Superpower Cooperation Research Articles

Upstaging the Cold War: American dissent and cultural diplomacy, 1940-1960

Traditional interpretations of the 1950s have emphasised how American anti-communists deployed censorship and the blacklist to silence dissent, particularly in the realm of foreign policy. Yet those efforts at repression did not always succeed. Throughout the early years of the Cold War, a significant number of writers and performers continued to express controversial views about international relations in Hollywood films, through the new medium of television, on the Broadway stage, and from behind the scenes. By promoting superpower co-operation, decolonisation, nuclear disarmament, and other taboo causes, dissident artists such as Lillian Hellman, Arthur Miller, Rod Serling, Dalton Trumbo, Reginald Rose, and Paddy Chayefsky managed both to stretch the boundaries of Cold War ideology and to undermine some of its basic assumptions. Working at times under assumed names and in some cases outside the United States, they took on the role of informal diplomats who competed with Washington in representing America to the world. Ironically, the dissidents' international appeal eventually persuaded the U.S. foreign policy establishment that their unconventional views could be an asset in the Cold War contest for hearts and minds, and their artistic work an effective means to sell American values and culture abroad. By the end of the 1950s, the Eisenhower administration not only appropriated the work of these talented artists but enlisted some of them to serve as official voices of Cold War cultural diplomacy.

The New World Order in Theory and Practice: The Bush Administration's Worldview in Transition

The twentieth century saw several major postwar efforts to create conditions conducive to the development of a new world order. This article focuses on the period of the end of the cold war, particularly the Persian Gulf crisis (1990‐1991). The authors analyze how the concept of the new world order evolved during this period and argue that the Bush administration consciously sought to create a framework for a new world order during the Gulf crisis. This framework was based on checking the offensive use of force, promoting collective security, and using great power cooperation.

The Middle East and the United States: a historical and political reassessment

Introduction (David W. Lesch. ) From Idealism To Realism: Wilsonian Intent To Cold War Practice The Ironic Legacy of the King-Crane Commission (James Gelvin. ) The Ambassador for the Arabs: The Locke Mission and the Unmaking of U.S. Development Diplomacy in the Near East, 19521953 (Paul W.T. Kingston. ) U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Iran During the Mussadiq Era (Mark Gasiorowski. ) Iranian Perceptions of the United States and the Mussadiq Period (Sussan Siavoshi. ) The Mussadiq Era in Iran, 19511953: A Contemporary Diplomats View (Sir Sam Falle. ) The Cold War In The Middle East National Security Concerns in U.S. Policy Toward Egypt, 19491956 (Peter Hahn. ) The United States and King Hussein (Richard B. Parker. ) The Jekyll-and-Hyde Origins of the U.S.-Jordanian Strategic Relationship (Robert B. Satloff. ) The 1957 American-Syrian Crisis: Globalist Policy in a Regional Reality (D. W. Lesch. ) U.S. Policy and Military Intervention in the 1958 Lebanon Crisis (Erika Alin. ) The United States and Nasserist Pan-Arabism (Malik Mufti. ) War And Peace, War And Peace The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: U.S. Actions and Arab Perceptions (Fawaz A. Gerges. ) Flawed Strategies and Missed Signals: Crisis Bargaining Between the Superpowers, October 1973 (Janice Gross Stein. ) The United States and Israel: The Nature of a Special Relationship (Bernard Reich. ) The U.S.-PLO Relationship: From Dialogue to the White House Lawn (JoAnn DiGeorgio-Lutz. ) The Specifics of the Meaning of Peace in the Middle East (Mohamed Sid-Ahmed. ) The United States in the Persian Gulf: From Twin Pillars to Dual Containment (Gary Sick. ) The Gulf Crisis And War Kuwait and the United States: The Reluctant Ally and U.S. Policy Toward the Gulf (Shafeeq Ghabra. ) From Over the Horizon to Into the Backyard: The U.S.-Saudi Relationship and the Gulf War (F. Gregory Gause III. ) The Invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War: Dilemmas Facing the Israeli-Iraqi-U.S. Relationship (Yair Evron. ) Retrospective And Reassessment The Soviet Union, the Gulf War, and Its Aftermath: A Case Study in Limited Superpower Cooperation (Robert O. Freedman. ) The Soviet Perception of the U.S. Threat (Georgiy Mirsky. ) T

Reviews of Books

Reviews of Books

Mexico and the United States: The Fragile Relationship (review)

182 SAISREVIEW But other, secondary aims of the book are achieved. The regional focus helps to show the importance of the rest of the world in affecting the evolution ofthe Cold War. As Edward A. Kolodziej says in the volume's conclusion, "Third states, regional groupings, and international movements such as the non-aligned states repeatedly frustrated the aims and strategies ofWashington and Moscow— often both simultaneously—or re-fashioned superpower designs to serve theirown local purposes." Indeed, as a survey of the regional escapades of the United States and the Soviet Union, the book is a valuable reference. There's even a handy chronological "Index of Cases of Superpower Cooperation" keyed to pages in the text. But while the nine-page index might seem to bolster the argument that the history ofthe Cold War is really the history of cooperating superpowers, the book nonetheless fails to answer the question: What can we learn from this? Perhaps it was the rush to publish the book while there still was a Cold War that left some of its articles carelessly edited. Sentences of sixty to eighty words make for difficult reading in some chapters. And phrases like "The cost of intervention also grew progressively more costly and risky" can really sap a reader's motivation, though there are a number of well-written chapters as well. The book's concluding chapter offers a set of explanations for the end of the Cold War. The costs ofregional intervention, says the chapter, did increase over the years, and the probability of success declined. Together with the emerging perception that client states were often greater liabilities than assets the superpowers learned to curtail their adventures abroad. Viewing the limitations on superpower influence as part of an erosion of the bipolar system, the conclusion states that if the U.S. has lost bargaining power since World War II, it was lost not to the Soviet Union but rather to the allies of the United States. Finally, the inability ofEastern European communist regimes to provide adequate living standards for their people "voided their right to rule and, correspondingly, weakened their determination to use police and armed forces to enforce their will." But most of these conclusion have been heard elsewhere and have the feeling of being tacked on the end, regardless of the content of the articles. The Cold War as Cooperation may be useful to those wanting to review how the Cold War played itself out in theaters around the world. But it fails to live up to its intriguing title. Mexico and the United States: The Fragile Relationship. By Lester D. Langley. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1991. 138 pp. Reviewed by Todd Eisenstadt, ??. Candidate, SAIS. By far the riskiest gambit of Mexico's president, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, has been his bid to close in on the great historical divide in relations with the United States in order to inexorably bind Mexico's economic fate with that of the U.S. and Canada. While the U.S. press and policymakers have hailed this sweeping market liberalization as "Salinastroika," more skeptical Mexico-watchers such as the diplomatic historian Lester Langley are guarded about Salinas' reforms. BOOK REVIEWS 183 Langley warns that without placing events into historical context it is impossible to understand Mexico's recent changes. In the epilogue of his work, the author admonishes that Salinas' bid for a North American Free Trade Agreement, and the rest of his economic liberalization policies have not translated into welfare gains. "Sooner or later," he writes, "whatever the 1990s promise for the economy of Mexico, the nation will have to deal with its glaring social inequalities. Strengthening the bilateral economic ties between Mexico and the United States will inevitably incorporate such issues into the political relationship." This slim volume offers a highly readable presentation of the major issues in the increasingly critical relations between Mexico and the U.S. since World War II, and succeeds admirably as an introductory treatment. Measured against its own objectives of giving a context to the latest turn in U.S.-Mexico relations, Langley's work succeeds largely as a historical outline. However, it is too terse to capture many of the nuances...

The Cold War as cooperation: superpower cooperation in regional conflict management

Journal Article The Cold War as cooperation: superpower cooperation in regional conflict management Get access The Cold War as cooperation: superpower cooperation in regional conflict management. Edited by Roger E. Kanetand Edward A. Kolodziej. London: Macmillan. 1991. 439pp. Index. £45.00. ISBN 0 333 52508 6. Robin Brown Robin Brown 1University of Leeds Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Affairs, Volume 68, Issue 1, January 1992, Pages 143–144, https://doi.org/10.2307/2620469 Published: 01 January 1992

Reaching out to Moscow: From Confrontation to Cooperation

The Challenge The Four-Stranded Rope The Soviet Quest for Perfect Security The New Thinking The Case for Caution The Need for Action Meeting the Challenge Testing the USSR--The Seventeen Points Testing the United States--The Nuclear Con Game Restructuring Conventional Forces The European Dimension The Open-End Game--Superpower Cooperation in a Post-Perestroika World The Economic Dimension The United States Government--A Mystery Wrapped in a Riddle Wrapped in an Enigma The Common European Home Bibliography Index

The Cold War as Cooperation: Superpower Cooperation in Regional Conflict Management

Part 1 The Cold War as co-operation: the Cold War as co-operation, Edward A. Kolodziej the Cold War as co-operation - a Soviet perspective, Victor A. Kremenyuk. Part 2 Superpower co-operation in conflict management - regional perspectives: superpower co-operation in Western Europe, Edward A. Kolodziej superpower co-operation in Eastern Europe, Roger E. Kanet superpower co-operation in the Middle East, Galia Golan superpower co-operation in North Africa, I. William Zartman superpower co-operation in sub-Saharan Africa, M. Crawford young superpower co-operation in Southern Africa, Daniel R. Kempton superpower co-operation in the Caribbean and Central America, W. Raymond Duncan superpower co-operation in South America, Howard J. Wiarda superpower co-operation in South Asia, Stephen P. Cohen superpower co-operation in West Asia, Marvin G. Weinbaum supower co-operation in Southeast Asia, Sheldon W. Simon superpower co-operation in East Asia, Samuel S. Kim. Part 3 Conclusions: the shadow the future in light of the past, Edward A. Kolodziej.

Realism, detente, and nuclear weapons

Recent developments in U.S.-Soviet relations have prompted reassessments of the effects that nuclear weapons may have had on world politics. If there has been a “nuclear revolution,” both the meaning of that term and its precise implications for the behavior of states remain unclear. This article agrees with the realist argument that the discovery of nuclear weapons did not by itself fundamentally change the structure of the international system. However, it argues that the subsequent condition of nuclear deterrence, resulting from the widespread deployment of nuclear weapons and sophisticated delivery systems during the 1960s, does constitute a source of structural change. Under nuclear deterrence, the superpowers have acquired a new function—“joint custodianship” of the system—which differentiates their role from that of other states. This suggests that the international system has a new organizing principle that varies from the standard realist conception of anarchy. Structural change led to the rise of detente in the 1970s; but because the processes by which leaders in Washington and Moscow adjusted to structural change were not always parallel, this detente was limited in scope and could not be sustained. As processes of adjustment begin to converge, the modified structural approach proposed in this article predicts that superpower cooperation in a new detente of the 1990s will go beyond what was achieved in the 1970s and also beyond what would be consistent with standard realist arguments.

The Alliance And Missile Defense

As originally conceived by President Ronald Reagan, the Strategic Defense Initiative was potentially more disruptive of transatlantic relations than the Sentinel antiballistic missile system of 1967 or the Safeguard system of 1969. While Sentinel and Safeguard were short-term programs with specific and limited objectives, SDI was a vague, longterm program aimed at substituting an ambitious area defense of the United States for the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction, which many Western Europeans believe is responsible for 40 years of peace in Europe. Unlike Sentinel and Safeguard, SDI posed a serious threat to a major arms control agreement. Many Western European leaders consider the 1972 ABM Treaty to be a crucial component of Western security and an important symbol of superpower cooperation. Given current budgetary constraints and SDI's more modest objectives under the Bush administration, the ABM Treaty is no longer perceived in Western Europe to be in jeopardy. Moreover, SDI no longer appears to be an insurmountable obstacle to the successful completion of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks.

Emerging views on a joint Soviet—US Mars mission

The political climate today is more favourable for joint superpower cooperation in space than it has been for many years. The authors of this Viewpoint, who studied together as members of the inaugural class of the International Space University, trace recent developments in the USA and USSR and evaluate how they might affect cooperation. Ironically, they find, it is the common problems both nations face in relation to space activities - budgetary constraints and declining political support for their space programmes - that argue most forcefully for cooperation. But a subtle and initially modest strategy will be needed to overcome the obstacles that stand in the way.

Toward a U.S.-Soviet Agreement in the Philippines

TOWARD A U.S.-SOVIET AGREEMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES Leif Rosenberger .he most important foreign policy issue facing the new U.S. administration will be the architecture and maintenance of a healthy U.S.-Soviet relationship. Soviet threats to vital U.S. security interests in the Third World, perceived or real, undermine the prospects for the steady improvement of this relationship. In the context of a warming trend in superpower relations, recent movement toward resolution of several regional conflicts, and "new thinking" in both the Kremlin and the White House, the alleviation of tensions through joint U.S. -Soviet efforts in the Third World is both feasible and timely. This article's examination of the current Philippine situation and its superpower component will serve as a yardstick by which to measure the possibilities and prospects for general superpower cooperation in the Third World. The Philippines, a country vital to U.S. strategic interests, looms as a potential battleground for superpower conflict. Soviet support of Third World insurgencies is exemplified by its assistance to the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its New People's Army (NPA), one part of the larger Soviet strategy of establishing Marxist client states. This extension of Soviet security assistance to the CPP/NPA is a strategy that the United States has found difficult to counter. In particular, a neo-isolationist Congress has cut U.S. security (military and economic) assistance back so radically that these potentially powerful tools are no longer viable instruments with which to combat the Soviet strategy. Should this isolationism continue, U.S. policymakers will eventually be faced with Leif Rosenberger is a national security affairs analyst at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. He frequently publishes articles on U.S.-Soviet strategy, international communism, and Third World conflict. The opinions expressed here do not necessarily refect those of the U.S. Army. 213 214 SAIS REVIEW the dilemma of appeasement versus overreaction. Cycles of vacillation between the two choices have not been uncommon in U.S. foreign policy, but they are not inevitable. An approach is proposed whereby the revival of U.S.-Soviet diplomacy would help resolve U.S.-Soviet differences in the Philippines and, perhaps, through extension, in other Third World areas. U.S. Interests U.S. interests in the Philippines— and the anti-Americanism exploited by Moscow and the Philippine Communists today—can be traced to the Spanish-American War. As a result of the war, the United States became the new colonial power occupying the country,1 and it cruelly suppressed the Philippine independence movement. Some Filipinos still believe that, despite their limited capabilities at the time, they were on the verge ofdefeating the Spanish and would have achieved independence had not the United States interfered. Although the United States granted the Philippines independence onJuly 4, 1946, the nature of that independence was still unclear in 1988, when Manila and Washington engaged in protracted base negotiations. Furthermore, many Filipinos continue to resent the perceived U.S. dominance in their country's internal affairs. This sentiment ran particularly high during the Marcos era, despite Marcos's pretensions of "standing up to the Americans." Yet these same Filipinos also have sentimental attachments to the United States and harbor fears of U.S. abandonment. Today, President Corazón Aquino inherits this love-hate relationship with the United States. As she pushes her country toward democracy the United States finds it even more difficult to influence policy in Manila. As the power of the Philippine legislature increases Washington must cultivate an assortment of players, rather than just President Aquino. In this new, more democratic Philippine society in which change takes time and results from consensus, latent anti-Americanism tends to be heard over the still largely pro-American "silent majority." The principal U.S. interests in the Philippines are the same under the Aquino government as during Marcos's tenure.2 The four-fold objective includes the strengthening of the free enterprise economy (while fostering social and economic justice), movement toward a permanent restoration of democracy, the development of a more unified and effective 1.See Donald M. Seekins, "Historical Setting," in Frederica M. Bunge...

The Case for Superpower Cooperation in Southern Africa

The Case for Superpower Cooperation in Southern Africa

Superpower cooperation often overlooked

The considerable array of successful U.S.-Soviet cooperative activities must be reported and analyzed more fully to counteract distrust and to overcome outmoded ideologies.

Revolt and Revisionism in the Gaullist Global Vision: An Analysis of French Strategic Policy

T he Gaullist critique of the present international system, however fragmented its expositon or self-serving its intent, deserves more serious and careful examination from scholars and practitioners in international relations than it has received until now. It can serve as a useful tool, among others, for an evaluation of the stability and legitimacy of the contemporary global order. Gaullist France challenged the comfortable assumption that the superpowers could assure peace, respond sensitively to the security needs of other states, and accommodate meaningfully the perceived interests of lesser powers. It focused attention, moreover, on the threatening implications of superpower conflict and cooperation for the continued existence, independent role, and effective influence of third states. An analysis of Gaullist global policy suggests, too, the basis of its appeal among small and middle-range powers and even its attractiveness to its critics at home.' The first part of this essay briefly summarizes the French evaluation of the stability and legitimacy of the contemporary international system during the de Gaulle period; the second relates French strategic doctrine and French policy towards the Atlantic Alliance and arms control and disarmament to its perception of the inadequacies of the existing global order and to the Gaullist alternative design.