Sovereign Debt Restructuring Research Articles

Sovereign bond prices, haircuts and maturity

We document that creditor losses (“haircuts”) during sovereign debt restructurings vary across debt maturity. In our novel dataset on instrument-specific haircuts suffered by private creditors in 1999–2020 we find larger losses on short- than long-term debt, independently of the specific haircut measure we use. A standard asset pricing model rationalizes our findings under two assumptions, both of which are satisfied in the data: increasing short-run restructuring risk in the run-up to a restructuring, and high exit yields. We relate our findings to the policy debate on restructuring procedures.

Economic diplomacy of Russia towards Venezuela: From H. Chaves to N. Maduro

The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela faces a deep political and economic crisis that is exacerbated by severe restrictive measures imposed against it by the United States and their allies. In these circumstances, the availability of external economic support becomes particularly important. In recent years, Russia has become one of the key donors for Venezuela with a wide range of economic diplomacy tools at its disposal. Drawing upon official data, as well as recent findings of Russian and foreign researchers, the present paper examines the evolution of Russian economic diplomacy towards Venezuela during the presidency of H. Chavez (1999–2013) and N. Maduro (2013 — present). The author emphasizes that bilateral economic cooperation was already institutionalized under H. Chavez. The most intense interaction took place in the energy and military-technical fields. The mechanisms of Russian economic diplomacy included primarily public and private loans, investments, and payments for the permission to develop Venezuelan oil deposits. The election N. Maduro was accompanied by a dramatic deterioration of political and economic situation in the country. The crisis was further aggravated by economic sanctions imposed by the US. The latter also affected Russian projects in the republic. However, Russia continued to provide significant support to Venezuela, both through already proven mechanisms of economic diplomacy and a number of new ones, including sovereign debt restructuring and advance delivery of goods. At the same time, the author notes that this assistance remains rather isolated and limited, it affects only specific areas, mainly oil and gas and military-technical cooperation, and its volume is insufficient to effectively address the economic crisis in Venezuela. In this context, the domestic economic policy of the Venezuelan government is of particular importance. Indeed, liberal economic reforms carried out since 2018 were helpful for recovery from the economic crisis. In this connection, the author provides a list of measures and mechanisms Russia could implement in the framework of economic diplomacy to ensure this positive trend.

Diplomacy, debt, and change: the international debt architecture after the Covid-19 pandemic

The article argues that the response from the Group of Twenty (G20) and the Paris Club to the covid-19 pandemic in the field of sovereign debt marks a turning point in the international debt architecture. In articulating a new approach, G20 leaders and Paris Club creditors approved the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI), which seeks to provide fiscal relief to help low-income economies (LIEs) face the pandemic crisis. Thereafter, the G20 and the Paris Club endorsed the Common Framework for Debt Treatments beyond the DSSI (CFDT), a mechanism to tackle the solvency problems of LIEs through debt restructuring processes. The CFDT is the first mechanism since the Paris Club’s creation in 1956 that brings together both its members and non-members on a permanent basis, and the first one that the G20 rather than the Group of Seven (G7) established. The CFDT’s design takes into account the changes in the sovereign debt landscape over the last 25 years, but it also seeks to maintain the Paris Club’s influence as the main forum for sovereign debt restructuring despite its declining importance.

How could a new universal code of conduct prevent and resolve sovereign debt crises? Proposals for design and implementation

AbstractIn response to the COVID‐19 crisis, government spending around the world has increased significantly and will continue to grow as interest rates rise. In view of protracted and costly sovereign debt restructurings in the previous decades, contractual and noncontractual instruments of the Global Debt Governance‐system have been insufficient to prevent and to resolve sovereign debt crisis. While statutory and comprehensive approaches to resolve sovereign debt crises lack the political support such as an insolvency procedure for states incomprehensive contractual approaches including collective action clauses (CACs) cannot fully secure a comprehensive debt resolution. Codes of conduct could constitute an essential instrument to contribute to preventing and resolving sovereign debt crises. There are two main impediments for establishing and adopting such codes of conduct effectively. First, a range of codes of conduct with different institutional settings and principles have been established − and partly implemented − including those of the Institute of International Finance, the United Nations, the G20, the IMF and the OECD. However, differing institutional settings do not contribute to preventing or effectively resolving debt crises when the actors concerned apply different codes of conduct. We suggest a new universal code of conduct in which the elements of the various proposals made by the public and private sectors would be combined. Second, the global economic governance structure lacks incentives for creditors and debtors to adhere to this new universal code of conduct. This paper proposes measures providing incentives for creditors and debtors to apply the nonstatutory code of conduct.

Improving sovereign debt restructurings

The wave of sovereign defaults in the early 1980s and the string of debt crises in subsequent decades have fostered proposals involving policy interventions in sovereign debt restructurings. The global financial crisis and the recent global pandemic have further reignited this discussion among academics and policymakers. A key question about these policy proposals for debt restructurings that has proved hard to handle is how they influence the behavior of creditors and debtors. We address this challenge by evaluating policy proposals in a quantitative sovereign default model that incorporates two essential features of debt: maturity choice and debt renegotiation in default. We find, first, that a rule that tilts the distribution of creditor losses during restructurings toward holders of long-maturity bonds reduces short-term yield spreads, lowering the probability of a sovereign default by 25 percent. Second, issuing GDP-indexed bonds exclusively during restructurings also reduces the probability of default, especially of defaults in the five years following a debt restructuring. The policies lead to welfare improvements and reductions in haircuts of similar magnitude when implemented separately. When jointly implemented, they reinforce each other’s welfare gains, suggesting good complementarity.

Hidden Defaults

China's lending boom to developing countries is morphing into defaults and debt distress. Given the secrecy surrounding China's loans, the associated defaults remain “hidden,” as missed payments and restructuring details are not disclosed. We construct an encompassing dataset of sovereign debt restructurings with Chinese lenders and find that these credit events are surprisingly frequent, exceeding the number of sovereign bond or Paris Club restructurings. Chinese lenders follow a resolution approach reminiscent of 1980s Western lenders; they seldom provide deep debt relief with face value reduction. If history is any guide, multiyear debt workouts with serial restructurings lie in store.

Addressing sovereign debt challenges in the era of COVID-19 and beyond: The role of the United Nations

Traditionally, sovereign debt problems of developing countries have been discussed mostly at institutions representing the creditors, such as the Paris Club, and at the International Monetary Fund, but they have also been addressed by the United Nations, mostly in the context of its international conferences on financing for development. Although the views of the United Nations on debt are not widely known, they are highly relevant in the post-COVID-19 context, as inflationary pressures could lead to tightened global financial conditions and exacerbate debt vulnerabilities in developing countries. The present paper provides an overview of sovereign debt restructurings from the 1980s, a summary of the debt situation of Asia and the Pacific as a case study and a review of the views of United Nations on debt issues. It also offers suggestions to improve the global debt architecture based on such views by highlighting the importance of linking debt sustainability with sustainable development in debt restructuring workouts and through a hub-and-spoke institutional arrangement to disseminate prudential debt management practices and promote transparency.

Fixing the collective action problem in sovereign debt restructuring: significance of Global South solidarity

This paper attempts to analyse the limitations of contractual mechanisms of resolving collective action disputes against sovereign debtors. The Global South has been at the receiving end of the sovereign debt obligations and collective action clauses (CACs) agenda. The lack of control over the domestic economy and the human rights impacts of mounting sovereign debt brings to the fore the absolute lack of fairness and equity in the CAC-based framework for restructuring sovereign debt. The contemporary international order does not address the non-economic concerns of an indebted state. The unfair treatment meted out to the Global South opens the need for Third World approaches to international law (TWAIL) voices against sovereign debt. The current discourse and literature on CAC have remained mainly aloof to the contributions and importance of TWAIL in the context of CACs. Sovereign debt and the use of CACs need a fresh outlook based on the development of international human rights law. Alternative movements based on Global South solidarity against the present structural and systemic problems of sovereign debt and CACs need to be explored.

Sovereign Bonds Since Waterloo

Abstract This article studies external sovereign bonds as an asset class. We compile a new database of 266,000 monthly prices of foreign-currency government bonds traded in London and New York between 1815 (the Battle of Waterloo) and 2016, covering up to 91 countries. Our main insight is that, as in equity markets, the returns on external sovereign bonds have been sufficiently high to compensate for risk. Real ex post returns average more than 6% annually across two centuries, including default episodes, major wars, and global crises. This represents an excess return of 3%–4% above US or UK government bonds, which is comparable to stocks and outperforms corporate bonds. Central to this finding are the high average coupons offered on external sovereign bonds. The observed returns are hard to reconcile with canonical theoretical models and the degree of credit risk in this market, as measured by historical default and recovery rates. Based on our archive of more than 300 sovereign debt restructurings since 1815, we show that full repudiation is rare; the median creditor loss (haircut) is below 50%.

Analysis of Economic Effect of COVID-19 Pandemic on the Kenyan Economy

Abstract COVID-19 virus can be described as one of the worst global pandemic ever experienced in the 21st Century. Focusing on the pandemic the study main objective was to analyze direct and indirect economic effect of COVID-19 pandemic and establish the extent to which the virus has affected Kenya’s key economic sectors contributing to the country’s GDP. The study adopts a content analysis approach whose aim is to describe COVID-19 phenomenon. The study relies on diverse secondary database not limited to: World Health Organization (WHO) on COVID-19 trends, IMF, UNDP, Central Bank of Kenya (CBK), KNBS, IPAR, ICA and KIPPRA among others. Data Analysis results reveal that COVID-19 poses an unprecedented shock by disrupting economic activity. Kenya’s current account deficits has declined drastically in capital flows. The GDP in 2020 shrank to 1.1% from. 5.7% .The country is also experiencing risk of collapse of health systems that is under pressure from spread of the virus; households have fallen into poverty; and a huge number of losses of employment have been experienced across all sectors estimated to about 4.64 million. Whereas the Kenyan Government focuses on re-engineering the economy by implementing economic stimuli package of fiscal, monetary, wage, and social protection policies aimed to arrest the economic recession. The study recommends that the government may consider sovereign debt restructurings; expansion of loan programs to firms and households in the formal sector and cash transfers to cushion vulnerable households in the informal sector and promote recovery of the economy.

Global Banks on Trial: U.S. Prosecution and the Remaking of International Finance

As the title ‘Global Banks on Trial’ indicates, Pierre-Hugues Verdier’s new book examines the US enforcement campaign against global banks across four key areas: benchmark manipulation, tax evasion, sanction violation, and enforcement of sovereign debt restructuring. His book questions the perception of how international finance is regulated and enforced in light of the expanding impact of US criminal prosecutions. Moreover, he outlines that through prosecuting global systemically important banks, the USA gained the competency to control the international financial system. He concludes that a unilateral approach—spearheaded by US prosecutors—will benefit the rest of the world in turn. In his book, Verdier contributes to two contemporary debates: first, the desirability and effectiveness of corporate criminal prosecutions, and second, the future of US dominance in international finance. Each chapter starts with a recapitulation of events, narrated by famous protagonists, which led to public attention about the misconduct, which is then discussed in...

The political economy of euro area sovereign debt restructuring

The establishment of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM) is one of the important issues in the academic debate on a viable constitution for the European Monetary Union (EMU). Yet the topic seems to be taboo in official reform contributions to the debate. Against this backdrop, the article identifies the SDRM interests of key players, including the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Central Bank and national governments. The empirical section takes advantage of the recently established EMU Positions Database. The findings confirm political economy expectations: Low-debt countries support an EMU constitution that includes an insolvency procedure whereas a coalition of high-debt countries and European institutions oppose it. The analysis points towards a possible political-economic equilibrium for coping with sovereign insolvencies: an institutional set-up without an SDRM and with hidden transfers. Recent European fiscal innovations in response to the Covid-19 solvency shock confirm this prediction.

Greek Debt Restructuring Case

227State immunity — Jurisdictional immunity — Exceptions — Acta jure gestionis — Acta jure imperii — Once a trader always a trader — State of emergency — Law-making — Legislature regulating legal relations initially established by acta jure gestionis qualifying as acta jure imperiiEconomics, trade and finance — European Monetary Union — Hellenic Republic — Public debt — Bonds — Greek sovereign debt crisis — Sovereign debt restructuring — Collective Action Clauses — Secondary market — Bond exchange — Financial stabilityRelationship of international law and municipal law — Compatibility with Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany — General principle of international law — Article 25 of German Basic Law — Right to a lawful judge — The law of Germany

The Imf's Role in Sovereign Debt Restructurings

The global recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting deterioration in many countries’ public finances have increased the risk of sovereign debt crises. Although crisis prevention remains paramount, these developments have made it imperative to re-examine the adequacy of the current toolkit for crisis management and resolution, in a context where changes in the creditor base and in the composition of public debt instruments have brought about new challenges in terms of reduced transparency and additional barriers to achieving inter-creditor equity. This report focuses on the international architecture for sovereign debt restructurings (SODRs), as seen through the lenses of the International Monetary Fund (IMF or “the Fund”) and with a special attention to the role that the Fund can play in facilitating orderly restructuring processes. It provides a set of findings and recommendations in relation to certain key elements of the Fund’s lending framework that have important ramifications on SODR processes, namely debt sustainability assessments (DSAs), the exceptional access policy (EAP) for financing above normal access limits, and the criteria for lending to countries with payments arrears to private creditors (LIA) or official bilateral creditors (LIOA). It also considers other indirect channels through which the Fund can affect SODRs, including its support for enhancing the transparency and public disclosure of sovereign debt information, its collaboration with the Paris Club and the G20 debt-related initiatives, the promotion of contractual standards for sovereign debt, and the monitoring of relevant legislative developments.

The IMFs role in sovereign debt restructurings (ECB Occasional Paper No. 2021/262)

The global recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting deterioration in many countries’ public finances have increased the risk of sovereign debt crises. Although crisis prevention remains paramount, these developments have made it imperative to re-examine the adequacy of the current toolkit for crisis management and resolution, in a context where changes in the creditor base and in the composition of public debt instruments have brought about new challenges in terms of reduced transparency and additional barriers to achieving inter-creditor equity. This report focuses on the international architecture for sovereign debt restructurings (SODRs), as seen through the lenses of the International Monetary Fund (IMF or “the Fund”) and with a special attention to the role that the Fund can play in facilitating orderly restructuring processes. It provides a set of findings and recommendations in relation to certain key elements of the Fund’s lending framework that have important ramifications on SODR processes, namely debt sustainability assessments (DSAs), the exceptional access policy (EAP) for financing above normal access limits, and the criteria for lending to countries with payments arrears to private creditors (LIA) or official bilateral creditors (LIOA). It also considers other indirect channels through which the Fund can affect SODRs, including its support for enhancing the transparency and public disclosure of sovereign debt information, its collaboration with the Paris Club and the G20 debt-related initiatives, the promotion of contractual standards for sovereign debt, and the monitoring of relevant legislative developments.

Costs of Sovereign Defaults: Restructuring Strategies and Financial Intermediation

Sovereign debt restructurings are associated with declines in the growth of GDP, investment, bank credit to the private sector and capital flows. Our empirical findings show that the intensity of these losses depends on two aspects: whether the restructuring preempts a default and the extent of the country’s reliance on bank intermediation. Post-default restructurings are associated with worse outcomes than restructurings that take place preemptively without missing payments to creditors and going into default. Much of that difference is driven by the particularly adverse effects experienced after post-default restructurings in countries with relatively larger banking sectors.

The Political Economy of Euro Area Sovereign Debt Restructuring

The establishment of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM) is one of the important issues in the academic debate on a viable constitution for the European Monetary Union (EMU). Yet the topic seems to be taboo in official reform contributions to the debate. Against this backdrop, the article identifies the SDRM interests of key players, including the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Central Bank and national governments. The empirical section takes advantage of the recently established EMU Positions Database. The findings confirm political economy expectations: Low-debt countries support an EMU constitution that includes an insolvency procedure whereas a coalition of high-debt countries and European institutions oppose it. The analysis points towards a possible political-economic equilibrium for coping with sovereign insolvencies: an institutional set-up without a SDRM and with hidden transfers. Recent European fiscal innovations in response to the Covid-19 solvency shock confirm this prediction.

Transnational Networks of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Regime

Transnational Networks of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Regime

Belize’s 2016–17 Sovereign Debt Restructuring – Third Time Lucky?

This paper examines the causes, process, and outcome of Belize’s 2016–17 sovereign debt restructuring – its third episode in last 10 years. As was the case in the earlier two restructurings, in 2006–07 and in 2012–13, the 2016–17 debt restructuring was executed through collaborative engagement with creditors outside an IMF-supported program. While providing liquidity relief and partially addressing long-term debt sustainability concerns, the restructuring will need to be underpinned by ambitious fiscal consolidation and growth-enhancing structural reforms to secure durable gains and avoid future debt distress situations.

Towards a more robust sovereign debt restructuring architecture: innovations from Ecuador and Argentina

The Collective Action Clauses published by the International Capital Markets Association in 2014/2015 aim to facilitate orderly and consensual sovereign debt restructurings. The clauses were designed to give sovereigns flexibility in structuring and consummating a transaction that would be capable of attracting broad creditor support, while safeguarding the integrity of the process and the rights of creditor minorities. The recent restructurings of Argentina and Ecuador presented the first opportunities for the ICMA CACs to be tested in practice, but the “re-designation” and “PAC-man” strategies first seen in the Argentine restructuring revealed shortcomings in the ICMA contractual architecture. Argentina’s and Ecuador’s creditors responded by negotiating tailored refinements to the standard CACs that would mitigate the risk that a sovereign could compel a restructuring that is not supported by the requisite creditor supermajorities. The qualified restrictions on “re-designation” and “PAC-man” adopted by Ecuador and Argentina enhance the ICMA architecture and provide strong incentives for a sovereign to engage constructively with its private creditors in a consensus-building process that results in a restructuring proposal capable of achieving supermajority support.