Programs to disarm and demobilize former combatants are standard features of peace agreements, but demobilized rebels face many challenges. I document a threat to demobilized rebels that emerges when rebel groups fragment, namely, selective violence by splinter groups. Why do splinter groups target demobilized rebels? While previous research on risks for this population has emphasized stigmatization or criminality, I argue that rebel splinter groups selectively target demobilized members of their parent group owing to their skills, experience, and potential for intelligence sharing. I analyze the pattern of violence against demobilized members of the FARC, a major rebel group in Colombia. Areas where FARC splinter groups emerged saw increased rates of violence against demobilized FARC rebels; this violence disproportionately affected demobilized rebels compared with other civilians, and activity by other armed groups did not have similar effects. These findings highlight an understudied channel through which rebel fragmentation threatens peace agreements.

Prophetess Christinah Nku is celebrated as the first African female Pentecostal to establish an African Independent Church (AIC), St John Apostolic Faith Mission after breaking away from the Apostolic Faith Mission of South Africa in 1938. Her church later reached Southern Africa through many splinter groups belonging to Apostolic churches. Three other female African Pentecostal, Pastor Mpfariseni Mukhuba, Pastor Irene Tshifhiva, and Bishop Mapula Mphahlele, also established independent African Pentecostal churches in the late twentieth century. Just like Prophetess Nku, all three women face entrenched patriarchy and stereotypes with their communities. The objectives of this article are (a) to explore how the three emulates Prophetess Christinah Nku in the prophetic gift, healing and deliverance, experiencing patriarchy, and elevating the status of African female Pentecostal leaders; (b) determine the biblical and theological leadership function of these four women. The three-step Magadi practical theology research method of is used to focus on the above objectives. The article concludes that although the four leaders lived in two different epochs, there latter three emulates the former leader in the prophetic gift, healing and deliverance, are victims of patriarchy and in elevating the status of African female Pentecostal leaders. Lastly, the article shows that, from a Pentecostal re-reading of some New Testament texts, their leadership role and function is biblically and theologically congruent.

ABSTRACT This article analyzes the role of familial leadership in insurgent organizations through the case of the Paraguayan People’s Army (Ejército del Pueblo Paraguayo - EPP), a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group that emerged in 2008 and developed a unique ideological framework known as Francismo del Siglo XXI. Drawing on a multidisciplinary methodology that combines bibliographic research, official judicial documents, media sources, and expert interviews, the article explores how kinship-based leadership structures shape cohesion, trust, and organizational resilience. Specifically, we state that the EPP developed a ‘two-ringed strategy’ which positioned founding figures and their relatives at the core of the organization, surrounded by a secondary circle of members with strong familial and affective ties. Despite this familial leadership fostering loyalty and protection against state infiltration, it also introduced severe limitations such as the concentration of power, internal divisions, and the formation of splinter groups. The article concludes that this rigid familial leadership model, once a source of strength, has likely become a vulnerability to the group, thus evidencing how kinship-based leadership can simultaneously strengthen and undermine insurgent organizations.

This study discusses the problematics of splinter groups (splinter sects) that have emerged in Dolok Manampang Village and their impact on the religious and social life of the local community. This phenomenon has drawn attention due to the emergence of teachings that deviate from mainstream Islam, both theologically and in ritual practices. The research focuses on several key aspects: the identity and doctrinal deviations of the splinter group, the resulting social and religious impacts, the responses of the community and religious leaders, and efforts to strengthen faith and maintain social harmony. The research employs a descriptive qualitative approach using data collection techniques such as interviews, observation, and document analysis. The findings show that the presence of the splinter group has caused unrest among residents, leading to disrupted social harmony and polarization in community relations. Religious leaders and community members have responded with various approaches, including rejection, religious education, and open dialogue to prevent further conflict. Comprehensive strategies are needed to counter the negative influence of such groups, including strengthening faith-based education within the community, inclusive religious counseling, and collaboration among religious leaders, educational institutions, and village authorities. These efforts aim to preserve social cohesion, reinforce religious conviction, and prevent social disintegration caused by extreme ideological differences.

What explains why some splinter groups are highly violent, capable, and durable, while others are not? Although existing scholarship provides important insights into the causes and consequences of terrorist group splintering, it provides contrasting – and at times contradictory – explanations of splinter behavior. This research note resolves this contradiction using the Tracking of Terrorist Organization Splintering (TOTOS) dataset. TOTOS is a new and original dataset that traces the lineage of terrorist organizations-both domestic and transnational-that were active between 1970 and 2020, identifying 144 original parent organizations and 370 splinter groups comprising 138 families. Using a novel, theory-based typology on terrorist group splintering, I distinguish four types of terrorist group splinters: divorce, reformation, challenger, and familial. I provide compelling descriptive and statistical evidence that disaggregating splinters reconciles competing findings about the consequences of splintering on violent behavior. Beyond advancing the literature on terror group formation and splintering, the new information in this research note will help scholars further explore why some groups are more violent, more willing to engage in activities that win the hearts and minds of host populations, and more likely to endure.

This paper explores factionalism in Nepalese political parties and its causes and effects on party factions. Nepal’s political culture is rife with factionalism, splinter groups, and power struggles. The paper traces the historical development of factionalization from ideological conflict and personal rivalry. The paper segments society into groups based on ideology, personality, geography, and one-off issues. It analyzes the negative impact of factionalism on party discipline, stability, policymaking, and government. This paper examines the social non-linearities of leadership in factionalism and shows how their presence makes effective leadership essential to combatting factionalism's effects. This case study of major Nepalese political parties is technically an objective and practical demonstration of factionalism. A global perspective can enhance many of the firm conclusions based on case studies of factionalism within political parties in various countries. The paper suggests ways of dealing with and tackling the issue of factionalism, including the importance of keeping its internal democracy and communication and showing how to deal with elements that would not help. The paper concludes with possible driving factors behind this exclusive mirage of a political system. It suggests a few essential recommendations to subdue factionalism, like strengthening leadership, intra-party democracy, improving the legislative mechanisms, etc. It essentially places the responsibility on concern for factionalism, which can stymie effective government and dilute the moral legitimacy of democracy in Nepal.

ABSTRACT This study examines the conditions under which insurgent groups can be successfully integrated into the state at political and military levels during post-conflict stabilization. While previous research emphasizes disarmament, demobilization, and integration, these steps are neither universal nor linear. Our research proposes an alternative approach: integrating insurgent groups into military and political institutions without requiring disarmament. This strategy hinges on a two-pronged method that divides insurgent groups into leaders and soldiers. Leaders are integrated into the political system, ensuring their power, legitimacy, and regional influence, while soldiers retain their arms within the military, reducing the risk of splinter groups and resentment. This approach provides insurgents with a compelling incentive to join state structures, discouraging a return to violent non-state activities. Through a mixed-methods analysis, including t-tests and case studies from the Philippines and El Salvador, we demonstrate that maintaining armed insurgents within state institutions reduces violence and fosters stability. This study builds on previous research by exploring tactics to draw insurgent groups into negotiations and offers significant contributions to state-building literature.

Jihad and Terrorism in the Perspective of Islamic Law (Hidayatussalam and Muhammad Mufti M. Djafar). Jihad and terrorism are two terms that have recently become the focus of international attention. The international community assumes that these two terms are manifested as movements of several activist groups that In Islam there are two sides that cannot be separated. Islamic history has noted that jihad and terrorism are not new phenomena, but each has a different history. Jihad emerged when Islam came, brought by the Prophet SAW, and became popular when the Prophet SAW moved to Medina. Meanwhile, terrorists emerged since the political constellation among the Shi'a which was spearheaded by Hasan bin Sabah, known as a splinter group of the Assassin sect, a splinter of the Shi'a Islᾱmiyyah group which allowed the murder of political opponents from the Bani Seljuq whom they claimed had gone astray in the 11th century and 13th. Jihad and terrorism are two terms that have recently become the focus of international attention. The international community assumes that these two terms, which have become the movements of several activist groups in Islam, are two sides that cannot be separated.

This research paper aims to analyze the resurgence of the two prominent terrorist organizations – TTP and ISKP. Pakistan is already faced with immense challenges in the form of political polarization and socioeconomic instability. The resurgence of TTP and ISKP adds to the mounting security challenges. The recent expansion of militant activities across the country indicates an on-again nature of insurgency that TTP and ISKP have waged against Pakistan. The reintegration of the significant splinter groups expanded jihad against Pakistan. A thorough reassessment of the resurgence and its impact on Pakistan's national security is made by employing a securitization theory. The resurgence of TTP and ISKP and their attempted comeback demands a more rigorous examination of the plethora of factors that might assist the rebuilding of the said terrorist organizations. This research intends to fill the literature gap that persists regarding the resurgence of the two aforementioned groups.

Abstract Putting anthropologists of design in conversation with Black studies, this article demonstrates how a group of repentant education entrepreneurs in post‐Katrina New Orleans mobilized racialized affective and narrative surplus within an information economy based on design rituals and protocols. I examine how this splinter group of education reformers established design communities through ritualized “pitches” and show how the egalitarian aspirations of designers rely on forms of empathetic erasure rooted in narratives of spectacular violence and universalist assumptions about the motivations, behaviors, and capacities of so‐called users and so‐called designers. While it is easy to laud the “empathy principles” of design thinking for taking seriously the agency and intellectual capacity of its racialized “users,” this article shares anti‐Blackness theorists’ skepticism of liberal humanization projects and is concerned with the burdens that the relationship between designers and users entails. What is the human at the center of design? Humanity here is not a shared essence, nor an egalitarian relation, but in this instance marks a process through which surplus affect and the spectacle of Blackness is instrumentalized and transmuted into racial capital.

Abstract Why do rebel splinter groups emerge during peace processes, and who chooses to defect? Since Colombia's landmark peace agreement with the FARC in 2016, roughly half of the territory once controlled by the group has seen a resurgence of rebel activity by FARC splinter groups. I argue that the FARC's return to arms is a case of “middle-out fragmentation,” whereby opportunities for profit induce mid- or low-ranking rebel commanders to establish splinter groups. In Colombia, I argue that profits from the cocaine trade incentivized local-level FARC officers to defect from the peace agreement and allowed them to rapidly mobilize viable splinter groups. I offer several lines of evidence for this argument. I first construct a chronology of splinter group formation, which demonstrates that mid- and low-level commanders, rather than high-level commanders, were the key drivers of fragmentation. Second, I show that splinter groups emerged in areas where opportunities for profit were greatest. Among areas previously controlled by the FARC, those with coca cultivation prior to the peace agreement were up to thirty-seven percentage points more likely to see splinter groups emerge by 2020 than areas without significant production. Using soil and weather conditions to instrument for coca cultivation produces similar results. Further, I use a novel measure of how critical each municipality is to drug trafficking to show that areas that are theoretically most important for drug trafficking are also more likely to see FARC resurgence. I also address competing explanations related to state capacity, terrain, and popular support for the rebels. These findings highlight an important challenge to peacebuilding: satisfying the political demands of rebel leadership is a necessary but insufficient component of peace agreements in cases where opportunities for profit motivate fragmentation from the middle out.

Although there are some techniques for dealing with sparse and concentrated discrete data, standard time-series analyses appear ill-suited to understanding the temporal patterns of terrorist attacks due to the sparsity of the events. This article addresses these issues by proposing a novel technique for analysing low-frequency temporal events, such as terrorism, based on their cumulative curve and corresponding gradients. Using an iterative algorithm based on a piecewise linear function, our technique detects trends and shocks observed in the events associated with terrorist groups that would not necessarily be visible using other methods. The analysis leverages disaggregated data on political violence from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) to analyse the intensity of the two most violent terrorist organisations in Africa: Boko Haram (including its splinter group, the Islamic State West Africa Province), and Al-Shabaab. Our method detects moments when terrorist groups change their capabilities to conduct daily attacks and, by taking into account the directionality of attacks, highlights major changes in the government’s strategies. Results suggest that security policies have largely failed to reduce both groups’ forces and restore stability.

Existing research portrays militant splinter groups as more violent than their parent organizations due to factors like more extreme preferences or capacity-building needs. Though widely held, the assumption that splinters are particularly violent has not been systematically tested. In this paper, we develop and test an alternative explanation for splinter behavior. We argue splinter groups often appear less violent than their parents due to an underlying selection effect. Splinters break away where there are large organizational barriers to internally address a faction's grievances. These barriers tend to exist in well-organized parents that are also capable of high levels of violence. Splinter groups lack this established organizational infrastructure, resulting in lower levels of relative violence. We test this logic with an original dataset on parent and splinter groups and a pair of comparative case studies. We find that splinters are less violent than parent organizations, challenging conventional wisdom.

The paper describes Islam in the Sahel region, prior to the advent of Usman Dan Fodio, who through Jihad, upset the established Islam and replaced same with a new form of Islam, which was said to be purer. He believed that, the Islamic ideology which had been in place around the Sahel region had been syncretic and should therefore be replaced. It does appear that, this development had formed the foundation for the present puritan struggle, led by the insurgents in the North East of Nigeria, where Islam had initially started off in Nigeria. The paper traces the basic beliefs and teachings of members of the Boko-Haram and their splinter groups, which clearly contradict the known Islamic standards. To this end, members of Boko-Haram had thrown caution to the winds as regards western education. It totally abhors and condemns western education and all its attendant paraphernalia. This belief system has set the extremists in collusion with the law enforcement agencies of Nigeria. The war has dragged on for so long, despite the fact that the leadership of the insurgency had been decimated severally. The lesson learnt has been that it would be very difficult to defeat the insurgents, as they continue to metamorphose and develop into splinter groups. To make the situation worse, the researcher discovered that, the insurgents are now internationally affiliated.

The rise in splinter groups within rebel movements and opposition groups has serious implications for conflict resolution efforts. Yet existing literature has not sufficiently touched on the key implications and factors that lead to the split and fragmentation of rebel groups. One of the conflicts that have been impacted by the problem of fragmentation of warring parties is the South Sudan conflict. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) has experienced internal fragmentation historically during the struggle for independence from Sudan and today during the civil war that began in 2011. New groups have emerged claiming to be paying allegiance to leaders and pursuing a different course. This paper argues that internal fragmentation within the SPLM constitutes a serious threat to peace in Africa’s youngest nation. The author examines the motivations behind such fragmentations and their implication in the understanding of the South Sudan prolonged conflict. The paper begins by examining the causes of the South Sudan conflict and the patterns of violence, and it assesses wartime governance and the fragmentation of the groups. The study concludes with a set of recommendations for the resolution of the conflict.

At the beginning of 2023, the second (and last) term of Muhammadu Buhari’s presidency came to an end. On February 25, there took place a general election, as a result of which Bola Tinubu, the candidate of the ruling All Progressives Congress, was elected as the new head of state. The election was held against the backdrop of a marked polarization of the country along ethnic and religious lines, exacerbated by the divisive rhetoric of certain presidential conten-ders. The new leader will face a host of challenges ranging from a security crisis to a mismanaged economy. Political instability persists in many parts of the country: terrorists of Boko Haram and its splinter group, the Islamic State West Africa Province, operate in the northeast; the conflict between pastoralists and farmers is escalating in the northwest and central regions; in the south, in the Niger Delta, anti-government groups engage in oil theft and vandalism; there is an upsurge of pro-Biafra separatist sentiment in the southeast, etc. At the same time, the coming to power in Nigeria of B.Tinubu, who actively participated in the political life of the country during the terms of M.Buhari and supported the former president in many undertakings, is unlikely to lead to fundamental changes in domestic, economic and foreign policymaking, including Abuja’s relations with Moscow.

This article discusses how forms of humour have been mobilised to negotiate, subvert or sustain various paradigms of structural oppression. By so doing, it highlights the shift between the sacred and the profane; the religious and the secular in performance activism by looking into humour as a genre of Resistance Art, both among secular and religious actors. As case studies, ‘Christian’ comedians Charbel Khalil and animator Ralf Karam exemplify the former (the secular); and ‘Sunni’ Palestinians (involved in nationalist struggle) and the ‘Shi‘a’ resistance movement Hizbullah, the latter (the religious). The rapid evolution of Hizbullah from a marginal splinter group to a dominant segment in Lebanese, regional and international politics enhanced its orientation towards cultural and artistic productions by giving them more weight and visibility in public space. Hizbullah believes that art is the most eloquent and effective means of Islamic propagation; thus relating public interest (maslaha) to reform, resistance, mobilisation and political struggle. That might explain why Hizbullah invests heavily in performance activism. As a Resistance Movement, Hizbullah considers purposeful art, or ideologically motivated art, as Resistance Art. In its ideology, Hizbullah regards popular culture as a site of struggle between: (1) the ‘resistance’ of subordinate groups in society, the subaltern groups, or the ‘oppressed’, and (2) the forces of ‘incorporation’ operating in the interest of dominant groups in society, or the ‘oppressors’. As an Islamic protest (jihadi) movement, Hizbullah considers Resistance Art as counter-hegemonic art, which aims at rectifying individuals and reforming society by portraying art as pious–moral productions that provoke serious thought and discussion, rather than what it considers the ‘purposeless’ ‘art for the mere sake of art’. All of the above, including Hizbullah, consider humour as an ‘agency’; as a socially constructed phenomenon. Both Khalil and Karam support the dictum of ‘scourge of evil laugh’. Their works exemplify the theatre of the absurd: absurdist drama or tragic comedy, replete with oxymora, which Hizbullah also subscribes to. Since Khalil and Karam consider their comic works as ‘artistic resistance’ (muqawama faniyya), then how does their humour differ from Hizbullah’s Resistance Art? Unlike Khalil and Karam, Hizbullah does not consider ‘the widest possible spectrum of humorous expression an artistic, cultural, and social good’ (Schweizer, 2020, p. 36), rather only performance activism of Resistance Art and its derivatives of didactic and purposeful-oriented art and performances.

The objective of this article to find out the strategy of the Islamic counseling in increasing people`s understanding in religion in Medan. The sampling technique in this study used the technique of Snowball sampling. The researcher selects the informants according to the sample category by following the suggestions and recommendations of the key informants, followed by the informants appointed by the key informants. Regarding the performance of extension workers in the Ministry of Religion of Medan City, the author directly met the Chair of the Pokjaluh Ministry of Religion of Medan City as the key informant. The method in this study uses a qualitative approach, namely the descriptive method. The problem is focused on the strategy of Islamic religious instructors in increasing religious understanding of the people in the city of Medan. Data collection techniques through triangulation techniques. namely comparing observation information, interviews with the contents of related documents. Based on the analysis and the data in the field, it is found that, first, Islamic counseling consists of 8 (eight) specializations – eradicating the Koran alliteration, halal products, radicalism and splinter groups, peaceful family, HIV/AIDS & drung, zakat (charity), waqf, and reconciliation of religius people; secondly, the strategy of Islamic counseling in increasing people`s understanding religion in medan has been successful.

What prompts individuals to leave an established extremist group to join a breakaway faction or splinter group? This phenomenon of inter-terrorist or inter-extremist group migration is under-studied. However, terrorists and extremists can and do migrate between groups, especially in those instances when the costs of exit are low. Using a systematic, iterative, inductive theoretical approach merging existing theory on fragmentation and defection with insights from deep fieldwork with 11 Islamist extremist groups in Indonesia between 2010 and 2019, this article identifies three mechanisms via which individuals migrate between extremist groups: social ties, ideological affinity, and opportunity. In doing so, it finds that Indonesian Islamist extremists rarely switch for the same reason each time; instead, their decisions are shaped by relationships, needs, and beliefs that evolve and shift over their lifecycle in that particular jihadi ecosystem.

This article focuses on how the white farmers responded to violent take-over of land. Having had a privileged status in society, the white farmers found themselves in a very fragile state as Third Chimurenga began. The violent take-over of land was spearheaded by war veterans. Images of white farmers who were beaten, killed, exiled and driven from their homes became synonymous with land invasions. Such events and acts of eviction became commonly referred to as Jambanja as more and more farmers suffered violent confrontations on their farms. The white farmers were portrayed as being in direct opposition to the government land distribution agenda that had given approval to the invasions and evictions. The article examine the effectiveness of Commercial Farmers Union in responding to the invasions, the new splinter groups and how they responded to the invasions and also the SADC tribunal petition by Mike Campbell. The article will also provide an analysis on how Jambanja spread and how it was carried out. Thus through reading library sources and literature in collections as well as carrying out interviews this article seeks to demonstrate that white farmers tried without much success to resist the sanctioned farm invasions. Ultimately the white farmers lost their prized possession that is the land. The article will highlight the dynamics of land politics in Zimbabwe. Keywords: Commercial Farmers Union, Implications, Jambanja, Land Politics, Third Chimurenga