State Intervention In Economy Research Articles

Property Threats, Antistatism, and Business Organization in Latin America

Business elites' ability to act collectively is influenced by the scope of their political organization. Within Latin America, large cross-national differences exist on this variable. Some countries have strong encompassing associations that can speak authoritatively for the private sector as a whole, but others do not. This article examines the causes of these differences through a comparative historical analysis of Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. The existing scholarship offers three explanations of variance in business organizational scope in the region, focusing on threats, state encouragement, and the mode of transition to neoliberalism, respectively. This article argues that the explanations involving state encouragement and neoliberal transition are unconvincing. Although the focus on threat is more satisfying, the existing perspective on threat should be refined in two important ways. One is by emphasizing the centrality of threats to private property. Threats of other types may induce temporary cooperation, but what distinguishes cases of strong and enduring encompassing organization is the occurrence of major property threats. The second refinement is to specify that ideas about the state provide the causal mechanism linking threat to organization. Property threats engender encompassing organization by institutionalizing, within the business community, views that underscore the dangers of state economic intervention.

Banditry or business? Rebel labor markets and state economic intervention

ABSTRACT Stationary banditry is ubiquitous in civil war, with some rebel groups even investing in and profiting from primary commodities for years or decades. But for many of these groups, labor is a necessary component of resource production, such that laborers’ economic participation is vital for rebel funding and survival. States, meanwhile, are eager to prevent rebels from establishing these economic footholds. In areas where rebels can assert control of primary commodity markets, military competition between states and rebels may be supplemented by economic competition over laborers’ efforts. Under what conditions do governments wage local economic war by providing incentives to laborers to minimize the appeal of economically partnering with rebels? I argue that laborers’ economic loyalty is a central and under-considered component to resource-driven conflicts. When rebels seek to establish stationary banditry, states incentivize laborers to participate in the legal economy rather than rebel-controlled markets. Specifically, states will pursue economic counterinsurgency policies in areas where rebels are most likely to profit from labor-intensive primary commodities. I find support for this argument using municipal-level Colombian data about the FARC’s involvement in the coca trade and government provision of agricultural credits. El bandolerismo estacionario es omnipresente en la guerra civil, yalgunos grupos rebeldes incluso invierten en productos básicos yse benefician de ellos durante años odécadas. No obstante, para muchos de estos grupos, el trabajo es un componente necesario de la producción de recursos, de modo que la participación económica de los trabajadores es clave para la financiación yla supervivencia de los rebeldes. Por su parte, los Estados ansían impedir que los rebeldes establezcan este tipo de apoyo económico. En las zonas donde los rebeldes pueden imponer el control de los mercados de productos básicos, la competencia militar entre los Estados ylos rebeldes se puede complementar con la competencia económica por el esfuerzo de los trabajadores. ¿En qué condiciones los gobiernos desatan una guerra económica local al ofrecer incentivos alos trabajadores afin de minimizar el atractivo de asociarse anivel económico con los rebeldes? Sostengo que la lealtad económica de los trabajadores es un componente fundamental ypoco considerado en los conflictos relacionados con los recursos. Cuando los rebeldes pretenden imponer un bandolerismo estacionario, los Estados incentivan alos trabajadores aparticipar en la economía legal en lugar de en los mercados controlados por los rebeldes. En concreto, los Estados promulgarán políticas de contrainsurgencia económica en las zonas donde los rebeldes tienen más probabilidades de beneficiarse de los productos básicos que requieren mucha mano de obra. Respaldo este argumento mediante datos que compartió Colombia anivel municipal sobre la participación de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) en el comercio de coca yla provisión de créditos agrícolas por parte del gobierno. Le banditisme stationnaire est omniprésent dans les guerres civiles, certains groupes rebelles investissant dans et profitant même des produits primaires pendant des années ou des décennies. Mais pour nombre de ces groupes, la main-d’œuvre est une composante nécessaire à la production de ressources, et la participation économique des travailleurs est donc essentielle au financement et à la survie de ces rebelles. Dans le même temps, les États souhaitent ardemment empêcher les rebelles d’établir ces points d’ancrage économiques. Dans les zones où les rebelles peuvent affirmer leur contrôle sur les marchés des produits primaires, la concurrence militaire entre les États et les rebelles peut être complétée par une concurrence économique sur les efforts des travailleurs. Dans quelles conditions les gouvernements mènent-ils une guerre économique locale en offrant des incitations aux travailleurs pour minimizer l’attrait d’un partenariat économique avec les rebelles ? Je soutiens que la loyauté économique des travailleurs est une composante centrale et insuffisamment prise en considération dans les conflits reposant sur des ressources. Lorsque les rebelles cherchent à établir un banditisme stationnaire, les États incitent les travailleurs à participer à l’économie légale plutôt qu’aux marchés contrôlés par les rebelles. Plus précisément, les États mèneront des politiques économiques de contre-insurrection dans les zones où les rebelles sont les plus susceptibles de tirer profit des produits primaires exigeant beaucoup de main-d’œuvre. J’ai trouvé du soutien à cet argument en m’appuyant sur des données colombiennes au niveau municipal concernant l’implication des FARC dans le commerce de la coca et l’octroi de crédits agricoles par le gouvernement.

Will China and/or the United States Transform the WTO?

China's 2001 entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the 2016 election of Donald Trump have converged to form an existential threat to the WTO. Can the WTO manage a large economy with China's level of state economic intervention and political authoritarianism? Will the Trump administration's confrontational approach reform or destroy the organization?

O CONSTITUCIONALISMO ALEMÃO: A EXPERIÊNCIA SOCIALDEMOCRATA DE WEIMAR

A Constituição de Weimar nasce sob os auspícios da derrota sofrida na Primeira Guerra Mundial e após a “vergonhosa”, para boa parte dos alemães, paz de Versalhes. A República de Weimar nasce sob as ruínas do antigo. Afirma-se como uma carta constitucional social democrata de novo tipo, instituidora de um Estado Social no plano político-jurídico e social. A República de Weimar proclamava-se um Estado destinado a satisfazer as necessidades sociais de seus cidadãos de uma forma inovadora, em uma dimensão grande até mesmo em um contexto internacional do inicio do século XX foram repletas de conturbações sociais que geraram significativos referenciais teóricos para o Direito, a Filosofia e Política. O Constitucionalismo alemão de Weimar institui direitos de 2º dimensão, intervenção econômica do Estado e um sistema de direitos e garantias fundamentais mais completos contribuindo para o constitucionalismo social nascente.

Política económica y modo de acumulación en la Argentina de la posconvertibilidad

In this article we show that a central aspect of accumulation mode and its tensions during the last decade in Argentina was a growing gap between economic policy and the main trends of capitalist accumulation in the period. This gap was originated in the way that the specifically political dimension of economic policy determined the course of State economic intervention. Given the importance attached to the characterization of the Argentine economic model since 2002 as neodevelopmentalist, we start from clarify the sense of neodevelopmentalist term for the major authors that used it and try to see to what extent the government’s economic policy moves away of that concept. Then we advance in characterizing the mode of accumulation in the Argentina of post-convertibility and finally go back to the question of the place of economic policy and of the meaning of mentioned gap.

No Country for Neoliberalism: A Topic Modeling Approach to Protean Discourses to Resist Privatizations in Italy

This paper analyzes the resistance to the neoliberal discourse supporting privatizations in the Italian sociopolitical field: we address the change from a state control over economy to a situation where most of the state owned enterprises are sold and neoliberal principles are widely adopted and accepted. We focus on resistance, which builds on two frames that differ according to the period when they arise, the words they are composed of, the meanings they bear upon. The first one, which is more prevalent in the period 1984-2000, and that we called “values of developmental state”, opposes privatizations from a technical point of view: it is used in quotes that rationally support state intervention in economy. The second frame, that we called “stigma privatizations”, becomes prevalent starting in 2000 and appears mainly in articles that deal with societal issues, literature, movies and the wider sociocultural debate. Here influential speakers blame privatizations as something that eroded societal cohesion. To explain the transformation, we mobilize the concept of capital as described by Bourdieu: as economic capital attached to delegitimized institutions erode, discourse on resistance does not disappear but is framed within the fields that are less dependent on economic capital. As a connected contribution, the key role played by cultural capital in preserving areas of resistances revives the debate on the role of intellectuals within power dynamics as described by Antonio Gramsci. From a technical point of view, we study the evolution of the vocabulary of privatizations by analyzing almost 70.000 articles in the period 1984-2014. we use Topic Modeling, that is an automated text analysis technique that elicits topics, which are the sets of words that constitute discourses. We then reconstruct frames starting from these topics.

The Societal Cost of China's Rapid Economic Growth

In China, political control is centralized and economic management is decentralized. This gives rise to a serious principal–agent problem, in which the agents are often better informed than the principal. China also has a semi-marketized economy involving much state intervention. This intervention serves both a political and an economic function. It enables the Communist Party to remain in political command and generates formidable patronage resources. It also provides the policy instruments, including incentive structures for officialdom, to maintain a “developmental state.” The combination of economic decentralization and a semi-marketized economy creates a problem of weak accountability and a breeding ground for rent-seeking and corruption. For a quarter of a century China's leadership gave overwhelming priority to the objective of achieving rapid economic growth. This policy was viewed as providing political legitimacy and securing the best protection against social instability. It is argued that the leadership was able to solve the principal–agent problem in its pursuit of economic growth. By contrast, the solution to the principal–agent problem failed in other respects, giving rise to societal costs. Little attention was paid to the dramatic socioeconomic changes—including rising inequality and economic insecurity, environmental degradation, mass migration, rent seeking, and corruption—which accompanied economic growth and posed new challenges. It is argued that these changes help to explain the failure of life satisfaction scores to rise over the two decades from 1990–2010. They can also help to explain the rise in indicators of social instability over that period. It is to be hoped that the new leadership's current anti-corruption campaign, together with its declared policy intention to reduce state economic intervention and increase reliance on competitive markets, will strengthen deterrence and weaken opportunities for rent seeking and corruption. The paper carries the implication that China's economy cannot be well understood except through the lens of political economy.

The Reversal of the Privatisation Logic in Central European Transition Economies

The main ambition of this study is to explain the unexpected change in the transition process of some Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries starting in the second half of the 2000s. Special attention is paid to changes in and the attitudes of governments toward state ownership. Although statist approaches gained momentum in the economic policy of various states in and after the 2008/2009 crisis, this did not mean a fundamental reorientation expressed in changes in the main economic conditions such as ownership patterns. Nevertheless, governments in some CEE countries seem to flirt with such ideas too in the general policy of increasing state economic intervention. The privatisation process was stopped and in a number of cases, formerly privatised assets were re-nationalised. Governments strengthened their influence in the governance structure in mixed-ownership companies. The main body of the present paper provides a better understanding of this change in state property policies. We also call attention to the risks of a reversal of the privatisation logic. An increasing role of the state as proprietor may today strengthen similar negative political and economic consequences and risks as the ones against which the privatisation agenda of the 1990s was suggested. It can reduce competition, give way for political and personal rentseeking, and weaken the functions of market economic institutions.

Some Things Borrowed, Some Things New: Toward a Multi-Sites of Power Approach to State Theory

INTRODUCTIONHow do we explain the relationship between the state and society that produces the main social organizing principles of race, class, gender, and sexuality? Theorists of the state have explored this question for decades, producing a lively debate among proponents of contrasting models, most of which have, however, remained embedded in an exploration of class-based issues. Business dominance state theorists, for example, have consistently focused on the relationship between the state and economic or class actors that reproduces largely class relations through the state's authority to create policy and the huge dominance of capital interests over the state (Akard, 1992; Burris, 1992; Clawson, Neustadtl, and Weller, 1998; Hooks, 1990; Prechel, 2000; Skidmore and Glasberg, 1996).Capitalist state structuralists, in contrast, have emphasized the notion that the state is not simply situated in a society, but is instead a state. State policies are forged by the structure of the state itself and its position within the larger economy. State managers are constrained by the imperatives of the political economy to create and implement policies that reproduce the conditions of capital accumulation and to manage the conditions that create accumulation crises. State managers have no choice but to legislate this way: were the state to somehow operate outside of these structural parameters, it would court economic crises, which in turn would create political legitimacy crises that state managers can ill afford (Poulantzas, 1969; Mandel, 1975; Wright, 1978; Valocchi, 1989; Block, 1987; Glasberg, 1989). Moreover, because the state is the structural unification of contradictory class relationships, it remains free from direct control by class-based organizations. Pro-capitalist state economic intervention is not, therefore, produced by the participation of business organizations and corporate actors in the policy formation process. Rather, policy is a product of the contradictory relations of power embedded within state structures themselves. It is an expression of the state's underlying, structural bias.In contrast to both business dominance and state structuralist theories, state-centered structuralist theories argue that the state is the site of bureaucratic political power. The state is neither necessarily in nor subject to capitalists' demands. As an institution, the state has interests separate from the demands of external groups or economic pressures. Thus, it is possible for state managers to create policy to which all interest groups might actually object. State policy is shaped neither by the class backgrounds of its personnel nor by the of the political economy, but rather by the imperatives of bureaucracies. The state, as a bureaucratic and political structure, is separate from the economy. As such, state policy is shaped by past policy precedents, political and party needs, and state managers' interest in expanding their administrative domain and autonomy. In sum, the state is impervious to mechanisms of intraclass unity identified by business dominance theory and unaffected by the capitalist nature of state structures assumed by state structuralists (Skocpol and Ikenberry, 1983; Skocpol, 1985; 1992; Amenta and Skocpol, 1988; Hooks, 1990; 1991; Amenta and Parikh, 1991; Amenta and Halfmann, 2000; Chorev, 2007). It is also, according to this perspective, impervious to pressures from below.Proponents of the class dialectic perspective disagree with this last assertion. Instead, they complicate the analysis of state policy formation by examining the role of labor in addition to the state and capitalists in the decision-making process. In this model, class struggle processes affect the state and its policy making. As such, social movements through organized resistance can in fact apply substantial pressure on the state to legislate in their interests or otherwise address their needs, even if these needs are not entirely consistent with those of capital accumulation interests (Zeitlin, Ewen, and Ratcliff, 1974; Zeitlin and Ratcliff, 1975; Whitt, 1979; 1982; Esping-Anderson, Friedland, and Wright, 1976; Levine, 1988; Eckstein, 1997; Jackson, 2008). …

ECONOMIA, ÉTICA E TRIBUTAÇÃO: DOS FUNDAMENTOS DA DESIGUALDADE

In recent years, a way of conceiving the Economic science became dominant, an understanding of economics as “engineering”. In this sense, the economics is seen as a problem of management, logistics, as if the resolution of economic problems had to be done from “mathematical models”. In this essay, instead, what we sought was to rescue the economics as a philosophical problem, economics as “ethics”, explaining the economic phenomenon by immersing this in a context of intersubjectivity that characterizes human relations. The problematic established by this background specifically evaluates the relationship between economics and taxation, since the state will be a key agent in the modern economy, whereas taxation is the main form of state economic intervention today. From this relationship, settles the central question of this paper: what is the relationship between economics, ethics and taxation? It was found that the discussions about these three points are guided by a foundation criterion, eg. always bet on some kind of notion of equality. Thus, to discuss the correctness of certain economic relations or the legitimacy/validity of a particular form of taxation, there is need to confront the political theory that supports the notion of equality in a particular community, since it will be from this conception that will fix the limits of acceptable inequality and the role of agents in economic and tax relations.

Value Attainment in Local Political Leadership. Evidence from Four Towns of East-Central Europe

The present paper is an attempt at examining the value configuration and the socio-demographical profiles of the local political elites in four countries of East-Central Europe: Romania, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and Poland. The treatment is a comparative one, predominantly descriptive and exploratory, and employs, as a research method, the case-study, being a quite circumscribed endeavor. The cases focus on the members of the Municipal/ Local Council in four towns similar in terms of demography and developmental strategies (i.e. small-to-medium sized communities of around 35,000 inhabitants, with economies largely based on food industry and commercial activities): Tecuci (Galaţi county, Romania), Česká Lípa (Liberec region, Czech Republic), Targovishte (Targovishte province, Bulgaria), and Oleśnica (Lower Silesia province, Poland). Hypothesizing that the local elites of the former Sovietized Erurope tend to differ in outlook, priorities, and value attainment, as compared to their Western counterparts, the paper considers the former's attitudes and perspectives in regard to seven values: a series of values customarily connected with the concept of “democracy” (i.e. citizen participation, political conflict, gradual change, economic equality), state intervention in economy, decentralization and increased local autonomy, cultural-geographical self-identification.

Changes in the Governance of Local Public Services in Italy. The Case of an Italian Municipality

This short paper is fundamentally a reflection on the subject, a medium size Italian municipality, that one of Terni, with about 110.000 inhabitants (number rather stable from 2000), about 1.000 employees and a budget (2008) of €370 million. This municipality has 3 fully owned corporations, participates with high percentages in 3 corporations and has minority in others 5. I intend to deepen the capability to apply proper corporate governance strategies, in order to fulfill the will of the principal, corporate entrepreneurship principles. the propensity to use PPPs and the ability to develop dynamic efficiency inside them.We move in a panorama in which persists an ideological attacks against the state intervention in economy, and in which the European legislation, as implemented by the Italian Parliament, progressively reduces the role of local and central state in the management of public services.

Privileged Accumulation Spaces and Restrictions on Development of State‐Business Relations in Argentina (1966–1989)

AbstractThe aim of this work is to explain how the state‐business relation has influenced economic development in Argentina. I will make a historical and systemic analysis of the Argentinian case to illustrate how and why state‐business relations supporting privileged accumulation spaces (PAS) increased development restrictions from 1966 to 1989.During this period, successive governments shared a common view about the central role the state had to perform for industrialization, especially by supporting the growth of big domestic industrial companies. This view would only radically change in 1989, when neoliberal structural reforms were implemented.To support this hypothesis, I suggest a methodological strategy that combines several techniques and sources in order to analyze the evolution of three complex variables and their multiple relations: state economic intervention, business behavior, and performance by large corporations.

Was the Bombay Plan a Capitalist Plot?

In 1944, a group of Indian businessmen issued A Plan of Economic Development for India. This came to be known as the Bombay Plan. The attitude of Indian industrialists to the economic structure of independent India was encapsulated in the Plan. The views of the bourgeoisie were, by this stage, closely aligned with those of the Indian National Congress. The Plan therefore contained a strong endorsement of state economic intervention and planning. The motives of the bourgeoisie in this endeavour are the subject of this article.1 Rejecting claims that the Indian bourgeoisie put forward the Plan as a ruse, the author concludes that the bourgeoisie’s self-interest at the time demanded state economic intervention—as did the interests of the nation.

Da Intervenção do Estado na Economia

The neo-liberal capitalist ideology holds that government intervention is harmful for the economy and that it should move away from economic issues and manage only the political and social orders. However, it is the State, through its institutions, that keeps the economic system adopted by a country and guards mechanisms and laws that confirm and maintain the status quo determined in Constitution. Since the Weimar Constitution, all countries determine the economic ideology in its Constitution and Brazil historically follows this line of State organization. In this paper, we will see the constitutional forecast of state intervention in economy since the first Brazilian constitution to this day. We will also study the ordinary laws governing the State intervention and public bodies which are responsible for this legitimate State action. After examining the proposal we realized that government intervention in the economy exists not only to meet the needs and desires of Brazilian society, but is mainly for the system maintenance and defense of ideology provided by the Federal Constitution.

Sinking under the weight of corruption: Neoliberal reform, political accountability and justice

The United Nations adopted the 2003 Convention Against Corruption to reduce corruption in developing nations. Corruption’s determinants include political systems’ permeability to economic influence, state economic intervention, weak political competition and officials’ discretionary power to allocate resources. Corruption’s outcomes are slowed economic development, misallocation of government resources, income inequalities and, less frequently, disasters. Using archival and interview data, this article documents corruption’s shaping of the 2006 sinking of an Egyptian ferry in the Red Sea, which killed 1034; high-level corruption not only caused the disaster but exacerbated its impacts. The study’s findings confirm much of the empirical literature but contradict assertions that corruption is associated with high levels of government intervention in the economy. Based on the findings, the article gives a critique of neoliberal reform that associates it with high-level corruption.

Self-regulation for professional activities of stock market participants their sense, aims and principles of integration

The expediency of introduction of self-regulation as most important element of realization of the general strategy of optimization of the state intervention in economy is proved. The essence, the purposes and principles of introduction of the self-regulatory organizations of stock exchange market participants are shown. Advantages and demerits of self-regulation are presented.

International Transformations of the Capitalist State1

Abstract: There has not been a retreat but a transformation of the state, involving significant changes in both the public sphere of politics and the so‐called private sphere of economic activity, and in their modes of interaction, especially law. The privatization of state‐owned assets and the reduction of direct state economic intervention have not led to a reduced role of the state but to changes in its form, involving new types of formalized regulation, the fragmentation of the public sphere, the decentering of the state and the emergence of multi‐level governance. This has been complemented by the increased salience of “private” regulation, so that in many ways the apparently private sphere of economic activity has become more public. In fact, there has been a complex process of interaction with a blurring of the divisions between apparently private and public regulation. Despite talk of deregulation there has been extensive reregulation, or formalization of regulation, and the emergence of global regulatory networks, intermingling the public and the private. The transition from government to governance means a lack of a clear hierarchy of norms, a blurring of distinctions between hard and soft law, and a fragmentation of public functions entailing a resurgence of technocracy.

BRUNO S. FREY I JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ O ZAWODNOŚCI PAŃSTWA I ZAWODNOŚCI RYNKU

One of the most fascinating economic issue is effectiveness of operating of resources allocation mechanisms. During 250 years, mercantilists were favouring a nation, later Adam Smith convincingly substantiated, that only market mechanism enables nations to achieve prosperity, however John Maynard Keynes postulated ‒ during the Great Depression ‒ a state intervention in economy. New more sublime arguments have appeared at issue of market failure and government failure. Several years ago, Joseph E. Stiglitz and Bruno S. Frey suggested an interesting solution to this problem. They maintain that it disappoints government, as well as market. J.E. Stiglitz claims that the state should intervene only in cases when it has possibility to reduce market failure. He postulates government and market co-operation, what can result in their reinforcement and effective solutions for social problems. Whereas, B.S. Frey notices that only a powerful nation is able to make rules for an economic game, which enable private markets to operate well. Each time, comparative analysis of costs and profits of market and state operating should make a decision which resources allocation mechanisms to choose.

The Dimension of Stateness in Times of Crisis: Case Study - Romania

For over a generation, the trend of world politics is to weak statehood. In the twentieth century, many states were too strong and committed acts of aggression both on its own population and the neighbouring states.However after September 11, 2001, the main problem of global politics was not to find ways of restricting the state, but to building it. For individualistic societies (USA) and the global community, rendering the state outside the arena was not a prelude to utopia, but the beginning of a global crisis. Despite the many concerns about the loss of power in a global world, the State remains the key actor in the domestic as well as international arenas. The many “challenges that we confront today are beyond the reach of any state to meet on its own. At the national level we must govern better, and at the international level we must learn to govern better together. Effective States are essential for both tasks and their capacity for both needs strengthening” (United Nations, 2000). Since its inception, the national state has guaranteed internal and external security; underpinned the law; funded national welfare systems; provided the structures for popular representation; instituted public accountability; and built the framework for economic and social activities. During the last century, the responsibilities of the State have expanded in all these areas. The general configuration of state responsibilities has changed and this has introduced important modifications both in the policy arena and in the State’s requirements for high-level skills, qualitatively and quantitatively. Even, developing countries have made tremendous progress toward reforming the state in the last decade. As Fukuyama noticed in his book ‘State – Building. Governance and world order in the 21st century’ the absence of a state-building agenda and an appropriate institutional framework, and also the capture of the state in the globalization movement (n.a.), brought it in an even worse situation after liberalization, than if this would not be produced at all. Starting from the distinction created by Fukuyama between the two dimensions of stateness (scale and institutional capacity/strength) we will try to place Romania in the stateness matrix considering the range of the state functions and their arrangement. In our study we will try to determine the state functions in times of crises taking into consideration that Romania is a state in transition, a state under reform. In times of crises the state must react and his reaction, in most cases, produces effects in economical and social sector. Therefore, often the main lever of state intervention in economy is public administration. For example the financial credits of the state are managed by the government, more precisely by public administration. But even in this area, there are a variety of ways of doing things. Thus, once we have identified the state functions we will try to determine public administration functions when the state is in economic crisis. On the state leaders agenda, at the request of IMF, is compulsory to take into account the reduction of the expenses of budgetary payments. In this situation the state must react and choose either the disposal of the civil servants either of sending them home in non-payment. One important point is to see if the state manages to keep the civil services at the same level of quality without budget, salaries or trained human resources (The Romanian Government announced disposals of 20% of civil servants even we can see that at local level it is a lack of trained human resources). In these conditions, is public administration capable to react? When it is “accused” of being bureaucratic, corrupt and short in civil servants? So, we will emphasis the idea that during the financial and economic crisis the state is as strong as public administration is capable to react and manage such a complex situation.