Terrorist Fraud Attacks Research Articles

Performing and mitigating force and terrorist fraud attacks against two RFID distance-bounding protocols

Radio frequency identification (RFID) systems have been used in widespread applications to identify any object. The growth of wireless systems has caused security and privacy vulnerabilities in RFID systems with limited resources and low cost provers. Authentication allows that the information is transfered between only authorized people; thus, we allow different levels of access to information for different people. Distance-bounding authentication protocols are one of the most efficient methods for authentication in RFID systems. Distance-bounding protocols have been proposed to address attacks related to location such as distance fraud attack, Mafia fraud attack, and terrorist fraud attack. In this paper, we examine the two new proposed distance-bounding protocols MP, and KA and prove that these protocols are vulnerable against terrorist fraud attack and force attack. Finally, we improve these two schemes. Then we show that our two improved protocols are resistant against the attacks.

All-or-nothing approach to protect a distance bounding protocol against terrorist fraud attack for low-cost devices

Distance bounding protocols are proposed based upon the round trip time measurements of the executed messages to prevent sensor networks against wormhole attack and to safeguard RFID systems against relay attack. In such protocols, the verifier authenticates users as well as establishing an upper bound on its physical distance between the users and itself. These protocols are also vulnerable to mafia fraud, distance fraud and terrorist fraud attacks. This paper deploys all-or-nothing method to propose a new distance bounding protocol with higher security level that can prevent terrorist fraud attack performed over the existing distance bounding protocols. Actually, the proposed protocol is the first protocol which can overcome all the three fraud attacks simultaneously with the lowest success probability of the attacks compared with the well known distance bounding protocols. Besides, the proposed protocol can be implemented on a low-cost device due to low computational cost and minimum system memory requirements.

Non‐linearity cannot help RFID resist full‐disclosure attacks and terrorist fraud attacks

ABSTRACTAs the concept of radio‐frequency identification (RFID) relay attack has been successfully implemented and demonstrated, the research of RFID distance‐bounding protocols to deter RFID relay attacks has drawn much attention from both the industry and academia. Conventionally, researchers adopted linear composition of secrets to resist terrorist fraud attacks. Recently, Peris‐Lopez et al. studied the weaknesses of previous RFID distance‐bounding protocols and proposed that non‐linear composition of secrets and inclusion of more random nonce could help RFID resist key disclosure attack and terrorist fraud attack. In this paper, we will show that non‐linear composition of secrets cannot help enhance the security actually. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

경량 RFID 경계 결정 프로토콜

최근 근접 인증에 사용되는 비접촉식 스마트카드와 같은 RFID 태그들이 경계 위조(distance fraud) 공격, 마피아 위조(mafia fraud) 공격, 테러리스트 위조(terrorist fraud) 공격과 같은 다양한 위치 기반 공격인 중계 공격(relay attack)들에 매우 취약함이 증명되었다. 더 나아가 이러한 중계 공격들을 방지하기 위해 리더와 태그사이의 메시지 송수신 왕복 시간을 측정하는 경계 결정(distance-bounding) 프로토콜이 한 해결책으로 연구되고 있다. 2005년에 Hancke과 Kuhn은 처음으로 해쉬 함수 기반의 RFID 경계 결정 프로토콜을 제안하였다. 하지만 Hancke-Kuhn 프로토콜은 공격자에게 n번의 왕복에서 (3/4)<TEX>$^n$</TEX>의 성공 확률을 제공하여 중계 공격을 완벽히 방어할 수 없다. 본 논문에서는 공격자에게 n번의 왕복에서 (5/8)<TEX>$^n$</TEX>의 성공 확률을 제공하는 새로운 경량 RFID 경계 결정 프로토콜을 제안한다. 연구 결론으로 제안한 프로토콜은 안전한 해쉬 함수와 XOR 연산을 기반으로 하여 높은 저장 공간 효율성을 제공할 뿐만 아니라, 공격자의 성공 확률을 (5/8)<TEX>$^n$</TEX>으로 최적화하여 중계 공격에 대해서도 더욱 더 안전하다. Recently, it is proved that contactless smart-card based RFID tags, which is used for proximity authentication, are vulnerable to relay attacks with various location-based attacks such as distance fraud, mafia fraud and terrorist fraud attacks. Moreover, distance bounding protocols have been researched to prevent these relay attacks that can measure the message transmitted round-trip time between the reader and the tag. In 2005, Hancke and Kuhn first proposed an RFID distance bounding protocol based on secure hash function. However, the Hancke-Kuhn protocol cannot completely prevent the relay attacks because an adversary has (3/4)<TEX>$^n$</TEX> attack success probability. Thus, this paper proposes a new distance-bounding protocol for light-weight RFID systems that can reduce to (5/8)<TEX>$^n$</TEX> for the adversary's attack success probability. As a result, the proposed protocol not only can provide high-space efficient based on a secure hash function and XOR operation, but also can provide strong security against the relay attacks because the adversary's attack success probability is optimized to (5/8)<TEX>$^n$</TEX>.

Reid et al.'s distance bounding protocol and mafia fraud attacks over noisy channels

Distance bounding protocols are an effective countermeasure against relay attacks including distance fraud, mafia fraud and terrorist fraud attacks. Reid et al. proposed the first symmetric key distance bounding protocol against mafia and terrorist fraud attacks. However, claims that this is only achieved with a (7/8)n probability of success for mafia fraud, rather than the theoretical value of (3/4)n (for n rounds) achieved by distance bounding protocols without a final signature. We prove that the mafia fraud attack success using the Reid et al. protocol is bounded by (3/4)n and reduces as noise increases. The proof can be of further interest as it is the first - to the best of our knowledge - detailed analysis of the effects of communication errors on the security of a distance bounding protocol.