Submarine Force Research Articles

How do Submarine Force trainers use computer-based navigation trainer systems? Applying cluster analysis to examine situated objectives in the employment of adaptive CBT

A “jobs-to-be-done” analysis was conducted to inform training and assessment techniques in support of an Office of Naval Research funded project involving U.S. submarine navigation training. In order to maximize the return on investment in training expenditures, a jobs-to-be-done analysis ensures that the transition of technologies supports critical organizational needs and objectives, particularly when the utilization of a single technology is employed to achieve various goals. The current study investigated the jobs-to-be-done by the navigation trainer across various organizational stakeholders, using data from 481 training events representing every recorded navigation trainer use in the U.S. Submarine Force during a typical training month. Each of the training activity clusters (Schoolhouse, Commander, Responsive, Staff training) revealed a specific organizational context and utilization goal. These clusters illustrate the repurposing of the same technology tool across different user groups, in order to accomplish the various purposes or jobs required by the fleet, including learning, practice, and assessment; the cluster analysis provided a rich description of how the trainer was being used in each job context. This jobs-to-be-done analysis identifies how stakeholders are using already-deployed technologies and capabilities across a variety of situated contexts, and informs best practices for versatile use of CBT technology tools.

Submarine Navigation Team Resilience

Advances in the assessment of submarine piloting and navigation teams have created opportunities for linking behavioral observations of team performances with neurodynamic measures of team organization, synchrony and change. Submarine navigation teams (n=12) were fitted with EEG headsets and recorded while conducting required navigation simulations. In parallel, their performances were assessed for team resilience by two evaluators using a team process rubric adopted by the Submarine Force. EEG models of team synchrony were created symbolically which identified times when there was increased across-team cognitive organization induced by the simulation and / or interactions with other crew members. One set of these organizations was observed in the 10 Hz EEG frequency band and coincided with the periodic activity of updating the ship’s position (e.g. Rounds). There were also periods of increased team synchrony between 25-40 Hz which were present during some Rounds events but were more prominent with task changes or when the team was stressed. More resilient teams had fewer periods of team synchrony and these were of smaller magnitude than those found in less resilient teams. These results indicate that both routine and unexpected activities trigger increased neurophysiologic synchrony / coherence in teams and that periods of persistent synchrony may signal a team being challenged.

DIE ONTWIKKELING VAN DIE SOWJET-VLOOT SEDERT 1945

After the second World War, Stalin decided on a naval programme for Soviet Russia in which the strategies of a 'fortress fleet' and a 'fleet in being' were combined. The naval strategy was based on the premise that a Western attack could only be repulsed in home waters under cover of ground based air support. Krushchev introduced no changes in the naval strategy in 1954. Admiral Gorschkov was appointed as chief of the Soviet navy and was directed to develop a missile armed and nuclear powered submarine force to defend the USSR. In 1961 the USSR decided to retain a defensive strategy but become tactically offensive as a result of the development of their navy on a world wide scale. During the fifties the commercial as well as the fishing fleets expanded and the USSR became independent of foreign navigation and was in the position to acquire overseas bases. Brezhnev didn't change this naval strategy. He built up a balanced fleet. Soviet Russia's basic naval problems could not be solved seeing that the navy was still dependent on foreign bases for replenishment and air support.

It is Not Just Hardware and Software, Anymore! Human Systems Integration in US Submarines

AbstractUntil recently, the Navy's approach to designing, engineering, and acquiring complex weapon systems did not routinely or completely include the human “warrior” as an integral part of the system. Rather, the Navy viewed systems as combinations of hardware and software. The results were often less‐than‐optimal capability and high life‐cycle cost—and, sometimes, even mission failure. Given the high rate of technological change and the need to rein in cost in the face of increasingly constrained budgets, the Navy and the other services have increasingly embraced the need to consider human‐performance capabilities and limitations up front and on an equal footing with hardware and software—as integral elements in both new‐acquisition and technology‐refresh programs. The US Submarine Force has championed human systems integration (HSI). HSI is a specialized engineering discipline that takes human limitations and capabilities fully into account to influence system design and engineering early in the research, development, and acquisition process, thereby helping to ensure the highest overall performance at the lowest total ownership cost. Implementation of HSI has involved new partnerships with unlikely partners such as the audio equipment company Bose, game‐makers, the visual‐reality industry, physiologists, and psychologists. Nowhere has this been more apparent than in the Virginia (SSN‐774)‐Class Nuclear Attack Submarine Program.

Maximizing Platform Value: Increasing VIRGINIA Class Deployments

AbstractThe FY11 Report to Congress on Annual Long‐Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels (commonly known as the 30‐Year Shipbuilding Plan) forecasts that the Navy's Attack Submarine (SSN) force structure will fall below the requirement of 48 SSNs in 2024, and will remain below the requirement throughout at least 2040 (the limit of the current report). Operating the fleet with fewer ships than necessary to meet commitments around the globe makes it imperative to maximize the mission time provided by each platform. Accordingly, the VIRGINIA Class Submarine Program Office (PMS 450) has developed a plan to mitigate this shortfall in force structure by designing reductions in depot‐level maintenance, thereby improving operational availability and maximizing mission time. This plan is encompassed in the Program Office's Reduction of Total Ownership Cost (RTOC) goals. However, actions arising from pressure to reduce Total Ownership Cost (TOC) may have the potential to inadvertently limit available platform mission time if the full consequences, including indirect impacts, are not rigorously assessed and analyzed in advance. The VIRGINIA Class Submarine Program faced this challenge explicitly in implementing the RTOC program while simultaneously working through details of a class maintenance plan modification for later submarines that adds a deployment to the operating cycle. Reducing TOC, while making changes to both the maintenance plan and the platform design, requires an integrated analytic capability to assess the impact of potential changes to both cost and delivered mission time. Evaluating the impact of maintenance changes on mission time is complicated by interactions between multiple stakeholders involved in controlling and managing the lifecycle of the submarine—including those responsible for maintenance planning (and the ability of the maintenance facilities to execute the work), operations and training, and modernizations. An approach and analytic framework, which captures “TOC Effectiveness” (defined as Mission Time Delivered divided by Net Cost) is needed to balance divergent program and stakeholder goals. To capture TOC effectiveness, a time‐phased dynamic simulation of the lifecycle employment of VIRGINIA Class Submarines (including depot maintenance time) has been developed to determine the likely submarine employment consequences of the plans, policies, and constraints of the stakeholders involved, and to ensure that the lifecycle maintenance plan targets are achieved. The simulation was validated against historical performance of LOS ANGELES Class maintenance execution at public shipyards, explicitly adjusting for known differences in VIRGINIA Class work packages (the first VIRGINIA Class depot maintenance availability did not start until October 2010). Simulation analysis has identified likely results of alternative plans and/or policies and provided insight into where changes can be made across multiple stakeholders to efficiently and effectively achieve program goals for deployments. The simulation is integrated into the VIRGINIA Class RTOC program process to identify specific areas where changes have high leverage to increase mission time, evaluate specific changes proposed by the RTOC effort, and track progress toward achieving mission time goals.

The Clinical Implications of a Smoking Ban on Submarines in the U.S. Navy

By the end of calendar year 2010, a total smoking ban on submarines is expected to be implemented throughout the submarine force because of the negative health effects of environmental tobacco smoke and the recently demonstrated exposure of nonsmoking submariners to measurable levels of nicotine during submarine deployments. Historically, smoking has been highly prevalent in the military, but new data on the negative health effects of tobacco have led the military to change its policies, restricting its use in certain environments. A number of research studies have examined the effect of smoking on the military, cessation and prevention interventions, effect of environmental tobacco smoke onboard the submarine, and treatment modalities aimed at smokers attempting to quit. With the potential for considerable physical and psychological effects, a mass tobacco cessation program is being implemented to support the prohibition onboard the submarine. Recommendations for a successful implementation program are included.

China's Future Nuclear Submarine Force (review)

Reviewed by: China's Future Nuclear Submarine Force L. H. Xavier Demián Soto Zuppa (bio) Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, William S. Murray and Andrew R. Wilson, editors. China's Future Nuclear Submarine Force. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007. xvi, 413 pp. Hardcover $45.00, isbn 978-1-59114-326-0. China's Future Nuclear Submarine Force is a compilation of the papers presented at the 2005 conference on China's new nuclear submarine force at the United States Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. The authors are academics who, in many cases, have served as officials on U.S. nuclear submarines (SSN) around the world. This volume is one of many efforts to assess the consequences that the impressively high and constant Chinese economic growth has shown in the last decades. The most evident results have been the People's Republic of China (PRC) increasing demand for oil and natural gas and its need to ensure its maritime trade to sustain its growing industry. These elements represent many maritime-oriented challenges that the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is striving to overcome by creating a capable submarine-centered navy that would be able to defend its regional interests, as a first phase, and to develop a power projection capacity in a later phase. The modernization of the PLAN has caused great anxiety among China's neighbors and in the United States about what role the U.S. Navy should play in East Asia. These elements are analyzed and contextualized by the participants of this very specific volume that focuses on the small proportion of Chinese SSNs. It also contains data about the submarine force and the navy as a whole. Furthermore, the book offers a wide range of perspectives that provide readers with the opportunity to make their own judgments based on a meticulous analysis of data from Chinese sources. There is a broad agreement among the participants regarding the Chinese Navy focus on the accelerated development of submarines and that the SSN 093 extends the strategic reach of the Chinese Navy. A consensus was also reached by the participants that further development of the SSN force could represent China's intentions to project broadly into global waters. A consolidation of the conventional/diesel submarine (SS) force would indicate a naval force oriented to a Taiwan crisis scenario or operations in the East Asian littoral. Disagreements emerge in the volume, largely because of the scarcity of reliable information about the PLAN modernization progress, based on speculations about the possible roles of the type 094 nuclear-powered ballistic submarine (SSBN), or the possible strategies that the PRC could follow in the near future. The book expounds first upon Chinese submarine development and then the dimensions of the new submarine capabilities. It continues with a discussion of current and future SSN operations. Finally, it offers an assessment of Cold War [End Page 494] lessons in order to understand the development of the PRC nuclear submarine force and the implications for the U.S. national security. The first section is initiated by Eric McVadon's work: an assessment of the current developments in the Chinese Army and its synergies with other new Chinese military capabilities. McVadon believes that China does not want to compromise its brilliant economic and international influence by provoking a crisis with Taiwan or a confrontation with the United States. Thus, a moderated and cautious posture currently prevails. Nevertheless, by enhancing its naval and missile forces to the point that in the case the Taiwan state of affairs goes awry, the PLAN could be available to contest Taiwan and U.S. forces. This causes some concern, not just in Washington and Taipei but in Tokyo as well. The PLAN has matured remarkably in its acquisition of platforms, equipment, and weapons. However, it still needs experience in exercising its forces and developing command and control capabilities, coordinating means and intelligence, and targeting support to make that force operational. It also needs a better-educated officer corps than it now has. If China reaches these objectives, in a strait crisis it could easily subdue Taiwan and delay U.S. intervention. Other factors also have to be...

Shielding the ‘Hot Gates’: Submarine Warfare and Japanese Naval Strategy in the Cold War and Beyond (1976–2006)

The build-up of Japan's military apparatus in the 1990s and 2000s has been often regarded by security analysts as indicative of a departure from the country's Cold War strategic posture. Japan appears to be engaged in a process of militarisation that is eroding the foundations of its ‘exclusively defence-oriented’ policy. In the case of the archipelago's naval strategy, such assessments overlook the longstanding significance of a core feature of its defence policy, namely the surveillance of maritime crossroads delivering the wealth of the country. The paper reassesses the evolution of the Japanese strategy since the Cold War by examining the development of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force's submarine force, one of the key components of the defensive shield for these crossroads. The paper argues that with the changes in the security environment of the 1990s, Japan already fielded a mature force with state-of-the-art submarines, and that the rise of a new naval competitor aiming at controlling key strategic points along Japan's sea lanes reconfirmed the critical importance of submarine operations to Japanese national security.

Howard Roark and the ghost of Admiral Rickover

PurposeThis case study aims to illustrate the interaction of organizational culture, human resource (HR) policy and firm performance. It contrasts the cultures of two science‐driven organizations – the Navy's nuclear submarine force and Merck, the large pharmaceutical firm – and traces the reaction of one individual to two organizations – the United States nuclear navy and Merck & Co., a large pharmaceutical firm.Design/methodology/approachThis paper is a case study based on field interviews and secondary sources.FindingsThe task‐oriented culture of the submarine fleet is compared to Merck's relations and team‐oriented corporate environment. Management skills such as flexibility, power and influence, interpersonal communication, self‐awareness and goal setting can influence career outcomes. Managerial skills are important in all settings, but a given style's efficacy is contingent upon organizational context. Adaptability is important, as is personal mission. Thus, the case examines how organizational culture, HR policies and leadership interact with an individual's career outcomes and organizational performance as well.Research limitations/implicationsBecause this is a case study it is not generalizable. However, the issues depicted in the case have been recognized in the managerial skills literature. The case study serves to illustrate and deepen managerial skills concepts.Practical implicationsThis case study has illustrative value as well as hypothesis and theory‐building value, but is not generalizable.Originality/valueThere is relatively little research on the specifics of how to apply managerial skills in a corporate setting. Hence, the case covers important, sensitive material of practical and theoretical value.

Dental Events during Periods of Isolation in the U.S. Submarine Force

Planning of dental support for populations serving in isolation is essential. Many programs of national or scientific interest such as U.S. Navy submarine missions, the manned space program, and research in Antarctica require long periods where dental care is not available. Submariners make an excellent study population due to their relatively large numbers, good health, excellent dental screening, and professional status. This study examines dental events occurring while underway on 240 submarine patrols from January 1, 1997 to September 30, 2000. A health events database contains medical encounter notes, demographic information, crew rosters, and medical evacuation reports. A special survey database contains information from three surveys conducted aboard 1 submarine during a 101-day submergence. The evacuation database contains medical evacuation data from the Atlantic and Pacific submarine fleets from 1991 through 1999. One hundred nine initial dental emergency visits and 45 revisits were recorded during these patrols. Of these visits, 48.6% were for an emergency related to an endodontic or caries problem. The incidence rate for all dental problems was 5.0 per 100,000 person-days at sea. Smoking was significantly associated with the occurrence of a periodontal-related emergency and also with the occurrence of any dental emergency. The rate of dental emergencies per 100,000 person-days decreased over time with the rate for the first 7 days being 7.5, days 8 through 14 being 5.5, and after day 14 being 4.6. Dental problems accounted for 6.9-9.3% of all medical evacuations from submarines between 1991 and 1999. The special survey of self-reported dental problems was designed to obtain information on minor conditions that might not be recorded in the medical encounter database. Of the problems reported, 13.1% had a dental problem during the 101-day submergence, 9.8% had a canker sore, and 4.1% had a gum problem.

Did Sigint Seal The Fates of 19,000 POWs?

The discovery of intercepts in the Japanese “Orange Translations” regarding the sinking of merchant ships (marus) bearing allied POWs led to the conclusion that the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area (JICPOA) gave latitudes and longitudes of these vessels to the Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific (ComSubPac) knowing that POWs would be killed. An examination of the “Orange Translations” reveals that most of the intercepts are from the Japanese Water Transport Code (2468) system, not the “Maru Code” (JN-11). The author concludes that while JICPOA provided ComSubPac with convoy coordinates, they were unaware of the presence of POWs on the marus.

Contribution of Russian science to the national submarine force

Contribution of Russian science to the national submarine force

The A‐RCI Process — Leadership and Management Principles

AbstractIn the mid 1990s, it became clear that the U.S. submarine force had lost the acoustic advantage over contemporary Soviet new construction submarines. At the same time, investment in undersea warfare suffered a marked reduction as the total obligation authority within the services continually eroded the means to develop capabilities in the traditional manner. New acquisition processes had to be created to grapple with the need to rapidly increase warfighting performance while continuously decreasing cost. The keys to solving this dilemma are based on three fundamental truths. First, meaningful competition for ideas always yields a better product at reduced cost. Second, the commercial marketplace readily provides low cost, high performance general purpose processing technologies. Third, the U.S. forward deployed naval forces can provide rapid, hands‐on customer feedback. These three elements are the centerpiece of the Submarine Acoustic‐Rapid Commercial‐Off‐the‐Shelf Insertion (A‐RCI) Program, which provided the vision and strategy to institutionalize a rapid acquisition process through new leader‐ship and management approaches, that has delivered to the Fleet a seven‐fold increase in submarine towed array sensor performance, while realizing a 60‐fold decrease in real processing costs.

Dealerting proposals for strategic nuclear forces: A critical analysis

Proposals for dealerting U.S. strategic nuclear forces would impose structural or procedural constraints that hypothetically would impede nuclear weapons from being delivered. The dealerters’ rationale is that, by removing strategic systems from an alleged “hair‐trigger” posture, these measures would reduce the risks of catastrophic accidents and would give U.S. and Russian political authorities more time to make critical decisions during crises. Largely the product of U.S. arms‐control advocates, dealerting proposals seek a radical “quick fix” to the evolutionary START process and represent a dangerous “back door” to nuclear disarmament. As this article demonstrates, dealerting schemes are risky formulas for undermining a prudent U.S. deterrent posture that emphasizes, above all, the safety and security of its nuclear forces. The article focuses on the deleterious potential impact of these proposals on the Trident nuclear‐powered ballistic‐missile submarine force that is shouldering an increasing burden of U.S. nuclear‐deterrence requirements.

The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II.

The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II.

Design of the EHF Waveguide Aboard 688 Class Submarines: A System Engineering Approach

ABSTRACT Submarine communications are evolving from closed architecture, vertically integrated systems into an open, systems‐based, common suite of equipment called the Submarine Communications Support System (SCSS). This evolution will integrate the submarine force with the command, control, communications, computer and intelligence (C41) infrastructure (Copernicus) for the 21st century. The Navy's Extremely high frequency Satellite Program (NESP) is a critical element in the Copernicus architecture. This paper discusses system engineering problems with the waveguide encountered during the initial deployment and operation of the USC‐38 (EHF) system aboard 688 Class submarines. Mechanical and structural considerations have driven design options for the electronic (waveguide) system. The interdisciplinary nature of this process re‐emphasizes the need for a total snip's system engineering approach to minimize the cost and effort required to deploy platforms with Copernicus radio rooms by the 21st century.

ComSubLant Pump and Valve Repair System

ABSTRACTFlexible Computer Integrated Manufacturing (FCIM) technology existing today in industry, combined with modern repair processes, can be used to address erosion and corrosion inherent in submarine and surface ship fluid systems. Commander Submarine Force Atlantic Fleet (ComSubLant) will implement in the near future a pump and valve repair system in the Trident Refit Facility (TRF), Submarine Base, Kings Bay, Ga. The system will support the repair of submarine and surface ship components such as valve bodies, valve tailpieces, and pump casings. It will replace metal lost by erosion and corrosion using repair processes such as automated welding and epoxy spray and reliably return these components to original specification with computer numeric controlled (CNC) machining.

A System Dynamics Model of Submarine Operations and Maintenance Schedules

The extent to which a proposed military force will achieve operational objectives is a prime concern of defence planners. This paper discusses the problem in the context of the exercise of sea power in distant waters and shows that a model of the whole problem would require a feedback analysis, for which an appropriate approach would be system dynamics. Such models have, in general, been continuous, but ships are discrete objects. The paper therefore addresses the construction of discrete system dynamics models as the basis for a model of the whole problem. Two models of a submarine force are presented. The first deals with the construction and major refit programmes, to evaluate the periods of fleet service availability achievable from a submarine force of a given size. The second examines unit usage during periods of fleet service.

Magnetohydrodynamic Submarine Propulsion Systems

ABSTRACTMagnetohydrodynamic propulsion systems for submarines offer several significant advantages over conventional propeller propulsion systems. These advantages include the potential for greater stealth characteristics, increased maneuverability, enhanced survivability, elimination of cavitation limits, greater payload capability, and the addition of a significant emergency propulsion system. These advantages can be obtained with a magnetohydrodynamic propulsion system that is neutrally buoyant and can operate with the existing submarine propulsion system power plant.A thorough investigation of magnetohydrodynamic propulsion systems for submarine applications has been completed. During the investigation, a number of geometric configurations were examined. Each of these configurations and mounting concepts was optimized for maximum performance for a generic attack class submarine. The optimization considered each thruster individually by determining the optimum operating characteristics for each one and accepting only those thrusters that result in a neutrally buoyant propulsion system.The results of this detailed optimization study show that the segmented, annular thruster is the concept with the highest performance levels and greatest efficiency and offers the greatest potential for a practical magnetohydrodynamic propulsion system for attack class submarines. The optimization study results were used to develop a specific point design for a segmented, annular magnetohydrodynamic thruster for an attack class submarine. The design point case has shown that this thruster may be able to provide the necessary thrust to propel an attack class submarine at the required velocity with the potential for a substantial acoustic signature reduction within the constraints of the existing submarine power plant and the maintenance of neutral buoyancy. This innovative magnetohydrodynamic propulsion system offers an approach for submarine propulsion that can be an important contribution to the development of the submarine force of the next century.

Automated in‐situ measurement of hydrophone sensitivity for hull‐mounted submatine sonar arrays using a reciprocity method

The United States Submarine Force currently conducts lengthy pre‐ and post‐repair evaluation of submarine hull‐mounted arrays using extensive, highly specialized external equipment and facilities. A methodology using transmission of acoustic energy between array elements employing portable test equipment controlled by a desktop computer has been developed that allows very rapid measurement of voltage and current parameters required for calculating sensitivities of acoustic transducers in situ. The method is an adaptation of one described by Van Buren [NRL Memorandum Report 5642, July 1985]. The method has been successfully applied to the determination of relative sensitivities for staves of DT‐276 hydrophones in submarine hull‐mounted arrays. Also, the method has been successfully adapted to detect the improper wiring of hydrophones in a stave of the array. The method is valuable since all measurements are performed from onboard the submarine. An outline of the procedures and examples of results will be presented. [Work supported by Naval Sea Systems Command.]