Traditional Digital Signature Schemes Research Articles

A research on quantum digital signatures

This paper provides an overview of the basic principles, types, recent works, and applications of quantum digital signatures. The security of traditional digital signature schemes is compromised by the rise of quantum computing, leading to a need for post-quantum cryptography. Quantum digital signatures, which rely on the principles of quantum mechanics, offer a potential solution to this problem. This paper aims to provide a comprehensive overview of quantum digital signatures and post-quantum digital signatures. The paper introduces the basic principles of quantum mechanics, then explains key distribution in quantum digital signatures. The paper then provides a detailed description of both quantum and post-quantum digital signatures, including their differences and applications. Finally, the paper summarizes the main findings in the field, highlights potential future directions, and discusses challenges that humans must address. In addition, the paper examines the widespread applications of quantum digital signatures and post-quantum digital signatures in various fields such as Bitcoin, smart city blockchain, and finance. Finally, the paper summarizes the key findings in the field, highlighting potential future directions and discussing challenges that humans must address. Overall, this paper aims to provide readers with a comprehensive understanding of quantum digital signatures and post-quantum digital signatures and their applications in various domains.

Controllable anonymous authentication scheme based on blockchain and decentralized traceable attribute-based signature

The development of information technology and the enhancement of peoples attention to personal privacy security put forward higher requirements for the identity authentication mechanism of traditional Internet applications, which not only needs to realize the users identity authentication, but also protects the users privacy information to the greatest extent. Compared with the traditional digital signature schemes, the attribute-based signature scheme has the characteristics of anonymity, that is, the attribute-based signature can hide the signers identity information, and other users cannot link a signature to the signers identity (attribute set). In practical application scenarios, we usually need to monitor the identity of users to prevent the occurrence of anonymous abuse and dishonesty. Therefore, in order to balance these two seemingly contradictory requirements, this paper proposes a controllable anonymous authentication scheme based on blockchain and decentralized traceable attribute-based signature. By properly improving the existing traceable attribute-based signature scheme, the decentralized attribute authority is realized without affecting the efficiency, so as to prevent the corruption of single attribute authority on system security. The results show that the proposed scheme is suitable for electronic voting systems and other scenarios with decentralized controllable anonymous authentication requirements.

A New Approach to Keep the Privacy Information of the Signer in a Digital Signature Scheme

In modern applications, such as Electronic Voting, e-Health, e-Cash, there is a need that the validity of a signature should be verified by only one responsible person. This is opposite to the traditional digital signature scheme where anybody can verify a signature. There have been several solutions for this problem, the first one is we combine a signature scheme with an encryption scheme; the second one is to use the group signature; and the last one is to use the strong designated verifier signature scheme with the undeniable property. In this paper, we extend the traditional digital signature scheme to propose a new solution for the aforementioned problem. Our extension is in the sense that only a designated verifier (responsible person) can verify a signer’s signature, and if necessary (in case the signer refuses to admit his/her signature) the designated verifier without revealing his/her secret key is able to prove to anybody that the signer has actually generated the signature. The comparison between our proposed solution and the three existing solutions shows that our proposed solution is the best one in terms of both security and efficiency.

Secure and efficient identity-based proxy signature scheme with message recovery

Digital signature with proxy delegation, which is a secure ownership enforcement tool, allows an original signer to delegate signature rights to a third party called proxy, so that the proxy can sign messages on behalf of the original signer. In today’s modern society, many applications use this mechanism. Several types of delegations are quite prevalent and the delegation of signing authority is one of them. In a traditional digital signature scheme, signer transmits signature along with message for verification, which leads to additional communication, computation cost and requires extra bandwidth. To resolve these issues, in this paper, we present an efficient ID-based proxy signature scheme with message recovery using bilinear pairings. Because of the message recovery feature, the proxy signer need not send the message to the verifier, so that the proposed scheme reduces the bandwidth requirement and communication cost. Our proposed scheme is proven secure against existential forgery under adaptively chosen message and identity attacks in the random oracle model (ROM) with the assumption that the Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP) is intractable. We compare our scheme with related schemes. The efficiency analysis shows that the scheme is computationally efficient. Thus the proposed ID-based proxy signature scheme is secure and efficient both in terms of computation and communication costs than the related existing schemes.

Strong Designated Verifier Signature Scheme with Undeniability and Strong Unforgeability in the Standard Model

Strong designated verifier signature can provide an efficient way to protect the identity privacy of the signer and the integrity of the data transmitted over the public channel. These characteristics make it very useful in outsourcing computing, electronic voting, electronic bidding, electronic auction and other fields. However, most strong designated verifier signature schemes are unable to identify the real signature generator when the signer and the designated verifier dispute a signature. In addition, the existing strong designated verifier signature schemes in the standard model rarely satisfy strong unforgeability, and thus cannot prevent the attacker from forging a valid signature on any previously signed message. Therefore, designing a strong designated verifier signature scheme without random oracles that satisfies strong unforgeability and undeniability is very attractive in both practice and theory. Motivated by these concerns, we design the first undeniable strong designated verifier signature scheme without random oracles, in which the arbiter can independently perform the judgment procedure to prove whether a controversial signature is generated by the signer or the designated verifier. Under standard assumptions, the scheme is proved to be strongly unforgeable in standard model. Furthermore, it not only achieves non-transferability and privacy of the signer’s identity but also satisfies the undeniable property of traditional digital signature schemes. Performance analysis results show that the length of the signer’s private key, the designated verifier’s private key and signature length are 40 bits, 40 bits and 384 bits, respectively. Compared with he related schemes, the proposed scheme has higher performance in signature length, private key size and computational overhead. Finally, we show how to apply it to implement outsourcing computation in cloud computing.

Double-authentication-preventing signatures

Digital signatures are often used by trusted authorities to make unique bindings between a subject and a digital object; for example, certificate authorities certify a public key belongs to a domain name, and time-stamping authorities certify that a certain piece of information existed at a certain time. Traditional digital signature schemes however impose no uniqueness conditions, so a trusted authority could make multiple certifications for the same subject but different objects, be it intentionally, by accident, or following a (legal or illegal) coercion. We propose the notion of a double-authentication-preventing signature, in which a value to be signed is split into two parts: a subject and a message. If a signer ever signs two different messages for the same subject, enough information is revealed to allow anyone to compute valid signatures on behalf of the signer. This double-signature forgeability property discourages signers from misbehaving--a form of self-enforcement--and would give binding authorities like CAs some cryptographic arguments to resist legal coercion. We give a generic construction using a new type of trapdoor functions with extractability properties, which we show can be instantiated using the group of sign-agnostic quadratic residues modulo a Blum integer; we show an additional application of these new extractable trapdoor functions to standard digital signatures.

Cryptanalysis and improvement of an efficient certificateless signature scheme

In traditional digital signature schemes, certificates signed by a trusted party are required to ensure the authenticity of the public key. In Asiacrypt 2003, the concept of certificateless signature scheme was introduced. The advantage of certificate-less public key cryptography successfully eliminates the necessity of certificates in the traditional public key cryptography and simultaneously solves the inherent key escrow problem suffered in identity-based cryptography. Recently, Yap et al. proposed an efficient certificateless signature scheme and claimed that their scheme is existentially unforgeable in the random oracle model. In this paper, we show that the certificateless signature scheme proposed by Yap et al. is insecure against public key replacement attacks. Furthermore, we propose an improved certificateless signature scheme, which is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model and provide the security proof of the proposed scheme.