The article examines the role and the influence of artificial intelligence in the digital age in the field of higher education, in particular in the field of International relations. The article, which comprehensively presents the issue under discussion, also makes the focus on the growing role of artificial intelligence in the field of international relations, which has become one of the important issues on the agenda of superpower relations. At the same time, the advantages and risks of digital technologies and artificial intelligence systems are discussed, which, on the one hand, ensure technological progress, and on the other, create dividing barriers between developed and less developed countries. The author researches how the foreign policy departments of the leading world powers use the opportunities provided by artificial intelligence systems in their work, and what advantages this provides. The above-mentioned questions indicate that the current generation of International relations scholars must be capable to use the instruments of digital technologies and artificial intelligence systems in the course of their professional activities, which will save time and increase the efficiency of the work done. However, the important question is how to use digital technologies and artificial intelligence systems in the educational process of training specialists in International relations, so that this does not have negative consequences and does not lead to overload of students or tutors. It is necessary to identify the relevant components of education in this regard, as well as to estimate the proportion of using the artificial intelligence in education. It is important that the university is also a research environment and the functioning of a continuous chain of science and education is really crucial, and in which the use of artificial intelligence capabilities is also important. The article also analyzes and presents the views of researchers involved in the issue regarding the positive and negative consequences of the use of artificial intelligence in higher education. Accordingly, conclusions were drawn regarding the prospects for the use of artificial intelligence in higher education.

The antagonisms between Russia and the "collective West" require comparation of the newly emerging international situation with that of the Cold War. The basic methodological approach in this article is, therefore, historical-comparative. Therefore, in the first part of the Paper, the phrase "new Cold War" is defined and the change in its use during the previous decades is followed, with an attempt to determine the transformation of international relations from the era of the old, classic "Cold War" to the present day. This phrase was first used during the eighties of the last century to describe the second, the final phase (1979-1985) of the original Cold War between the two superpowers of that era, which ended with a new detente, Soviet Perestroika and the Reagan-Gorbachev negotiations. Later it was used to describe the heightened contemporary political, military, social, informational and ideological tensions between the US (and its allies) on the one hand, and Russia and China on the other. Then, in the second part of the Paper, the basic characteristics of the old "Cold War" are described (the dominance of the military-strategic approach in superpower relations, proxy wars, fear of a nuclear escalation, the division of the world into spheres of interest, the primacy of ideology in the conflict between two superpowers, classic geopolitical background of ideological competition). The "New Cold War" is characterized by regional and not global competition, the disproportion in economic power of Russia in relation to the West, the absence of a deeper ideological dimension of the conflict, the dominance of the geopolitical, territorial dimensions of the competition, the existence of third powers that are uniting with Russia against the West, the integration of the conflicting parties in single world capitalist system... In the final part of the Paper, it is concluded that the differences between the old and "New Cold War" confrontations lie, first and foremost, in the structural transformation of contemporary international relations in the direction of multipolarism through a new distribution of world power that yesterday's dominant, hegemonic world power wants to prevent or at least to slow down, and we can all see the decline of the power of the West and the rise of the power of the recovered and new centers of global power in the emerging multipolar world. The US wants to use the "New Cold War" confrontation to protect its previously acquired positions, weaken its rivals and prevent them from strengthening their position and influence in contemporary international situations. These circumstances, however, do not favor the success of such action - for the simple reason that the world has changed dramatically compared to that of more than three decades ago, when the first Cold War ended. The power of the West, both economic, political-ideological and military, is constantly declining, while the power in other centers is permanently strengthening in most of these parameters. In addition, these power centers are interconnected, so it is impossible to implement the isolation measures of the old Cold War period towards them. And finally, there are the internal problems of Western societies themselves: increased social problems, lowest ever levels of trust in their own elites, increased inequality, turning of democratic elections into an empty form with predetermined outcomes, mass immigration that the West is unable to assimilate and convert to "their cultural code"... All this, unless there is a nuclear escalation, indicates that the outcome of the new Cold War will be completely different from the outcome of the first one.

Abstract Does today’s US–China relationship resemble the bygone rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union? In this article, we suggest that there are some instructive similarities between US–China and US–Soviet relations, but the Cold War analogy works best when the contemporary United States is cast in the role of the historical Soviet Union. Specifically, the United States (1991–present) has in common with the Soviet Union (1945–91) the fact that it occupies a position of near dominance on the Eurasian continent during a prolonged era of relative peace. It was Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe that gave the bipolar international system of the Cold War era its defining characteristic—that is, a geographic distribution of power assets in Eurasia that the United States and its allies mobilized to resist and overturn. Now, it is US primacy in Eurasia that serves to define the basic contours of the present (if ailing) unipolar international system: a geopolitical configuration that denies any power other than the United States the opportunity to carve out an effective sphere of influence. In short, the legacy forward deployment of US forces shapes the context within which Sino-American relations are unfolding just as the legacy occupation of Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union structured superpower relations during the Cold War.

The Limits of Détente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969–1973

ABSTRACT In the early 1970s, Moscow and Washington had established a satellite verification regime to monitor arms control treaty compliance. Satellites had become a primary source of transparency and stability in superpower relations. Yet by the end of the 1970s, both the United States and the USSR were developing anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons that could destroy observation satellites. This article uses recently declassified archival documents to show that Jimmy Carter pushed for ASAT limits due to his broader arms control agenda, whereas Ronald Reagan rejected ASAT arms control primarily because of its potential impact on the Strategic Defense Initiative.

This article delves into the technopolitics of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, a groundbreaking collaboration between American and Soviet space engineers in 1975. The mission's objective was to design a docking system that would integrate the two superpower space systems, Apollo and Soyuz, thereby reducing tensions and promoting peace during the Cold War era. The engineers' task went beyond mere technical innovation, as they sought to create a technological fix that would bridge the ideological divide between the two nations and avert Mutual Assured Destruction. This study examines the success of the docking design in both technical and political terms, exploring whether the mission achieved its broader goal of fostering détente and promoting peaceful superpower relations. By analyzing the intersection of technology, politics, and diplomacy, this research sheds light on the complex dynamics of Cold-War era international relations and the role of engineering in shaping global politics.

ABSTRACT This article locates the political economy of Southeast Asia’s highly uneven and constrained development within the context of capitalism generally and, in particular, capitalism in its most recent “world market” stage. It concentrates upon development in a classically modernist sense, beyond narrow contemporary methodologically nationalist delimitations situated around growth, governance and official development assistance. It is argued that Southeast Asian development (much like the “developing world” generally) must be understood, first and foremost, in relation to key historical dynamics beyond the nation-state, including colonialism, superpower relations and, crucially, perpetually shifting relations of production. Importantly, each of these facets has played an important role in conditioning opportunities for social forces to realise their interests.

Currently, 25 empirical articles published in independent peer-reviewed journals or in scholarly conference proceedings have reported that the collective, or group, practice of the Transcendental Meditation and TM- Sidhi program enhances the societal quality of life and reduces violence, conflict, and war. The present study retrospectively investigated the impact of this program on U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War era, as reflected in public statements of U.S. President Ronald Regan concerning the U.S.S.R. Such statements are regarded as one of the most sensitive and relevant indicators of superpower relations. All 478 pertinent statements published in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents from January 1984 to December 1987 were content-analysed by two raters on a peace/war rating scale. Time series, impact-assessment analyses established that the quartile distributions of the number of participants in the group practice of the Transcendental Meditation-Sidhi program had a significant relationship with the weekly average ratings of the presidential statements at lags 3, 5, and 8 (p = .0005), with positive total impacts (steady state gain) beyond the second and third quartiles. Weekly ratings totals showed significant impacts at lags 0 and 3 weeks (p = .0018), with a positive steady state gain when the number of participants was above the second or third quartiles. Statistical assumptions of the analyses were satisfied and competing alternative explanations could not plausibly account for the findings. The results of the analyses also supported a causal interpretation. The findings of the current study thus lend support to the hypothesis that the U.S. president’s statements about the U.S.S.R. would be significantly more positive and harmonious during and shortly following weeks when the number of group participants was larger.

This study empirically tests the hypothesis that during the years from 1979 to 1986, the Cold War climate of superpower relations was significantly improved through the reduction of global stress and tension produced by four large groups of experts practicing the Transcendental Meditation-Sidhi program, an advanced aspect of the Transcendental Meditation technique. The number of group participants in these four global ‘World Peace Assemblies’ approached or exceeded the theoretically predicted critical threshold for a global effect: the 1% of the world’s population at that time, approximately 7,000 participants. Consistent with theoretical prediction, time series analysis found a significant increase in cooperation and reduction in conflict for Soviet behavior directed toward the U.S., as measured by monthly content-analyzed event data from the Zürich Project on East-West Relations. The analysis was based on a Box-Jenkins transfer function model that included a binary ‘impact-assessment’ variable to measure the effect of the World Peace Assemblies. Both a significant immediate influence of the Assemblies on Soviet behavior toward the U.S. (p = .0034) as well as delayed effects at lags 2 (p = .0125) and 4 months (p = .00004) were found. The null hypothesis of no effect on Soviet behavior was also rejected by a joint-significance test for the three impact-assessment parameters (p = .0029). The large estimated total impact of the World Peace Assemblies was both practically and statistically significant. Sensitivity analysis and diagnostic tests found that the impact of the World Peace Assemblies could not be explained by the impact of Mikhail Gorbachev on Soviet foreign policy, seasonal or other cycles in Soviet behavior, or pre-existing trends (including the ‘spurious regression phenomenon’). While sensitivity analysis found a significantly positive Gorbachev influence on Soviet behavior (p = .00004), the positive effect of the World Peace Assemblies remained highly significant and was 1.7 times larger than the Gorbachev effect.

Louis Sell is a retired U.S. Foreign Service Officer whose 27-year career included an extraordinary series of assignments that allowed him to witness the final decades of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. From the prelude of a student visit to Moscow in 1967, to State Department work on the U.S.-Soviet summit of May 1972, to the “dissident beat” at the U.S. embassy in Moscow in the late 1970s, to strategic arms negotiations in Geneva in the early 1980s, to chief of the bilateral relations section of the State Department's Soviet desk in mid-decade, to chief political reporting officer first in Belgrade and then in Moscow during the final years, up to the collapse of 1991: Sell was present at a dozen key junctures of the waning Cold War. His Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, also published by Duke (in 2002), harvests his years in the Balkans. Here he draws on his rich Soviet experiences to fashion a judicious and accessible one-volume account of the USSR's last decades and where U.S.-Soviet relations fit in, both at the time and in history's rearview mirror.Yet it is more than a memoir, even if Sell's own recollections provide one of its threads. They make the story vivid and often poignant. Anyone who has raised American children behind the Iron Curtain will instantly recognize Sell's three-year-son, in Louisville on a visit, trying to eat a banana without removing the peel, because he had never seen one before (p. 376). But the recollections are only one thread in a multilayered book. The backbone is an engaging, detailed narrative of Soviet developments and U.S.-Soviet relations that draws principally on a highly impressive range of memoir and documentary sources, especially Soviet and many unavailable in English, that have appeared since 1991. Full disclosure: he and I were Foreign Service colleagues working the same Soviet and Balkan beats, and our careers intersected often during these years; I, too, have retired to academic analysis and writing. By the same token, I can testify to the meticulous care with which he has constructed his narrative, and to how successfully it weaves together data from those sources and his own lived experience. It is this tapestry of the personal and the analytical that gives the book its charm and its value.Sell's narrative is comprehensive. Prefaced by useful general background on the Soviet Union, it then treats every important development in Soviet life and politics and the superpower relationship over his two decades. From Able Archer 83 to Gennadii Zakharov via Vladimir Bukovskiy and Nicholas Daniloff, alarms and expulsions, “spy dust” and the rest of espionage diplomacy, Korean Air Lines Flight 007, East-West arms control in all its avatars—they are all here ably, chronologically, and coherently recounted. The only sequence that is hard to follow covers the years 1985–1986, the first two years under Mikhail Gorbachev. In this section, domestic events (Chernobyl, Andrei Sakharov) and foreign affairs (Geneva and Reykjavík in U.S.-Soviet relations) chase each other into something of a jumble. The reader who follows the story to 1991, however, will understand what happened, wie es eigentlich gewesen, in this large and critical segment of modern history.Sell's own sensible judgments of historical cause and effect benefit from this careful sequencing. For the period through the demise of the USSR, he avoids swooping macro-judgments and instead carefully shows how specific and how contingent developments actually were.I might have judged certain factors somewhat differently. Although Sell acknowledges that the dissident movement was successfully repressed, he insists, in line with Yurii Andropov (who served as General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party from November 1982 to February 1984 after having been director of the KGB state security apparatus for more than fifteen years), that otherwise the dissidents could have threatened the regime itself: “Just as a tiny leak, if not plugged immediately, can eventually sweep away a massive dam, the dissidents were the earliest precursors of a larger current that only a few years later swept away the seemingly immovable edifice of Soviet rule (p. 40).” I am not so sure; but then again, although I dealt with many Soviet, Polish, and Romanian dissidents, I was not a designated “dissident officer.” The book contains other examples of a natural desire to have the cake and eat it too, to do justice to the complexities and yet suggest implausible ways out. Was a “Chinese strategy” of freeing the economy and maintaining the dictatorship actually an option for Gorbachev in a country in which two-thirds of the economy was in industry, compared to China's 15 percent, which could be “parked” long enough to reap the growth benefits of agricultural liberation first? Is it fair to criticize Gorbachev for failing to create an institutional basis for reform, or for not implementing the “500 Days” economic reform plan, or for not realizing that the system needed to be replaced rather than reformed, in a country in which party members and their families, dug in against reform, numbered perhaps 75 million? Issues such as these will be the stuff of historiographical discussions for years to come.Sell's overall judgments are judicious and well within the emerging scholarly consensus about these years: The collapse of the Soviet Union was not inevitable and instead resulted from an accumulation of worsening structural weaknesses and Gorbachev's mistakes. The U.S. approach to the country and the relationship, Sell feels, was sound and basically successful. Negotiating from a position of recovered economic and military strength, the United States recognized the limits of its influence in a deteriorating Soviet situation and made the wise choice to limit its positive efforts to support Gorbachev. Similarly, U.S. diplomatic handling of the geostrategic consequences of the crisis, seeking as much arms control progress as possible and a united Germany in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, was masterful. Among the many heroes of Sell's story on both sides, Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush and Secretaries of State George Shultz and James Baker stand out. There are many fewer villains.Sell recaptures the hopefulness of the 1990s and mourns its passing in a postscript on the years since then. Without naming villains, he fails to find heroes either. He argues that, during the presidency of Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s, the restrained U.S. policy that seemed wise under Gorbachev seemed to lack both adequate empathy for Russia's suffering and the imagination to seize the moment to refashion the geopolitical landscape in creative ways that would include Russia. All of us involved in policy in those years ask versions of Sell's question: How far was the United States responsible for the fading of those hopes and the advent of Vladimir Putin's Russia? Here, too, however, I would answer that question with two other questions, emulating the familiar Ashkenazi Jewish ritual. First, is it realistic to call retrospectively for that kind of creativity in a decade when the Cold War was over, when the United States wanted some post–Cold War nation-rebuilding at home, and when, with 70 United Nations peacekeeping missions underway, many U.S. citizens yearned for the world to take care of itself? Second, did Putin's Russia really emerge through another process of specific and contingent developments, like the one that brought the Cold War to an end, but this time after the turn of the millennium? Sell has given us an enduringly useful account of the first process; it will be up to all of us to respond to his concluding qualms about the second; and it may take many years.

This article argues that the creation of the IAEA (1953–1957) was shaped by the overlapping dynamics of superpower relations, decolonisation, and the growing influence of the ‘global South’ in the United Nations. During the four years of multilateral and international negotiations, many of the developing countries argued that the new organisation should not exacerbate global inequalities, practice discrimination, or institutionalise ‘atomic colonialism’. While American-Soviet understanding during these negotiations was at times strikingly good, the uranium-producing states and the future recipients of IAEA technical assistance often faced each other as rival blocs. The article is based on multi-archival research at the IAEA and the UN, as well as at the National Archives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and South Africa.

The Polish crisis of 1980 and 1981 was one of the intermittent bouts of protest that erupted in the communist bloc during the Cold War. The Thatcher government recognised Poland as a vital crucible of the conflict and that the regime in the country was among the most vulnerable in the region. The limited measures the British offered to assist Solidarity in Poland were a result of the Thatcher government's own position as well as the underlying geopolitical reality at that time. The strategy that Britain progressively employed towards Poland during the rest of the decade, ultimately achieving its long-term objectives, was indicative of the thaw in superpower relations, the consolidation of Thatcherism at home and the march of neo-liberal ideas internationally.

Consisting of 34 essays by an equal number of scholarly experts from around the globe, The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War should prove an invaluable resource for specialists and students alike. The essays explore a wide range of topics. Eschewing a standard chronological approach, editors Richard H. Immerman and Petra Goedde have organized the volume around geographical and thematic topics. Every major region of the world is covered, as is almost every conceivable topic—from the standard ones (geopolitics, economics, the nuclear revolution) to those that have become fashionable more recently (race, gender and women's rights, the environment, transnationalism, globalization, and the religious Cold War, among them).One of the book's many strengths is that the contributors do not speak with a single voice. Rather, they represent a diversity of viewpoints and perspectives, including an opening essay by Akira Iriye that takes a contrarian stance, arguing for the relative unimportance of the Cold War compared to other global developments during the twentieth century's second half—such as globalization and the emergence of a human rights regime. The authors have positioned the volume, in their words, “at the intersection of boundaries that divide many cold war histories and historians” (p. 3). Yet three guiding precepts run through the various chapters. First, many of the individual authors stress the global dimensions of the Cold War, emphasizing the agency of small states as well as non-state actors, thus moving well beyond the traditional concentration on superpower relations. Second, the essays taken together help overcome the tendency to separate the political, economic, ideological, and cultural spheres as distinct; the inextricable links between those spheres emerge clearly here. Third, many of the essayists highlight the tight connections between domestic and international developments, showing how the Cold War was influenced by and in turn influenced domestic forces.As with any edited collection, some essays stand out for their freshness and analytical rigor. Naoko Shibusawa's essay on “Ideology, Culture, and the Cold War,” for example, provides the most concise and sophisticated explication I have yet seen of that important subject. She regards ideologies of race, gender, and maturity as mutually reinforcing “notions of modernity” that shaped U.S. and Soviet attitudes and policies, and portrays the Cold War as a struggle between “competing exceptionalist claims” emanating from Moscow as well as Washington (pp. 39, 41). Cary Fraser, in his contribution on “Decolonization and the Cold War,” offers an equally provocative and persuasive explication of that critical historical phenomenon. “Decolonization,” he writes, “was thus project, process, and outcome of the search for a replacement for the quest for North Atlantic hegemony that had shaped the imperialism that preceded 1945 and the bipolar vision of the leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact that emerged after 1945” (pp. 471472). John Prados's outstanding synthesis of “Cold War Intelligence History” and Vladislav Zubok's explication of the intersection between power and culture in Soviet strategy also deserve to be singled out for commendation. Among the regional essays, the contributions on the Middle East, by Salim Yaqub; South Asia, by Andrew J. Rotter; and Japan, by Antony Best, are especially noteworthy. Campbell Craig's masterful, succinct essay on the role of nuclear weapons in the Cold War also stands out.Other essays prove more descriptive than analytical, and a few border on the superficial, including the entries on geopolitics, on Africa, on international institutions, and on economics.Yet the volume contains far more strong essays than weak ones. Overall, the collection stands as a magnificent achievement. Its breadth and its helpful bibliographical aids alone make this a must-have volume. The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War belongs on the bookshelf of every serious scholar of the Cold War.

This article will examine the effectiveness of the Carter administration’s efforts to promote human rights in the Soviet Union. It will pay particular attention to how human rights promotion fit into a larger approach to transforming Superpower relations in ways favorable to U.S. interests called “reciprocal accommodation [détente].” The use of this framework provides an excellent way to tease out the complexities of how the administration balanced the promotion of human rights in the USSR with other important objectives such as concluding the SALT II treaty. It also helps reveal how executive branch worked to reduce Soviet human rights violations by citing the provisions of the Final Act and working with private citizens to raise international awareness about human rights issues. Without losing sight of his administration’s inability to protect Soviet dissenters from arrest and harassment, this article will demonstrate that Carter had every intention of making the issue of human rights an important element of Cold War competition and implementing a new approach to détente that at least in part aimed at transforming Soviet internal behavior.

Previous articleNext article No AccessREVIEWSOil and Gas in China: The New Energy Superpower's Relations with its Region. Lim Tai Wei Kun-Chin LinKun-Chin Lin Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The China Journal Volume 65January 2011 Published on behalf of the Australian Centre on China in the World at the Australian National University Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/tcj.65.25790573 Views: 6Total views on this site © The China JournalPDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

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Recent scholarship on the Cold War has drawn attention to the importance of 1963, during which the superpowers appear to have moved toward a relaxation of tensions. This article closely examines this critical year from an international perspective, exploring calculations on both sides of the superpower rivalry. It argues that Kennedy played a central role in these events and highlights an often overlooked element in the Cold War: the influence of American domestic politics. The détente of 1963 resulted from a complex combination of developments at all levels of the international system. A close look at 1963 reveals a highly fluid period in which the superpower relationship altered noticeably. In the end these changes though significant proved fleeting and the détente short-lived.

When the Berlin Wall was breached in 1989 and the Cold War ended, specialists in the field of international relations (IR) readily acknowledged that it was necessary to take stock and assess the historical significance of these events. Unsurprisingly, no agreement has been reached. For most realists, the events reflect no more than an important shift in the power structure of the international system. But for liberals, the forty years of Cold War are now depicted not as a struggle for power, but as an ideological battle between capitalism and communism from which capitalism has emerged triumphant. The significance of this development for the future of international relations is difficult to gauge. As a key concept, ‘capitalism’ has largely been the preserve of the Marxian fringe in IR. It did not resonate amongst most mainstream theorists in the field, whether realist or liberal. The concept was most familiar as a term of communist propaganda. It was avoided by many specialists during the Cold War era who failed to see how capitalism could promote an understanding of superpower relations. But with the end of the Cold War now linked to the triumph of capitalism, it is impossible for liberals, in particular, to discuss the future of the international system without some evaluation of the unfolding international role being played by capitalism.

Introduction: International Space PolicyA Paradigm for Intergovernmental Relations The Origins of Space Policy: A Reflection and an Instrument of Foreign and Domestic Interests Early Days of Confrontation and Attempts at Cooperation The Context of Competition and Cooperation in Space: Overall U.S.-Soviet Relations and the American and Soviet Space PrograMs. Cooperation Come and Gone: The 1975 Apollo-Soyuz Test Project and the Subsequent Souring of Superpower Relations A Confluence of U.S. and Soviet/Russian Interests in Space: Cooperation as the Cold War Ends Obstacles to Cooperation in Space, PostCold War: A Nation in Disarray Obstacles to Cooperation in Space, PostCold War: International Barriers, New and Old The Market Bridges the Gap: Commercial Space Cooperation Conclusion: The Space Age Outlives the Cold War