Treaty Of Tlatelolco Research Articles

Tlatelolco Treaty: The Global South’s Postcolonial Contestation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

This article demonstrates how Global South countries tried to manage global pressures and preserved nuclear scientific ambitions via post-colonial understandings. By resorting to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), this work states this treaty operated as a response to arguably colonial-minded nonproliferation structures and, in this sense, refined existing instruments through a Latin American initiative. The lessons from this example are still crucial because it represented the first well-accomplished Global South initiative to establish a fully-fledged Nuclear-Free-Zone area. In so being, Latin American countries acquiesced to global nuclear rules by requiring some concessions from great powers. For instance, the Treaty of Tlatelolco’s Additional Protocols I and II require that foreign countries with overseas territories in Latin America and nuclear-armed countries assumed not to perform tests or stock atomic weapons in the region. Employing a post-colonial theoretical approach, this article qualitative analyzes primary sources to unveil some peculiar regional tendencies from Latin America that encouraged countries to provide a response for international mechanisms erstwhile under formulation to curb nuclear proliferation according to great powers’ understandings.

Nuclear weapon-free zones and the issue of maritime transit in Latin America

Abstract Why did Latin American states exclude a prohibition on maritime nuclear transit from their regional nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ)? Latin American countries and nuclear powers shared common anxieties about the dangers of the nuclear arms race in the early 1960s. Thus, they decided to craft a regional nuclear non-proliferation mechanism. Latin American states favoured limiting maritime nuclear transit as part of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco. However, they disagreed on defining transit and the zone of application of a ban, and they faced US opposition. This article identifies issue bracketing as a negotiating tactic Latin America used to ensure a successful treaty codification. It argues that Latin American states bracketed the maritime nuclear transit issue out of the NWFZ discussions and onto the agenda of the negotiations establishing ocean governance rules in the 1970s. The Latin American construction of a NWFZ questions assumptions in international law and nuclear politics studies about the agency of the global South in the global nuclear order. Latin American concessions in Tlatelolco were not impositions from nuclear powers. Their compromises were strategic decisions that helped them promote their governance preferences.

The Security of Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones: The Middle East as a Test Case for Unconditional Security Assurances

ABSTRACT A just nuclear order based on voluntary abstinence by states and the promotion of nuclear weapon-free zones would require more credible negative security assurances than provided by the current non-proliferation regime. The question here is: how to create the necessary conditions for such a change? The negative security assurances issued to the non-nuclear states in general and to the existing regional nuclear weapon-free zones in particular are reviewed. These are analysed in relation to their conditionality and ambiguity in order to understand the security provided. On this basis, possible options to achieve unconditional, legally based security assurances collectively for all the zone states are presented. These assurances could potentially be a tool to increase the number of non-nuclear states and nuclear weapon-free zones, especially in cases where there are one or several nuclear weapon states. Currently, the most acute example is the one in the Middle East. The lack of progress in this case will haunt the NPT review conferences and deepen the crisis until some positive steps take place. In case unconditional, legal security assurances are agreed to, these could provide an interim first phase for the WMD-free zone in the Middle East and allow for some of the disagreements among the participants to at least be discussed. The model here would be the transformation of the hostile relations between Brazil and Argentina initiated by the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

The role of Brazil in multilateral disarmament efforts

Abstract This article examines Brazil’s motivations, objectives, and action in international instances related to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and arms control, particularly the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The paper describes the evolution of Brazilian attitudes and decisions and discusses prospects for nuclear disarmament opened by the proposal of a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons.Keywords: Nuclear disarmament; multilateral institutions; Brazilian foreign policy; non-proliferation of nuclear weapons Received: May 23, 2017 Accepted: August 28, 2017 Introduction Brazil in the world A former colony of a Southern European metropolis, Brazil achieved independence with comparatively little strife. It has a large landmass and a diversified population with a culture based on Western European values and indigenous, African, and Asian elements. Brazil thinks of itself as a significant world player whose influence in international affairs has not been commensurate with its size and resources. Located in an area of the world which is relatively undisturbed by the main geopolitical interests and rivalries of the major powers, the external action of Brazil seeks to ensure that the activities of states are governed by the prevalence of international norms and institutions rather than by the economic and political clout of those powers. Thus, the Brazilian view of global security privileges multilateral rules over unilateral action. Lasting peace is to be achieved through investment in institutions that will promote peace and the rule of law. For Brazil, the United Nations is the primary organization in charge of global security

‘We are not a rich country to waste our resources on expensive toys’: Mexico’s version of Atoms for Peace

The Atoms for Peace initiative was announced by U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly on 8 December 1953. The ways in which Eisenhower’s proposal was interpreted, adapted and reshaped by different countries allows us to understand the various meanings and uses of nuclear technologies, particularly in Third World countries. Mexico’s version of the initiative was related to its modernizing nationalism, a distaste for overt geopolitical alignment and nuclear weapons, and an intermittent commitment of the federal government with nuclear technologies. These ingredients eventually led to the promotion of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco (TT) signed in Mexico City in 1967. The TT made Latin America the first nuclear weapons-free populated region in the world, thus positioning Mexico in the new geopolitical nuclear order through a denuclearization discourse and a policy of non-engagement with nuclear technologies.

Accepting Regional Zero: Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, U.S. Nonproliferation Policy and Global Security, 1957–1968

Nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs) were an important development in the history of nuclear nonproliferation efforts. From 1957 through 1968, when the Treaty of Tlatelolco was signed, the United States struggled to develop a policy toward NWFZs in response to efforts around the world to create these zones, including in Europe, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. Many within the U.S. government initially rejected the idea of NWFZs, viewing them as a threat to U.S. nuclear strategy. However, over time, a preponderance of officials came to see the zones as advantageous, at least in certain areas of the world, particularly Latin America. Still, U.S. policy pertaining to this issue remained conservative and reactive, reflecting the generally higher priority given to security policy than to nuclear nonproliferation.

The Complete Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula: Some Considerations under International Law

The primary purpose of this article is to propose general conditions for establishing a nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the Korean Peninsula from the viewpoint of international law. North Korea’s nuclear weapons development has created the most negative environment for the peace and security of Northeast Asia since the early 1990s. In spite of painstaking negotiations to denuclearize North Korea, the parties concerned have not found any fundamental solution yet. This interim failure is due to the uncompromising positions of the two sides as well as the inherently paradoxical structure of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which legalizes the development of nuclear weapons by the recognized nuclear powers. The most reasonable solution is to completely and fairly denuclearize the whole Korean Peninsula under an NWFZ. This paper scrutinizes legal, political and technical problems for realizing the plan for a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. In a world that all too often seems dark and ominous, the Treaty of Tlatelolco will shine like a beacon. This Treaty is a practical demonstration to all humanity of what can be accomplished when sufficient dedication and the necessary will exist. U Thant

History of Nuclear Power in Brazil

The 1973 energy crisis prompted the United States to suspend supplies of enriched uranium to the reactor being built in Brazil, Angra I. In 1975, the Brazil–Germany Nuclear Agreement was announced. The Programme was a failure. Today the Angra II nuclear reactor has been completed, the only reactor completed under the agreement with Germany. Brazil's last military President implemented the Parallel Nuclear Programme, which included uranium enrichment with the justification of developing the technology that had not been transferred through the Nuclear Agreement with Germany. In 1986, the existence of a deep shaft drilled by the Air Force was revealed. A Technical Report concluded that it had all the characteristics and dimensions required to test a nuclear bomb. Some years later, the Civilian Government acknowledged the existence of an underground nuclear explosion facility and symbolically sealed this shaft. The situation in Brazil has improved recently. Brazil ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco on the denuclearisation of Latin America and established ABACC, an agency handling mutual inspections of nuclear facilities in Brazil and Argentina. Brazil also signed the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty. The uranium enrichment activities are being transferred to a civilian industry. More importantly, I do not believe that the uranium enrichment project is intended to endow Brazil with the capacity to produce nuclear weapons.

The nuclear equation in a new middle east

regime? What about the Iran-Iraq nuclear entanglement? Can both issues be dealt with under a regional arrangement? Can new global approaches be reconciled with a regional approach in the Middle East? This article attempts to identify and explore some of these issues, examining the Middle Eastern nuclear situation in light of the experience of Iraq, North Korea, South Africa, and Latin America. It begins with a tour de horizon of both the positive and negative nonproliferation trends in the region, then considers the deadlock on the nuclear issue as manifested in recent regional discussions. Since both Arabs and Israelis now agree that the long-term objective of those talks should be the establishment of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons (WMDFZ), the article examines the feasibility of such a zone in the Middle East by comparing the situation in this region with both the establishment of a nuclear-weaponsfree zone (NWFZ) in South America under the Treaty of Tlatelolco and South Africa’s unilateral decision to dismantle its nuclear weapons program and join the NPT. Although my findings present a rather pessimistic assessment of the near-term likelihood of establishing a NWFZ in the Middle East, they also point to other possible confidence-building measures that could eventually lead to the establishment of such a zone. Finally, the article comments more optimistically on the applicability to the Middle East of the recent proposal for a global ban on the production of fissile material.

Huddling with the Honchos in Havana

The economic collapse following the Soviet Union's disintegration has affected all aspects of life in Cuba. In this paper Cuban foreign policy and defense is discussed. This article evaluates the energy situation of Cuba (oil imports), food shortages, Cuba's position on the Treaty of Tlatelolco (formally, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America), Cuba's nuclear power projects, and discussions concerning Cuban involvement in biological warfare. The effects of U.S. military activities on U.S.-Cuban relations are emphasized. 8 refs.

The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone

The pursuit of nuclear non-proliferation has been a major international concern of our times. The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 is of great historical significance for having created the world's first nuclear-free zone (NFZ). Article 5 of the Treaty prohibits any nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste in the Antarctica. The Treaty of Tlatelolco of 1967 established the first internationally recognised Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (NWFZ) in a populated region of the world, namely Latin America. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 was an attempt to bring in a global regime to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). States in the latter category can adhere to the NPT while accepting a stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories, as long as they do not exercise jurisdiction and control over the weapons. West Germany is an obvious example of such a country. A NWFZ, however, prohibits such stationing of nuclear weapons. The three essential characteristics of a NWFZ are non-possession, non-deployment and non-use of nuclear weapons. NWFZs can help to strengthen and promote non-proliferation by providing a means of extending and reinforcing the NPT. In fact Article 7 of the latter accepts that, “Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of states to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.” The article merely acknowledged that one such treaty had been negotiated more or less simultaneously with the NPT. The second NFWZ in an inhabited region was not to be established for another eighteen years. At the Sixteenth South Pacific Forum meeting held in Rarotonga, Cook Islands, Forum countries adopted the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty on 6 August 1985 (Hiroshima Day). The Preamble to the treaty expresses the commitment to world peace, a grave concern at the continuing nuclear arms race, the conviction that every country bears an obligation to strive for the elimination of nuclear weapons, a belief in the efficacy of regional arms control measures, and a reaffirmation of the NPT for halting nucleor proliferation. The core NFZ obligations are contained in Articles 3–7. Each party agrees not to manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control—or seek to do so—over any nuclear device; not to assist or encourage others to make or acquire nuclear weapons; to prevent the stationing or testing of nuclear weapons on its territory; not to dump radioactive wastes at sea anywhere in the zone, and to prevent such dumping by others in its territorial sea. Discussions at the United Nations had, by the mid-1970s, identified nine major principles as the guiding elements of a NWFZ: (1) the initiative should come from the countries of the region; (2) the specific provisions of the NWFZ treaty should be negotiated between the regional member states in the form of a multilateral treaty establishing the zone in perpetuity; (5) while adherence to the treaty should be voluntary, the NWFZ must nevertheless embrace all militarily significant states in the region: (4) existing treaty relationships within the zone should not be disturbed; (5) there should be an effective verification system: (6) peaceful nuclear development should be allowed; (7) the zone should hare clearly defined and recognised boundaries; (8) in defining the territory of the zone, members must respect international law, including freedom of the seas and straits used for international navigation and of international airspace; and (9) the NWFZ should have the support of the nuclear-weapon states. Thus the NWFZ concept in established United Nations vocabulary does not prohibit the temporary presence of nuclear vessels during transit or on port calls, and it does not necessarily preclude the acquisition of sensitive nuclear facilities and materials tantamount to having a nuclear-weapon capability or producing untested nuclear bomb components. Nevertheless, it will be useful to follow the UN criteria in order to examine the nature and implications of the South Pacific zone.

The South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone

T HE WORLD NOW HAS a second treaty requiring military denuclearization of an inhabited area in perpetuity, the Treaty of Rarotonga.' The pact was signed on August 6, 1985, the fortieth anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing, by eight of the fourteen members of the South Pacific Forum at a conference held in the capital of the Cook Islands. The new treaty partially reflects, but also in some respect differs from, the Treaty of Tlatelolco providing for a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) for Latin America and the Caribbean. For the independent South Pacific nations, which were already free of nuclear weapons before the treaty emerged, the Rarotonga pact is a step onto the global anti-nuclear stage. The peace movement has welcomed the agreement as a conservative precursor of a further spread of nuclear pacifism. The South Pacific NWFZ will be incomplete unless and until the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) accept the Rarotonga Protocols. Since the 1970s, the NWS have shown varying degrees of interest in a South Pacific NWFZ. South Pacific Forum delegations visited the capitals of the NWS in early 1986 to explain the Rarotonga Treaty and invite comments on its protocols. Ratified protocols would assure that China, France, the U.S.S.R. and the United States would abstain from any action violating treaty norms, and that the NWS would not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against Rarotonga parties. What are the leading provisions of the new pact and how do they compare to the Latin American model? How did regional actors, especially Australia and New Zealand, bring about the Rarotonga Treaty? Do the South Pacific states, large and small, agree among

The Soviet Union and Nuclear Proliferation

Prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons has long been a theme of the Soviet! Union's declaratory arms control policy. It has also found concrete expression in Moscow's endorsement of the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America of 1967 (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968, and, since 1958, in the stringent nuclear export policy of the Soviet Union. Although much of Moscow's nonproliferation rhetoric and elements of its nonproliferation behavior can be explained in terms of narrow self-interest (namely, prevention of access to nuclear weapons by traditional adversaries), the range and consistency of its nonproliferation efforts, as well as certain specific actions, indicate that the Soviet leadership appreciates the dangers posed by the diffusion of nuclear weapons.

Article VII, the treaty of Tlatelolco and colonial warfare in the 20th century

Article VII, the treaty of Tlatelolco and colonial warfare in the 20th century

The Tlatelolco regime and nonproliferation in Latin America

The regime established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco is supportive of peace and security in the Latin American region and global nonproliferation efforts. Circumstances leading to the creation of the nuclear-weapon-free zone include careful preparations and negotiations, individual leadership, existence of certain shared cultural and legal traditions of Latin American countries, and the temporary stimulus of the Cuban missile crisis. Lack of overt superpower pressure on Latin America, compared with more turbulent regions, has permitted continued progress toward full realization of the zone. Tlatelolco's negotiating process, as well as the substance of the Treaty, deserve careful consideration relative to other areas.The Treaty enjoys wide international approval, but full support by certain Latin American States (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba) has been negatively affected by the failure of the U.S. Senate to ratify Tlatelolco's Protocol I. Nuclear programs of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico are expanding rapidly and these nations are forming linkages with West European countries, rather than the United States. The May 1980 Argentine-Brazilian nuclear agreement foresees significant cooperation between the two nation's nuclear energy commissions and more coordinated resistance to the nuclear supplier countries. Argentine-Brazilian nuclear convergence—and the response accorded to it by the United States will have significant implications for the future of the Tlatelolco regime and nonproliferation in Latin America.

Regional nuclear arms control in Latin America

The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) was signed in 1967 and is now in force for eighteen Latin American nations (the important exceptions being Argentina and Brazil). Under the terms of the treaty the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) was established in 1969. With headquarters in Mexico City, OPANAL is a sophisticated control mechanism composed of three principal organs: a General Conference, Council and Secretariat. This article examines the effort to establish regional nuclear weapons free zone in Latin America and analyzes the ability of the Tlatelolco Treaty to provide the legal and political framework for containment of the growing military potential of Latin American nuclear energy programs. Particular attention is given to the positions of key Latin American nations within the region, nuclear weapons states, and those nations retaining territorial interest within the nuclear weapons free zone. In addition several policy options are advanced which could facilitate the more complete implementation of regional nuclear arms control in Latin America.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco and the United States: A Latin American Nuclear Free Zone

On Sunday evening of March 31, 1968, millions of Americans watched President Lyndon Johnson announce a major bombing halt in the hostilities in Viet-Nam and his intention not to seek re-election as President. At the same time a reception was being held in the United States Ambassador’s official residence in Mexico City in honor of Vice President Hubert Humphrey, who took leave from the many guests to listen to the President’s address.