Speculative Attack Models Research Articles

CURRENCY CRISES AND CONTAGION CHANNELS IN ASIAN ECONOMIES

This study examines multiple transmission mechanisms that propagate and amplify shocks across Asian nations owing to financial turbulence with emphasis on global shock transmission between economies that prioritise ‘trade’ and ‘financial’ connections in four countries: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Based on the logit estimation outcomes, a higher degree of trade openness amplifies the implications of shocks on the economy. Relevant implications are drawn for optimal regional monitoring and the coordination of integration as the economic fundamentals associated with the currency crises complements the first-generation models of speculative attacks.

Discussion of “Currency Stability Using Blockchain Technology”

The volatility of crypto currencies hinders their ability to be media of exchange or stores of value, leading to the implementation of exchange-rate pegs in an attempt to stabilize these currencies. This strategy has been used by crypto currencies such as US Dollar Tether, Steem Backed Dollar and TrueUSD; and was previously adopted in countries such as Brazil, Mexico and Argentina. However, an exchange-rate peg is vulnerable to speculative attacks if it is not 100% backed by reserves, as discussed in Obstfeld (1996). Using insights from the bank-run literature, Routledge and Zetlin-Jones (2018) build on Green and Lin (2003) and propose a model of speculative attacks. They show that adjustments to the exchange rate can prevent speculative attacks in equilibrium. They also show how to implement such contracts using blockchain technology. In this discussion paper, I provide a cautionary tale. I show also in a version of Green and Lin (2003) that the information content in the blockchain prevents agents from attaining all the gains from risk sharing—highlighting the downsides of too much public information.

Neural Networks for Estimating Speculative Attacks Models.

Currency crises have been analyzed and modeled over the last few decades. These currency crises develop mainly due to a balance of payments crisis, and in many cases, these crises lead to speculative attacks against the price of the currency. Despite the popularity of these models, they are currently shown as models with low estimation precision. In the present study, estimates are made with first- and second-generation speculative attack models using neural network methods. The results conclude that the Quantum-Inspired Neural Network and Deep Neural Decision Trees methodologies are shown to be the most accurate, with results around 90% accuracy. These results exceed the estimates made with Ordinary Least Squares, the usual estimation method for speculative attack models. In addition, the time required for the estimation is less for neural network methods than for Ordinary Least Squares. These results can be of great importance for public and financial institutions when anticipating speculative pressures on currencies that are in price crisis in the markets.

A model of currency crises with heterogeneous market beliefs

This paper shows that the approach followed by Tamborini (2015) in analyzing and interpreting the euro area public debt crisis, based on the role played by agents characterized by heterogeneous market beliefs, can be applied also to the case of currency crises. By doing so, rather than considering the private sector as an atomistic player endowed with perfect information, and by considering a central bank that optimizes the amount of unsterilized inflow of foreign reserves in a Mundell-Fleming type speculative attack model, allows to explain the interest rates convex non-linearity that characterized, for example, a country like Italy during the 1992–93 EMS crisis.

Speculative attacks in a two-peg model

We present a two-country model of speculative attacks where the two countries peg their currency to the U.S. dollar and a continuum of investors can either attack or defend one or the two pegs. The main objective of the paper is to show how extending a single-peg model of speculative attacks with the presence of a second country pegging its currency changes the range of parameters for which a currency is attacked. The model suggests that the presence of another country fixing its exchange rate changes dramatically the range of parameters for which a currency is attacked or defended. For example, the model indicates that a peg with a relatively high probability of collapse could survive if the other peg is not very likely to be abandoned, so investors prefer instead to defend the second peg. Finally, under complete information, when the level of fundamentals in both economies is neither weak nor strong the stronger peg may collapse while the weaker peg may survive, so in principle any peg could be successfully attacked.

Using genetic algorithm in dynamic model of speculative attack

Evolution of speculative attack models shows certain progress in developing the idea of the role of expectations in the crisis mechanism. Obstfeld (1996) defines expectations as fully exogenous. Morris and Shin (1998) treat the expectations as endogenous (with respect to noise), not devoting too much attention to information structure of the foreign exchange market. Dynamic approach proposed by Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan (2006) offers more sophisticated assumption about learning process. It tries to reflect time-variant and complex nature of information. However, this model ignores many important details like a Central Bank cost function. Genetic algorithm allows to avoid problems connected with incorporating information and expectations into agent decision-making process to an extent. There are some similarities between the evolution in Nature and currency market performance. In our paper an assumption about rational agent behaviour in the efficient market is criticised and we present our version of the dynamic model of a speculative attack, in which we use a genetic algorithm (GA) to define decision-making process of the currency market agents. The results of our simulation seem to be in line with the theory and intuition. An advantage of our model is that it reflects reality in a quite complex way, i.e. level of noise changes in time (decreasing), there are different states of fundamentals (with “more sensitive” upper part of the scale), the number of inflowing agents can be low or high (due to different globalization phases, different capital flow phases, different uncertainty levels).

Speculative attacks with multiple targets

This paper examines a global games model of speculative attacks in which speculators can choose to attack any one of a number of targets. In the canonical global games model of speculative attacks with a single target, it is well known that there exists a unique equilibrium that survives iterative deletion of dominated strategies, characterized by the threshold values of the private signal and the fundamentals. This paper shows that with two targets, there is again a unique, dominance-solvable equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the threshold value of signal for attacking a given currency is a function of the signal for the other target, and the threshold value of fundamentals that determines the outcome of attack on one currency is a function of the other target’s fundamentals. Under certain condition on the noise distribution, the result is shown to extend to environments with any $$N$$ symmetric targets. This paper then presents a number of numerical examples and shows, among other results, that more accurate private signals have a decoupling effect on the outcomes of attack on different currencies.

Central Bank and Government in a Speculative Attack Model

This paper studies the interaction between monetary and fiscal authorities while investors are coordinating on a speculative attack. The authorities want to achieve specific targets for output and inflation but also to avoid a regime change (i.e. sovereign default). They use the traditional policy instruments. The model examines the informational role of simultaneous implementation of monetary and fiscal policies in coordination environments. While endogenous information generated by the intervention of one policy maker has been shown to lead to multiple equilibria, we show that if the actions chosen by the central bank and the government not only deliver information to the markets but also influence the fundamentals of the economy, when the authorities have a strong incentive to preserve the status quo over other objectives, then there is no equilibrium in which investors' strategies depend monotonically on their private information on fundamentals.

Models of Speculative Attacks and Crashes in International Capital Markets

Currency and financial turmoils in international capital markets have been the focus of an extensive theoretical research which started around 30 years ago. This paper provides a synthetic overview of this theoretical modeling. We analyze the basic analytical framework corresponding to the dominant theoretical approaches, and discuss their extensions to include the financial sector, contagion across markets and countries, capital ‡flows and borrowing constraints, strategic interactions among agents and equilibrium selection. In the final section we focus on the relevant policy issue of crisis prevention and optimal foreign regime choice in a world of full financial integration.

Unique Equilibrium in a Dynamic Model of Speculative Attacks

A main challenge of understanding currency crises is explaining their puzzling timing. Most “second generation” currency crisis models are static models with multiple equilibria, and exogenous shifts between equilibria are interpreted as shifts of sentiments on financial markets leading to crises. This article develops a dynamic, continuous time model with a payoff structure similar to second generation models. We derive endogenous conditions under which shifts in sentiment occur over time, characterise them in terms the strategic risk associated with speculation, and provide comparative statics. Moreover, we show that the findings correspond almost exactly to the implications of global game currency crisis models, which are often used for equilibrium selection in the static context.

Speculative Attacks with Multiple Sources of Public Information*

AbstractWe propose a speculative attack model in which agents receive multiple public signals. Diverse pieces of public information can be taken into account differently by different players and are likely to lead to different appreciations ex post. This process defines players' expected private values of a successful attack. The main result shows that equilibrium uniqueness depends on two conditions: (i) signals are sufficiently dispersed and (ii) private beliefs about signals' relative precision differ sufficiently. We derive some implications for information dissemination policy. Transparency in this context is multidimensional: it concerns the publicity of announcements, the number of signals disclosed and their precision.

Talking Ourselves to Efficiency: Coordination in Inter‐Generational Minimum Effort Games with Private, Almost Common and Common Knowledge of Advice

We use experiments to investigate the use of advice as a coordinating device in the Minimum Effort Game which is a coordination game with weak strategic complementarities and Pareto-ranked equilibria. The game is played by non-overlapping generations of players who, after they are done, pass on advice to their successors who take their place in the game. We conjectured that this intergenerational design might enable subjects to converge to the payoff-dominant outcome. We find that coordination is most likely to result when the advice is made public and also distributed in a manner that makes it common knowledge. Coordinating the actions of multiple agents is a central issue in many economic problems and the successful resolution of coordination failures is crucial to achieving optimal outcomes in such cases. For example, one of the most important problems in macroeconomics involves the issue of under-employment where the economy can be trapped in a Pareto-inferior equilibrium (Cooper, 1999). In such instances no firm wishes to expand production unless it can be assured that others will do so, yet not doing so leads to an outcome that is worse for everyone concerned. Kremer (1993) in his O-Ring theory of development proposes extensive coordination failures as the cause of under-development in many countries. Here countries may be caught in a low-level equilibrium trap when development requires the simultaneous industrialisation of many sectors of the economy but no sector can break even industrialising alone; see also Murphy et al. (1989). Similar considerations arise in models of currency crises or speculative attacks (Morris and Shin, 1998), models of bank-runs (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) and models of political revolution (Kuran, 1987, 1995) where it is politically risky to attempt to overturn a government unless it is commonly known that others will rise up together. 1 Such coordination problems are ubiquitous and typically

Foreign exchange risk hedging in the context of speculative revaluation attacks

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to propose predictive models of speculative revaluation attacks, which would facilitate currency risk hedging in emerging and developed countries.Design/methodology/approachThe purpose of this paper is achieved using the methodology of multiple triangulation. Paper combines different theoretical perspectives (three generations of speculative attack models), two sources of data (emerging countries and developed countries) and three methods (logit regression, probit regression and artificial neural networks, ANN) for identification of leading indicators and forecasting of speculative attacks. Combination of multiple observations (data), underlying theories and methods allowed achieving least biased results.FindingsA list of leading indicators of speculative revaluation attacks was generated based on previous researches and three generations of speculative attacks' models. Qualitative and quantitative differences of speculative revaluation attacks in emerging and developed countries were identified. The decision matrix of currency risk hedging in the context of speculative devaluation and revaluation attacks was proposed.Research limitations/implicationsAlthough the sample of this researcher includes a wide range of countries (65 in total), their separation into developed and emerging countries is arbitrary (in the course of 35 years some countries have changed the status from emerging towards developed). The initial list of leading indicators is limited, includes mostly economic variables. It could be improved by encompassing political variables, credit ratings, consumer and business confidence indices.Practical implicationsDeveloped predictive models of speculative revaluation attacks may significantly reduce important element of risk – uncertainty – and, consequently, the cost of financial hedging.Originality/valueThis paper is one of the first public attempts to apply alternative methodology of ANN for forecasting speculative attacks. The results showed that latter method is more accurate than probit and logit regressions. Also, to the author's best knowledge, this is a first public attempt to separately analyse the phenomenon of speculative revaluation attacks.

Cabinet Collapses and Currency Crashes

Asset market performance conditions the strategic context of cabinet terminations. In turn, information about cabinet terminations shapes how market actors evaluate the government's commitment to specific policies, affecting overall economic performance. To understand how the economy affects cabinet terminations, therefore, we must account for the endogeneity between cabinet outcomes and market performance. In this article, we model both cabinet terminations and speculative currency attacks. We argue that changes in the probability of different types of cabinet ends condition the probability that currency traders will sharply shift their assets out of a country. In turn, the probability of a speculative attack influences the probabilities of different types of cabinet ends—for instance, the higher the likelihood of speculative attack, the lower the chance of an early strategic election. We connect separate models of cabinet termination and speculative attacks using an instrumental-variables framework.

SOLUTION UNIQUENESS IN A CLASS OF CURRENCY CRISIS GAMES

A common feature of many speculative attack models on currencies is the existence of multiple equilibrium solutions. When choosing the equilibrium strategy, a trader faces Knightian uncertainty about the rational choice of the other traders. We show that the concept of Choquet expected utility maximization under Knightian uncertainty leads to unique equilibria. In games of incomplete information the optimal strategy maximizes the expected utility with respect to a two-dimensional information: environment and rationality. We define a new concept of equilibria, the Choquet-expected-Nash-equilibria, which allows the analysis of decisions under uncertainty, which result in multiple equilibria in standard analysis. We provide uniqueness theorems for a wide class of incomplete information games including global games and apply them to fairly general currency attack models. The uniqueness of the equilibrium remains valid for arbitrary noise distributions, positively correlated signals, the existence of large traders, individual payoff functions, and for the case that non attacking traders suffer a loss in case of a successful attack, as is the case for investors in the attacked country.

An evolutionary model of speculative attacks

We build an evolutionary model of currency crises incorporating learning through imitation and experimentation by heterogeneous agents. Foreign currency speculators in the model interact and learn over time through experimentation. Drawing on results from game theory, we show that the resulting dynamic converges to a unique long run equilibrium, in which the currency is “attacked” if the economic fundamentals are sufficiently adverse. Evolutionary selection is thus shown as a way to resolve the issue of indeterminacy of equilibria associated with models of currency crises.

The Role of Domestic and Foreign Investors in a Simple Model of Speculative Attacks

We introduce local and foreign investors in a simple model of speculative attacks. Local investors have less tolerance for overvaluation of the fixed exchange rate because they tend to incur lower costs when taking a short position and possess better information, and because of moral hazard created by discriminatory government guarantees. On the other hand, the prospect of higher taxation after a balance of payments crisis deters speculation by locals compared to foreign investors. Finally, the lower the degree of exchange rate pass-through, the more likely domestic investors are tp take the lead during capital flight.

The Role of Domestic and Foreign Investors in a Simple Model of Speculative Attacks

We introduce local and foreign investors in a simple model of speculative attacks. Local investors have less tolerance for overvaluation of the fixed exchange rate because they tend to incur lower costs when taking a short position and possess better information, and because of moral hazard created by discriminatory government guarantees. On the other hand, the prospect of higher taxation after a balance of payments crisis deters speculation by locals compared to foreign investors. Finally, the lower the degree of exchange rate pass-through, the more likely domestic investors are tp take the lead during capital flight.

Real exchange rate volatility and the choice of regimes in emerging markets

Traditional models of the choice of exchange rate regimes ignore the destabilizing effects of sharp and unanticipated exchange rate movements. Recent research, however, has shown that these movements have real costs in emerging markets owing to the dollarization of liabilities. This paper evaluates the performance of an emerging market economy under a credibly fixed rate, a collapsing fixed rate, and a flexible-rate regime using a speculative attack model that takes into account the real effects of unanticipated movements in exchange rates. The model is applied to South Korea to determine the dominant exchange rate regime.

An interest rate defense of a fixed exchange rate?

Defending a government's exchange-rate commitment with active interest rate policy is not an option in first-generation models of speculative attacks. In those models, the interest rate is the passive reflection of currency-depreciation expectations. In this paper, we show how to adapt the first-generation framework to allow for an interest rate defense. It is shown that increasing domestic currency interest rate before the attack makes domestic assets more attractive according to an asset substitution effect, but weakens the domestic currency by increasing the government's fiscal liabilities. As a result, an interest rate defense can be successful only conditional on sound fiscal policy.