ABSTRACT Why did Italian centre-right parties moderate their stance on Taiwan after entering government in October 2022? This article argues that the shift reflects the constraints of intensifying US – China strategic competition. Positions articulated in opposition – rooted in anti-communism, nationalism and sympathy with democratic Taiwan – were recalibrated once in office as governing parties prioritised strategic realignment with Washington while managing the risks of antagonising Beijing. Drawing on interviews, parliamentary debates, public statements, and official documents, the article advances that alliance relations functioned as the strategic driver of foreign policy behaviour, while economic interdependence with China operates as a constraining tactical consideration. Taiwan policy thus emerged as a derivative outcome of this trade-off. During Italy’s disengagement from the Belt and Road Initiative Memorandum of Understanding, Taiwan-related rhetoric and engagement were deliberately attenuated to avoid economic and commercial reprisals from China. Yet attenuation did not amount to abandonment. Once the tactical urgency subsided, the governing majority gradually reopened limited and adaptive channels of engagement with Taiwan. By tracing how ideological preferences are filtered through domestic and international constraints, the article contributes to debates on foreign policy change, party politics, and Europe’s role in the Indo-Pacific under heightened great power rivalry.

As China increasingly dominates global clean energy supply chains and critical mineral processing, it continually strives with established powers, particularly the USA, for greater international influence in shaping the emerging green economic order. Indonesia, as a regional power and the most crucial player in Southeast Asia's energy landscape, must balance these competing foreign influences during its complex energy transition. This paper analyzes the influencing mechanisms of Sino-US strategic competition—specifically through the lenses of critical mineral investments (such as nickel down streaming) and international climate finance (such as the Just Energy Transition Partnership, JETP). By examining relevant policies and case studies, this research investigates how this geopolitical rivalry exerts dual influences on Indonesia's project selection, domestic structural reforms, and strategic policymaking. Ultimately, this analysis provides insights into how developing "middle powers" can navigate great power competition to secure an autonomous, just, and sustainable path for energy transition.

The Indo-Pacific is increasingly marked by strategic rivalry and maritime coercion, placing pressure on the regional order and on States seeking to preserve strategic autonomy without entering formal alliances. Within this context, India and Vietnam have steadily expanded their strategic partnership, especially since the elevation of bilateral ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2016. This article explores how concerns over China’s assertiveness affect India–Vietnam cooperation. How did India intensify strategic cooperation with trusted partners, such as Vietnam, particularly, after the Galwan crisis? This article argues that the bilateral relationship is understood best as a form of soft balancing, embedded within Vietnam’s broader hedging strategy.

Why does Samsung operate China’s most advanced foreign-owned semiconductor facility despite US export controls? Why does LG maintain Chinese battery production in spite of Inflation Reduction Act restrictions? This article applies the Coopetition Framework (COOPF) to explain how South Korea simultaneously competes and cooperates with China under asymmetric alliance constrains. COOPF theorises that system-level forces dispose states’ directional behaviours toward coopetition or cooperation, while unit-level forces moderate their pacing behaviours. Applying COOPF to South Korea finds how US-China power distribution shifts dispose Seoul’s competitive alignment with Washington, yet unit-level forces, such as technological dependencies, sunk investments, North Korean crisis imperatives, and domestic political economy, moderates this disposition by necessitating continued Chinese cooperation. South Korea leverages the US alliance to manage security competition, allowing the US to lead technological decoupling and military deterrence, while Korean firms preserve Chinese partnerships serving national economic interests. Through examination of semiconductor and electric vehicle battery sectors (2018–2025), this analysis is to demonstrate how COOPF explains coopetition under asymmetric alliance: allies strategically pass balancing costs to great power protectors while pursuing economic cooperation with strategic competitors. This argument validates COOPF’s system-unit interaction logic while unveiling how protection-dependence paradoxes produce coopetition under alliance constraints.

The definition of the United States as being in a ‘strategic competition’ with China in the 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy document was but a matter of rhetorical clarity by the American side, as the post-1949 bilateral relationship has always evolved in a pattern of cooperation, competition, and contention. China does not subscribe to the same framing since its concurrence would imply defining a finality in future interactions as a total win for either side. Instead, China chooses to enter into strategic partnership arrangements with strategic allies of the United States. Chinese pursuits of and reactions to policies by strategic allies of the United States are based on factors of economic geography, technological pathways, and histories of relations, rather than the alliance structure.

As multi-view datasets expand across diverse practical fields, feature selection (FS) has become an indispensable preparatory stage for machine learning models. Nevertheless, real-world multi-view data is often unlabeled and distributed among isolated clients, posing significant challenges to traditional centralized methods due to privacy concerns and communication constraints. Furthermore, existing centralized and federated approaches frequently suffer from entrapment in local optima and lack robust convergence guarantees. To address these issues, we propose Fed-MUFSHT, a federated framework for multi-view unsupervised FS (MUFS) that integrates tensor learning with a novel metaheuristic optimizer, Hierarchical-Cognitive Tianji’s Horse Racing Optimization (HC-THRO). Within the federated learning paradigm, Fed-MUFSHT follows a dual-stage local optimization process. Stage 1 applies HC-THRO, which integrates Hierarchical Competitive Learning and Adaptive Cognitive Mapping to simulate multi-level strategic competition and cognitive adaptation among individuals. This design enhances global exploration, adaptive learning, and fine-grained feature selection in high-dimensional spaces. Stage 2 employs a TL module based on canonical polyadic (CP) decomposition to perform missing-view imputation and refine latent representation learning. At the global level, a privacy-preserving aggregation strategy based on Normalized Mutual Information (NMI) and feature weights enables efficient model coordination without exposing raw data. Comparative experiments on several public benchmark datasets reveal that Fed-MUFSHT maintains clear advantages over strong competing methods, showing better optimization results together with more dependable convergence characteristics. The overall evidence suggests that the proposed approach is both robust and effective for distributed optimization tasks involving privacy protection.

The China–Arunachal Pradesh dispute represents one of the most enduring and complex territorial conflicts in contemporary geopolitics. While its origins lie in colonial-era boundary demarcations, particularly the McMahon Line, the dispute has evolved into a multidimensional contest shaped by strategic rivalry, ideological narratives, ecological concerns, and technological transformations. This article argues that the conflict has transcended its territorial origins and now reflects a broader systemic rivalry characterized by layered securitization. By examining cartographic aggression, civilizational legitimacy rooted in Tibet and Tawang, infrastructural militarization in the Himalayan frontier, hydropolitical tensions surrounding the Brahmaputra River, and the increasing role of surveillance and digital technologies, the study highlights the depth and persistence of the dispute. It concludes that Arunachal Pradesh has emerged as a critical geopolitical node in Asia, where competing visions of sovereignty, identity, and regional order intersect, making resolution both urgent and highly complex (MEA, 2026; Chellaney, 2025; CSIS, 2026).

After two crisis decades, the European Union (EU) needs to meet the challenges of climate change, migration, strategic competition, and war. But, given these challenges, what kind of Europe do Europeans want? The article argues that the idea of more or less integration does not adequately capture different polity preferences since more integration can mean different things to different people. In order to capture this polysemy, the article presents a richer conceptualisation of European integration along two dimensions: binding (EU centralisation of competences) and bounding (bordering at the EU level). Combining these two, five types of polity formation preferences are constructed: Fortress, Sovereign, Cosmopolitan, Minimalist, and No-vision EU. Exploiting a new original survey, the analysis confirms that public preferences are well represented by these two dimensions. A majority wants more bounding, but they are divided on binding.

How do states develop domestic arms production capacity when facing a strategic competitor? Theories of arms races and regime finance assume states can manufacture military means, but India complicates this assumption. Despite hosting one of the world’s largest arms industries—largely composed of state-owned enterprises—India remains a top global arms importer. We propose an ends, ways, and means approach used in military strategy—of which defense industries are a subset—to argue three self-reinforcing factors undermine India’s defense industries: (1) vertically integrated state-owned enterprises; (2) insufficient pools of skilled labor; and (3) a shortage of domestically produced machine tools.

Abstract This article examines the United States' strategic reorientation toward the ‘Indo-Pacific’, arguing that it signifies a deliberate geopolitical recalibration. Anchored in neo-classical realism's structure–agency synthesis, this recalibration fuses classical geopolitical logic with adaptive state agency to counterbalance China's systemic rise and manage Eurasia's contested power dynamics. This article contends that the US Indo-Pacific strategy reflects a ‘back to the future’ approach, reinvigorating Nicholas Spykman's ‘rimland’ thesis, which underscores the importance of controlling Eurasian coastal peripheries. This historical logic is adapted for the contemporary multipolar context, underpinned by reconfigured US-led alliance networks and sophisticated technology–economic statecraft. Through a geopolitical genealogy of the Indo-Pacific concept and an analysis of US strategic practices, this article explores how Washington endeavours to reconcile its relative decline with its aspirations for continued primacy by leveraging Eurasia as a decisive theatre for strategic competition. By bridging the gap between enduring geopolitical structures and dynamic strategic agency, this article proposes neo-classical geopolitics as a hybrid analytical framework, contributing to scholarly debates on the US–China competition, spatial re-territorialization and the durability of the US-led international order.

The interaction of artificial intelligence (AI), global economic interdependence, and foreign policy is turning into one of the issues of modern international politics. AI has ceased to be just a technological innovation in the context of a multipolar world where the United States, China, the European Union, Russia, and the emergent regional powers engage in strategic competition. It is becoming a geopolitical tool that defines trade, finance, supply chains, surveillance abilities, and diplomatic bargaining power. The thesis of this paper is that AI enhances the weaponization of economic interdependence through states being able to monitor, predict, manipulate, and disrupt transnational network with unprecedented accuracy. The paper examines how AI is reshaping economic relationships between countries based on international political economy and foreign policy theory, which are previously sources of mutually beneficial relations, into instruments of coercion. It also studies how states can adjust their foreign policies to this fact by focusing on resilience, technological sovereignty, strategic decoupling and coordination through alliances. The paper finds that AI is redefining foreign policy in a multipolar world by making the line between economic cooperation and strategic vulnerability indistinct, and driving the states to reconsider interdependence not as the source of peace, but as a battlefield of power.

ABSTRACT The global energy transition is increasingly driven by competition among major powers instead of multilateral cooperation, raising questions about its impact on resource-rich countries in the Global South. While International Relations (IR) and International Political Economy (IPE) have focused on the geopolitics/geoeconomics of the transition, a growing discussion within Development Studies highlights ‘green windows of opportunity’ for economic catch-up and structural change. These two approaches often operate separately, overlooking how geopolitical competition and development prospects are interconnected and mutually shape one another. This article addresses this gap by focusing on the agency of extractivist countries, those heavily dependent on extracting and exporting raw materials, as they navigate the geopoliticization of the energy transition. Geopoliticization is a framing process in which the energy transition becomes part of strategic rivalry, affecting the international environment where resource policies, partnerships, and development strategies are negotiated. The article proceeds in three parts. First, it identifies four main sources of uncertainty driving this process: technological path dependencies, geoeconomic competition, reorganisation of energy systems, and socio-political conflicts related to extraction. Second, it explains how these uncertainties create policy ambiguities at the national level, complicating decisions about resource governance, technology transfer, domestic policy dependence, and energy security. Third, it highlights the role of extractivist political settlements in assessing whether these windows of opportunity exist and, if so, how deeply rooted political and economic structures can either reinforce extractivism or adapt to new incentives. By connecting geopoliticization with the political economy of extractivist countries, this article provides a detailed framework for understanding why the global energy transition does not automatically lead to green industrialisation or structural change in many parts of the Global South. It demonstrates that opportunities are ambiguous, contingent on circumstances, and shaped by both international pressures and domestic political arrangements, emphasising the need for deeper exploration of domestic agency in the Global South.

On November 19, 2025, Major General Steve Hunter presented CANSOF 2030 at the 2025 West Coast Security Conference. The presentation examined the evolution of Canadian special operations from their origins in domestic counterterrorism to sustained overseas combat operations and, more recently, to their place in strategic competition. Major General Hunter outlined the expanded mandate of Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM), emphasizing precision effects, readiness, partnership building, and operations across physical, digital, and human domains. The session also addressed the role of narrative influence and hybrid threats in the gray zone, alongside emerging capabilities such as artificial intelligence.

ABSTRACT The undersea domain has become increasingly central to global security, economic connectivity, and strategic competition. Critical infrastructures such as submarine cables and pipelines, advances in underwater technologies, expanding interest in seabed resources, and accelerating environmental change have intensified activity beneath the ocean surface. While the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides the foundational legal framework governing maritime zones and seabed activities, contemporary security challenges in the undersea domain increasingly arise from the interaction of multiple factors rather than from legal entitlements alone. Existing scholarship examines aspects of the undersea domain through disciplinary lenses, including international law, strategic studies, technological research, political economy, and environmental science. However, these approaches often analyse legal regulation, geopolitical competition, technological capability, infrastructure development, and ecological change separately. This fragmentation limits understanding of how security risks emerge beneath the ocean surface. This paper develops a five-dimensional analytical framework for analysing security in the undersea domain. Integrating legal, geopolitical and security, technological, economic, and environmental dimensions, the framework demonstrates how regulatory ambiguity, technological capability, infrastructure dependency, economic activity, and environmental transformation interact to shape patterns of vulnerability, competition, and governance beneath the ocean surface.

How has the concept of sea power evolved from Mahan’s classical formulation to the 21st century, and what continuities and transformations define its contemporary meaning? In what ways does artificial intelligence reshape the determinants and methods of exercising sea power, particularly in relation to naval force structures, underwater warfare, and strategic competition? To what extent does the integration of AI challenge or reinforce the traditional geopolitical foundations of sea power—such as geography, economic strength, and political capacity—within an emerging multipolar maritime order? Using a qualitative, historical-interpretive analysis that combines conceptual history with analytical synthesis, this study seeks to systematically trace the evolution of the concept of sea power since Mahan, clarify its various interpretations, and examine the key factors shaping sea power in the 21st century. In this context, it is important to consider the role and influence of artificial intelligence on power, which is undoubtedly unprecedented. However, at present, recent transformations do not suffice to overturn the fundamental principles and underlying dynamics of sea power, nor are they powerful enough to completely alter the influence of geographical factors. Meanwhile, the methods of maintaining and exercising sea power are undergoing significant transformations. Contemporary sea power, while building on Mahan’s legacy, now encompasses not only naval strength but also institutional capacity, legal frameworks, and technological innovation, with modern navies adopting hybrid force structures to navigate a multipolar maritime order beyond the framework of large-scale conflicts and decisive battles.

In the context of rapid digital transformation, cybersecurity has emerged as a central component of contemporary international security, fundamentally reshaping the structure and dynamics of global power relations. The increasing dependence of states, institutions, and societies on digital infrastructures has amplified the scale, complexity, and transnational nature of cyber threats, positioning cyberspace as a critical domain of geopolitical competition in the 21st century. This study aims to examine the evolving relationship between international security systems and cybersecurity within the framework of a changing world order. It analyzes how the transition from a traditional, state-centric security paradigm to a multidimensional and networked security environment has altered the nature of threats, actors, and strategic responses. The research focuses on the role of state and non-state actors, the growing importance of public–private partnerships, and the challenges posed by attribution, governance, and regulatory frameworks in cyberspace. Methodologically, the study adopts a qualitative analytical approach, drawing on comparative analysis, theoretical frameworks in international relations, and selected case-based evidence from leading global actors. It integrates perspectives from security studies, geopolitics, and cyber governance to provide a comprehensive understanding of the contemporary cybersecurity landscape. The findings demonstrate that cybersecurity introduces a new layer of complexity into international security by blurring the boundaries between war and peace, civilian and military targets, and domestic and international domains. The study highlights the limitations of existing international legal and institutional frameworks, emphasizing the need for enhanced cooperation, norm development, and adaptive governance mechanisms. Furthermore, it underscores the strategic significance of cybersecurity in shaping geopolitical competition and influencing the balance of power in the digital age. The originality of this research lies in its integrated analysis of cybersecurity as both a technological and geopolitical phenomenon, offering a multidimensional perspective on its impact on international security systems. The study contributes to the growing body of literature by proposing a conceptual understanding of cybersecurity as a transformative force in the reconfiguration of global security architecture.

This article examines the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS) as foundational statements of a reoriented American grand strategy under President Trump. It argues that the documents do not reflect simple retrenchment or acceptance of a spheres-of-influence order, but rather a strategy of consolidation aimed at restoring U.S. structural strength while preserving primacy. The NSS elevates the Western Hemisphere as the core strategic arena, deemphasizes liberalism, and recasts alliances as instruments of burden-shifting. At the same time, the NDS operationalizes a denial-based deterrence posture in the Indo-Pacific, while reducing U.S. liabilities in Europe and the Middle East. Together, the strategies mark a shift from a “rules-based international order” to a power-centered framework. While framed as “flexible realism,” the approach risks weakening alliances, legitimizing territorial aggrandizement, and expanding U.S.–China rivalry into new theaters. The success of this consolidation strategy depends on domestic industrial revival, alliance resilience, and the reactions of strategic competitors.

Competition law is ordinarily complex and multi-dimensional requiring detailed analysis and balancing of economic efficiencies, innovation, productivity, and consumer costs. However, competition law has an additional dimension of complexity in eras of strategic conflict as national security becomes a factor for regulators. The complexity in the era of China-US strategic rivalry is particularly acute for three reasons. One, the expanding conceptualization of national security means that security is no longer relegated solely to defence from armed attack but encompasses economic, technological, and ideological power. Two, large and strategic corporations are the leading economic actors globally, inextricably connected to economic, technological and ideological power, and therefore constitute paramount national security assets. Three, the two great powers have contrasting economic governance models. China’s distinct political-economic governance raises speculation that Chinese corporations are under the influence of a corporate parent, the Party-state, and utilized to advance Party-state objectives. This paper endeavours to outline and discuss competition law in the era of strategic conflict from a US and EU regulatory perspective and offers some pathways on analysing the issues.

ABSTRACT In China's search for modernization since the early twentieth century, international contingencies have served as the systemic catalyst that fostered the Chinese statist economic planning and aspirations in scientific and technological (S&T) advancement. This points to an “outside‐in” trajectory. This paper examines two pivotal junctures of imminent national security challenges confronting China: (1) the Kuomintang (KMT) of the 1930s as Chiang Kai‐shek prepared for military struggles against Imperial Japan; and (2) the People's Republic of China (PRC) today under Xi Jinping and its techno‐security programs amidst heightening strategic competition with the United States. Though the nature of these structural shocks is vastly different, they are determinative of China's push for industrial and high‐tech self‐sufficiency. Both Chiang and Xi interpreted and responded to foreign stresses through an amalgamation of Chinese traditions and technonationalism. However, the extent of the state's propensity for a restrained or assertive strategic posture also matters.

Knowledge pursuit across distance: Revealing the multipolar trend of international student attraction with the A-index