ABSTRACT Without the quantitative constraints of New START or any other formal nuclear arms control framework, states must navigate future conflicts and crises with less clarity and confidence. This is an unwelcome development for strategic stability at an inopportune time globally. But even if the expansive US and Russian arsenals had remained capped, the greatest risks incurred over the last decade and surely into the next are qualitative. These risks owe much more to the understandings between leaders on acceptable roles of nuclear weapons, the specific capabilities fielded in national arsenals, and the broader risk profiles of day-to-day operations than weapon counts. There is little historical evidence that rapid surges in nuclear weapons technologies or deployments yield strategic stability; rather, there is a consistent record that unconstrained capability additions have led to serious instabilities, requiring new arms control efforts to stabilize the deterrence relationship. Putting aside any near-term reconstitution of formal arms-control mechanisms, states can better navigate the next decade by focusing on the qualitative elements of nuclear strategy. By unilaterally constraining weapon types, avoiding entanglement risks, and upholding norms of restraint, states can construct a more stable base from which to navigate the myriad emerging security threats of the late 2020s and beyond.

This report examines the Golden Dome for America (GDA) and its potential implications for nuclear strategic stability. Drawing on insights from a three-event webinar series organised by International Student/Young Pugwash (ISYP) and Student/Young Pugwash UK (SYP UK) in late 2025, it reviews the initiative’s conceptual scope, projected architecture, budgetary requirements, and technical feasibility, with particular attention to space-based sensors and interceptors, midcourse and boost phase missile defence, and systems aimed at countering hypersonic glide vehicles. The report finds that GDA remains highly ambitious, politically significant, and conceptually fluid, while facing major technical, industrial, budgetary, and operational constraints. At the same time, the initiative is already shaping strategic perceptions among major nuclear powers. By extending US homeland missile defence aspirations beyond limited threats and toward peer competitors, GDA risks accelerating offensive and defensive arms competitions, intensifying counterspace developments, and undermining adversaries’ confidence in the effectiveness of their nuclear deterrents. The report also briefly considers the limited conditions under which missile defence could have stabilising effects and identifies recommendations aimed at reducing misperception, improving transparency, strengthening pre-launch notification mechanisms, and grounding policy in realistic technical assessments.

Outer space affairs have undergone many changes since nuclear deterrence last played a central role in great power competition. These changes in outer space affairs have been driven in great part by the private sector and its evolving role in this domain. This research note provides an introduction to the roles played by U.S. private actors in the space-nuclear nexus. It covers more traditional roles for private actors, such as constructing satellites, and potentially destabilising novel trends, namely the emergence of private companies as operators for military clients in space. Within these categories, launch services, satellite communications, remote sensing, satellite operations and space situational awareness, as well as warfighting itself are analysed. These discussions briefly consider the role of private companies as political players, economic actors, and members of the international community. The text concludes that the involvement of private actors within the space-nuclear nexus is neither inherently stabilising nor destabilising. However, far better governance and greater transparency will be necessary to ensure that this trend has a positive impact on nuclear strategic stability.

The article conducts a comprehensive theoretical study of artificial intelligence (AI) as a systemic factor in the transformation of the contemporary international security paradigm. The transition from traditional strategic analysis models to algorithmically driven systems is substantiated, fundamentally altering the ontology of decision-making in the military-political sphere. The author’s attention is focused on the analysis of epistemic shifts within the security environment, specifically the phenomenon of "time compression" and the emergence of the cognitive phenomenon known as "automation bias," which leads to the degradation of critical reflection by human operators in the face of ultra-fast digital solutions. Special emphasis is placed on the role of generative language models as instruments for synthesizing strategic scenarios and processing unstructured data. Specific threats associated with the use of "stochastic parrots" are identified, which are capable of generating extremely persuasive yet substantively hollow analytical reports, creating the risk of decisions based on algorithmic hallucinations. The research delves into the cognitive risks of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) methods, which can institutionalize the biases of developers and create an "algorithmic confirmation" effect, thereby distorting the objective picture of the security environment. Through the prism of Ukrainian scientific discourse, the experience of repelling armed aggression is examined, where AI emerges as a dominant component of intelligence and targeting (particularly within programs such as Project Maven). It is proven that the integration of AI into public administration and defense alliances requires the preservation of the "human-in-the-loop" principle as a fundamental condition for ethical control and strategic stability. The study conceptualizes AI not merely as a technological tool but as an integral component of a new global governance architecture that necessitates the immediate formation of international legal regulatory mechanisms. The paper argues that the future of international security depends on the ability of the global community to develop unified rules for "algorithmic behavior," where humans remain the subjects of ethical control, preventing the degradation of critical analysis in the digital age.

Memory poisoning in multi-agent collaborative environments can be modeled as a strategic adversarial interaction between malicious and cooperative agents. This study formulates poisoning propagation as a repeated stochastic game, where agents choose memory update strategies under uncertainty. A Nash equilibrium analysis is conducted to characterize stable contamination states. Theoretical derivation identifies a critical poisoning incentive coefficient beyond which malicious memory injection becomes evolutionarily stable. Simulations were performed on networks of 100 agents across 1,000 interaction rounds. When adversarial utility exceeded 0.38 relative to cooperative reward, contamination equilibrium emerged in 72.5% of trials. Introducing adaptive penalty reinforcement reduced equilibrium contamination probability to 19.4%. The framework provides formal insight into strategic stability conditions of poisoning behavior and informs incentive-based mitigation design.

This research explores that the nuclear posture of Pakistan is undergoing a major change influenced by the changing regional threats and an increment in the reconfiguration of the system of international relations to multipolarity. This paper explores the changing nuclear course of Pakistan through the lens of the intermingling aspects of nuclear modernization, diplomatic signaling and strategic stability. It maintains that modernization process in Pakistan is not a product of expansionist agendas but a sense of asymmetry created by the conventional modernization of force in India, changing nuclear policies, and increased integration with the international nuclear order. At the same time, Pakistan has been using the diplomatic coded signals to present itself as a responsible nuclear state which believes in the stability of deterrence as opposed to nuclear adventurism. The research positions the nuclear policy of Pakistan in an up-and-coming multipolar system marked by the competition between great powers, division of technologies, and the decline of the norms of arms control, which complicates the classical deterrence relations in South Asia. Evaluating the doctrinal developments, the posture of the force, and the diplomatic activities, the article describes the issues which Pakistan is experiencing to ensure having credible deterrence without escalation and isolation by other countries. The results indicate that the future of nuclear in Pakistan will be characterized by the capability of Pakistan to strike the right balance between deterrence credibility and strategic restraint and diplomatic flexibility. The article helps to support the wider discussion of nuclear stability in the regional context and highlights the necessity of the inclusive and criteria-based approaches to the global nuclear governance in the multipolar world.

The nuclear strategy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has long been in the spotlight of the international community. As a de facto state possessing nuclear weapons, the DPRK significantly influences regional security. The development of its nuclear arsenal and missile technologies has not only heightened tensions with neighboring countries but also posed threats to global security. This strategy has drawn widespread criticism from the international community and led to the imposition of international sanctions against the DPRK. The article conducts a systematic analysis of the nuclear strategy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the logic of its evolution, based on the configuration of the security system in Northeast Asia. The research aims to identify the multifaceted reasons for the formation and development of the DPRK's nuclear strategy in terms of security needs, institutional constraints, and both internal and external political factors, as well as to assess its impact on the structure of regional security and strategic stability. The study's findings show that the DPRK's nuclear strategy has gradually developed under the combined influence of international pressure, the need to maintain internal political stability, and an institutionalized perception of security threats. The North Korean leadership views nuclear weapons primarily as a key tool for strategic deterrence, compensating for the limited capabilities of conventional armed forces and ensuring the survival of the political regime. The scientific novelty of the article lies primarily in the research approach and analytical framework used. The DPRK's nuclear strategy is examined through a comprehensive analysis that integrates security factors, domestic politics, and institutionalization, allowing for a departure from explanations based solely on external threats or military-technical aspects. In conclusion, it is stated that in the absence of significant changes in the regional security environment and existing institutional frameworks, the likelihood of the DPRK abandoning nuclear weapons in the short and medium term remains low. The nuclear strategy will continue to serve as one of the key cornerstones of the country's national security and political stability, significantly influencing strategic stability and the security architecture of Northeast Asia, while remaining a long-term regional security governance challenge.

Developmental capability of Iran’s nuclear weapons is a remarkable challenge facing the security dynamics of regions as well as the world at large, especially in the already volatile Middle East region. The purpose of this study is to explore the potential impacts of such an acquisition on strategic stability in response to Israel's expansion on the one hand and Saudi-Pak Strategic Partnership on the other within the region. Drawing on historical precedents from South Asia and the Middle East, this paper will set in context the situation to be studied. It will analyze how Iran’s nuclear capabilities could alter the strategic calculations of key regional actors, including Saudi Arabia, Israel, and non-state actors like Hezbollah. This research will also consider the reactions of the international community, particularly the United States and other European nations, regarding an Iran with nuclear weapons. The nature of the research undertaken in the study is qualitative, and it utilizes case studies and interviews of experts on how nuclear proliferation may change power shifts, security collaborations, and even the scopes of conflict. By citing important themes and trends in the responses of various stakeholders, this research hopes to add depth and richness to regional stability. At the very least, this study expects to provide policymakers and scholars with insights into the delicate relationships between the highly contested issue of nuclear proliferation and strategic stability in the Middle East: that it will provide insights for future diplomatic efforts and security frameworks.

The paper analyzes the potential implications of transitioning India's nuclear doctrine from a No First Use (NFU) policy to a First Use (FU) policy. Based on neo-realist theory, the paper argues that India has been experiencing a shift in doctrine in its quest to acquire relative power vis-à-vis Pakistan and China. India’s current policy, defined by strategic ambiguity, can be adjusted in response to evolving regional security dynamics. Nevertheless, the introduction of FU brings new complexities, and it may lead to the destabilization of the strategic balance and possibly an arms race in South Asia. India's aggressiveness underscores the logic of relative gains, in which maintaining its advantage over Pakistan is prioritized over the stability of the two nations. This may further lead to major economic problems for Pakistan, which is already struggling with heightened investment in national security, and raise the risk of entanglements between the two countries. The inherent ambiguity in India’s nuclear doctrine also makes the command-and-control problems highly severe; hence, the risk of unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons could also be on the rise. The research suggests that China’s evolving strategic position may be a key factor driving this potential doctrinal shift, adding further complexity to regional security dynamics, particularly for Pakistan. The paper also highlights the importance of preemptive diplomacy, Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), and greater transparency in India’s nuclear policy for enhancing regional and global security.

Robert McNamara played a crucial role in transforming the United States’ defense strategy during the 1960s by moving military decision-making away from traditional expertise toward quantitative analysis and rational modeling. As Secretary of Defense (1961–1968), he established what became known as the “systems analysis” approach, which focused on assessing costs, effectiveness, and expected outcomes before choosing any military option. In the nuclear area, McNamara helped shift from a strategy of massive retaliation to the principle of Flexible Response, enabling the use of multiple force levels instead of relying solely on nuclear weapons. He also introduced the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) as the basis for strategic stability during the Cold War, arguing that deterrence depends on each side’s ability to cause unacceptable damage rather than on achieving absolute nuclear superiority. McNamara implemented significant organizational reforms within the Department of Defense, notably unifying planning, budgeting, and armaments under centralized civilian authority and reducing the traditional military leadership’s independence in shaping major policies. This enhanced civilian control over the military while also marginalizing qualitative, field-based judgment in favor of numerical indicators. Although this approach improved efficiency and strategic discipline, its application in the Vietnam War exposed its limits, as quantitative metrics failed to account for the political, social, and psychological aspects of the conflict. McNamara later recognized that overreliance on numerical analysis led to misjudging the true nature of the war.

Artificial Intelligence is garnering an increasing interest for application within the complex and dynamic state of nuclear deterrence between major global powers. The latent implications of increased incorporation of fully or semi-autonomous functions into key sets of systems within nuclear deterrence capabilities hold the potential for both reinforcing and undermining strategic stability. The paper explores the role of the broad set of solutions falling under the auspices of the general andpopularly adopted term of AI in the nuclear deterrence equilibrium with a baseline focus on the largest nuclear powers of the U.S.A., Russia, and China. The historical evolution of automation around the creation of effective deterrence during the Cold War is the first point of analysis in a process of historical deconstruction and extrapolation of key trends, historical understandings and the definition of vital layers of deterrence provision, which can be a subject of improvement through automation. Subsequently, the paper provides for the three general types of AI automation – rule-based AI systems, machine/deep learning and foundation models, and how each relates to specific elements or layers, such as early warning, tracking, response calculation, and targeting, as well as some of the associated challenges. Finally, the paper provides an analysis of the consequences for nuclear deterrence in the sense of probable areas of incorporation, a shifting centre of gravity in nuclear capabilities, and some prospective scenarios of AI integration in both offensive and defensive systems.

This research investigates the transformative impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on nuclear relationships, focusing on the 2025 India–Pakistan and Iran–Israel conflicts. The study addresses a critical research gap: the lack of empirical, comparative analysis on how AI integration alters nuclear deterrence dynamics and crisis stability in real-world regional conflicts. The objective is to empirically test the Nuclear Deterrence Stability Paradox in the AI era, examining whether AI technologies simultaneously reinforce and undermine strategic stability. Employing a mixed-methods comparative case study approach, the research draws on open-source intelligence, defense publications, and quantitative conflict metrics to measure escalation timelines, AI deployment, cyber warfare intensity, and decision-making acceleration. Key findings reveal that AI compresses decision-making timelines, increases inadvertent escalation risks, and enables precision targeting of nuclear infrastructure, challenging traditional deterrence frameworks. The implications underscore the urgent need for new international governance mechanisms and crisis management protocols to address the unique risks posed by AI-enabled nuclear systems.

This paper argues that artificial intelligence (AI) is transforming national security not primarily through greater destructive capacity, but through three interlocking mechanisms: the accelerated tempo of decision-making, the opacity of model reasoning, and the autonomy that compresses the space for human judgment. These properties systematically undermine strategic stability by increasing misclassification risk, reducing time for interpretation and restraint, widening legal and ethical responsibility gaps, and pushing lethal workflows toward machine-speed operation. To substantiate this theoretical framework, the paper employs a structured comparative case study analysis, examining the integration of layered automation in contemporary conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza. This empirical analysis demonstrates how the compression of the "sensor-to-shooter" loop functionally narrows human validation windows in practice. The logic of compression and opacity is then extended through a focused conceptual analysis to the domain of nuclear command-and-control (NC3), where the paper contends that even advisory or decision-support automation could destabilize crisis signaling and raise the risk of inadvertent escalation. Furthermore, the paper evaluates how private-sector dominance over frontier compute and model access reshapes state sovereignty, while multipolar divergence in semiconductor supply chains enables the development of parallel, incompatible AI ecosystems—especially among nonaligned states—thus challenging traditional assumptions of U.S.-led institutional rule-setting. In response to these interconnected risks, the paper concludes by synthesizing a policy architecture centered on enforceable, testable technical and institutional guardrails. These include: an aviation-style military AI incident reporting regime; mandatory, contractually embedded TEVV (test, evaluation, verification, validation) processes; cryptographically enforceable specifications for meaningful human control; NC3 systems with "default-to-delay" logic under anomaly; calibrated export controls paired with transparency measures; deepfake crisis-preparedness protocols; and the proactive inclusion of Global South actors in technical standard-setting. Ultimately, this analysis contends that effective governance in the AI-military domain will be determined first by technical engineering defaults—such as logging schemas, evaluation playbooks, and interoperability baselines—not by treaty language alone. Preserving human judgment in an age of machine-speed warfare requires consciously designing socio-technical systems that move fast only when evidence is strong and verifiable, and that are architected to slow down automatically when uncertainty spikes (Stanley-Lockman, 2021; Osoba & Welser, 2017; Pраkter, 2024).

ABSTRACT This article examines contemporary Russian thinking on strategic stability and deterrence, focusing on the strategic culture shaping Russia debates and military strategy. Drawing on original Russian-language writing, including primary sources and military publications, it explores how Russian elites interpret the evolving international security environment, the role of nuclear and non-nuclear deterrence, and the implications of technological change. The analysis highlights the influence of strategic culture on evolving doctrinal development and operational planning, examining the structural and situational factors determining a shift towards ambiguity, risk-taking, and coercive signalling. The article concludes by assessing the implications for Western deterrence strategies.

Background: The nuclearization of South Asia poses a long-term threat to the regional and global security. The long-standing rivalry between India and Pakistan is dangerously compounded by their opposing nuclear doctrines, and hence an analysis of their strategic stability is an imperative. Methodology: This study uses the methodology of comparative analysis and analysis of the nuclear postures of India and Pakistan in the context of modern deterrence theory and international law. The analysis rests on empirical evidence from past crises up to the time of the 2025 escalation to gain real world credibility of the doctrines. Objectives:The purpose of this paper is to dissect India's 'No First Use' policy vis-a-vis Pakistan's 'Full-Spectrum Deterrence' and first use ambiguity. It aims to examine how these contrary doctrines contribute to escalation and whether they comply with international legal norms. Findings: The analysis illuminates a critical "stability-instability paradox," in which nuclear weapons prevent total war but lower the threshold for limited conflict. Inconsistencies such as India's massive retaliation vow against Pakistan's tactical nuclear weapons add dangerous pressures to escalation. This asymmetry and poor communication with crisis lead to a very volatile security environment. Originality/Novelty: The novelty of the paper is the integration of the deterrence theory with international law and its application to contemporary empirical data such as the 2025 crisis. It contends that current nuclear postures, far from being stabilizing, have opened new avenues to war, calling conventional wisdom on deterrence into question.

The subject of the research is an important and relevant issue of strategic stability between the United States of America and the Russian Federation in the context of the 21st century. The object is the military-political relations between these two states, particularly the context of the crisis associated with arms reduction, which is observed against the backdrop of a multipolar world. The author conducts a detailed analysis of the evolution of negotiations and military doctrines of both Russia and the USA, including an analysis of the existing strategic balance of power. An important aspect of the research is the regulatory legal framework governing cooperation between the countries, including significant documents such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START III), missile defense, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), and the Open Skies Treaty. Special emphasis is placed on identifying problems and barriers that hinder a consistent disarmament process. Such barriers include geopolitical interests, mutual rejection of opponents' political systems, stagnation of diplomatic relations, which create additional difficulties in establishing constructive dialogue. Potential directions for cooperation between the USA and Russia that can be implemented in the military-industrial complex and strategic planning are considered. The methodology used in this research is based on the principles of historical objectivity and a systematic approach. It includes general scientific methods such as systemic, dialectical, and comparative analysis, as well as specialized methods related to legal, political science, and historical aspects. The novelty of the research lies in identifying key issues that hinder the development of strategic stability, as well as proposing specific ways to address them, taking into account recent geopolitical trends. The author concludes that, despite the existing barriers present in the negotiation process between the USA and Russia, there remains potential for renewal, especially in the area of disarmament and arms control. The potential of new types of weapons is also assessed, particularly in the context of the stagnation of the negotiation process in this area. In conclusion, the research underscores the importance of creating conditions for constructive dialogue and cooperation, which is a necessary step towards achieving strategic stability and preventing further escalation of tensions between the two states.

Abstract Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly being incorporated into military decision making in the form of decision-support systems (DSS). Such systems may offer data-informed suggestions to those responsible for making decisions regarding the resort to force. While DSS are not new in military contexts, we argue that AI-enabled DSS are sources of additional complexity in an already complex resort-to-force decision-making process that – by its very nature – presents the dual potential for both strategic stability and harm. We present three categories of complexity relevant to AI – interactive and nonlinear complexity, software complexity, and dynamic complexity – and examine how such categories introduce or exacerbate risks in resort-to-force decision-making. We then provide policy recommendations that aim to mitigate some of these risks in practice.

Modern trends of globalization, innovative development, digital transformation, as well as the increase in the number of negative factors, the emergence of threats and risks determine the importance of constantly increasing performance indicators and at the same time increasing competitiveness. It has been determined that the prerequisite for increasing profitability, financial stability, and protection from threats of the market environment is the implementation of operational planning of production and economic activities and the implementation of an anti-crisis strategy. It has been proven that operational planning affects the increase in the effectiveness of operational activities, which ensures an increase in the level of business profitability. It is substantiated that the use of anti-crisis tools, namely the anti-crisis strategy, is of a comprehensive nature and will guarantee the stability of functioning through protecting the enterprise from crisis phenomena, their prevention and neutralization of the impact. It is proven that increasing competitiveness requires enterprises to introduce innovations, continuous development, which is possible on the basis of establishing innovative activity. It is innovative activity that acts as a significant tool for innovative development, the formation of innovative potential. During the study, an analysis of indicators on the results of the operating activities of enterprises, the level of profitability, and innovative activity was conducted. The results confirmed the importance of implementing operational planning to stabilize production and sales performance; the dependence of profitability on the implementation of anti-crisis tools; the impact of innovative activity on financial performance. The mechanism for forming an anti-crisis strategy and implementing operational planning of production and economic activities on the basis of innovative activity has been improved, the implementation of which will guarantee not only the use of anti-crisis tools and operational planning methods, but also the formation of prerequisites for innovative development, which will guarantee competitiveness and strategic stability. The implementation of the mechanism will ensure the sustainability of the enterprise and its long-term development based on the synergy of innovative activity, operational planning and anti-crisis tools

“The Golden Dome”, D. Trump’s new missile defense program for the United States, raises concerns about strategic stability enhancement. The project means complete and ultimate rejection to recognize the existence of inseparable interrelationship between strategic offensive arms reduction and the level of quality of strategic defensive arms. Within “the Golden Dome” concept, it is planned to revive R. Reagan’s fantastic ideas known as Strategic Defense Initiative. Nuclear-weapon States are in fact offered escalation of the arms race, but with an access to outer space. Meanwhile, a high price of the program is ignored by Washington. The entire “Golden Dome” program is hardly feasible. However, even partial implementation of it can undermine the concept of nuclear deterrence and disrupt the international balance of power. International peace strengthening requires extra diplomatic efforts as well as repudiation of building up a large-scale program designed to establish unconstrained, global, deeply layers and multi-domain missile defense system to protect against any missile threats, including all types of missiles from “peer and near-peer adversaries”. It is necessary to apply diplomatic efforts to coordinate the principle of world practice by joint efforts – it is impossible to strengthen national defense at the expense of the security of other states.

<span>The Indian Ocean Pivot: Geopolitical Stakes in the Indo-Pacific</span>