Ethical Spirit Research Articles

Self-knowledge and the practice of ethics: Ostad Elahi's concept of the “imperious self”

When approaching the perplexing issue of self-knowledge, two questions should be kept in mind: What type of knowledge do we expect? and, more importantly, Why does this knowledge matter for us? Among the motivations behind such an endeavor, the ethical project of self-transformation is of particular interest, for it sheds light on the inherently constructive nature of self-knowledge. Psychologists dealing with the issue of self-realization and identity formation, however, generally tend to overlook the resources offered by ethics considered as a genuine self-transformative practice (in contrast to morality as a set of rules or principles to be applied in specific contexts). The tradition of "spiritual exercises" is considered from this self-transformative perspective, as well as Plato's conception of self-knowledge ("know thyself"). Finally, Ostad Elahi's concept of the "imperious self" is examined in detail: beyond the particular context to which it belongs (spiritual ethics), the "imperious self" appears as a valuable tool for understanding the active part played by self-modeling in the process of self-transformation.

ПРОБЛЕМА ТРАГИЧЕСКОГО В ЭЛЕКТРОННО-ВИРТУАЛЬНОЙ РЕАЛЬНОСТИ: ФУТУРОЛОГИЧЕСКИЙ АСПЕКТ

In the article the potential of tragic as strong factor of influence upon moral spirit of man in the sphere of electronic virtual (computer) reality (EVR) are analyzed. EVR is considered as a special type of «soft» reality, characterized by particular existential-constructive function, which gives one an opportunity to realize his resourses.

The Convergence Model of Pietist Ethics: Faith Active in Love (Gal. 5:6)

From their theological and devotional writings to their social and ecclesial practices, the fathers and mothers of Pietism boldly declared the ethical spirit of the Christian faith. The core theology of Pietism is simple: faith active in love. Against misunderstandings of Pietism as individualistic, rule-based, and otherworldly, this paper argues that Pietist ethics is best categorized by convergences, e.g., of faith and life, holiness and action, piety and social reform. In addition to clarifying what scholars call "one of the least understood movements in the history of Christianity," this paper challenges a religious culture that juxtaposes faith and social action.

Environmental Ethics from the Japanese Perspective

The subject of Western environmental ethics has been widely written about and discussed but the same can not be said of ‘Japanese’ environmental ethics. This discipline has not been covered in any branch of Japanese philosophy nor has there been sufficient pressure exerted by ecologists on Japanese thinkers and writers to explain how the Japanese code addresses environmental concerns. Although some Japanese scholars have in the past articulated their ideas on working with the natural world, the field covering the spirit and core of Japanese environmental ethics remains largely unexplored. This paper examines and compares the discipline of Japanese environmental ethics, a ‘bottom up process’, with that of the Western model, a ‘top down process’. It defines, and presents a new insight into environmental ethics from the Japanese perspective where the concept of ‘living with nature’ is more sensitive towards the environment than is the Western one of ‘taming nature’.

Virtue Ethics and Modern Society—A Response to the Thesis of the Modern Predicament of Virtue Ethics

The revival of modern Western virtue ethics presents the question of whether or not virtue ethics is appropriate for modern society. Ethicists believe that virtue ethics came from traditional society, to which it conforms so well. The appearance of the market economy and a utilitarian spirit, together with society’s diversification, is a sign that modern society has arrived. This also indicates a transformation in the moral spirit. But modern society has not made virtues less important, and even as modern life has become more diversified, rule-following ethics have taken on even greater importance. Modern ethical life is still the ethical life of individuals whose self-identity contains the identity of moral spirit, and virtues have a very important influence on the self-identical moral characters. Furthermore, modern society, which is centered around utilitarianism, makes it apparent that rules themselves are far from being adequate and virtues are important. Virtues are a moral resource for modern people to resist modern evils.

論醫療中的家庭決策

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.本文首先通過引入“家庭決策”揚棄“家屬決策”之概念而統一了家庭、患者和家屬之意願，消弭了長久以來醫療決策領域存在的患者決策和家屬決策之矛盾與紛爭。其後，文章從中國儒家文化中的“仁愛”、“孝悌”與“家庭觀”之視角立論了家庭決策的妥當性與可行性，並在西方倫理的自由主義和主體性思想中找到了家庭決策之落腳點。This paper begins with a definition of “family decisions.” I emphasize that family decisions are made jointly by all close family members on a voluntary basis. This decision-making mechanism is designed to embody the spirit of Confucian family ethics and maximize the benefit of family involvement in medical decision making.Introducing this concept allows us to abandon the outdated concept of “family member decisions” that seems to exclude the patient from the process of decision making. Family decision models should reflect the unity of the family, and should include both the patient and his or her close family members in the proper way in the decision making process. This unity will help to eliminate contradictions or disputes on whether medical decisions should be made by the patient alone or by the patient’s family members only. This paper expounds on the appropriateness and feasibility of the family decision model from the perspectives of benevolence (ren), filial piety (xiao), and family values cherished in the Chinese Confucian culture. First, Confucianism regards benevolence as the highest ethical and moral virtue, with filial piety as the foundation. According to the Confucian concept of filial piety, the rudimentary moral standard for individuals is that they must love their family members. As family decisions involving medical care need to take into account the long-term interests and common development of all family members, those decisions should be more in line with the spirit of reciprocal affection among family members advocated in the concepts of Confucian benevolence and filial piety. At the same time, family members are more likely to reach a compromise among themselves, based on mutual love, that maximizes the interests of the family for every member. Second, in accordance with the Confucian concept of the family, the life and behavior of individuals do not entirely belong to them, but rather to their family. Indeed, individual happiness is greatly dependent on the well-being of the family. Hence, the Confucian concept of the family underpins the family decision model and makes it appropriate in a clinical context. Influenced by the Confucian concept of the family, family decisions are easier to reach in China.This paper also explores the basis for family decisions in Western ethics, and suggests that the family decision model can also be defended from a liberal ethical perspective. In the process of family decision-making, every family member must limit their own behavior so as not to interfere with the freedom of other family members, thereby allowing every member the maximum freedom that they can enjoy in familial life. This reflects the ethical meaning of liberalism in a more comprehensive and in-depth way. Further, when making family decisions, all family members participate in the consultation as moral agents, and the status of each member as a moral agent is fully respected and exhibited. Finally, a family often serves as a moral community, and there are thus few obstacles to joint decision making arising from differing views on values. At the same time, even if family members hold different moral standards, they can still fully understand the needs of other family members in the process of familial decision making through effective mutual communication, so that a consensus is easier to reach through reciprocal compromise.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 122 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.

Spinal anesthesia: how can we improve patient satisfaction?

Since spinal anesthesia was introduced in clinics about 100 years ago, many studies have examined whether spinal anesthesia decreases operating time, mortality, cardiovascular morbidity, number of patients requiring a blood transfusion, deep vein thrombosis and pulmonary embolism, pain, opioid-related adverse effects, and the length of hospital stay when compared with general anesthesia. Macfarlane et al. [1] performed a systemic review of the contemporary literature comparing general anesthesia and/or systemic analgesia with regional anesthesia for total knee arthroplasty. They did not suggest a difference in blood loss or duration of surgery. However, regional anesthesia reduced postoperative pain and opioid-related adverse effects in patients undergoing total knee arthroplasty. Length of hospital stay may also be reduced and rehabilitation facilitated by regional anesthesia compared with general anesthesia. They found insufficient evidence from randomized, controlled trials alone to conclude whether anesthetic technique influenced mortality, cardiovascular morbidity other than postoperative hypotension, or the incidence of deep vein thrombosis and pulmonary embolism in the setting of routine thromboprophylaxis. In this issue of the journal, Rhee et al. [2] prospectively evaluated factors affecting dissatisfaction and refusal of spinal anesthesia. Anesthesiologists have a duty to inform patients about risks and alternatives to anesthetic methods. It is the basic spirit of medical ethics to allow patients to choose an anesthesia method. Anesthesiologists frequently hold a biased view when they choose the anesthetic method rather than obtain the opinion of patients, and they have a variety of reasons for choosing a given anesthetic technique. A technique may be chosen simply because we know it; it may be a favorite technique or a less familiar technique chosen to maintain competence/experience or to teach. Other reasons are a request from patients or surgeons [3]. If anesthesiologist allow patients to decide the anesthetic method, in many cases the patients say don't know. It's up to you; Is spinal anesthesia painful?, don't want to awaken during the Will I feel pain after the operation?, or Does spinal anesthesia cause back pain?. Therefore, the anesthesiologists must explain fully about the applicable anesthesia method and help patients to decide the procedure by their own volition. If a patient can not decide their anesthetic method, anesthesiologists must choose it considering the patient's situation. In a study by Rhee et al. [2] 44/1,191 patients (3.7%) revealed dissatisfaction with spinal anesthesia. The reasons for the dissatisfaction were backache (29.5%), postoperative nausea and vomiting (PONV; 20.4%), pain at the puncture site (15.9%), inadequate analgesia (13.6%), consciousness during the operation (6.8%), postdural puncture headache (4.5%), transient neurologic symptoms (4.5%), and urinary retention (4.5%). In that study, postoperative backache was the most common cause of dissatisfaction. However, back pain may not be directly related to spinal anesthesia and is almost always associated with pre-existing back pain [4,5]. Backache after spinal anesthesia is almost always associated with positions during the operation, surgical trauma, operation time, age, pregnancy, needle type, the number of punctures, a different bed, or long bed rest other than preadmission to the hospital [4,6]. Therefore, if the anesthesiologist had explained to the patient that back pain was not directly related to the spinal anesthesia, in most cases, the results of their study would change. PONV after spinal anesthesia is often due to fentanyl administered with local anesthetics. It is difficult to say that PONV is a side effect of spinal anesthesia. It can increase the satisfaction rate not to mix opioids with local anesthetics when it is known that PONV will cause a problem to patients. Rhee et al. [2] reported that the dissatisfaction rate from spinal anesthesia was 3.7%. Other studies have demonstrated higher rates such as 3.8-17% [7,8]. A patient's satisfaction is associated with multiple factors including the methods and attitudes of the investigators, social circumstances, and the relationship between the patient and doctor. I think that the patient-doctor relationship is the most important factor when physicians care for their patients, and good rapport can affect patient satisfaction. Paresthesia and pain at the puncture site are dependent on the skillfulness of the physician, the number of punctures, and age and gender of the patient. Sedation during an operation with spinal anesthesia is frequently required and is an important factor to increase satisfaction rate. Midazolam, propofol, and dexmedetomidine are used for this purpose. The main uses for sedation in regional anesthesia are to reduce anxiety and improve patient comfort and cooperation [9]. In conclusion, some factors increase the satisfaction rate of patients who are undergoing an operation with spinal anesthesia. First, a patient's opinion is very important when deciding the anesthetic method. Secondly, the anesthesiologists must fully explain about spinal anesthesia before surgery. Thirdly, the anesthesiologists should have good rapport with their patients. Finally, the anesthesiologist should manipulate the patient skillfully and sedate the patients if they want.

The Destiny of Modern Virtue Ethics

The revival of Aristotelian virtue ethics since the 1980s does not signify that it goes back to its original form; rather, it is generally manifested in three different variations: The first is a variation of what is known as communitarianism, the second is universalism, and the third is phronesis. On the social level of morality, the serious attempt of modern virtue ethics towards improving the moral spirit of society is laudable. However, its method and reasoning deviates greatly from the demands of modern society’s integration of its operating rules and regulations, and concept of values; hence all of its attempts can hardly escape the fate of becoming just a fantasy. Yet, on the level of dealing with ethic conflicts and moral paradox, modern virtue ethics—via interpreting the theory of phronesis by Aristotle—proposes the valuable thought of a balanced morality that principlism should concern itself with and nourish itself from.

The Sanctuary Movement and Central American Activism in Los Angeles

The Sanctuary movement of the 1980s combined religious faith and social activism to provide refuge for Central Americans fleeing violence and persecution and to raise awareness of the responsibility associated with U.S. policy in the region. Features of the Los Angeles area, such as its large Latino population, provided support and a sense of community; in this sense the city itself was a sanctuary. The presence of many Central Americans who brought their experience and skills in organizing in their home countries to the development of solidarity and refugee organizations in Los Angeles were also an important resource for the Sanctuary movement. The development of the Sanctuary movement was characterized by the interaction of spiritual ethics and religious practice with activism in raising consciousness and providing legitimacy. The strength of the movement lay particularly in the profound experiences and narratives of refugees, shared through personal connections that spanned cultures and countries.

Response to “Prohibition of artificial hypoxic environments in sports: health risks rather than ethics”

We appreciate the comments made by Dr. Lippi, Dr. Franchini, and Dr. Guidi in response to our article ‘‘The spirit of sport, morality, and hypoxic tents: logic and authenticity’’ (Malloy et al. 2007). In their response, Lippi et al. have made a case for a prospective health risk associated with ‘‘excessive exposure to hypobaric hypoxia’’. The scientific evidence they report indicates that exposure to hypoxic environments — be they natural or artificial — beyond 3000 m presents a potential for significant physical risk. However, Levine and Stray-Gundersen (1992) suggest that an altitude of up to 4000 m is safe to facilitate the necessary physiological adjustments that improve sport performance. Consistent with the logic of the argument we presented, any training regime that places athletes in danger would be condemned. That is, teleologically, sleeping in a tent that replicates a dangerous environment (e.g., >4000 m) would be unacceptable — as would sleeping in the naturally, yet dangerously high, hypoxic environment of a mountain 5000 m above sea level to achieve the similar physiological adaptation. Both of these extremes take the hypoxic training strategy to a hazardous level and are therefore unacceptable. Having said this, extremes in training of any kind are potentially dangerous. For example, a progression of training volume (e.g., kilometres per week) or intensity is used by athletes as a necessary part of the training regime. However, if the progression in volume or intensity is too great, the athlete will be at an increased risk of injury. Thus, too much training too quickly is detrimental to both athletic performance and health. Some of the negative health outcomes associated with an inappropriate progression in training is an elevated resting heart rate, shin splints, decreased appetite, low energy levels, and depression. Reason seems to dictate that athletes are to avoid these dangerous extremes and seek what Aristotle (1968) would argue as ‘‘virtuous’’ training. He describes virtue as the mean between excess and deficit. To occupy either extreme is not only to choose badly, but also to damage the individual’s ‘‘soul’’. He states that

Contrasting the Behavioural Business Ethics Approach and the Institutional Economic Approach to Business Ethics: Insights From the Study of Quaker Employers

The paper suggests that in a modern context, where value pluralism is a prevailing and possibly even ethically desirable interaction condition, institutional economics provides a more viable business ethics than behavioural business ethics, such as Kantiansim or religious spiritual ethics. The paper explains how the institutional economic approach to business ethics analyses morality with regard to an interaction process, and favours non-behavioural, situational intervention with incentive structures and with capital exchange. The paper argues that this approach may have to be prioritised over behavioural business ethics which tends to analyse morality at the level of the individual and which favours behavioural intervention with the individual’s value, norm and belief system, e.g. through ethical pedagogy. Quaker ethics is taken as an example of behavioural ethics. The paper concludes that through the conceptual grounding of behavioural ethics in the economic approach, theoretical and practical limitations of behavioural ethics as encountered in a modern context can be relaxed. Probably only then can behavioural ethics still contribute to raising moral standards in interactions amongst the members (stakeholders) of a single firm, and equally, amongst (the stakeholders of) different firms.

The spirit of sport, morality, and hypoxic tents: logic and authenticity

The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) has recently made a decision to allow the use of hypoxic tents amid a significant amount of controversy over the morality of their use for athletic training purposes. Currently, altitude training is considered moral, but other means of improving aerobic performance are not; for example, blood doping. Altitude training and blood doping have similar results, but the methods by which the results are achieved differ greatly. The controversy lies in how the use of a hypoxic device falls within WADA's philosophy, which will then dictate future policy. This paper discusses the influence of a hypoxic environment on human physiology, altitude training's influence on athletic performance, the concept of authentic physiology, and moral behaviour that is the foundation for logical debate.

Utylitaryzm wobec krytyki etyków cnót

The subject of the article is the current debate between virtue ethics and the proponents of utilitarianism, who represent one of the most important ethical conceptions present in analytic philosophy. Among other things, advocates of virtue ethics blame utilitarianism and ethics based on the deontological model for the long absence of virtue in thinking about morality; they do not accept the strong consequentialist suppositions of utilitarianism and criticize the fundamental ambiguity of the category of happiness in this theory. A closer analysis of contemporary utilitarianism shows that the objections of advocates of virtue ethics have been overcome in some of the positions formulated on the ground of utilitarianism. Moreover, there have also appeared several attempts to reinterpret utilitarianism in the spirit of virtue ethics, for example, R. Crisp’s virtue utilitarianism, R. Adams’ motive utilitarianism, and P. Railton’s value utilitarianism. This seems to imply that the basic principles of utilitarianism and virtue ethics are not as divergent as has often been assumed.

Agents of responsibility in software vulnerability processes

Modern software is infested with flaws having information security aspects. Pervasive computing has made us and our society vulnerable. However, software developers do not fully comprehend what is at stake when faulty software is produced and flaws causing security vulnerabilites are discovered. To address this problem, the main actors involved with software vulnerability processes and the relevant roles inside these groups are identified. This categorisation is illustrated through a fictional case study, which is scrutinised in the light of ethical codes of professional software engineers and common principles of responsibility attribution. The focus of our analysis is on the acute handling of discovered vulnerabilities in software, including reporting, correcting and disclosing these vulnerabilities. We recognise a need for guidelines and mechanisms to facilitate further improvement in resolving processes leading to and in handling software vulnerabilities. In the spirit of disclosive ethics we call for further studies of the complex issues involved.

Specters of the Humean Self

The significance of Hume's skeptical arguments for the development of Kant's critical philosophy is well-known to those familiar with the history of philosophy. In fact, it would not be imprecise to say that the whole of Kant's philosophy may be viewed as a reply to Hume. What is less clear is the degree of success Kant had in answering Hume. While it is beyond the scope of this essay to evaluate the whole of Kant's corpus, I will argue that despite his transcendental turn, the ghosts of Hume still haunt Kant's philosophy. In particular, I will draw attention to an aspect of Kant's thought that paradoxically is often overlooked yet is of great importance to contemporary Kant scholars, namely his account of virtue. Kant's account of virtue in the Metaphysics of Morals and Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason leads to a fracturing of the self and a failure to account for virtue as an abiding state of character. Furthermore, I will locate Kant's problem in his understanding of subjectivity and argue that Husserl's description of embodied transcendental subjectivity can provide a more adequate account of subjectivity and virtue while retaining the spirit of Kant's ethics. I will first discuss Kant's theory of virtue as it is presented in the above works and indicate how it leads to a re-emergence of the Humean self in Kant's moral philosophy. Second, I will argue that these difficulties are founded upon Kant's conception of subjectivity as bifurcated between rational and sensible nature. Third, I will argue that a new conception of moral subjectivity is needed in order to overcome this difficulty and that Husserl's notion of embodied transcendental subjectivity meets this need. Finally, I will end with some indications of how a Husserlian ethics can retain the spirit of Kant's moral philosophy by discussing Husserl's notion of the "truly ethical human being." Kant's Account of Virtue and the Re-emergence of the Humean Self Let me begin my discussion of Kant's theory of virtue by indicating the importance of this problem for Kantian ethics. Contemporary Kantian apologists have devoted a considerable amount of attention to the role of the emotions within Kant's moral philosophy. In general, they have argued against a traditional reading of Kant that accuses him of having an inadequate moral psychology. Because we have become increasingly aware of the extent of Kant's writings on ethics, these scholars have been able to cogently argue that Kant's moral philosophy does not reject the emotions (or inclinations) from playing a positive role in our ethical lives.1 While I do not have the time to engage in a discussion of these arguments, it is clear that these efforts on the part of Kant scholars are also an attempt to answer the criticism from neo-Aristotelean and virtue ethicists that Kant's ethics has a "thin" moral psychology.2 However, articulating a coherent theory of virtue is a task internal to Kantian ethics, and insofar as this is the case, this essay will not directly address neo-Aristotelian critiques. In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant indicates the importance of a doctrine of virtue for his ethics. He states that ethics "provides a matter (an object of free choice). . . an end that, as far as human beings are concerned, it is a duty to have."3 In other words, ethics provides the content or ends that human beings must pursue if they are to act morally, and Kant's "Doctrine of Virtue" seeks to identify these ends. This description of the "Doctrine of Virtue" may strike some as odd, for it does not make reference to traditional theories of virtue that focus on the cultivation of certain habitual dispositions. Kant is aware of these approaches and explicitly rejects them. He does not want to define virtue in terms of a habit or attribute, for "unless this aptitude results from considered, firm, and continually purified principles, then, like any other mechanism of technically practical reason, it is neither armed for all situations nor adequately secured against the changes that new temptations could bring about. …

From Detachment to Immersion: Wittgenstein and ‘The Problem of Life’

Wittgenstein is widely recognised as a philosopher with a markedly ethical character to his thought. This paper seeks to highlight the dimension of selflessness and renunciation in this ethical character. It also seeks to show that there are distinct differences in Wittgenstein's implicit conception of what an ethical selflessness amounts to in the early and the later periods. The concept of absolute safety enables us to appreciate the connections between the early Wittgenstein and a particular type of nineteenth‐century obsession with a selflessness that combines with a self‐sufficient capacity to stand aloof from anxiety in the face of the human condition involving meaninglessness and death. In the early Wittgenstein that aloofness came close to a solipsistic and, in some ways, self‐affirming apartness from everything other than the self. In contrast, the ethical spirit that permeates Wittgenstein's later thought is imbued with a sense of the immersion of the self ultimately and absolutely ‘in the world’. The sense in which this latter phrase is used is defined further in the paper.

Spirit of Business Ethics underlying the "Sumitomo Family Precent"

Spirit of Business Ethics underlying the "Sumitomo Family Precent"

Spiritual ethics and information security

Readers of the book “ Marooned in Realtime” by Vernor Vigne are familiar with the concept of a technological singularity. Vigne suggests that the acceleration in world changes brought about by technology is rapidly moving us to a point, a so-called event horizon, beyond which everything will dramatically change. Specifically, he makes reference to a point where computer intelligence exceeds that of humans.

Must we care about morality?

Abstract Moral philosophy is at its best when it takes human psychology seriously. Such are the instincts of Thomas Wren. His engaging book Caring About Morality is an attempt to offer an account of human motivation that is true to human psychology, but which captures the spirit of Kantian morality without Kantian metaphysics. I argue that there are some fundamental psychological considerations which Wren does not take into account, and which are an obstacle to the success of his project. Moral motivation, 1 suggest, is much more tied to the psychological histories of persons than Wren allows.

The separation of law and justice: Managing impressions of corporate ethics programs

Thbs article is based on the study of two companies that differ in their definition of ethics, one with a narrower definition than the other. The one with the narrower definition invited skepticism about its commitment to the spirit of ethics but was better able to manage expectations about its ethics program. The one with the broader definition might have appeared more true to the spirit of ethics but was more vulnerable to claims made against their own standards and language. The implications of these findings for corporate ethics programs are discussed.