Mirror Neuron Theory Research Articles

Intentional and Skillful Neurons

In the mid-1990s, there was a major neuroscientific discovery which might drastically alter sport science in general and philosophy of sport in particular. The discovery of mirror neurons by Giacomo Rizzolatti and colleagues in Parma, Italy, is a substantial contribution to understanding brains, movements, and humans. Famous neuroscientist V. S. Ramachandran believes the discovery of mirror neurons ‘will do for psychology what DNA did for biology’ (http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/ramachandran/ramachandran_p1.html). Somehow mirror neurons have not received the deserved attention in the philosophy of sport, but perhaps now is the time to reflect on some implications and consequences. The discovery of mirror neurons may increase our insights about our ability to learn, understand, intend, and produce skillful motor actions. In this article I will first examine what mirror neurons are and how they function in monkeys and humans. Second, I will review some objections to the so-called mirror neuron theory of action understanding, and try to reconcile some of these objections. Third, I will inquire into some implications for philosophy, which I believe are also fundamental to several topics in the philosophy of sport. I will then try to relate some of the most interesting aspects of mirror neurons to recent debates in the philosophy of sport. Finally, I will speculate on what further neuroscientific research might teach us about the nature of being a moving subject.

A major blow to primate neonatal imitation and mirror neuron theory.

Keven & Akins' (K&A's) compelling new hypothesis explaining the developmental and neural basis of neonatal tongue protrusion has important implications for current understanding of primate imitation and the explanatory value of mirror neurons. If correct, this hypothesis eliminates a major source of evidence for neonatal imitation. I explore the implications this has for mirror neuron research and the arguments building upon them.

Eating imaginary raisins: theatre’s role in the making of mirror-neurons

The emergence of mirror neuron theory in the 1990s has been of great interest to theatre and performance scholars. But are we condemned to merely incorporate and absorb the grander discoveries of our scientific counterparts? Swivel one's gaze away from the 'discoveries' themselves, and a different relationship between science and theatre unfolds. Scientific facts are not discovered in a vacuum. They are produced through vast and complex arrangements, performative networks of people, materials, practices, institutions and technologies. Start teasing these apart, and it becomes clear that theatrical techniques and spaces can play a surprisingly important role in creating new scientific facts. Whether it is experimenters pantomiming scenes in the lab or studying the movement of blood in the brain cells of actors whilst they recite verse in fMRI scanners, theatrical labour is part of the conditions that make new knowledge about the brain possible – not least of all, in the field of mirror neurons.

Effect of action observation therapy on daily activities and motor recovery in stroke patients

ObjectiveTo evaluate the effects of action observation therapy, which is based on mirror neuron theory, on upper limb function and activities of daily living in patients with stroke. MethodsSixty-one patients with stroke were randomly divided into two groups; those in the control group received routine rehabilitation treatment and nursing, whereas those in the experimental group additionally received eight weeks of action observation therapy for 30 min, six times per week. Patients receiving action observation therapy watched videos depicting a model performing specific motor actions typically performed in daily life before enacting the same actions themselves. All patients were assessed using the Fugl–Meyer assessment, Barthel index and the modified Ashworth scale at baseline and at eight weeks, after treatment. ResultsAfter the eight weeks of treatment, both groups of patients exhibited significant improvement in all the measurements (all p < 0.05). Furthermore, the Fugl–Meyer assessment, Barthel index and modified Ashworth scale scores were significantly higher in the experimental group compared to the control group (all p < 0.05). ConclusionAction observation therapy significantly improves upper extremity motor function and performance of activities of daily living, and alleviates upper limb spasticity in patients with stroke.

Embodied cognition and mirror neurons: a critical assessment.

According to embodied cognition theories, higher cognitive abilities depend on the reenactment of sensory and motor representations. In the first part of this review, we critically analyze the central claims of embodied theories and argue that the existing behavioral and neuroimaging data do not allow investigators to discriminate between embodied cognition and classical cognitive accounts, which assume that conceptual representations are amodal and symbolic. In the second part, we review the main claims and the core electrophysiological findings typically cited in support of the mirror neuron theory of action understanding, one of the most influential examples of embodied cognition theories. In the final part, we analyze the claim that mirror neurons subserve action understanding by mapping visual representations of observed actions on motor representations, trying to clarify in what sense the representations carried by these neurons can be claimed motor.

Do infants provide evidence that the mirror system is involved in action understanding?

The mirror neuron theory of action understanding makes predictions concerning how the limited motor repertoire of young infants should impact on their ability to interpret others' actions. In line with this theory, an increasing body of research has identified a correlation between infants' abilities to perform an action, and their ability to interpret that action as goal-directed when performed by others. In this paper, I will argue that the infant data does by no means unequivocally support the mirror neuron theory of action understanding and that alternative interpretations of the data should be considered. Furthermore, some of this data can be better interpreted in terms of an alternative view, which holds that the role of the motor system in action perception is more likely to be one of enabling the observer to predict, after a goal has been identified, how that goal will be attained.

The effects of action observation therapy based on mirror neuron theory on upper-extremity motor function and somatosensory evoked potentials after stroke

Objective To explore the effects of action observation therapy based on mirror neuron theory on upper-extremity motor function and somatosensory evoked potentials after stroke.Methods Thirty stroke patients were randomly assigned to an observational group (15 cases) or a control group (15 cases).Both groups received conventional rehabilitation including,for example,good limb positioning,balance training and training in the activities of daily living (ADL).The observational group also received action observation therapy for 8 weeks,10 times per week.Both groups were assessed before treatment with the Fugl-Meyer assessment (FMA),the Barthel index (BI)and somatosensory evoked potentials (SEPs) and then again after 4 and 8 weeks of treatment.Their SEP N9 and N20 latencies were also analyzed.Results The average FMA scores at the 4th week (18.87 ± 6.62) and the 8th week (26.27± 9.22) in the observational group had increased significantly compared with the pre-treatment assessment.The control group's FMA score at the 8th week (20.07 ± 6.77) had also increased significantly compared with pretreatment.But at the 8th week the increase in the average FMA score of the observational group was significantly better than that of the control group.The average BI scores of both groups had increased significantly at both the 4th and the 8th week compared with each group's pre-treatment assessment.There was no significant difference in the increases in BI score between the two groups after 8 weeks of treatment.At both the 4th and the 8th week the N9 and N20 latencies on the affected side in the observational group had shortened significantly compared with the pre-treatment assessment.And the N9 and N20 amplitudes on the affected side in the observational group had also increased significantly compared with before treatment.In the control group,the N20 latency on the affected side had shortened significantly at the 4th week,and both the N9 and N20 latencies were significantly shortened at the 8th week compared with before treatment.Only the N20 amplitudes at the 8th week were observed to increase significantly compared with before treatment in the control group.Conclusions Action observation therapy promoted the recovery of upper-extremity motor function and SEPs in hemiparetic patients after stroke. Key words: Action observation; Mirror neurons; Stroke; Upper extremity function; Rehabilitation; Somatosensory evoked potentials

Imago Dei and Simulatio or Imitatio Dei: A Philosophical Essay on Empathy

Some advocates of the mirror neuron theory (MNT) argue that mirror neurons are necessary and sufficient to explain all types of mindreading of which empathy is seen as the core subject matter. Hence, the MNT is expected to be able to account for all kinds of empathic behavior. There is no need for analogical inference or theory of mind. To read another mind is to represent the perceptions, intentions, beliefs, expectations, and so on of the other. Due to mirror neuron activity, mindreading (and hence empathy) is automatic, immediate, unconscious and pre-reflective. I shall argue that mirror neuron activity may be sufficient to underpin primitive and involuntary types of empathic behavior but that mirror neurons are only to some extent involved in more developed, complex and consciousness related types of empathy such as what in the Jewish tradition is called doing mitzvah. Furthermore, I shall argue that in the process of mindreading the principle of analogical inference and the theory of mind cannot be entirely avoided.

A geographical history of social cognitive neuroscience

The history of social cognitive neuroscience (SCN) began with isolated islands of research in Europe and the United States in the 1990s. In the decade between 1995 and 2004 most of the major areas of current SCN research were identified in a series of high profile first studies. This paper reviews the timeline as well as the geography of important moments in the short history of this field. Of note is the different focus seen in European contributions (theory of mind, mirror neurons, and empathy) and the more self-focused U.S. contributions (self-knowledge, emotion regulation, implicit attitudes).

AS09-03 - Empathy and neurosciences. epistemological remarks on a complex interrelation between the conceptual and the experimental levels

Empathy became a fashionable phenomenon to study with the functional imaging techniques of modern neurosciences. To many, neurosciences (in particular the theory of mirror neurons ) are providing the scientific proof that empathy is a “real” phenomenon. The studies addressing the empathy for human pain will be used here to discuss the relation between the concept of empathy as it was conceived in philosophy and psychology at one side, and the experimental results at the other side. It will be shown that the conception of empathy has changed across centuries, moving from a philosophical standpoint to a psychological one, and eventually to current neurophysiology. Even in modern neuroscience the definition of empathy widely varies in the various studies; it oscillates between an automatic and preconscious phenomenon to one influenced by drives, beliefs and expectations. In conclusion, this review shows that modern neurosciences do not provide a simple neurological basis for the classic concept of empathy (seen as a unitary and stable phenomenon). On the contrary, they contribute to reshape the original concept, which now tends to be subdivided in different features related to different patterns of brain activity, with both top-down and bottom-up arms.

Brain reading social action

What mechanism guides the social researcher in inferring a choice of action from particular beliefs and desires of the agent or in reconstructing the beliefs and desires that caused an action? Through the identification process, the researcher should be able to intercept the inferential principles guiding the agent, even when those principles differ from his own. As when dealing with members of other cultures or other psychic groups, the researcher should quarantine his own principles of inferential rationality and identify those of the agent. Cognitive simulation and empathic identification are the necessary premise to understand an action and generalize it into an ideal type representing aggregate social behavior or a social phenomenon. Brain research may contribute to the knowledge of the mechanisms involved in analyzing social action. In particular, mirror neuron theory can supply an interesting explanation of the automatic simulation in mind reading and of the processes involved in empathy and verstehen.

Teaching and Learning Guide for: Mirror Neurons, the Motor System, and Language – From the Motor Theory to Embodied Cognition and Beyond

Teaching and Learning Guide for: Mirror Neurons, the Motor System, and Language – From the Motor Theory to Embodied Cognition and Beyond

Emotional Empathy in Autism Spectrum Conditions: Weak, Intact, or Heightened?

Dear Editor, Autism spectrum conditions are frequently characterized as empathy disorders (e.g., Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright 2004; Decety and Moriguchi 2007). Although, thanks to the theory of mind hypothesis (Baron-Cohen 1995), it is widely accepted that people with autism tend to have weak cognitive empathy, there is now a range of theoretical views about autism and emotional empathy (EE). EE is an emotional response in an individual that stems from and parallels the emotional state of another individual. Theories positing (inter alia) that people with autism have weak EE include the ‘‘extreme male brain’’ theory (Baron-Cohen 2002) and the mirror neuron theory (Williams et al. 2001). In support of these theories, Minio-Paluello et al. (2009) reported that embodied pain empathy is absent in adults with Asperger syndrome. However, the video stimuli used in that study did not include facial, vocal, or gestural expressions of emotion. Other recent research indicates that people with Asperger syndrome have intact EE (Dziobek et al. 2008). Two theoretical approaches explicitly propose that individuals with autism actually have heightened EE: the ‘‘empathy imbalance’’ hypothesis (Smith 2006, 2009) and the ‘‘intense world’’ hypothesis (Markram et al. 2007). The former hypothesis is derived from a Darwinian argument about human empathy and the latter hypothesis is based on neurophysiological findings in a rodent model of autism. Both hypotheses propose that children with autism have overwhelming EE and thus find it difficult to interact with others. Houzel’s (2000) psychoanalytic approach also seems to imply that children with autism have too much EE. Caldwell (2006), an experienced autism practitioner, has outlined a similar idea. There is evidence that motor empathy (the tendency to automatically mimic the movements of another individual) and EE are inextricably linked (Nummenmaa et al. 2008). And there are now four empirical studies showing that people with autism spectrum conditions may have stronger EE/motor empathy than people with typical development. Capps et al. (1993) observed the faces of children with autism and children with typical development in a paradigm designed to elicit EE in the children. They found that the children with autism displayed much more empathic facial affect than the other children. Magnee et al. (2007) reported that the faces of adults with autism show heightened electromyographic responsiveness to the emotional expressions of others. Bird et al. (2007) found that adults with autism show heightened automatic mimicry of the hand movements of others. Bastiaansen et al. (2008) conducted a neuroimaging study in which the participants viewed movies of facial expressions of emotion: Adults with autism activated their neural mirror systems more strongly than participants with typical development. The researchers suggested that individuals with autism ‘‘may find the social world challenging not because it fails to engage them but because it overwhelms them’’ (p. 276). Many people with autism and their caregivers believe that heightened EE is a feature of autism (Smith 2009). The simplest (and most far-reaching) explanation of the origin of these beliefs is that they are accurate. I predict that further empirical evidence of heightened EE in individuals with autism will emerge. A. Smith (&) Dryburgh Industrial Estate, 7 Faraday Street, Dundee DD2 3QQ, Scotland, UK e-mail: adamjamessmith@fsmail.net

Eight Problems for the Mirror Neuron Theory of Action Understanding in Monkeys and Humans

The discovery of mirror neurons in macaque frontal cortex has sparked a resurgence of interest in motor/embodied theories of cognition. This critical review examines the evidence in support of one of these theories, namely, that mirror neurons provide the basis of action understanding. It is argued that there is no evidence from monkey data that directly tests this theory, and evidence from humans makes a strong case against the position.

Implications of mirror-neuron theory in language: Investigation of patterns of connectivity in Broca's region

Implications of mirror-neuron theory in language: Investigation of patterns of connectivity in Broca's region

Asymmetric fMRI adaptation reveals no evidence for mirror neurons in humans

Neurons in macaque ventral premotor cortex and inferior parietal lobe discharge during both the observation and the execution of motor acts. It has been claimed that these so-called mirror neurons form the basis of action understanding by matching the visual input with the corresponding motor program (direct matching). Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) adaptation can be used to test the direct matching account of action recognition by determining whether putative mirror neurons show adaptation for repeated motor acts independently of whether they are observed or executed. An unambiguous test of the hypothesis requires that the motor acts be meaningless to ensure that any adaptation effect is directly because of movement recognition/motor execution and not contextually determined inferences. We found adaptation for motor acts that were repeatedly observed or repeatedly executed. We also found adaptation for motor acts that were first observed and then executed, as would be expected if a previously seen act primed the subsequent execution of that act. Crucially, we found no signs of adaptation for motor acts that were first executed and then observed. Failure to find cross-modal adaptation for executed and observed motor acts is not compatible with the core assumption of mirror neuron theory, which holds that action recognition and understanding are based on motor simulation.

Speech perception performance is mediated by brain regions involved with speech production

Event Abstract Back to Event Speech perception performance is mediated by brain regions involved with speech production Daniel Callan1, 2*, A. Callan3 and Mitsuo Kawato1 1 Advanced Telecommunications Research Institute International, Japan 2 National Institute of Communication Techologies, Japan 3 ATR Cognitive Information Science Laboratories, Japan The finding that premotor areas are active not only during action production but also during observation of action, Mirror Neuron System, has led to considerable conjecture regarding the neurophysiological mechanisms underlying a variety of abilities ranging from perception to social cognition. Despite these findings, the relationship of this activity to perceptual performance has not been demonstrated. Without such evidence, it may be argued that this activity does not reflect neural processes important for perception at all, but merely reflects covert imitation of the perceived action that is the product of perceptual processing. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging as well as 208 channel MEG for each subject (N=13) to measure brain activity to correct and incorrect trials on an auditory phonetic identification task. The task involved listening to a syllable (/ba/, /bo/, /da/, do/) presented aurally embedded in white noise and selecting the initial phoneme (/b/ or /d/) by button press as quickly and accurately as possible using the left hand. An event-related analysis was employed in which the correct trails were contrasted with incorrect trials. An additional fMRI experiment was conducted in which subjects overtly produced the same syllables as were presented on the auditory speech perception task. Only the left premotor cortex showed super-threshold activity differences for correct over incorrect trials (p < 0.005; spatial extent > 50 voxels, small volume correction pFDR < 0.05) (Figure 1). The activity was in the same region found to be active during speech production of the syllables, supporting the hypothesis that articulatory processes serve to facilitate perceptual performance, while further dispelling concerns that activity found in this region is merely a product of covert imitation of the perceived action. These results have far reaching implications bringing performance related support to studies proposing that action perception is mediated by brain regions involved with action production (Mirror Neuron Theory). pic1 tn_pic1 pic Conference: 10th International Conference on Cognitive Neuroscience, Bodrum, Turkey, 1 Sep - 5 Sep, 2008. Presentation Type: Poster Presentation Topic: Language Citation: Callan D, Callan A and Kawato M (2008). Speech perception performance is mediated by brain regions involved with speech production. Conference Abstract: 10th International Conference on Cognitive Neuroscience. doi: 10.3389/conf.neuro.09.2009.01.241 Copyright: The abstracts in this collection have not been subject to any Frontiers peer review or checks, and are not endorsed by Frontiers. They are made available through the Frontiers publishing platform as a service to conference organizers and presenters. The copyright in the individual abstracts is owned by the author of each abstract or his/her employer unless otherwise stated. Each abstract, as well as the collection of abstracts, are published under a Creative Commons CC-BY 4.0 (attribution) licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) and may thus be reproduced, translated, adapted and be the subject of derivative works provided the authors and Frontiers are attributed. For Frontiers’ terms and conditions please see https://www.frontiersin.org/legal/terms-and-conditions. Received: 09 Dec 2008; Published Online: 09 Dec 2008. * Correspondence: Daniel Callan, Advanced Telecommunications Research Institute International, Kyoto, Japan, dcallan@atr.jp Login Required This action requires you to be registered with Frontiers and logged in. To register or login click here. Abstract Info Abstract The Authors in Frontiers Daniel Callan A. Callan Mitsuo Kawato Google Daniel Callan A. Callan Mitsuo Kawato Google Scholar Daniel Callan A. Callan Mitsuo Kawato PubMed Daniel Callan A. Callan Mitsuo Kawato Related Article in Frontiers Google Scholar PubMed Abstract Close Back to top Javascript is disabled. Please enable Javascript in your browser settings in order to see all the content on this page.

Naturalizing Cognition: The Integration of Cognitive Science and Biology

Descartes drove a wedge between human cognition and biology. Cognitive neuroscience is beginning to bridge the gap, and the application of mirror neuron theory to a range of problems in psychology has demonstrated the possibility of developing an understanding that spans from neural anatomy to language and empathy.