pigs are important hosts in ecology of the influenza virus because they have two receptors, namely NeuAc 2,3Gal and NeuAc 2,6Gal which make the pigs are sensitive to infection of influenza virus from birds and humans and genetic reassortment can be occurred. Classical swine influenza H1N1 viruses had been circulated in pigs in North America and other countries for 80 years. In 1998, triple reassortant H3N2 swine influenza viruses that contains genes of human influenza A virus (H3N2), swine influenza virus (H1N1) and avian influenza are reported as cause an outbreaks in pigs in North America. Furthermore, the circulation of triple reassortant H3N2 swine influenza virus resulting reassortant H1N1 swine influenza and reassortant H1N2 swine influenza viruses cause infection in humans. Humans who were infected by triple reassortant swine influenza A virus (H1N1) usually made direct contact with pigs. Although without any clinical symptoms, pigs that are infected by triple reassortant swine influenza A (H1N1) can transmit infection to the humans around them. In June 2009, WHO declared that pandemic influenza of reassortant H1N1 influenza A virus (novel H1N1) has reached phase 6. In Indonesia until 2009, there were 1005 people were infected by H1N1 influenza A and 5 of them died. Novel H1N1 and H5N1 viruses have been circulated in humans and pigs in Indonesia. H5N1 reassortant and H1N1 viruses or the seasonal flu may could arise because of genetic reassortment between avian influenza and humans influenza viruses that infect pigs together. Key words: influenza viruses, swine, genetic reassortment

To the Editor: We would like to retract the letter entitled “Triple Reassortant Swine Influenza A (H3N2) Virus in Waterfowl,” which was published the April 2010 issue of Emerging Infectious Diseases (1). The nucleoprotein gene sequences from the viruses reported in that letter are very closely related to those from the earliest detected triple reassortant swine influenza viruses [{type:entrez-nucleotide,attrs:{text:CY095676,term_id:340784762,term_text:CY095676}}CY095676 A/sw/Texas/4199–2/1998(H3N2)]. Although these viruses could have acquired a swine-origin segment, the branch lengths are quite short for 9 years of evolution. Therefore, we have withdrawn these 4 isolates from GenBank and subsequently retract this letter.

Efficient worldwide swine surveillance for influenza A viruses is urgently needed; the emergence of a novel reassortant pandemic H1N1 (pH1N1) virus in 2009 demonstrated that swine can be the direct source of pandemic influenza and that the pandemic potential of viruses prevalent in swine populations must be monitored. We used the ferret model to assess the pathogenicity and transmissibility of predominant Korean triple-reassortant swine (TRSw) H1N2 and H3N2 influenza viruses genetically related to North American strains. Although most of the TRSw viruses were moderately pathogenic, one [A/Swine/Korea/1204/2009; Sw/1204 (H1N2)] was virulent in ferrets, causing death within 10 d of inoculation, and was efficiently transmitted to naive contact ferrets via respiratory droplets. Although molecular analysis did not reveal known virulence markers, the Sw/1204 virus acquired mutations in hemagglutinin (HA) (Asp-225-Gly) and neuraminidase (NA) (Ser-315-Asn) proteins during the single ferret passage. The contact-Sw/1204 virus became more virulent in mice, replicated efficiently in vitro, extensively infected human lung tissues ex vivo, and maintained its ability to replicate and transmit in swine. Reverse-genetics studies further indicated that the HA(225G) and NA(315N) substitutions contributed substantially in altering virulence and transmissibility. These findings support the continuing threat of some field TRSw viruses to human and animal health, reviving concerns on the capacity of pigs to create future pandemic viruses. Apart from warranting continued and enhanced global surveillance, this study also provides evidence on the emerging roles of HA(225G) and NA(315N) as potential virulence markers in mammals.

North American triple reassortant swine (TRS) influenza A viruses have caused sporadic human infections since 2005, but human-to-human transmission has not been documented. These viruses have six gene segments (PB2, PB1, PA, HA, NP, and NS) closely related to those of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic viruses. Therefore, understanding of these viruses' pathogenicity and transmissibility may help to identify determinants of virulence of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic viruses and to elucidate potential human health threats posed by the TRS viruses. Here we evaluated in a ferret model the pathogenicity and transmissibility of three groups of North American TRS viruses containing swine-like and/or human-like HA and NA gene segments. The study was designed only to detect informative and significant patterns in the transmissibility and pathogenicity of these three groups of viruses. We observed that irrespective of their HA and NA lineages, the TRS viruses were moderately pathogenic in ferrets and grew efficiently in both the upper and lower respiratory tracts. All North American TRS viruses studied were transmitted between ferrets via direct contact. However, their transmissibility by respiratory droplets was related to their HA and NA lineages: TRS viruses with human-like HA and NA were transmitted most efficiently, those with swine-like HA and NA were transmitted minimally or not transmitted, and those with swine-like HA and human-like NA (N2) showed intermediate transmissibility. We conclude that the lineages of HA and NA may play a crucial role in the respiratory droplet transmissibility of these viruses. These findings have important implications for pandemic planning and warrant confirmation.

Influenza-like illness was noted in people and pigs in attendance at an Ohio county fair in August 2007. The morbidity rate in swine approached 100% within 1-2 days of initial clinical signs being recognized, and approximately two dozen people developed influenza-like illness. Triple-reassortant swine H1N1 influenza viruses were identified in both pigs and people at the fair. The identified viruses (A/Sw/OH/511445/2007, A/Ohio/01/2007, and A/Ohio/02/2007) were similar to H1N1 swine influenza viruses currently found in the U.S. swine population. This case illustrates the possibility of transmission of swine influenza in settings where there is close human/swine interaction.

The epidemiological success of pandemic and epidemic influenza A viruses relies on the ability to transmit efficiently from person-to-person via respiratory droplets. Respiratory droplet (RD) transmission of influenza viruses requires efficient replication and release of infectious influenza particles into the air. The 2009 pandemic H1N1 (pH1N1) virus originated by reassortment of a North American triple reassortant swine (TRS) virus with a Eurasian swine virus that contributed the neuraminidase (NA) and M gene segments. Both the TRS and Eurasian swine viruses caused sporadic infections in humans, but failed to spread from person-to-person, unlike the pH1N1 virus. We evaluated the pH1N1 and its precursor viruses in a ferret model to determine the contribution of different viral gene segments on the release of influenza virus particles into the air and on the transmissibility of the pH1N1 virus. We found that the Eurasian-origin gene segments contributed to efficient RD transmission of the pH1N1 virus likely by modulating the release of influenza viral RNA-containing particles into the air. All viruses replicated well in the upper respiratory tract of infected ferrets, suggesting that factors other than viral replication are important for the release of influenza virus particles and transmission. Our studies demonstrate that the release of influenza viral RNA-containing particles into the air correlates with increased NA activity. Additionally, the pleomorphic phenotype of the pH1N1 virus is dependent upon the Eurasian-origin gene segments, suggesting a link between transmission and virus morphology. We have demonstrated that the viruses are released into exhaled air to varying degrees and a constellation of genes influences the transmissibility of the pH1N1 virus.