The Reconversion of the Hagia Sophia into a Mosque:A Historian's Perspective Edhem Eldem (bio) KEYWORDS Hagia Sophia, Turkey, Secularism, Nationalism, Kemalism, Erdoğan Almost two years ago, only days before the municipal elections that promised to challenge his party's hold over Istanbul, President Tayyip Erdoğan rekindled the debate over the reconversion of the Hagia Sophia into a mosque, suggesting that he would challenge the decree that had transformed it into a museum.1 However, nobody really believed that he would carry out the measures that would make the "dream of the Muslim world" come true. This reconversion had been demanded for decades: first, by "marginal" groups rebelling against the Kemalist establishment; then, by some political parties who knew well that their claims would remain rhetorical; and finally, by Erdoğan's AKP (Justice and Development Party), especially after a proposal was brought to Parliament in 2013 by an MP from the MHP (Nationalist Action Party).2 Things had evidently taken a more serious turn, as it was felt that Erdoğan's populist and authoritarian ambitions were feeding increasingly on Islamist sentiments and rhetoric. After all, had two other Hagia Sophias not been converted into mosques in İznik (partly, 2011)3 and Trabzon (2013)4? Yet it simply did not make sense as the stakes were too high. The Hagia Sophia was too visible, too [End Page 243] famous, and the consequences would be disastrous: international opprobrium, loss of prestige, and, perhaps more importantly, tourism revenue. Erdoğan's general attitude confirmed this assumed cautiousness. To hopeful partisans, he simply pointed to the many neighboring mosques that first had to be filled before the Hagia Sophia's reconversion could be justified. And yet, on 10 July 2020, the improbable, indeed the unthinkable, did happen. The Hagia Sophia was converted back into a mosque by presidential decree, following a decision of the Council of State to cancel the 1934 decree that had turned it into a museum. Two weeks later, on Friday, 24 July, the re-consecration was performed before a packed audience of allegedly hundreds of thousands, despite the ongoing pandemic. While the event unleashed feelings of elation among AKP supporters and the Muslim-conservative public that were then relayed to the broader Turkish public by the partisan press and media, opponents displayed reactions ranging from disappointment to outright anger. Those members of the political opposition who did not openly approve of the move were very cautious in voicing criticism. Scholarly objections were severely curtailed by the lack of a proper platform and audience. Of course, the real outcry came from abroad, with the obvious exception of the Muslim world. Rather predictably, Greece, whose national sensitivities are often like a mirror image of Turkey's, was outraged and demanded the adoption of sanctions against Turkey. Political and cultural institutions throughout the Western world voiced their criticism by employing a more diplomatic vocabulary of sadness, regret, and concern. One of the rare but notable consequences of this move was that the International Association of Byzantine Studies (AIEB) revoked its decision to hold the next International Congress of Byzantine Studies in Istanbul in 2021, postponing the meeting until 2022, and changing the venue to Venice and Padua.5 The 24 July event was showy and aggressive, but it was carried out in conjunction with a series of statements that resembled a process of negotiation or bargaining. The government tried to reassure the concerned parties on some of the immediate issues, such as tourism and access to the Byzantine/Christian heritage of the monument. Promises were made that it would remain open to tourists—now free of charge—outside of prayer times; plans were made to find means to veil and unveil the frescoes and mosaics offensive to Muslims, ranging from traditional solutions such as curtains and screens, to the—somewhat dubious—use of sophisticated laser technology. Foreign Minister Mevlut Çavuşoğlu was said to have declared that Turkey was sensitive to the protection of the building's character, adding, rather enigmatically, "The function [End Page 244] can be this way or that way—it does not matter."6 No solution was proposed for the remarkable stone floor...
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