State Secrets Research Articles

The Effect of the Successful Assertion of the State Secrets Privilege in a Civil Lawsuit in Which the Government Is Not a Party: When, If Ever, Should the Defendant Shoulder the Burden of the Governmentts Successful Privilege Claim?

It is well-settled that the national government has an evidentiary privilege protecting state and military secrets. The privilege protects information that can be vital to the country’s safety and survival. It was expectable that the national government would begin asserting the privilege more frequently after 9/11. The government has invoked the privilege in several prosecutions of alleged terrorists. However, the privilege also applies in civil actions. Indeed, the government may assert the privilege in a civil action even when the government is not joined as a party. The government has the right to intervene for the purpose of claiming the privilege. In recent years, the government has asserted the privilege in a large number of civil actions, including cases involving high technology companies, private security firms, infrastructure contractors, and weapons and aircraft manufacturers. When the government successfully asserts the privilege in a civil action in which it is not a party, the question naturally arises: What is the procedural effect of the assertion? As the quotations at the beginning of this article indicate, the generalization has been that the only effects are that the privileged information becomes unavailable as evidence and that the case can proceed without the privileged evidence. However, Part I of this article demonstrates that that generalization is a gross over-simplification. In many cases, the court terminates the litigation, resulting in a peremptory victory for the defense. The plaintiff loses the opportunity to conduct discovery or take the case to trial. Part II of this article presents a critical evaluation of the current state of the law. The primary thrust of Part II is that at least in one set of circumstances, the plaintiff ought to be permitted to proceed – namely, when (1) the plaintiff has sufficient unprivileged evidence to present a prima facie case, (2) proceeding would not raise a significant risk of the inadvertent revelation of privileged information, (3) the privilege claim affects the defense’s ability to develop an affirmative defense, and (4) the defendant has a closer relationship to the government than the plaintiff. A factual proposition is considered an affirmative defense because the law assigns the defendant the burdens of pleading, production, and proof on the proposition. The allocation of these burdens to the defendant can be outcome determinative. If there were sufficiently weighty policies to assign those burdens to the defendant, in these circumstances the defendant should also bear the burden of the loss of the privileged evidence. The government’s privilege claim neither extinguishes nor diminishes the policies that originally warranted assigning the burdens to the defense. Part II adds that there is a colorable argument that the plaintiff should also be permitted to proceed when the government claim interferes with the defendant’s ability to present a simple defense, merely negating an element of the plaintiff’s case. Part II emphasizes that although the plaintiff should be permitted to proceed in these exceptional cases, the court should not grant the plaintiff the sort of peremptory victory that the defense usually obtains after the government’s claim. Even when the plaintiff proceeds, it is not a foregone conclusion that there will be a plaintiff’s verdict. A key plaintiff’s witness may become unavailable for trial, a nervous witness might forget information critical to the plaintiff’s case, or the witness may display negative demeanor that prompts the jury to disbelieve the witness’s testimony. Hence, the judge should neither enter summary judgment for the plaintiff nor direct a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor. However, the thesis of this article is that in these cases the law should be reformed to accord the plaintiff an opportunity to proceed and fairly win a verdict.

Development of a mathematical model of scrambler-type speech-like interference generator for system of prevent speech information from leaking via acoustic and vibration channels

The protection of speech information is one of the main tasks of information protection and is a sign of a responsible attitude of an organization (company) both to its information resources and respect for partners. The object of research is the process of protecting speech information from leakage by acoustic and vibrational technical channels at the objects of information activity. An exceptional feature of such facilities is the circulation, processing and discussion of issues containing information of limited access, including state secrets. A peculiarity of Ukraine is the requirement to use exclusively technical means that have passed the relevant certification at such facilities. The basis of the active noise jamming system is a noise generator. At the same time, one of the most problematic issues is that in Ukraine only noise interference generators of the “white” noise type and its clones are allowed to be used. The systems have a number of significant drawbacks – the low protection level of intercepted speech signals from noise filtering (interference), a significant noise level in the premises to be protected, and others. A block diagram of an interference generator is proposed. And its mathematical model is also developed and researched in Matlab. In the course of the research, a comparative analysis of the signals input and synthesized by the generator was carried out, their temporal and spectral characteristics were investigated. The obtained results indicate the high efficiency of the proposed method of protecting speech information. This is due to the fact that the method of forming a speech-like interference has a number of features that provide a significant destructive effect on speech information, namely the use of a combined scrambler model with time and frequency transforms. The method takes into account the use of dynamic keys for coding systems, and the connection of third-party sources of speech signals, as well as ringing (mixing of the input and output signals) at the input of the scrambling unit. This decision excludes reengineering. The results are confirmed by the research of an experimental sample. The destructive effect of typical noise interference ( « white » noise and its clones) and the noise interference created by the proposed method are compared by the criterion of residual speech intelligibility of the speaker’s speech. Studies have shown that, provided that no more than 10 % of the level of residual intelligibility is provided, the volume level of the output signal of the noise interference generator can be reduced by almost 6 dBA.

Exercise-induced BDNF production by mononuclear cells of sedentary and physically active obese men.

Obesity and low physical activity changes the redox state and neurotrophin secretion by leukocytes. However, the role of exercise on brain derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) production and oxidative stress markers of peripheral blood mononuclear cells (PBMC) remains unknown. This study aimed to verify the impact of acute maximal exercise on oxidative stress markers and the BDNF production by stimulated PBMC from sedentary and physically active obese men. PBMC from twelve sedentary obese (SED group) and twelve regular exercisers (EXE group) obese men were collected before, immediately and 1-h after maximal exercise. PBMC were stimulated with lipopolysaccharide (LPS) to evaluate the BDNF and nitrite production, lipid peroxidation, and antioxidant enzymes catalase (CAT) and superoxide dismutase (SOD) activities. PBMC from EXE group presented higher BDNF production (P=0.03) and lower TBARS levels than SED group at baseline. Maximal exercise increased BDNF and nitrite production, and lipid peroxidation immediately and 1-h after the bout in both groups. The EXE group presented higher superoxide dismutase activity immediately after bout and higher catalase activity 1-h after bout in PBMC. On the other hand, PBMC from SED group had lower superoxide dismutase activity immediately after exercise. Furthermore, PBMC from EXE group presented higher BDNF production and SOD activity and lower TBARS concentrations than SED group immediately after maximal exercise. Maximal exercise changes the redox state and enhances BDNF production by LPS-stimulated PBMC in obese individuals.

防衛秘密と司法判断 ――米国判例に見る「軍産複合体」の一側面

防衛秘密と司法判断 ――米国判例に見る「軍産複合体」の一側面

“Tsensuuri töö on väga vastutusrikas.” Dokumentaalne pilguheit Eesti NSV Glavliti tegevusele aastatel 1941–1948 [Abstract: “The work of censorship carries a great deal of responsibility”. A documentary glimpse of the activity of the Estonian SSR Glavlit

Abstract: “The work of censorship carries a great deal of responsibility”. A documentary glimpse of the activity of them Estonian SSR Glavlit in 1941–1948"
 Censorship was one of the important social control mechanisms of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Main Administration for Literary and Publishing Affairs, or Glavlit (in Russian Glavnoe upravlenie po delam literaturȳ i izdatel’stv), was established under the jurisdiction of the People’s Commissariat for Education on 6 June 1922 by decree of the Russian SFSR Council of People’s Commissars. Its task was to combat the ideological opponents of the Soviet regime. The censorship of essentially all printed works published in the Soviet Union was gradually placed under Glavlit’s jurisdiction. By the end of the 1930s, Glavlit was transferred to the jurisdiction of the USSR Council of People’s Commissars (starting in 1946 the Council of Ministers), but substantially, censorship officials were placed under the direction of subordinate institutions and officials of the Communist Party, and of the state security organs. The same kind of institutions in the Soviet republics and oblasts were subordinated to the central Glavlit of the USSR. The Glavlit of the Estonian SSR was established by decree of the Estonian SSR Council of People’s Commissars on 23 October 1940.
 The task of Glavlit was to prevent the disclosure in print and in the media of Soviet military, state and economic secrets with the overall objective of banning the publication of all manner of ideas and information that was unacceptable to the regime. It was also to prevent such ideas and information from reaching libraries. To this end, both pre-publication censorship (the review of control copies of printed works before their publication) and post-publication censorship (review of published printed works, the physical destruction or obstruction of access to works that have proven to be unsuitable) were implemented. In order to carry out censorship, lists of banned literature were drawn up in cooperation with the state security organs, along with enumerations of information that was forbidden to publish in print. These formed the basis for the everyday work of Glavlit’s censors, in other words commissioners. Not a single printed work or media publication could be published during the Soviet era without Glavlit’s permission (departmental publishing houses practiced self-censorship). In addition to scrutinising printed works, the monitoring of art exhibitions, theatre productions and concert repertoires, the review of cinema newsreels, and provision of guidelines for publishing houses and libraries also fell within Glavlit’s jurisdiction. Censors also read mail sent by post and checked the content of parcels (first and foremost the exchange of postal parcels with foreign countries).
 In the latter half of the 1980s, when Mikhail Gorbachev rose to lead the Soviet Union, Glavlit’s control functions in society gradually started receding. State censorship was done away with in the Soviet Union on 12 June 1990, depriving the former censorship office of its substantial functions. Glavlit was disbanded in Estonia on 1 October 1990.
 The Estonian SSR Glavlit activity overview for the years 1940–1948 is published below. This is a report dated 20 October 1948 from Leonida Päll, the head of the Estonian SSR Glavlit (in office in 1946–1950), to Nikolai Karotamm, the Estonian SSR party boss of that time. This document provides a brief departmental insight into the initial years of the activity of the Estonian SSR Glavlit. It outlines the censorship agency’s main fields of activity, highlights the key figures of that time, and describes the agency’s concrete achievements, including recording the more important works and authors that had been caught between the gearwheels of censorship.

(Dys)Functional Secrecy

The topic we have been asked to address is how secrecy presents an obstacle to civil and criminal litigation. The underlying assumption is that suppressing information affects the judicial system in detrimental ways. At some level, this is clearly true. Any student of national security law could provide ready examples. If the government refuses to confirm or deny that an individual has been a target of surveillance, it takes little by way of imagination to understand how standing doctrine may prevent litigation from moving forward. Pari passu, classified procedures and parallel construction may prevent criminal defendants from ever being able to challenge potentially unconstitutional provisions — much less evidence amassed against them. No more so is it difficult to see how judicially-created rules, such as state secrets privilege, impair the progress of civil and criminal cases. Between 2001 and 2009, the government asserted state secrets in more than one hundred cases, even as the doctrine’s shadow fell over dozens of others. Since then, there have been more than 200 cases involving claims that the suit cannot continue without revealing sensitive information. The doctrine has blocked complaints related to breach of contract, patents, trade secrets, fraud, and employment termination. It has prevented wrongful death, personal injury, and negligence suits from moving forward, as well as cases brought against telecommunications companies for acting outside the law; torture suits; environmental degradation claims; breach of contract suits; and defamation litigation. Even more pernicious are clandestine interpretations of the law that depart from ordinary standards and allow for significant powers to be assumed entirely beyond public scrutiny. When the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) issues legal opinions that are binding on agencies, yet cloaked from public view (such as the John Yoo memo secretly approving the use of torture), or when the National Security Division (NSD) secretly embraces a sui generis interpretation of the law (as it did in the bulk telephony metadata collection program), the fact that these interpretations are hidden from public view prevents those harmed from bringing legal challenges. The issue is thus not just whether secrecy may have a harmful impact on civil and criminal litigation. It is how secrecy affects the conduct of trials and the legal system writ large. In other words, the problem with the topic is not that its underlying assumption is necessarily erroneous, but that the query is too narrow: it fails to question what we mean by “secrecy” and to fully consider its affect, ranging from conditions under which it may be beneficial to the legal system, to the impact of secrecy on the morality of law (and obedience to the law), as well as the rule of law. While many theorists consider secrecy inimical to the state, examination of its precise role has been extremely limited. This chapter, accordingly, lays out a functional theory of secrecy, considering its role in relation to four areas: deliberation, information security, law, and adjudicatory processes. Drawing particular attention to how secrecy operates in the realm of national security law, it posits that whether and to what extent cloaking information advances the interests of the liberal, democratic state varies according to how it operates in each category.

Extraordinary Renditions and State Secrets: A Human Rights Approach

One of the world’s main concerns over the past decades has been the phenomenon of terrorism. It is evident that terrorism must be eradicated, especially considering the huge threat it poses to the basic values of democratic societies. However, it must be kept in mind that arbitrary governments also represent a huge threat to these same values and, therefore, safeguards must exist to guarantee that state authorities act within the framework of law. Unfortunately, some governments misuse the ‘state secrets privilege’ argument, created to protect their right to confidentiality in national security affairs, to prevent their gross violations of human rights from being assessed by the judiciary, violating victims’ rights and promoting impunity. This is particularly true in cases involving so-called ‘extraordinary renditions’ used to fight terrorism. This article defends the premise that as much as the existence of secrecy is essential for the protection of every nation, no secrecy can serve as an excuse for governments to violate human rights and disregard the rule of law. In order to ensure that state secrets privilege is not used as a way to promote impunity for serious human rights violations, it is very important that mechanisms are implemented in order to have the claim of secrecy in national security related issues closely scrutinised by an impartial judicial organ. It is in the interest of democracy and justice that a fair balance is struck between the interests of national security and the protection of human rights.

Legal Regulation of State Security: a Review of Modern Trends in Foreign Legislation

Reviews of modern trends in foreign legislation and a general overview of normative legal acts that embody the attitude of the state to the concept and attributes of state security have always been and still remain relevant from both practical and theoretical viewpoints. The authors stress that legal regulation of state security is a basic factor for the development of state policy in every modern society. They study some problems connected with the break-up of the Soviet Union and analyze the prerequisites that later influenced the development and adoption of independent criminal legislation in the countries under review. The authors also examine key trends of state security policy as well as military, political, economic and other domains of ensuring state security. They present a list of key approaches to the goals of nation strategy of protecting certain subjects against external and internal threats. They also offer a general description of normative legal acts that reflect the attitude of different states to the concept and attributes of state security, study the common features and the differences of some crimes against state security (high treason, espionage, subversion, sabotage, disclosure of a state secret, loss of documents containing a state secret, and some others).

Problems Of Using YERDR As A System Of Information Support For Pre-Trial Investigation Of Criminal Offenses

Practice shows that today law enforcement is increasingly a need to obtain and use information about objects that were in the scope of the investigation on a variety of information systems regardless of their departmental affiliation. Therefore, it is proper information and reference software is a prerequisite for success of the pre-trial investigation.
 Crime investigation, as a dynamic procedural activity, goes through separate stages and is a process of transition from the original procedural situations to the next. Such activities are not possible without proper information and inquiry support for the investigation of crimes.
 Analyzing this order, it should be noted that the YERDR structure includes a large number of records of persons for whom criminal proceedings have been opened, as well as persons who were interested persons (applicant, victim, etc.) of these proceedings. In connection with what we can attribute a single register of pre-trial investigations to the information-inquiry systems of pre-trial investigation bodies.
 Therefore, it can be concluded that the investigator conducting the direct investigation of criminal offenses is limited in information on other criminal offenses. As a result, investigators consider the ineffective use of YERDR in criminal investigations as information support. Therefore, we suggest that investigators, after reporting a suspected person, have access to information outside the criminal offenses that they are being investigated. In addition, the cases provided for by the law on state secrets.
 This paper analyzes the use «YERDR» criminal investigation body and along these lines is suggested to use a registry as providing information and help investigate crimes.

Cover Feature: After Salisbury Nerve Agents Revisited (Mol. Inf. 8‐9/2019)

The Cover Picture shows the Novichok agent A 242 as reported by V. Mirayanov. The agents were developed in Russia by scientists at the GOSSNIIOkhT institute in Moscow (V. S. Mirzayanov, State Secrets. An insider's chronicle of the Russian chemical weapons program, Outskirts, Press, 2009, 604 pages. The photo was generated based on AM1 calculations (OASIS software). More Details can be found in the Full Paper by Lars Carlsen, please see DOI: 10.1002/minf.201800106. 8-9/2019 .

국가안보를 위한 국가비밀보호 개선 방향 연구

국가안보를 위한 국가비밀보호 개선 방향 연구

‘Crocodiles in the Corridors’: Security Vetting, Race and Whitehall, 1945–1968

ABSTRACT In July 2018, the UK’s Intelligence & Security Committee issued a report into diversity and inclusion across the intelligence and security community. The picture the report painted was far from satisfactory; in short, Britain’s intelligence agencies did not ‘fully reflect the ethnic make-up of modern Britain’. The report argued that Britain’s spy agencies – MI5, SIS (or MI6) and GCHQ – should improve black, Asian and ethnic minority recruitment, highlighting areas for improvement, especially around the vetting of recruits. This problem stems from the post-war Cold War ‘security state’ and the development of security-vetting programmes from the 1940s, aiming to protect Whitehall from Soviet spies and ‘fellow travellers’ to those with so-called ‘character defects’– drink, drugs and homosexuality. But this ‘security state’ also saw the newly emerging multicultural Britain as a major threat. The so-called ‘Windrush Generation’ of migrants from the Caribbean, and migration from the Indian subcontinent and Africa, forever changed the social complexion of Britain, but posed significant questions for security officials. What was Britishness? With first or second generation migrants entering the civil service, who was a ‘UK eye’ and what access to secret information should they have? To what extent was discrimination justifiable to protect state secrets, and how should officials respond to new legislation such as the Race Discrimination Act? As this article shows, new entrants to the civil service faced deeply engrained prejudices, and questions over their loyalty to Britain. As late as the 1960s (and beyond), ‘coloured’ members of the civil service were rejected from secret posts across government, including the Ministry of Defence and intelligence and security services, especially MI5 and GCHQ, with discrimination on ‘security’ grounds justified by the landmark 1968 Race Relations Act, which barred race discrimination for housing and employment elsewhere.

Preventing Data Leak through Semantic Analysis

The theft and exfiltration of sensitive data (e.g. state secrets, trade secrets, company records, etc.) represent one of the most damaging threats that can be carried by malicious insiders against institutions and organizations. In the last decade, data leak prevention (DLP) has emerged as a new mechanism to detect and block unauthorized data transfer from the organization perimeter. While DLP has gained traction and led to several commercial products in industry, there are still many unresolved challenges hampering its operation and full adoption. Existing DLP systems exhibit relatively limited accuracy and can be circumvented using various evasive tactics. In this paper, we present a new DLP model that tracks sensitive data using a summarized version of the content semantic called document semantic signature (DSS). The DSS can be updated dynamically as the protected content change and it is resilient against evasion tactics, such as content rewriting. The evaluation of the DSS model on a public dataset achieved very encouraging results in terms of detection effectiveness.

Kakskümmend viis aastat hiljem. Ajakirjanike meenutused nõukogude tsensuurist / Twenty-five Years Later: Estonian journalists recall Soviet censorship

Artiklis analüüsitakse nõukogudeaegsete ajakirjanike tsensuurimeenutusi. Analüüsi aluseks on 57 eluloolist intervjuud aastatest 2015–2016. Põhiküsimus on, kuidas tõlgendavad ajakirjanikud nõukogude tsensuuri veerand sajandit pärast selle lõppemist. Uurimismeetodina on kasutatud raamistamise analüüsi (frame/framing analysis). Ajakirjanikud raamistasid tsensuuritemaatikat eelkõige neljal moel: ajakirjanik kui tsensuuriteadlik tegutseja; salastatud tsensuur; vähetähtis tsensuur; totter tsenseerimine. Intervjueeritud rõhutasid enese teadlikkust süsteemist ning leidsid, et kogenud ja tark ajakirjanik leppis tsensuuriga kui paratamatusega ja oskas keelde ennetavalt arvestada. Nad ei tõlgendanud seda aga mitte tsensuurile allumisena, vaid tsensuurist eemalseismisena.
 
 This article studies Soviet era journalists’ recollections of censorship. The analysis is based on 57 face-to-face biographical interviews with press, radio and television journalists which were conducted in 2015–2016 (the total length of interviews is 99 hours, 5% deal with the topic of censorship).
 The main question of the article is how do journalists interpret Soviet censorship twenty-five years after its end. Firstly, what do they remember or recall. Secondly, to which extent can these recollections be considered a source of truth, and how do they deviate from the truth. Thirdly, how do journalists interpret censorship and their relations with censorship, in particular, their relations with resistance to censorship. The method of frame analysis is used.
 Soviet censorship was designed to regulate all spheres of life but, at the same time, to be invisible (according to the Constitution, freedom of speech and of the press was guaranteed to Soviet citizens). The complex and intertwined censorship system can be divided into two parts: ideological control and concealment of state secrets.
 The ideological control, or party censorship was based on ideological correctness, defined and controlled by the Communist Party and the KGB (Committee for State Security). Guidance on what is ideologically dangerous and forbidden was given by the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party through its propaganda and agitation department. The rules were not always precise and specific, many guidelines were oral and not documented. Party censorship was executed on the individual publication level by editors-in-chief, whose task was to ensure that the correct ideological line was followed.
 State secrets were the responsibility of Glavlit, whose task was to check that the press did not disclose military, state or economic secrets. Their work was based on regularly updated lists of data which were forbidden to be published. For example, in 1976, the list of banned data consisted of 176 pages. The existence and contents of the list of banned data was a secret, only a limited circle of accountable persons (including editorial leaders, but not lower ranking journalists) were allowed to know its content.
 Four main conclusions can be drawn based on the analysed interviews.
 
 The journalists’ recollections of censorship cannot be regarded as objective truth. Recollections are contradictory both in minor details and in fundamental issues. Based on the recollections, no definite conclusions can be drawn about the entire censorship system, but they can be used to understand how specific bans functioned and specific censors acted.
 Journalists preferred to interpret censorship narrowly, as a ban on publishing state secrets. Ideological party control, exercised by editors-in-chief and party functionaries, was interpreted not as a censorship, but as a routine part of the Soviet editing process. In doing so, the journalists distanced themselves from censorship and the censorship process. Journalists placed themselves and the editors outside of the censorship system. Censorship was performed by “others”, in particular, by Glavlit officials and the persons who had to communicate with these officials.
 Journalists framed censorship in four ways: a journalist as a wise, censorship-conscious agent; secretive censorship; unimportant censorship; ridiculous bans. Journalists focused on self-agency, they did not interpret themselves as the victims of circumstance, but as skilfully coping professionals who knew the system and chose ‘doublethink’ to deal with it. Thus the self-superiority dominated – journalists set themselves above censorship. In addition, a number of journalists described the Soviet censorship in a neutral way, without expressing a clear negative or positive attitude towards it and without taking a side. They described, explained and exemplified the bygone phenomenon and the remote past.
 The interviewed journalists framed the experience of the Soviet-era censorship differently from how the editors of cultural magazines have done in their memoires. Among the editors of cultural magazines, the pathos of resistance dominated, while the so-called regular journalists among the studied sample represented the pathos of adaptation. The interviewed journalists emphasized their awareness of the system, its way of functioning and its boundaries. They found that an experienced and wise journalist accepted censorship as an inevitability of Soviet life and was able proactively to take bans into account. They did not, however, interpret it as being subjected to censorship, but as avoiding censorship. Thus, journalists distanced themselves from the scale of adaptation/resistance to censorship and described themselves as bystanders.

Security in the balance: How Britain tried to keep its Iraq War secrets

State secrecy is incompatible with the values of liberal democracy if there is no publicly reasonable justification for the concealment. So how can a liberal democracy continue to keep state secrets amidst suspicion that no such justification exists or that, worse, those secrets contain evidence of wrongdoing? This article maps and critiques the justificatory strategies that were used by the British state to refuse to disclose secret material related to the 2003 Iraq War, despite widespread accusations of hidden deception and illegality. Through an analysis of the legal discourse that underpins freedom of information (FOI) and disclosure protocols, the article shows how the law regulates disclosure through a metaphorical ‘balance’ of public interests. This balance, however, is no balance at all. It is profoundly one-sided because security only features on one side. The law explicitly recognizes that disclosure can create insecurity for public interests, but lacks any recognition of the opposite: the insecurity of secrecy. Rather than security trumping liberal values, this law allows enduring secrecy to be framed, paradoxically, as a means to secure liberal democratic accountability. The significance of this claim is far-reaching as FOI laws in many other countries employ a similar harm-based, one-sided justificatory strategy.

PROBLEM ASPECTS OF FORENSIC EXAMINATION ON STATE SECRETS’ ISSUIS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDING

Article 518 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine for the first time regulated the production of forensic examination regarding the legality of attributing information in the field of defense, economics, science and technology, foreign relations, state security and law enforcement to state secrets, changing the secrecy of this information and its declassification damage caused to the national security of Ukraine in the event of the disclosure of classified information or the loss of material carriers of such information. This definition is cumbersome, that is why it is advisable to call the expertise at issue broader in content and more laconic in form – “in matters of state secrets”. The appointment, support and conduct of forensic examinations on this issue is accompanied by lengthy and still not completed scientific discussions and related practical problems, which include subjects which are able to conduct examinations on state secrets, and the methodology for conducting them. Thus, the disposition of Part 1 of Art. 518 Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine regarding the subject of the examination on state secrets do not correspond to the content of other applicable laws and regulations. Also, no certified and registered by the established procedure methodology for conducting forensic examination on state secrets’ issues has been established. In order to comply with the rule of law and legality as basic criminal proceedings according to Art. Art. 7, 8, 9, 22 Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine: – it requires forming by authorized order the type of forensics as a state secret forensic and a type of relevant expert specialty; – it is advisable to expand the circle of subjects of expertise on state secrets’ issues at the expense of other specialists who are knowledgeable in matters of state secrets. They can be members of expert commissions under state secrecy experts, if at the same time complying with the set of normatively defined requirements for judicial experts who are not employees of state specialized agencies conducting forensic examinations. These requirements must also be met by state secrecy experts. In the future, a crucial step could be to consider the assignment of the functions of judicial experts on state secrets’ issues to the Security Service of Ukraine staff, which is entrusted with Article 2 of the Law of Ukraine “On the Security Service of Ukraine” to ensure the protection of state secrets and which is a specially authorized state body in the field of ensuring the protection of state secrets in accordance with Part 5 of Article 5 of the Law Of Ukraine “On State Secrets”; – authorized state bodies are obliged to solve the problem of developing, certifying and state registration of a methodology for conducting a forensic examination on state secret issues. Key words: state secret, forensic examination.

Демократичний цивільний контроль над сектором безпеки і оборони України і перспективи його вдосконалення

The article examines the current state of democratic civilian control in the security and defense sector of Ukraine and looks at the prospects for its improvement. It is noted that the system of democratic civilian control over the security and defense sector of Ukraine is in the process of becoming. It is emphasized that the creation of a truly legal democratic state where parliamentarians and political leaders feel accountable to voters, listening to the views of civil society is an objective precondition for the implementation of effective democratic civilian control over the security and defense sector. At the same time it is noted that strengthening the Verkhovna Rada’s control powers, improving the legislation on state secrets, and ensuring the openness of the state budget will contribute to the improvement of the system of democratic civilian control over the security and defense sector of Ukraine.

Терористичні загрози закордонним дипломатичним установам України

Стаття присвячена розгляду проблем забезпечення безпеки закордонних дипломатичних установ (ЗДУ) України в умовах виникнення терористичних загроз у країні акредитації. Зокрема, автором проаналізовані вирішення завдань забезпечення безпеки ЗДУ під час терористичних акцій в їх оточенні, при блокуванні представництв терористами та захопленні приміщень установ і їх співробітників як заручників.
 Метою статті став пошук ефективних шляхів забезпечення безпеки закордонних дипломатичних установ України та їх персоналу під час терористичних акцій в країнах акредитації.
 Наукова новизна статті полягає у дослідженні можливостей розробки сучасної системи організації в ЗДУ, адекватної протидії наявним викликам і загрозам терористичного характеру, а також відповідної актуалізації відповідних правових норм та інструкцій. У статті відпрацьовані конкретні рекомендації щодо дій в екстремальних ситуаціях під час терористичних акцій в оточенні ЗДУ, зокрема, при блокуванні представництв терористами чи захопленні їх приміщень злочинцями, а також утримуванні дипломатичних співробітників як заручників.
 Висновки. Негативні тенденції сучасного світового розвитку такі як: прояви міжнародного тероризму, організованої злочинності, контрабанда наркотиків і зброї, нелегальна міграція і торгівля людьми; зростання екологічних і природних катастроф, загроз епідемій та пандемії; збереження ескалації заморожених конфліктів і поява нових джерел напруженості, виникнення кризових ситуацій, зокрема, активізація щодо України внаслідок подій на сході терористичної та розвідувально-підривної діяльності спецслужб РФ, покладають на СЗР України та інші спеціальні державні органи завдання належним чином забезпечувати національну безпеку держави, її закордонних дипломатичних установ, їх співробітників і членів сімей, а також відряджених за кордон українських громадян, обізнаних з відомостями, що становлять державну таємницю. Напрацьована світова практика та удосконалення нормативного регулювання у сфері зазначених питань сприятимуть вирішенню завдань забезпечення безпеки ЗДУ під час терористичних акцій в їх оточенні, при блокуванні представництв терористами та захопленні приміщень установ і їх співробітників як заручників.

Problems of legal regulation of the grounds for termination of an employment contract at the initiative of the employer

The presented scientific article arises from the research of theoretical and practical problems of the legal regulation associated with the grounds and the procedure for termination of an employment contract at the initiative of the employer under a free market economy. The article substantiates a number of concepts, along with ideas and conclusions which are conceptual in theoretical terms and important for the legal practice. In particular, for the first time the classification of stages of development of the labor legislation regulating the procedure for termination of an employment contract at the initiative of the employer is given, characteristics of each of these stages are analyzed and defined. In addition, the article summarizes the expediency of bringing the norms of the national legislation on the dismissal of employees at the initiative of the employer in accordance with the conventions and recommendations of the International Labor organization, and substantiates the need to fix the amount of severance allowance depending on the grounds for dismissal of the employee and the length of current employment. There have been formulated proposals to specify the grounds for termination of an employment contract with an employee performing educational functions. Moreover, it is suggested to introduce in the labor legislation standalone grounds for termination of an employment contract at the initiative of the employer, namely: dismissal of the employee on completion of qualification testing; violation of labor protection rules by the employee, which resulted in serious consequences, including injuries and accidents; dismissal of the employee due to changes to essential labor conditions; deliberate violation by the employee of the obligation not to disclose the state, commercial and other secrets or information protected by law; provision of false information by the employee to the employer when concluding the employment contract; termination of business by the employer as an individual.

Right to privacy: a review of international and national legislation

The article explores the role and importance of confidential information in the life of modern society, focuses on the problems of ensuring the legal protection of confidential information. The degree of personal freedom in the state, democracy and humanity of the political regime depends on how guaranteed the confidentiality of information is, the secrets of the private life of citizens, how deeply a state can penetrate the content of these secrets. As a result of the study, theoretical statements were formulated proving the existence of the institution of confidential information, its significance in the development of communicative relations was determined, a classification of existing types of confidential information in the legal system of the Republic of Kazakhstan was proposed with substantiation of its practical significance, the definition of secrecy in legislation was outlined, characteristics. Many of these problems have not been previously studied independently or are not sufficiently developed or require rethinking in relation to the new conditions of life in the country.
 Recently, there have been positive developments in terms of overcoming the previously established stereotypes of the secrecy cult. Many information barriers have been eliminated; methods of administrative-command management of information flows are eliminated. The general civilization process of creating the global information space implies greater openness of states. At the same time, the formation of a new statehood based on the principles of democracy, legality, the desire for more active cooperation with foreign countries based on the openness of the parties does not exclude the need to maintain state secrets and other types of confidential information.