Hanoi watchers tracking the performance of the tough and determined men of the Vietnam Politburo over the years have long known of one enduring principle in their operational code: when the going gets tough, the tough hunker down. The year 1990 was a tough one for the leadership, and predictably, the ruling Politburo returned to the bunker, driven there primarily by the influence of those astounding changes in the Leninist political systems of the world now widely labeled the Revolution of 1989. For Vietnamese leaders, the policy dilemma centered on how to give the people a prosperous life without significantly altering the Leninist political construct achieved at such a high price in blood, treasure, and wartime sacrifice. Their policy response, in a word, was judiciously to do nothing-to make no policy changes in any sector, on any matter, if such could be managed. This is characteristic of any highly defensive governmental policy position, not unknown in other world capitals. Often it is seen as indecisiveness, but it is not. Rather, it is the determination to seek systematically to buy time, pending some hopedfor turn of events. The leaders in Hanoi implemented their policy of judiciously doing nothing with consummate skill. Looking back on Vietnam during 1990, it is clear that there were virtually no significant policy changes in any state or party sector-economic, internal political, or foreign relations-and that this had been accomplished with no great sacrifice. In those few instances where change did occur, it was either for defensive purposes (the crackdown on intellectuals), because of irresistible outside pressure (Cambodia policy), or was apparent change rather than changed reality (foreign-China, U.S-.policies).