The authors make a timely argument that the temporal profile of consciousness is an under-exploited constraint on theories of consciousness. However, the exact timing matters for the evolutionary hypothesis. A rival hypothesis is that in aquatic environments, it already had the function of representing distal objects, with a time-delay to consciousness in the 100-200ms range.

A central plank of Fleming and Michel's thought-provoking paper is that postdiction reveals a lower bound for the speed of consciousness, showing that perceptual awareness is slow and motivating their perceptual reality monitoring theory of consciousness. The plank cannot bear the weight: Postdiction neither demonstrates a lower bound for the speed of consciousness nor shows that awareness is slow.

Fleming and Michel associate consciousness with sensory horizons, model-based computations, reality monitoring, and decision termination. However, these functions can be implemented without consciousness and may make consciousness epiphenomenal. As with other current theories of consciousness, too much explanatory weight rests on a small number of explanatory factors.

ABSTRACT Female first-generation Caribbean students are an understudied population; not only are they members of three societal groups which have historically been marginalized, but they are also often mistaken for African Americans. Through direct engagement with Triple Consciousness Theory (TCT), this article discusses how this specific student body constructs intersectional gendered, ethnic, and racialized identities at predominantly white institutions (PWIs) which positively impact their self-efficacy, engagement, and academic achievement. The aim of this research is not only to add to existing scholarship on TCT in higher education but also to inform the very educational policy which currently neglects Black diaspora students’ needs.

What is the role of sensory processing in conscious perception? Current theories of consciousness are divided on this question. Some propose that conscious perception arises during the buildup of sensory representations. Others argue for a secondary process that broadcasts these representations to higher-level areas. This second view makes a counter-intuitive prediction: one could consciously perceive abstract representations untied to any low-level sensory feature. We tested this prediction by combining visual masking with retrospective cueing. We found that when visually masked words were followed by a semantically related auditory word, participants were better at detecting this past word and reporting its identity, but were strikingly unable to report its visual features (letter casing or position on screen). This suggests that retro-cueing can help a semantic representation reach awareness even after the associated sensory information has been masked. The mechanisms of conscious access might thus be largely independent of early sensory build-up.

This article explores the liminality between life and death, suggests a collective longing to communicate with the departed, and addresses psycho-analysis’ struggle with the existential trauma of mortality. The author (LD) describes her attempt to communicate with someone who had died through her dreams. This is followed by a paranormal experience wherein the deceased person ‘visited’ her while she was awake in the form of a felt presence of an angry bird trying to attack her. The author panicked but was then able to set a boundary and extricate herself. This left her acutely aware of the liminality between life and death, challenged her views concerning mourning, and gave rise to questions regarding how the clinician’s personal beliefs around death may impact therapy with patients dealing with this issue. Jewish views of the afterlife, research on near death experiences, and theories of consciousness are cited to understand this uncanny experience.

We surveyed attendees at two leading conferences on consciousness, asking for their views on central issues concerning infant consciousness. These include questions about whether newborns are conscious, when consciousness and self-consciousness emerge, where in the brain the neural basis of infant consciousness is found, what sorts of consciousness infants may have, and how best to study infant consciousness, as well as questions about which creatures are conscious and which theories of consciousness are preferred. A majority of respondents favoured the view that newborns are conscious. Pluralities favored the view that consciousness emerges prenatally after 24 weeks of gestation and the view that self-consciousness emerges postnatally after 6 months of age. Large majorities favoured the views that infants have sensory and affective consciousness (with fewer favouring cognitive and agentive consciousness). A plurality favored the view that the neural basis of infant consciousness is in sensory cortex. Majorities favored behavioural and neural markers (but not theories of consciousness) as a guide to infant consciousness.Highlights of “A survey of views about infant consciousness”A survey of neuroscientists, psychologists, philosophers, and others.A large majority favors the view that newborn infants are conscious.A plurality favors late pre-natal emergence of consciousness.A plurality favors late post-natal emergence of self-consciousness.Majorities favor newborns having sensory and affective consciousness, but not cognitive or agentive consciousness.

Report-modulated prefrontal activity and consistent posterior representations during conscious visual perception.

Here, we present a large-scale, multi-center dataset of combined magnetoencephalographic (MEG) and electroencephalographic (EEG) recordings, along with eye-tracking data and high-resolution structural MRI (T1); complementing with iEEG and fMRI datasets that are shared in accompanying data papers. The data was obtained through an adversarial collaboration between advocates of two neuroscientific theories of consciousness: the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory and the Integrated Information Theory. The dataset includes recordings from 100 individuals (mean age 22.79 ± 3.59 years, 54 female, all right-handed) across two research centers (UK and China), using a standardized data collection protocol. During the experiment, participants were asked to perform a non-speeded Go/No-Go target detection task, during which they were exposed to visual stimuli from four distinct categories (faces, objects, letters, false fonts) presented at different orientations (front, left, right view), and for varying durations (0.5, 1.0, 1.5 s), under different task conditions. The quality of the data was assessed and organized according to the Brain Imaging Data Structure (BIDS). It is accompanied by extensive metadata to enhance reusability.

The pursuit of a scientific theory of consciousness has gained momentum in neuroscience over the past 25 years. While much research has centered on perceptual consciousness, the dynamic experience of the stream of thought, proposed by William James over a century ago, has remained relatively underexplored. The Dynamic Framework of Thought (DFT) introduced a taxonomy of thought dynamics, emphasizing their role in shaping conscious experiences. The present study explores the introspective accessibility and distinctiveness of two dynamic dimensions of thought, freely moving and deliberately directed, derived from the taxonomy of the DFT. To investigate these dynamics, four experiments were conducted, including laboratory-based and online experiments as well as an fMRI-based experiment, to assess the consistency of the relationship between these thought dynamics across various experimental contexts. In all experiments, participants reported the dynamics of their thoughts during a probed resting period in which they sat quietly with eyes open, viewing a blank screen. Using a mixed-methods approach combining qualitative and quantitative assessments, this study suggests that individuals can have some introspective access to their thought dynamics. Freely moving and deliberately directed thoughts were distinguishable and negatively correlated but not anticorrelated across participants and experimental contexts. These findings suggest that the stream of thought can be characterized by at least two distinct dynamic dimensions—freely moving and deliberately directed—offering valuable insights for future neurophenomenological research aimed at bridging first-person reports of thought dynamics with third-person data on brain processes.

It is assumed that a useful theory of consciousness (ToC) will explain why consciousness is associated with brains. However, the findings of evolutionary biology, developmental bioelectricity and synthetic bioengineering reveal ancient pre-neural roots of many mechanisms and algorithms occurring in brains: minds may have preceded brains. Most work in the emerging field of diverse intelligence emphasizes externally observable problem-solving competencies in unconventional media, such as cells, tissues and life-technology chimeras. Here, we inquire about the implications of these developments for ToCs. Specifically, we analyse popular current ToCs to ask: What features of each theory specifically pick out brains as a privileged substrate of inner perspective, or do the features emphasized by the theory occur elsewhere? We find that the operations and functional principles of most ToCs are not confined to neural substrates, and that the focus on brains is more driven by convention than by the specific content of existing ToCs. Encouragingly, several contemporary theorists have made explicit efforts to apply their theories to synthetic systems in light of recent technological developments in artificial intelligence and organoid bioengineering. We suggest that the science of consciousness should remain open to minds in unconventional embodiments. This article is part of the theme issue 'World models in natural and artificial intelligence'.

We present a functional magnetic resonance (fMRI) dataset collected as part of an adversarial collaboration aimed at arbitrating between the Global Neuronal Workspace theory (GNWT) and the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness. Participants (N = 118) were presented with suprathreshold visual stimuli belonging to four different categories (faces, objects, letters, false fonts) with three orientations (front, left, right view), and three durations (0.5, 1.0, 1.5 seconds). Participants were asked to identify infrequent targets that changed in each block, thereby rendering two categories task-relevant and two task-irrelevant. The simplicity of the experimental design and of the task given to the participants ensures that these data are broadly reusable. Besides testing predictions from other theories of consciousness, these data can be used to examine various aspects of visual processing. The anonymized data were converted to Brain Imaging Data Structure (BIDS), and can be easily accessed through a web platform or an API. The dataset contains quality reports, demographics, behavioral performance, and eye-tracking data. We also provide code for preprocessing and analyzing the data.

Visual mental imagery-the ability to generate percept-like experiences in the absence of external stimuli-varies widely across individuals, from vivid visualization to aphantasia, the reported absence of imagery. Evidence from neurological patients and functional neuroimaging converges to challenge the classical view that imagery depends on the reactivation of the early visual cortex. Instead, imagery emerges from interactions among high-level visual regions in the ventral temporal cortex, frontoparietal control networks, and a left-lateralized fusiform imagery node, which likely serves as a bridge between visual and semantic information. A taxonomy distinguishing neurological, psychogenic, and congenital aphantasia helps clarify the heterogeneity of this phenomenon. Congenital aphantasia appears to reflect impaired access to, rather than the absence of, visual representations. Altogether, recent findings support a revised neural model in which conscious visualization arises from dynamic network coordination rather than local reactivation, with implications for theories of consciousness and clinical interventions targeting imagery.

Ephaptic field research has undergone a remarkable evolution spanning over nine decades, from pioneering observations in the 1930s through a period of severe scientific skepticism in the mid-20th century to a contemporary renaissance driven by advanced computational modeling, measurement techniques, and new consciousness theories. This review traces the complete chronological development of ephaptic coupling research, examining early foundational work by Adrian, Katz and Schmitt, and Arvanitaki, the influential skepticism of Lashley's study that marginalized the field for decades, and the recent resurgence beginning in the 2000s that has led to recognition of ephaptic interactions as providing fast and direct communication throughout the brain. Contemporary research has established that weak electric fields (0.1-5 V/m) can produce measurable physiological effects and that ephaptic coupling contributes significantly to brain network complexity, memory formation, and potentially consciousness itself. Ephaptic communication, together with some form of electromagnetic field (EMF) theory of consciousness, provides a ready solution to the critical 'binding problem' that has perplexed philosophers and neuroscientists for at least the last century. This historical perspective demonstrates how scientific paradigms can shift dramatically as methodological advances allow for more sophisticated investigation of previously dismissed phenomena.

This study reviews Maxine Beneba Clarke's The Hate Race (2016). Drawing from Fanon's theories from Black Skin, White Masks (1952), the present investigation inspects how the protagonist's sense of self is designed and fractured under the encumbrance of the "white gaze." Clarke's illustration of racial microaggressions, linguistic alienation, and subjugation displays how colonial hierarchies continue in modern multiethnic people. By inspecting themes of shame, resistance, and self-awareness, the paper proves that The Hate Race bears a resemblance to Fanon's theory of double consciousness as the unending reconciliation between the "black self" and the "white world." This study also reveals how Clarke re-claims voice and agency through narrative performance, translating trauma into cultural confrontation. Lastly, this review contends that The Hate Race not only repeats Fanon's denunciation of colonial psychology but also spreads it into the sphere of modern racial experience.

ABSTRACT This paper reconstructs Sartre’s theory of perception in Being and Nothingness and related texts through the lens of the representationalism/naïve realism debate. I argue that Sartre’s position can be best understood as a fundamentally relational view that incorporates certain insights of intentionalism, resulting in what I term an ‘intentional relationalism’. For Sartre, perception is simultaneously a real, immediate relation with the perceived object and a contentful, intentional exploration of that object. It has a two-dimensional structure, in which the dimension of relationality is explanatorily more basic. The paper discusses the intellectual lineage of this distinctive view in Sartre’s engagement with his philosophical predecessors and examines how he develops this approach through his theory of consciousness as nihilation.

This paper examines how 19th-century realist literature by Jane Austen, George Eliot, and Louisa May Alcott critiques the institution of marriage and explores women’s agency within restrictive social frameworks. Through close readings of Pride and Prejudice, Middlemarch, and Little Women, the essay analyzes how female protagonists navigate economic dependence, intellectual constraint, and societal expectations. Drawing on feminist theories, including the works of Simone De Beauvoir’s concept of woman as “the Other”, bell hooks’ theory of critical consciousness, and Adrienne Rich’s exploration of marriage as both constraint and negotiation, this paper examines how these authors subvert dominant narratives of womanhood. Valerie Bryson’s idea that “the personal is political” and Paulo Freire’s theory of problematization further grounds the discussion, situating each protagonist’s choices within larger systems of power. In addition to incorporating Emma Goldman’s critique of marriage as a tool of economic and emotional subjugation, the paper argues that these novels collectively envision alternative paths for women’s self-determination. Together, they offer a literary foundation for ongoing feminist discourse on autonomy, love, and resistance.

Could there be quantum superpositions of conscious states, as suggested by the Wigner's friend thought experiment? Mathematical theories of consciousness, notably integrated information theory (IIT), make this question more precise by associating physical systems with both quantitative amounts of consciousness and structural characterizations of conscious states. Motivated by a recent proposal that ties wave-function collapse to integrated information, we construct a simple quantum circuit that would, on that proposal, place a minimal system-a feedback dyad-into a superposition of states that differ in their associated conscious states. This "Schrödinger's dyad" provides a controlled setting for evaluating a central desideratum of consciousness-based collapse models: that collapse rates depend on how different the experiences in the superposition are. We prove a structural constraint on collapse dynamics of a standard (Lindblad) type: if collapse is governed by too few collapse operators, collapse rates cannot in general be made to depend solely on qualitative differences between conscious states. Avoiding this limitation requires introducing many commuting operators, leading to a rapid proliferation of collapse terms even for very simple systems. This proliferation bears directly on claims that IIT-based collapse theories may be especially experimentally tractable, since the required dynamics becomes highly complex. More generally, the difficulty is not specific to IIT: any Wigner-style collapse theory that distinguishes experiences using rich internal organization (such as neural connectivity in addition to neural state) will face a comparable explosion in dynamical complexity.

Conducting a concept analysis of caring partnerships can enhance understanding and communication among professionals and aid in perceiving and measuring the concept. Therefore, this study aimed to elucidate the concept of a caring partnership in nursing based on Newman's health as expanding consciousness theory. Concept analysis. The eight-step approach of Walker and Avant's concept analysis was employed to explore the caring partnership concept, including its definitions, defining characteristics, antecedents, consequences and empirical referents through a comprehensive literature search. The identified defining attributes-presence, mutual trust and connectedness-describe a caring partnership as a meaningful connection between a nurse and a client. A caring partnership serves as a nursing intervention wherein a nurse assists a client in navigating difficult situations to find meaning, fostering an expansion of consciousness for both. Recognising these attributes enhances nurses' understanding of caring partnerships, offering a rationale for their application in research and clinical practice. This study provides theoretical evidence for research on caring partnerships as well as the implementation of the concept in clinical practice. This study is novel in that it provides theoretical evidence for research on caring partnerships as well as the implementation of the concept in clinical practice by defining it based on Newman's health as expanding consciousness theory. Subsequent studies should develop instruments for measuring caring partnerships and education programs that enhance caring partnerships, considering the attributes and definitions of the concepts derived in this study. We have adhered to the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses guidelines. No patient or public contribution.

Current theories of consciousness often emphasize its ego-centric functions, highlighting the role of the insular cortex in interoceptive self-modeling and subcortical brain regions in qualitative experience and motivation, aptly described as the ‘hidden spring’ of consciousness. From ecological and pragmatic perspectives, conscious experience may facilitate the self-organization of complex organisms by optimizing goals that are typically parallel, multifaceted, and difficult to reconcile. However, the notion that all forms of conscious experience are ego-centric, or at least grounded in a minimal sense of self, is challenged by credible reports of minimal phenomenal experience (MPE), which occur without any self-referential content. I propose that this apparent duality in conscious experience can be explained by the dual-origin theory of cortical development. This theory suggests a gradual expansion of cortical cytoarchitecture from two distinct subcortical origins. The ‘Amygdala-System’ supports interoceptive self-modeling for habitual interactions with the body and the environment. It expands ventrally from the olfactory system and amygdala, enabling ego-centric processing. In contrast, the ‘Hippocampus-System’, centered on the hippocampus and expanding dorsally, supports allocentric cognition and experiences that are not constrained by self-referential processing. This complementary system allows for open-ended, selfless forms of experience, akin to an ‘endless ocean’. In this framework, MPE may represent a fragile form of consciousness, typically overshadowed by the self-related interoceptive and exteroceptive functions of the Amygdala-System. Finally, I discuss how real-time functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) neurofeedback could be used to upregulate the Hippocampus-System, potentially enabling the controlled study of MPE in neuroscientific settings.HighlightsEvidence from developmental neuroanatomy suggests two different subcortical origins of the mammalian cerebral cortex, potentially entailing two modes of conscious experience.An amygdala-centered developmental gradient could allow for ego-centric functions relevant for adaptive self-regulation including survival in a physical and social world.A hippocampus-centered system could allow for allo-centric world modeling, which is less constrained by an ego-centric perspective.Several hypotheses are proposed to investigate the neuroanatomical and phenomenological claims by using real-time functional MRI-based neurofeedback in a controlled experimental setting.