This article analyses India’s soft power strategy in Afghanistan across three phases: its consolidation (2001–2021), abrupt disruption following the Taliban’s return, and cautious recalibration thereafter. It contends that, despite the inherent limits of soft power in coercive environments, humanitarian and development assistance has functioned as the primary vehicle for New Delhi’s pragmatic re-engagement with the Taliban regime after 2021. Drawing on two decades of Indian aid diplomacy and post-2021 policy shifts, the study examines how India has balanced principled commitment to inclusive governance with strategic imperatives of maintaining relevance and countering rival influence. The analysis illuminates the tension between values and realpolitik in India’s evolving Afghanistan policy and evaluates the opportunities and constraints of its current “humanitarian-plus” approach within a broader quest for regional stability and strategic autonomy.

The return of the Taliban to power in August 2021, following the abrupt withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, marked a critical shift in the region’s geopolitical landscape. While many global actors distanced themselves from the new regime, China adopted a pragmatic and interest-driven approach. This paper examines China’s evolving strategy toward Taliban-led Afghanistan, emphasizing how China balances its regional ambitions with calculated restraint. Rather than offering formal recognition, China has engaged through economic diplomacy i.e. expanding trade, maintaining a diplomatic presence, and integrating Afghanistan into its Belt and Road Initiative framework. A major turning point came in 2023 with the extension of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghan territory, signalling China’s intent to solidify its regional influence through infrastructure and connectivity. Grounded in the realist theory of international relations, this study analyses trade data from 2021 to 2024 to assess how China has pursued its interests under Taliban rule. The findings show a sharp increase in China’s exports and total trade volume, indicating a strategy that leverages economic tools while avoiding political entanglement. At the same time, China’s caution particularly in security cooperation and formal recognition-reveals the limits of engagement with a regime lacking international legitimacy. Ultimately, the paper argues that China’s approach is defined by selective engagement: expanding influence without overcommitting in an unpredictable environment.

ABSTRACT The Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan in 2021 has led to calls for a review of counterinsurgency strategy. One aspect of COIN strategy in Afghanistan was the use of militias in the anti-insurgent campaign the Taliban. As well as their use in Afghanistan, states have successfully countered insurgent violence through the deployment of, or cooperating with, pro-government militias elsewhere. Indeed, between 1981 and 2014, more than 504 militias were active across the world, 1 1 Sabine Carey, et al., ‘The Life, Death and Diversity of Pro-Government Militias: The Fully Revised Pro-Government Militias Database Version 2.0’, Research and Politics 9/1 (2022). of which many were identified as anti-insurgent non-state forces in counter-rebel campaigns. Taking Colombia and Philippines as two contemporary cases, this paper will explore the limited contributions of anti-insurgent militias (such as the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia and the Manila Crusaders for Peace and Democracy) in counterinsurgency campaigns. The paper will seek to identify the reasons why these armed groups produce contributions in countering armed rebels. These case studies are diverse and both have faced highly adaptable and unique rebel campaigns. Both highlight how the use of militias as counterinsurgency mechanisms can yield positive results. Using evidence from both case studies (government reports, primary archives etc.), I provide evidence of how militias can produce valuable results for a government’s anti-insurgent campaign.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush attacked Afghanistan in the name of War on Terror. He intended not only to topple the Taliban government but also to extend diplomatic, economic and military support to anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan. Offensive realism was the driving force behind the US strategy to achieve its objectives in its war against terror in Afghanistan. But strategic guerilla war by the Taliban fighters and rise of China especially after 2008 have made it very difficult for the US defense policymakers to continue the offensive approach in Afghanistan. Thus, the US strategy of relentless security competition and power struggle, as imagined by the offensive realism, is finally unsuccessful and unconvincing after prolonged Afghan war. As a result, the US had to change its strategy in Afghanistan based on defensive realism and offshore balance and decided to tackle it with the war-cum-peace strategies from defensive realists’ perspective.

Implementing the Sustainable Green Revolution Strategy in Afghanistan is thoroughly examined in this paper, with a focus on how it might boost food security and promote economic growth. The fact that agriculture employs 61.6% of the workforce and accounts for roughly 23% of the country's GDP highlights the importance of this sector to Afghanistan's economy. To ensure greater output while protecting biodiversity, the study presents the idea of "Green Revolution 2.0," which aims to modify past agricultural advances to Afghanistan's particular socioeconomic and environmental challenges. Important prospects for agricultural development are noted, such as various climates, foreign assistance, and the involvement of young people. The paper also discusses urgent issues like poor infrastructure, budgetary limitations, and how climate change affects agricultural productivity. A successful implementation approach is suggested, emphasizing education, climate-smart agriculture, credit availability, and infrastructure development. A Gantt chart, which involves stakeholders including the Afghan government, non-governmental organizations, and foreign organizations, provides an organized schedule for the actions required to carry out the strategy successfully. The results highlight the significance of strengthening community involvement, encouraging sustainable farming methods, and creating a supporting governance structure. In the end, this paper promotes a multifaceted strategy for agricultural development that seeks to enhance rural Afghanistan's general quality of life in addition to productivity, opening the door for long-term resilience and economic stability.

Despite the fact that America had spent a lot of money since 2001 and after the collapse of the Taliban to advance the project of nation-building in Afghanistan; but this militant group was able to take over Kabul again on August 15, 2021.The action of the Taliban in Afghanistan was accepted at a time when Joe Biden had determined his new policy towards Afghanistan based on the withdrawal of America from this country; for this reason, many experts should know that the control of the Taliban is the result of the government's policy, which was followed by Trump before. However, another question and concern that was raised at this time was whether the steps should be taken in relation to the withdrawal of the United States from a pre-determined regional plan with specific goals and foundations, or whether it was just at the top to reduce America's foreign spending and on the basis of partisanship. Did the democratic government accept this incident? The authors of this research have tried to compare these two views based on the method of case study. The result of this study shows that despite the existence of two main views on foreign policy, different components and variables should be included in the strategy for Afghanistan, which is a multi-faceted approach. This multi-factor approach has been presented by the authors in the end.

In recent years, Sino-Afghan relations have seen unprecedented growth, with China actively involving itself in Afghanistan's political transformation due to its longstanding friendly ties with the country. This marks China's efforts to play a proactive role in Afghanistan. The gradual withdrawal of NATO and US forces since 2014 has prompted China to adopt a new geopolitical approach towards the region. The new phase of Afghanistan-China relations has the potential to transform China from a mere observer into a constructive and intervening force in Afghanistan. This article aims to shed light on China's new diplomatic strategy in Afghanistan by examining its characteristics and implications. It is predicated on the belief that constructive engagement with Afghanistan will yield strategic, economic, and security benefits for China, which directly impact its national security risks and economic opportunities.

The geopolitical situation of Afghanistan is drastic and hence the demolition of the country has started after the comeback of Taliban and withdrawal of American forces. Recently, the third Regional Security Dialogue on Afghanistan was held in New Delhi on September 10, 2021. (NSAs). In 2018 and 2019, Iran hosted the forum's initial two meetings. Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan agreed with India's National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval. There were two individuals who were absent. Moeed Yusuf, Pakistan's national security adviser, rejected the offer in writing, stating that "a spoiler (India) cannot be a mediator." Chinese authorities reported "scheduling problems." Given the current state of affairs in Pakistan, the refusal was not unexpected. China's absence indicates that Pakistan would continue to direct China's Afghanistan strategy. So, this is found to be a known situation for Indian leaders but these situations forces India to stay updated with the developments and hence modify their role in Afghanistan. The paper aimed to understand the redefining role of India in Afghanistan and hence it tried to determine the situation, strategies, plans and actions of India with Afghanistan. After a details exploratory examination, it has been found that yes, ofcourse, the role of India is changing but the recent developments has gave a significant power to Indian leadership which can help in creating betterment facilities for the welfare of people of both the nations in coming future.

After the Bonn Summit in Germany in 2001, followed by the adoption of the new Constitution of Afghanistan in 2003 and the Electoral Law in 2004, affirmative action strategy with a clear and systematic mechanism to improve the status of women in socio-political participation entered the Afghan legal literature. With the passage of time prosperous life of women in Afghanistan required that in this qualitative study the above strategy be represented and narrated from the perspective of the lived experience of women representatives. In this regard, data collection and coding was done in interview with 15 female representatives in person. According to the findings, facilitating competition with men, creating opportunities, productivity of gender diversity, and flexibility in laws indicate the need for women this strategy. The results also showed developing the ability and capability of women. Because the emergence of ability, the acquisition of skills and experience, complement meritocracy, are among the categories that were extracted from the experience of female representatives. What matters is how this strategy is implementation; based on the findings, unequal access, blame, feelings of inferiority, patriarchy, abuse and lack of peace in the interviewees' experience indicated affirmative action challenges to this strategy.

The Afghan direction is rather important for German foreign policy, given the scale and duration (nearly two decades) of German military presence in this Central Asian country. It remains to continue one of the directions of Bundeswehrs usage outside the NATO zone of responsibility. The article tries to explore the specifics of the German military and political-diplomatic tools used in the course of Resolute Support operation. The key research methods are comparative and event-analysis. The paper evaluates the characteristics and the results of the German participation in ISAF activity by the mid-2010s. In this regard it is shown that to a large extent the efforts of the Bundeswehr contingent in Resolute Support were aimed at completing unfinished tasks during the ISAF mission. The new (since 2015) tasks of the German military personal, their determinism, and the peculiarities of their implementation are defined. The article traces the ascending dynamics of the German military presence in Afghanistan. In comparison with Syria and Iraq, taking into account the scale of threats projected from their territory to the Euro-Atlantic community in the mid-2010s, the peculiarities of forms and amounts of the Bundeswehrs use in Afghanistan are demonstrated. The author examines Berlins attempts to maintain its military presence in Afghanistan in conditions when US President Trumps administration and the Taliban (banned in Russia) signed an agreement on the withdrawal of US troops on February 29, 2020. The range of factors that could affect the revision of the White Houses position in the second half of 2020 and early 2021 is defined. During this period, Germany has been trying to keep its military presence in Afghanistan. But after the final decision of the Biden administration on the withdrawal of troops, official Berlin was forced to accelerate the evacuation of its contingent (by July 1, 2021), which largely crossed out the previously declared results of the strategy in Afghanistan. The article concludes by presenting the consequences of the military drawdown in Afghanistan for the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany as a whole.

The overall U.S. strategy in Afghanistan lacks clarity and consistently coordinated efforts/policies to bring peace in the war-torn country. From the Bush to Obama and Trump administrations, the situation remains complex, and ambiguity prevails on the future of Afghanistan and achievements; therefore, the U.S. needs to think outside the box to emerge from this turbulent 19 years-long war. No single country can bring peace and security in Afghanistan due to its complex and diverse nature of issues, its history of conflicts and unsettled domestic issues, which divided the nation into different tribes and factions. The continuity in using soft and smart powers, a multilateral approach, along with Principal-Agent theory, would help to further pave the way forward for bringing peace in Afghanistan. The consistent approach towards state-building and nationbuilding took by U.S. coalitions, and the U.N. will have a positive impact and create a consensus to develop a peaceful and stable Afghanistan.

This article aims to analyze the development and implementation of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan under President Donald Trump’s Republican administration. By removing constraints, which limited U.S. action in Afghanistan under President Obama, Trump added more flexibility to American strategy in Afghanistan. Sporadic attempts to reach a compromise with the Taliban, which the U.S. made since 2010, resulted in signing the Doha Agreement in February 2020. Despite Trump’s willingness to bring the war to a close, there is lack of overwhelming consensus over strategy in Afghanistan among American politicians and pundits. Some influential segments of U.S. foreign policy and military elites advocate for a limited counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan. Regardless of fulfilling plans to minimize America’s involvement in the war, the U.S. will keep the capability to interfere in Afghanistan if the security situation in this country deteriorates further. The development of the U.S. Afghan strategy under Trump reflects continued infighting in America’s policy and expert circles between proponents of different strategies. To consolidate their influence on foreign policy debates, they use a number of axiomatic views. Unlike the advocates of the Afghanistan mission, its opponents use a wider variety of arguments, including shifting regional dynamics and dramatic changes in the international system. The infighting of Trump’s decision-making team concerning U.S. continued involvement in Afghanistan reflects a broader struggle between liberal internationalists and supporters of a more restrained U.S. foreign policy.

Referring to archival materials and historiography, the authors of this article examine the circumstances behind the development of principles regulating the presence of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan (1979–1989), its nature, and scope. It is concluded that Soviet military strategy in Afghanistan initially set itself limited goals and assumed limited obligations. It also used a narrow set of expert assessments, mainly those that fitted into the usual picture of a “cold” confrontation and the established paternalistic model of interaction with countries in the zone of the USSR’s ideological and political influence. The study shows that the Soviet state machine was largely focused on solving geopolitical problems, and the militarist directions of defence and law enforcement agencies and provided society with very limited information. The long-term consequences of the Afghanistan policy (especially internal and economic) at the time of the decision to send troops were practically not calculated, since the initial strategy was aimed at appeasing Afghanistan with the help of limited forces without active military operations. The contradictions between the geopolitical thinking of the Soviet leadership and the peculiarities of the Afghanistan military campaign, which did not fit into the expected strategy of full-scale military operations but at the same time immediately went beyond the “limited” impact, gives contemporaries a reason to deny the victory or defeat of the Soviet troops, but does not give them an opportunity to doubt the reality of hostilities and their negative impact on the relationship between the Soviet state and society.

This article examines China's future role and strategy for Afghanistan and how it will affect the development of Afghanistan. China border touch with Afghanistan, and has the same security issues as Afghanistan, and a common interest in developing natural resources. Within the foreign policy of China, its contacts with Afghanistan same as other nations in the region. Chinese firms hope to exploit Afghanistan assets to promote China's economic development. China wishes to use its monetary power to stabilize the nation while waiting for the security condition to recover. Afghanistan will profit from China's infrastructure construction and investment, but China's actions in Afghanistan are unclear in future. Finally, Chinese investment in Afghanistan may cause the region to become a participant in the world economy or cause troubles that continue to receive attention.

Winning Hearts and Minds, Losing the War: Public Opinion, COIN, and Rebel Strategy in Afghanistan, 2009-2014

Exposure to household tobacco smoke and risk of cancer morbidity and mortality: Analysis of data from the Afghanistan Demographic and Health Survey 2015

This paper attempts to explore the level of variations in the pattern of foreign policies of Pakistan and China to US Afghan strategy. To investigate this question, the paper examines US strategy in Afghanistan. The current administration under Trump and announcement of China Pakistan Economic Corridor further complicated the US presence in Afghanistan. The study analyses the factors that are responsible for differences between Pakistani and Chinese stance. About the results, China's response was an outcome of their foreign policy principles, that is not to indulge in direct clash with the US and Western world. The interests of China in Afghanistan are linked to that of Pakistan, South and Central Asia. China does not want to wage unilateral talks with Taliban at the cost of Pakistan's interests. While on the other hand, post 9/11 2001, Pakistan could not resist the pressure of US policies in Afghanistan because it was heavily dependent on the US, economically, militarily, politically and diplomatically. The respective Political structure and culture; their foreign policy priorities, goals, and tradition; perception of threat and resulting priorities; political and economic dependence; location, policy options and decision-making and professional capabilities of decision making were jointly responsible for their differences.

This article explores the evolution of the U.S. policy towards Afghanistan between 2009-2017 with particular emphasis on major adjustments to the original plans outlined by President Obama. The article analyses the main reasons underlying contraction of foreign policy decision-making cycles during Obama’s second term. It examines regional dynamics and the new developments in Afghanistan primarily the Taliban’s dramatic gains and the Islamic State’s growing presence since the official end of the coalition’s combat mission. It also analyzes the continuity and change aspects of Donald Trump’s new strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia.

Douglas Wissing has produced a work of disarming starkness. His contention is not just that the United States' strategy in Afghanistan has been delusional but that it has also been corrupt. He concludes that ‘the same toxic system that connected ambitious American careerists, greedy US military and development corporations, Afghan kleptocrats and their jihadi collaborators was alive and well in Afghanistan’ (p. 165). The format of the book is deceptive. The average chapter is a five-page vignette, built around a visit or a conversation, told in a chatty, amusing style with an engaging tendency to conjure new words out of thin air. There are moments of pure comedy, such as the anti-farting rule in the US Marine Corps (p. 59), but these instances are rare. Indeed, most chapters are disturbing and sardonic, especially when Wissing reports from ‘inside the wire’ of American military camps. Once he leaves the military's embrace and is free to roam in Kabul, the mood noticeably lifts as he encounters people and projects that he admires. Notable in this category is Nancy Hatch Dupree (the veteran academic) who condemns ‘the pernicious impact … of too much money, too many outsiders taking decisions’, which has undermined Afghan self-sufficiency (p. 128).

The nations take various strategies in exposure to different developments and phenomena and impact on foreign and internal policies of countries in international scene proportional to their internal and external conditions and rivals and at international arena. What US implemented after September 11 Event and targeted accusation finger toward Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan is deemed as a type of strategy that has occurred in created nostalgic climate together with hasty decision making and negligence to domestic issues in Afghan Community while their output was to take different and even paradoxical strategies in this crisis-stricken region since 1980s. In this article that has been written in order to analyze US Post September- 11 Strategies in Afghanistan this basic question will be answered that how changes in US macro policies influenced in orientation of diplomacy of this country and why this country has adapted different policies in occupation of Afghanistan. Afterwards, it is deduced according to the given findings from librarian data collection method that the constant changes in US strategy in Afghanistan were due to overlooking of domestic issues and historic, ethnic, cultural, political, and ideological complexities of this country that has resulted in degradation of US position in world scene and its failure in suppression of Taliban.This article has been excerpted from my PhD treatise under title of ‘The role of United States in the regional crisis (e.g. Afghan and Iraqi crises) and the rise of revolutionary and radicalism on the emergence of international terrorism’.