Theory Of Mind In Children Research Articles

Sincere, Deceitful, and Ironic Communicative Acts and the Role of the Theory of Mind in Childhood

The aim of the study is to investigate the relationship among age, first- and second-order Theory of Mind and the increasing ability of children to understand and produce different kinds of communicative acts – sincere, ironic, and deceitful communicative acts – expressed through linguistic and extralinguistic expressive means. To communicate means to modify an interlocutor’s mental states (Grice, 1989), and pragmatics studies the inferential processes that are necessary to fill the gap, which often exists in human communication, between the literal meaning of a speaker’s utterance and what the speaker intends to communicate to the interlocutor. We administered brief video-clip stories showing different kinds of pragmatic phenomena – sincere, ironic, and deceitful communicative acts - and first- and second-order ToM tasks, to 120 children, ranging in age from 3 to 8 years. The results showed the existence of a trend of difficulty in children’s ability to deal with both linguistic and extralinguistic pragmatic tasks, from the simplest to the most difficult: sincere, deceitful, and ironic communicative acts. A hierarchical regression analysis indicated that age plays a significant role in explaining children’s performance on each pragmatic task. Furthermore, the hierarchical regression analysis revealed that first-order ToM has a causal role in explaining children’s performance in handling sincere and deceitful speech acts, but not irony. We did not detect any specific role for second-order ToM. Finally, ToM only partially explains the observed increasing trend of difficulty in children’s pragmatic performance: the variance in pragmatic performance explained by ToM increases between sincere and deceitful communicative acts, but not between deceit and irony. The role of inferential ability in explaining the improvement in children’s performance across the pragmatic tasks investigated is discussed.

The role of executive functioning and theory of mind in children’s lies for another and for themselves

In the current study, children’s abilities to lie both for themselves and for another were examined in relation to executive functioning skills and theory of mind understanding. A total of 160 preschoolers (ages 4–5 years) participated. Their willingness to tell self-motivated lies and other-motivated lies were measured using two different experimental paradigms. Children’s lie-telling was compared to their performance on measures of executive functioning and theory of mind. Results revealed that the majority of children (69%) told lies for themselves, while less than half of children (45%) told lies for others. Although there was a modest degree of consistency in children’s lie-telling behavior for the two lies, different executive functioning measures and theory of mind abilities were found to support self and other related lie-telling. Specifically, higher performance on tasks of inhibitory control (Whispers task) and first-order ToM were associated with self-oriented lies. Yet, other motivated lies were related to performance on tasks of inhibitory control (Stroop task) and cognitive flexibility. Further, higher cognitive flexibility and ToM scores were associated with an overall greater willingness to lie in both contexts. Taken together, the findings suggest that children’s lie-telling abilities are multi-faceted in nature and vary as a function of motivational context and cognitive skill development.

Development of Theory of Mind: Considerations for Children with Visual Impairments

Theory of Mind (ToM) is defined as understanding the perspective of oneself and others (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). The false-belief task is used to assess the acquisition of ToM. Recently, researchers have adapted the test to validate it with children with visual impairments. In studies using these adapted versions of the false-belief task, researchers have found little delay in the development of ToM in children with visual impairments. In this literature review, current research was used to assess whether the newly adapted version of the false-belief test contains the salient features of traditional false-belief tests necessary to assure that the same constructs are being tested. Additionally, factors that correlate with the development of ToM are discussed. Questions are raised regarding how ToM is assessed and how it develops in children with visual impairments. Suggestions for practice and future studies are offered.

A Bayesian Framework for False Belief Reasoning in Children: A Rational Integration of Theory-Theory and Simulation Theory.

Two apparently contrasting theories have been proposed to account for the development of children's theory of mind (ToM): theory-theory and simulation theory. We present a Bayesian framework that rationally integrates both theories for false belief reasoning. This framework exploits two internal models for predicting the belief states of others: one of self and one of others. These internal models are responsible for simulation-based and theory-based reasoning, respectively. The framework further takes into account empirical studies of a developmental ToM scale (e.g., Wellman and Liu, 2004): developmental progressions of various mental state understandings leading up to false belief understanding. By representing the internal models and their interactions as a causal Bayesian network, we formalize the model of children's false belief reasoning as probabilistic computations on the Bayesian network. This model probabilistically weighs and combines the two internal models and predicts children's false belief ability as a multiplicative effect of their early-developed abilities to understand the mental concepts of diverse beliefs and knowledge access. Specifically, the model predicts that children's proportion of correct responses on a false belief task can be closely approximated as the product of their proportions correct on the diverse belief and knowledge access tasks. To validate this prediction, we illustrate that our model provides good fits to a variety of ToM scale data for preschool children. We discuss the implications and extensions of our model for a deeper understanding of developmental progressions of children's ToM abilities.

Theory of mind in children with and without autism spectrum disorder: Associations with the sibling constellation.

The two prior studies that have examined associations between the sibling constellation and theory of mind in autism spectrum disorder yielded discrepant findings. Thus, efforts to better understand the sibling-theory of mind link in autism spectrum disorder are necessary. This study examined a sample of prekindergarten- and kindergarten-aged (i.e. 4-6 years) typically developing children ( n = 39) and verbal children with autism spectrum disorder ( n = 61). Sibling presence, number of siblings, and having younger and older siblings were positively associated with theory of mind in typically developing children, but not in the full sample of children with autism spectrum disorder. However, in the subgroup of children with autism spectrum disorder without sibling recurrence, the presence of at least one older sibling was positively associated with theory of mind. Findings expand previous limited research on the sibling-theory of mind link in children with autism spectrum disorder by demonstrating a potential difference in the influence of the sibling constellation between children from simplex and multiplex families.

Beyond Conceptual Knowledge: The Impact of Children's Theory-of-Mind on Dyadic Spatial Tasks.

Recent studies show that Theory of Mind (ToM) has implications for children’s social competences and psychological well-being. Nevertheless, although it is well documented that children overall take advantage when they have to resolve cognitive problems together with a partner, whether individual difference in ToM is one of the mechanisms that could explain cognitive performances produced in social interaction has received little attention. This study examines to what extent ToM explains children’s spatial performances in a dyadic situation. The sample includes 66 boys and girls between the ages of 5–9 years, who were tested for their ToM and for their competence to resolve a Spatial task involving mental rotation and spatial perspective taking, first individually and then in a dyadic condition. Results showed, in accordance with previous research, that children performed better on the Spatial task when they resolved it with a partner. Specifically, children’s ToM was a better predictor of their spatial performances in the dyadic condition than their age, gender, and spatial performances in the individual setting. The findings are discussed in terms of the relation between having a conceptual understanding of the mind and the practical implications of this knowledge for cognitive performances in social interaction regarding mental rotation and spatial perspective taking.

Theory of Mind in Children’s Narratives

Theory of Mind in Children’s Narratives

Theory of mind in middle childhood: Longitudinal associations with executive function and social competence.

The vast majority of studies on theory of mind (ToM) have focused on the preschool years. Extending the developmental scope of ToM research presents opportunities to both reassess theoretical accounts of ToM and test its predictive utility. The twin aims of this longitudinal study were to examine developmental relations between ToM, executive function (EF), and teacher-rated social competence in middle childhood. One hundred thirty-seven children (69 males) were followed across a 4-year period spanning middle childhood (M ages at Waves 1 and 2 = 6.05, SD = .35, and 10.81, SD = .35, respectively). Individual differences in ToM were moderately stable across middle childhood. Although there were concurrent associations between ToM and EF at both time points, there were no longitudinal links between these constructs. In contrast, there were concurrent and longitudinal links between ToM and teacher-rated social competence, such that individual differences in ToM predicted later social competence at school. These results are discussed in light of competing theories about the links between ToM and EF and the importance of individual differences in ToM for children's social lives. (PsycINFO Database Record

Theory of mind in children with Neurofibromatosis Type 1.

Neurofibromatosis Type I (NF1) is a single gene disorder associated with cognitive and behavioral deficits. While there is clear evidence for poorer social outcomes in NF1, the factors underlying reduced social function are not well understood. This study examined theory of mind (ToM) in children with NF1 and unaffected controls. ToM was assessed in children with NF1 (n = 26) and unaffected controls (n = 36) aged 4-12 years using a nonverbal picture sequencing task. The task assessed understanding of ToM (unrealized goals, false belief, pretence, intention), while controlling for social script knowledge and physical cause-and-effect reasoning. Children with NF1 made significantly more errors than unaffected controls on most ToM stories while demonstrating no difficulty sequencing physical cause-and-effect stories. Performance on the picture sequencing task was not related to lower intellectual function, symptoms of attention deficit-hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), or parent ratings of executive function. Results suggest a generalized ToM deficit in children with NF1 that appears to be independent of general cognitive abilities and ADHD symptoms. The study refines understanding of the clinical presentation of NF1 and identifies psychological constructs that may contribute to the higher prevalence of social dysfunction in children with NF1. (PsycINFO Database Record

Neural responses to affective and cognitive theory of mind in children and adolescents with autism spectrum disorder

Children and adolescents with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) are characterized by an impaired Theory of Mind (ToM). Recent evidence suggested that two aspects of ToM (cognitive ToM versus affective ToM) are differentially impaired in individuals with ASD. In this study, we examined the neural correlates of cognitive and affective ToM in children and adolescents with ASD compared to typically developing children (TDCs). Twelve children and adolescents with ASD and 12 age, IQ matched TDCs participated in this functional MRI study. The ToM task involved the attribution of cognitive and affective mental states to a cartoon character based on verbal and eye-gaze cues. In cognitive ToM tasks, ASD participants recruited the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and superior temporal gyrus (STG) to a greater extent than did TDCs. In affective ToM tasks, both ASD and TDC participants showed more activation in the insula and other subcortical regions than in cognitive ToM tasks. Correlational analysis revealed that greater activation of the mPFC/ACC regions was associated with less symptom severity in ASD patients. In sum, our study suggests that the recruitment of additional prefrontal resources can compensate for the successful behavioral performance in the ToM task in ASD participants.

Theory of mind in recognizing and recovering communicative failures

ABSTRACTWe analyzed the role played by theory of mind (ToM) in children's ability to recognize and repair different kinds of communicative failures. In particular, we analyzed three different kinds of communicative failures: failure of the expression act, communicative meaning, and communicative effect. We administered videotaped stories, in which people act out a communicative failure and first- and second-order ToM tasks, to 120 children ranging in age from 3.5 to 8.5 years. The children showed a trend of increasing difficulty in managing the communicative failures investigated. Moreover, children's ToM ability is partially correlated with recognition and repair of a communicative task; however, it is not able to explain the trend of difficulty we detected. We suggest that the factor better explaining such trend is the increasing complexity of the mental representations underlying the three different kinds of failures.

Theory of mind in preschool children and its relationship with social maturity

Introduction Theory of mind (ToM) is the intuitive understanding of one's own and other people's minds or mental states – including thoughts, beliefs, perceptions, knowledge, intentions, desires, and emotions – and of how those mental states influence behavior. Theory of mind is an innate human ability that is sometimes called intuitive psychology, folk psychology, or even mind reading. Social maturity is the process of appropriate attitudes for personal, interpersonal and social adequacies of an individual, which are essential for functioning effectively in the society. According to the findings, there were not statistically significant relationship between theory of mind and social maturity and there is a need for more research in this area. Objective The objective of this study is to survey preschool children's theory of mind and its relationship with social maturity. Method Research method is correlational research and sample included 30 children between 5–6 years old. In this study, theory of mind test and Vineland social maturity scale were used. Results The results showed that 5- and 6-years-old children's performance in third-level theory of mind had significant difference and in first and second level theory of mind had no significant difference. The findings also showed that there was no relationship between theory of mind and social maturity in preschool children. Conclusion According to the findings, there was no statistically significant relationship between theory of mind and social maturity and there is a need for more research in this area.

Theory of Mind in Children with Fetal Alcohol SpectrumDisorders.

Theory of mind (ToM) refers to the ability to understand and make inferences about other people's intentions, feelings, and beliefs. Although children with fetal alcohol spectrum disorders (FASD) are known to have deficits in social-cognitive function, little is known about ToM in FASD. ToM ability was assessed using a developmentally sensitive ToM battery, including the reading the mind in the eyes (RME) test, a measure of mental inferential ability that has been found to be impaired in other clinical populations. IQ and executive function (EF) were assessed as potential mediating variables. The battery was administered to 63 children (aged 9 to 11years) from Cape Town, South Africa, whose mothers had been prospectively recruited during pregnancy. Children with fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS; n=8) and partial FAS (PFAS; n=19), as well as nonsyndromal heavily exposed children (n=17), were compared to children born to abstaining or light drinkers (n=19) from the same community. No FASD group differences were found on the less challenging ToM tasks. By contrast, children with FAS and PFAS performed more poorly than controls on a more challenging ToM task, the RME test. A continuous measure of prenatal alcohol exposure (PAE) was more sensitive than FASD diagnosis in that it was related to 4 higher-order ToM measures, particularly the ability to attribute mental states assessed on RME. IQ only partially mediated the effect of exposure on RME performance, and these effects were not mediated by EF. Hence, the data suggest that these ToM measures tap into a specific alcohol-related social-cognitive deficit that does not merely reflect poorer EF. FASD diagnosis and PAE were each also related to RME after control for attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder. These findings suggest that deficits in higher-order ToM function may play a significant role in the social-cognitive behavioral impairment in FASD.

Peer social skills and theory of mind in children with autism, deafness, or typical development.

Consequences of theory of mind (ToM) development for daily social lives of children are uncertain. Five to 13-year-olds (N = 195) with typical development, autism, or deafness (both native and late signers) took ToM tests and their teachers reported on their social skills for peer interaction (e.g., leadership, group entry). Groups differed in both ToM understanding (with late-signing deaf children especially delayed even relative to autistic children) and peer social skills (with autistic children especially delayed even relative to deaf late signers). Crucially, for the typically developing hearing children and deaf children alike, ToM understanding independently predicted peer social skills over and above age, gender, language ability, and, for deaf children, status as native- or late-signer. These novel findings offer some of the best evidence to date of the relevance of ToM cognitions to real-world social behavior for both these groups. However, for those with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) the pattern was different. The apparent link of ToM to peer competence was not a direct one but instead was significantly mediated by language ability. Several possible explanations for this intriguing autism-specific result were also discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record

Preschoolers' Mind‐related Comments During Collaborative Problem‐solving: Parental Contributions and Developmental Outcomes

AbstractPreschool children's mind‐related comments were analyzed during collaborative problem‐solving interactions with mothers and fathers, and in relation to parental mind‐mindedness (MM) and children's concurrent theory of mind (ToM). Seventy‐two parents (36 fathers, 36 mothers) and their four‐year‐olds participated. Parents' comments to encourage independent thinking and children's own mind‐related comments were expected to mediate, in serial, the relationship between parental MM and children's ToM. The proposed model of mediation received empirical confirmation. In addition, mothers and fathers were found to perform similarly on two measures of MM and in their usage of autonomy promoting and control comments. Finally, no differences were found in the frequency of children's mind‐related comments during interactions with fathers and mothers.

Theory of Mind in Children With Specific Language Impairment: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis.

The relation between language and theory of mind (ToM) has been debated for more than two decades. In a similar vein, ToM has been examined in children with specific language impairment (SLI), albeit with inconsistent results. This meta-analysis of 17 studies with 745 children between the ages of 4 and 12 found that children with SLI had substantially lower ToM performance compared to age-matched typically developing children (d = .98). This effect size was not moderated by age and gender. By revealing that children with SLI have ToM impairments, this finding emphasizes the need for further investigation into the developmental interface between language and ToM as well as the extended consequences of atypical language development.

The language cognition interface in ASD: Complement sentences and false belief reasoning

Theory of Mind (ToM) deficits are often attested in Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD). Previous work on ASD has identified links between ToM abilities and knowledge of sentential complements, with the hypothesis that this component of language provides a tool for individuals with ASD to figure out solutions to ToM tasks. However studies on ASD are yet to show if the impact of complementation on ToM performance carries over to instances where ToM is assessed nonverbally. As such, the links identified between ToM tasks and complementation tasks may stem from linguistic difficulties that impact scores across the measures used, rather than from the role played by sentential complements in mental representation. This study is the first to evaluate associations between complements and nonverbal ToM in children with ASD compared to typically developing children of similar nonverbal intellectual ability and general language level. Correlations controlling for nonverbal abilities were found between complements and non-verbal ToM success in the ASD group only. Furthermore, regression analyses showed that competence with complement sentences of verbs of communication explained 30% of the variance in their performance at non-verbal ToM. These findings provide new evidence in favour of the view that sentential complements play a role in ToM reasoning in ASD.

Investigating the Development of Theory of Mind: Post Pre-school Children

This paper is aimed at investigating four children's development of Theory of Mind (ToM) in computation with their social-emotional, cognitive and linguistic developments after their year in pre-school education. In this qualitatively designed research, the case study method has been applied. Data collected from the children, their mothers and their teacher, have been analyzed with the descriptive method. At the end of the research, it can be seen that the children's ToM progressed by at least one level, and one child even progressed by three.The social-emotional, cognitive and linguistic sides of the participating children improved after one year of pre-school education. It is assumed that this progress contributed to the development of children's ToM. Furthermore, the success and failure in the ToM tasks are in evidently related to the demographic characteristics of the children.

Relationship between social competence and neurocognitive performance in children with epilepsy.

Epilepsy may affect a child's social skills and social cognition. The purpose of the study was to examine associations between sociocognitive skills and neurocognitive performance in children with epilepsy. Thirty-five children with epilepsy between the ages of 7 and 12 years (25 with partial and 10 with generalized epilepsy) and 30 controls participated. Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks, Social Cognition Questionnaire proposed by Saltzman-Benaiah and Lalonde (2007), and Social Skills Rating System were used to assess social competence and sociocognitive skills. Neurocognitive performance was assessed using the NEPSY battery. Children with epilepsy demonstrated more difficulties in understanding false belief (p<.001) and intentional lying (p<.05) and exhibited more behavioral problems (p<.05). Notably, their social skills were at the same level as typically developing peers. Children with epilepsy performed significantly worse in attention, executive, verbal, and fine motor tasks (p<.05). We found positive correlations between the understanding of false belief and in executive (r=.6, p<.05), verbal (r=.45-.49, p<.05), and visuospatial skills (r=.34-.48, p<0.01). Children with generalized epilepsy had more problems in memory tasks (p<.05) and understanding of sarcasm (p<.05) compared with children with partial epilepsy. An age of onset over 9.1 years was positively associated with ToM skills (r=.42, p<.05). In conclusion, better ToM in children with better executive functions, and language and visuospatial skills was revealed. The type of epilepsy and age of onset significantly affected ToM skills.

The role of executive functions and theory of mind in children’s prosocial lie-telling

Children’s prosocial lying was examined in relation to executive functioning skills and theory of mind development. Prosocial lying was observed using a disappointing gift paradigm. Of the 79 children (ages 6–12years) who completed the disappointing gift paradigm, 47 (59.5%) told a prosocial lie to a research assistant about liking their prize. In addition, of those children who told prosocial lies, 25 (53.2%) maintained semantic leakage control during follow-up questioning, thereby demonstrating advanced lie-telling skills. When executive functioning was examined, children who told prosocial lies were found to have significantly higher performance on measures of working memory and inhibitory control. In addition, children who lied and maintained semantic leakage control also displayed more advanced theory of mind understanding. Although children’s age was not a predictor of lie-telling behavior (i.e., truthful vs. lie-teller), age was a significant predictor of semantic leakage control, with older children being more likely to maintain their lies during follow-up questioning.