Soviet Technology Research Articles

The design from scratch to an alternative experimental assembly for the LVR-15 research reactor – A case study in Czech Republic

Project LEU-FOREvER put together a consortium of 9 European stakeholders, including research centers, designers and fuel manufacturers, with the specific aim to secure the nuclear fuel supply for European research reactors. One of the shortage risks has been addressed by the project with the definition of a second supply chain, complementary to the current one, with the aim to fuel medium power research reactors (MPRRs) originally manufactured with the Soviet technology. For this reason, one activity was the definition of a core which could accommodate both the original Russian technology (uranium oxide extruded fuel meat) and new European designed fuel elements (uranium silicide dispersed fuel meat) that are being developed, licensed and qualified in the frame of the 4EVERTEST within LEU-FOREvER project. The Czech reactor LVR-15 was selected for performing the developed assembly irradiation test, which will be followed by a basic post irradiation inspection for the assessment of the irradiation performance. For this reason, the project is proceeding through various logical and operative steps. They are described in the present work, starting with the collection of the relevant information about reactor characteristics by fuel designer, the design phase (performed in parallel with reactor operator in order to tune the codes and data coherently), then the detailed safety analysis study which was submitted to national regulator in order to get the irradiation license approval. The neutronic and thermohydraulic analysis performed shows that the fuel assembly can be safely irradiated in the LVR-15 core. The fuel assembly is being irradiated in the reactor at present. Further work for the next future will consist in collecting relevant data from the irradiation in the reactor and the post irradiation inspection activities.

Atomic Visitors from Outer Space: The Tunguska Nuclear Hypothesis in Soviet Technological Imagination

In the mid‐1940s an idea arose that a crash of an atomically‐powered alien spaceship had caused the mysterious Tunguska explosion of 1908 in Siberia. Initially expressed as fiction, this speculation evolved into an active hypothesis that inspired decades’ worth of amateur investigations. This article examines the history of the Tunguska nuclear hypothesis and what it reveals about nuclear and technological culture in the USSR. It argues that Soviet technological imagination had a tendency to place the country's developments into a cosmic perspective that drew parallels between contemporary circumstances on Earth and the possible existence of technologies among civilizations elsewhere in the universe. Seeing the country's communist project as part of a cosmic drama involved a form of universalism that aligned with Marxist ideology, but also possessed distinctive influences and afterlives. By concentrating on cosmic analogies at play in Soviet technological imagination about Tunguska, this article also underscores how the suspected link between otherworldly civilizations and earthly actions informed ways of conceptualizing race and ethnicity, the boundaries of scientific knowledge, and the natural environment.

Technology Transfer and Early Industrial Development: Evidence from the Sino-Soviet Alliance

This paper studies the short and long-run effects of international technology transfer on early industrial development, using evidence from the Sino-Soviet Alliance. Between 1950and 1957, the Soviet Union supported the so-called “156 technology transfer projects” in China, that involved the construction of large capital-intensive plants in heavy industries, the transfer of state-of-the-art Soviet machinery and equipment, as well as technical assistance and know-how diffusion from Soviet engineers to the Chinese counterpart. We hand-collected archival data on the 156 projects that we complemented with plant, firm and provincial-level information from 1949 to 2013. To estimate the causal effect of the program we exploit that, due to unanticipated political tensions between the two countries, some projects were built as planned with Soviet machinery and technical assistance (treated projects), while others were eventually realized by China only without any Soviet technology or assistance (comparison projects). We find that: 1) plants in treated projects had better performance that plants in comparison projects in both the short and the long run; 2) Soviet technical assistance diffused industry-specific knowledge through the training of Chinese engineers that further increased plant outcomes; 3) the program generated local horizontal and vertical spillovers; 4) there was a substantial reallocation of production in treated project counties from state owned to privately-owned companies after the waves of privatization started in 2005.

Devices of Soviet Propaganda of Science and Technology as Exemplified by the Plan of Media Coverage of the Salyut Orbital Station Flight

This paper presents an archival document from the GARF (State Archive of the Russian Federation) collections, a plan of media coverage of the flight of a permanent orbital station that became known as Salyut, dated spring 1971, and an introduction to it. The version of this document the author has worked with was forwarded to the General Directorate for the Protection of State Secrets in the Press (Glavlit), the central censorship body in the USSR, to be subsequently deposited in this organization’s archive. This relatively short document sets forth the procedure for the coverage of the orbital station’s flight and the work of the visiting missions in the leading Soviet newspapers, popular science publications, and on TV. What makes this document particularly interesting is that it reveals the internal bureaucratic mechanism of the Soviet science and technology propaganda of the early 1970s and the details of the organization of censorship in the USSR. It describes the stages of approval of such documents, characterized by numerous endorsements and signatures of the officials. In addition, this document clarifies some facts related to the preparation and flight of the Salyut station. The source is accompanied by the commentaries.

Taking on Technocracy: Nuclear Power in Germany, 1945 to the Present. Dolores L. Augustine. New York: Berghahn Books, 2018. xiv + 289 pp. Illustrations, graphs, notes, bibliography, and index. Cloth $120, e-book $110.16.

<i> Taking on Technocracy: Nuclear Power in Germany, 1945 to the Present. </i> Dolores L. Augustine. New York: Berghahn Books, 2018. xiv + 289 pp. Illustrations, graphs, notes, bibliography, and index. Cloth $120, e-book $110.16.

The Bulgarian nuclear sector in transition: Adopted Russian technology, state sovereignty and accession to the EU

Applying the notion of ‘orders of worth’ (L. Boltanski, L. Thévenot), the paper explores the technology & policy challenges the Bulgarian nuclear energy sector faced from the mid-1980s to the early 2000s. Emerging after the 1960s based on Soviet technology and under Soviet political domination, it had to adapt to the new conditions set by the winners of the Cold War and to the pressure of local green movements. Key events included the completion of the second 1000 MW Soviet nuclear reactor at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), the termination of work on the Belene NPP (1990–1991), and the painful decommissioning under EU pressure of the four old 440 MW reactors (2004–2006). The paper traces the public debates during these developments, the resources used by the actors to justify their behavior and draws conclusions about the peculiarities of emerging ‘technical democracies’ in Eastern Europe.

Technology Transfer and Soviet Modernization (Using the Materials of Head Scientific Research Institutes)

The article deals with the problems of technology transfer in the conditions of the “cold war”. Along with the existing research in the field of technology transfer, the contribution to the understanding of Soviet modernization through the economic and technological cooperation between the USSR and the West in the 1950s and 1960s has been made. The focus of this work is on the transfer in the field of physical and chemical research. The authors studied the official documents of the head Research Institute of Physics and Chemistry named after L. Ya. Karpov in the Russian state archive in Samara. The available materials give examples of situations that initiated borrowing, show how these situations were implemented, interacted with each other. The authors traced the process of adaptation and institutional support of technology, using methods of analysis of transfers, consistently comparing the situation before and after borrowing, paying special attention to the phenomena arising “at the border”. The documents show that the political factor largely determined the nature of the technology transfer. The strategy of interaction with capitalist countries was built on the background of serious efforts of the Soviet political elite to present cooperation as only a demonstration of achievements of Soviet science and technology. At the same time, the desire of state bodies to ensure access of Soviet researchers to Western developments is a confirmation that it was possible to achieve the most effective results in cooperation. The logic of such relations, as the materials studied show, was built not only in the framework of state modernization programs, but also on the basis of research interests of scientists. The existing objective prerequisites, even in the conditions of ideological confrontation, contributed to the active network interaction of scientific community.

Soviet Technological Projects and Technological Aid in Africa and Cuba, 1960s-1980s

This paper examines Soviet development projects in African countries and Cuba during the Cold War. We analyze types of projects led by Soviet specialists and engage into the question of how Soviets, both leadership and engineers, viewed their roles and impacts as well as challenges on African territory and Cuba. In so doing, this paper analyzes differences and similarities in Soviet penetration to lands with newly established governments in Africa and Cuba.

Становление советской научно-технической политики в области вычислительной техники (конец 1940-х – середина 1950-х гг.)

Становление советской научно-технической политики в области вычислительной техники (конец 1940-х – середина 1950-х гг.)

THE SPATIAL LEGACY OF INFORMAL EMPIRE: OIL, THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE CONTOURS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA'S FAR WEST

AbstractBeginning in the 1930s, Soviet geologists, engineers, and economic planners began laying the infrastructure of informal empire in China's westernmost province of Xinjiang. Seeking to gain access to its rich petroleum wealth in particular, these Soviet state agents helped create a blueprint for state investment and development in Xinjiang that continues to resonate today. Confronting the substantial Soviet investment in the province and driven by a border policy intent on minimizing capital expenditures for distant peripheries, economic planners in the Republic of China and the People's Republic alike relied heavily on Soviet reports, technology, and infrastructure in their own economic development plans. In the end, the efforts of Chinese and Soviet planners, often working in collaboration, helped create an enduring pattern of state investment in Xinjiang. Focusing on oil extraction, processing, and transport operations in Xinjiang, this work reveals the long-term resonances of informal empire in ...

An Evolving Scientific Public Sphere: State Science Enlightenment, Communicative Discourse, and Public Culture from Imperial Russia to Khrushchev's Soviet Times

ArgumentBy the late nineteenth century, science pedagogues and academicians became involved in a vast movement to popularize science throughout the Russian empire. With the aftermath of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, many now found the new Marxist state a willing supporter of their goals of spreading science to an under-educated public. In the Stalin era, Soviet state officials believed that the spread of science and technology had to coalesce with the Communist Party's utilitarian goals and needs to revive the industrial sector of the economy. This resulted in a new Stalinist technologically oriented popularization campaign. In the Khrushchev era (1953–64), Soviet politicians became increasingly more aware of the competitive power of Soviet technology in the global arena and developed extensive campaigns to publicize Soviet feats for a broad domestic and foreign public audience. This was particularly true for topics such as the space program and big technologies such as nuclear power.

SOVIET PATENT BULLETIN PROCESSING: A PARTICULAR APPLICATION OF MACHINE TRANSLATION

Soviet patents are used for, among other things, gleaning information on developing trends in Soviet technology. Originally the patents had to be translated by human translators, indexed manually, and then entered into the CIRC II database for data manipulation and subsequent searching. This paper presents a description of the task, and of some of the technical problems that had to be overcome in changing to a machine translation system.

China's catching up in aerospace

Since the foundation of the People's Republic in 1949, China (PRC) has made strong efforts to build an independent aircraft industry, both civilian and military. During the first decade of its existence, the PRC received technology from the Soviet Union, while it started to build its domestic public institutions for research and teaching. After the Sino-Russian split in 1966, the flow of Soviet technology ebbed. Since 1972, the PRC started progressively to tap Western sources of technology, and is now close to launch its own commercial aircraft industry with a view to global markets. The paper analyses the strategies of the Chinese government for domestic institution building and international technology transfer, and how Western companies and governments helped China to nurture its future competitors.

“Make Your Voice Heard”: Communism in the High School Curriculum, 1958–1968

The launch of Sputnik in 1957 sparked a crisis in American education. Suddenly threatened by superior Soviet technology, progressive educators' concern for children's preferences, health, and adjustment in school yielded to public demands for more basic learning and academic skills. Congress soon passed the National Defense Education Act, providing millions of dollars for math, science, and foreign language instruction. By the early 1960s, educators and academics began to reexamine other aspects of the curriculum as well. Their efforts prompted two changes in the social studies: one was a shift from worksheets and memorization to the investigative approach of the “new social studies,” the other a requirement that schools teach about the specter of international Communism. Much has been written about the first of these reforms, surprisingly little about the second. Yet, insofar as the new social studies grew out of Cold War imperatives, instruction about Communism provides an interesting perspective on its tenure in American schools. In fact, a closer examination of the relationship between the two might force us to reconsider current assumptions about the nature of curriculum reform during the period.

Sputnik Goes to Brussels: The Exhibition of a Soviet Technological Wonder

The first universal exhibition of the post-Second World War era and a major battleground in the ‘cultural Cold War’, the 1958 Brussels Exposition served as an appropriate venue for the display of Sputniks I and II. As the centerpiece of the enormous Soviet pavilion, the Sputnik replicas enabled the USSR to bask in the reflective glow of its scientific and technological achievement before an international audience of 40 million. Based on archival sources (from Brussels and Moscow) as well as contemporary published material, this article employs a modified version of Stuart Hall's reception theory to analyze Soviet authorities' production (or ‘encoding/writing’) of the exhibit and its appropriation (‘decoding/reading’) by radically different publics – non-Soviet visitors and Soviet readers back home. It argues that the producers exercised only tenuous control over the meaning of Sputnik.

Analysis of Soviet Technology Transfer in the Development of China's Nuclear Weapons

Because China built its atomic and hydrogen bombs at a time of resource scarcity and rudimentary industrial development, it is generally believed that it got a great deal of help from Soviet nuclear technology transfer during the late 1950s. In particular, Soviet leaders and scientists asserted that they supplied China with extensive and critical assistance; some even claimed that this transfer of nuclear technology shortened the time needed to develop China's nuclear weapons by at least 15 years. Many non-Soviet researchers have concurred. Yet while Chinese officials, scientists, and historians have always given the Soviets due credit for this help, many have also continued to assert that because the Chinese solved key nuclear technology issues on their own, the effect of Soviet technology transfer was in fact more limited than these other experts claimed. Following a brief review of the history of Soviet nuclear-weapons technology transfer to China, this article addresses the issue by describing the kinds of Soviet nuclear-weapons technology transferred to China, assessing the role this Soviet technology played in China's nuclear-weapons program, and finally comparing and contrasting Soviet and Chinese views on the importance of Soviet technology transfer to the development of China's nuclear-weapons program.

Conflicts of Eastern and Western Technology Transfer: Licenses, Espionage, and R&amp;D in the Hungarian Defense Industry during the 1970s and 1980s

The article first tracks the process of disillusionment in Soviet technology transfer, and the conflicts between indigenous R&amp;D and production under licenses. Next are examined the main technological questions of the 1970s and 1980s: How could a socialist state legally or illegally acquire state-of-the-art technologies? How did Hungary endeavor to procure Western licenses? The article's final section demonstrates the impact of the transferred technologies and the R&amp;D efforts by means of three brief case studies from different branches of the Hungarian defense industry.

Enabling Computers for Factory Planning and More: In Memory of Dr. Moshe M. Barash, A Giant in Manufacturing Research

Dr. Moshe M. Barash passed away on June 16, 2006, after a very distinguished career in teaching and research in manufacturing.Moshe was a Fellow of ASME since 1984, Ransburg Professor of Manufacturing from 1982–1992, and retired from Purdue University as Ransburg Professor Emeritus of Manufacturing Engineering and Industrial Engineering since 1992. He pioneered computerized planning for manufacturing processes and systems that formed a technical foundation for CAD/CAM integration and computer integrated manufacturing systems. He was recognized as a pioneer and a world leader in the area of manufacturing systems engineering.Moshe obtained his degrees of B.Sc. and Dipl.Ing. in both EE and ME from the Technion, Israel in 1947 and 1950, respectively, and a Ph.D. from the University of Manchester, England in 1958.Moshe had extensive experience in industry and non-university research in a number of fields; in particular, design of complex machines, instruments, control systems, and production processes and tools. His university experience, extending 39 years, included teaching and research of very diverse topics in manufacturing. He conducted research in theory of machines, material transformation processes, reliability, wear, surface integrity, metrology, and modeling and optimization of manufacturing systems. Moshe's research was developed uniquely in and across the areas of processes, machines, systems, and metrology in manufacturing. It was common in discussion with Moshe on a new research idea, regardless if it was in manufacturing processes or systems, for him to say, “I did some work in this topic 20 years ago,” and he would show you a paper of his pioneering work. Moshe was an explorer and a trail blazer of manufacturing research.His research activities in the years before his retirement included design of automatic flexible fixtures, automated design of manufacturing systems, precision engineering, robot applications, computer aided manufacturing, and others.A major contribution that Moshe had made was his pioneering effort for research enabling computers for factory planning and scheduling, including the automatic planning for processes first and then for computerized manufacturing systems.With P. B. Berra, his Ph.D. student, they published, in the International Journal of Production Research, the earliest paper known in automated process planning in 1968, leading to the emergence of a second phase of computer-aided manufacturing, after the invention of numerical controlled machine tools. The subsequent activities in enabling the computers for planning manufacturing systems had led to an NSF Grant in 1974 for research into the “Optimal Planning of Computerized Manufacturing Systems.” This project pioneered the research for planning and scheduling of a manufacturing system later known as flexible manufacturing systems (FMS). The basic structure of a flexible manufacturing system was described in his paper entitled “Integrating Machining Systems With Workpiece Handling,” published in The Industrial Robot in 1976. This pioneering research had built a technical base and contributed to the subsequent research in CAD/CAM integration, computer integrated manufacturing systems (CIMS), intelligent manufacturing systems (IMS), and later the reconfigurable manufacturing systems (RMS).Dr. Barash also contributed extensively to technical literature. He produced over 120 papers in research proceedings and journals and had written over 380 review articles on various technical subjects, appearing in American Machinist (1950–1955, over 20 original manufacturing techniques described), Digest Of Soviet Technology (1959–1962, 96 technical reviews and analysis articles), Manchester Guardian (1958–1965, 142 technical review articles), Tool And Manufacturing Engineer (1964–1965, 12 articles), Machinery (1965–1971, 68 articles), and Manufacturing Engineering (1976–1980, 54 articles).People who worked with or were taught by Moshe can all remember his radiant personality, dedicated spirit, and enthusiastic manner. We remember his office that might be viewed by others as totally unorganized, but was actually a perfectly organized place for him. We remember and enjoyed his uncomplicated, candid, and sometimes naïve personality. Altogether, the manufacturing community mourns the loss of a giant, a scholar, and a gentleman, who introduced computers for factory planning and built a conceptual and technical foundation for modern computerized manufacturing systems.Note: Purdue University is setting up a fund for “Moshe M. Barash Distinguished Lectureship in Manufacturing.” Contributions should be addressed to: Moshe Barash Memorial Fund, School of Industrial Engineering, 315 N. Grant St., Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 47907-1287, USA.Fig. 1Professor Moshe M. Barash April 5, 1922–June 16, 2006

The Dog That Did Not Bark during the Night: The "Normalcy" of Russian, Soviet, and Post-Soviet Science and Technology Studies

The collapse of the Sqviet Union let loose a flood of information about the history of the tsarist and Soviet periods. In the years since, scholars have produced much valuable work based on that new information, as the pages of Voprosi Istorii Estestvoznaniia i Tekhniki (Questions in the history of science and technology) attest. Cooperation and communication among researchers are far easier and faster than they were, aided immensely by the internet and the worldwide web. In Russia, the community of historians of science and technology is healthy if not yet fully robust.1 It seems to be a good time to pause and take stock. What have we as historians of science and technology learned in the past fifteen or so years? A recent conference on Russian and Soviet science between 1860 and 1960 at the University of Georgia gathered academics from seven countries whose major problem was securing funding, not visas.2 It served to demon-

Chapter four: Dismantlement

For over three decades, driven by the core motive of deterring external threats to its security, Libya sought to acquire nuclear weapons. Having attempted but failed to procure them ‘off the shelf’ from several states during the 1970s, by late 2003 it had succeeded in assembling much of the technology required to manufacture them. Nevertheless, following secret negotiations with the UK and US governments, in December 2003 Colonel Muammar Gadhafi resolved to abandon the pursuit of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This decision reflected the regime's radically altered security perceptions during the 1990s and early twenty-first century. The pursuit of nuclear weapons had come to be viewed as a strategic liability. This Adelphi Paper examines the motives for Libya's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, from Gadhafi's rise to power in 1969 through to late 2003. It assesses the proliferation pathways that the regime followed, including early dependence on Soviet technology and assistance and, subsequently, its reliance on the A.Q. Khan network. It examines the decision to give up the quest for nuclear weapons, focusing on the main factors that influenced the regime's calculations, including the perceived need to re-engage with the international community and the United States in particular. The process of dismantling the nuclear programme is also addressed, as is the question of whether Libya constitutes a ‘model’ for addressing the challenges posed by other proliferators.